Bethel v. Mount Anthony Union High School District
Annotate this Case
Bethel v. Mount Anthony Union High School District (2001-276); 173 Vt. 633;
795 A.2d 1215
[Filed Mar-12-2002]
[Motion for Reargument Denied 16-Apr-2002]
ENTRY ORDER
SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2001-276
JANUARY TERM, 2002
Michael Bethel } APPEALED FROM:
}
}
v. } Bennington Superior Court
}
Mount Anthony Union }
High School District }
} DOCKET NO. 120-3-01 Bncv
Trial Judge: John P. Wesley
In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:
Appellant, Michael Bethel, sought a declaratory judgment in superior
court, brought pursuant to 12 V.S.A. § 4711, to determine the validity of
a 1998 amendment to an agreement which established the Mount Anthony Union
High School District. Appellee, the Mount Anthony Union High School
District, filed a motion to dismiss, pursuant to V.R.C.P. 12(b), premised
on a claim that the Appellant's complaint was time-barred. In a
subsequent motion for summary judgment, Appellant asked the superior court
to declare the amendments invalid. The court below granted the Appellee's
motion to dismiss, and Appellant appeals. We affirm.
In 1962, the Bennington, North Bennington, Pownal, Shaftsbury, and
Woodford School Districts agreed to form the Mount Anthony Union High
School District (MAU District) pursuant to 16 V.S.A. § 701. The agreement
authorized the MAU District to operate schools for the students in each of
the member districts, grades seven through twelve. On March 2, 1998, an
amendment proposing to include grade six within the MAU District's
authority was presented to the voters of each member district. The vote
was conducted by Australian ballot and each member district's votes were
tallied separately. The tallies revealed that a majority of the total
voters supported expansion; however, the majority of voters in the Pownal
and Woodford districts opposed expansion. As a result of the tabulated
votes, the MAU District announced that the amendment had been approved and
then proceeded with plans to construct a new middle school designed to
accommodate grades six through eight. On August 22, 2000, the MAU
District obtained voter approval for a $20 million construction bond for a
new middle school.
Appellant filed a petition for declaratory judgment on March 23, 2001,
more than three years after the amendment certification, disputing the
validity of the amendment to the union school district agreement.
Appellant argued that the amendment to the union agreement was void because
it was not ratified by a majority of the voters within each of the five
respective member districts as
required by 16 V.S.A. § 706n(a) if the proposed amendment concerns the
method of allocating capital and operating expenses of the union. The MAU
District in turn filed a Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss on March 30, 2001,
claiming that the Appellant's complaint was not timely filed pursuant to
16 V.S.A. § 552, which establishes a six month statute of limitations for
commencing actions that challenge the formation or existence of a union
school district. In the alternative, the MAU District argued that
Appellant's complaint was a challenge pursuant to V.R.C.P. 75, which
requires that such complaint be made thirty days after notice of any
action of which review is sought, and, therefore, Appellant's complaint
was time-barred.
Appellant countered that Rule 75 was not applicable, or, if
applicable, that the facts in this case presented a special situation
where the six year limitation for general civil claims, 12 V.S.A. § 511,
would apply rather than the thirty day limitation under Rule 75. Appellant
did not address the District's claims under 16 V.S.A. § 552 at the trial
court level. On appeal, Appellant contends that the section does not
apply.
The purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is "to test the law of a claim,
not the facts which support it." Levinsky v. Diamond, 140 Vt. 595, 600,
442 A.2d 1277, 1280 (1982) (quoting Niece v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 293 F. Supp. 792, 794 (N.D. Okl. 1968), overruled on other grounds by Muzzy v.
State, 155 Vt. 279, 583 A.2d 82 (1990). Thus, when considering a Rule
12(b)(6) motion, "[t]he Court's attention . . . is . . . directed toward
determining whether the bare allegations of the complaint constitute a
statement of a claim under V.R.C.P. 8(a)." Id. Since averments of time
and place are material for testing the sufficiency of a complaint,
defenses based on a failure to comply with the applicable statute of
limitations are properly raised in a motion to dismiss. Fortier v.
Byrnes, 165 Vt. 189, 193, 678 A.2d 890, 892 (1996).
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted should not be granted unless it is beyond doubt "that there
exist no facts or circumstances that would entitle the plaintiff to
relief." Amiot v. Ames, 166 Vt. 288, 291, 693 A.2d 675, 677 (1997). When
reviewing the disposition of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, this Court assumes
that all well pleaded factual allegations in the complaint are true, as
well as all reasonable inferences that may be derived therefrom. Richards
v. Town of Norwich, 169 Vt. 44, 48, 726 A.2d 81, 85 (1999). Using this
standard, we affirm the decision of the trial court.
The District argues that the Appellant's claim is time-barred due to
the six month statute of limitations for commencing actions challenging
the formation of a union school district, or the legality or validity of
bonds issued by any school district found in § 552 of Title 16. This Court
agrees and holds that 16 V.S.A. § 552 governs the issue in the instant
case. Section 552 reads:
No action shall be brought directly or indirectly attacking,
questioning or in any manner contesting the legality of the
formation, or the existence as a body corporate and politic of
any union school district created pursuant to chapter 11 of this
title, after six months from the date of recording in the office
of the secretary of state of the certificate of the commissioner of
education designating such district . . .; nor shall any action be
brought directly or indirectly attacking, questioning or in any
manner contesting the legality or validity of bonds, issued or
unissued, voted by any school district, after six months from the
date upon which voters in any such school district met pursuant
to warning and voted affirmatively to issue bonds to defray the
cost of school improvements. This section shall be liberally
construed to effect the legislative purpose to validate and make
certain the legal existence of all school districts in this state
and the validity of bonds issued by school districts, and to bar
every right to question the existence of a school district or the
validity of a bond voted by it, in any manner, and to bar every
remedy therefor notwithstanding any defects or irregularities,
jurisdictional or otherwise, after the expiration of the six
month period. (emphasis added).
In cases of statutory construction, our obligation is to effectuate
the intent of the legislature. Brennan v. Town of Colchester, 169 Vt.
175, 177, 730 A.2d 601, 603 (1999). We construe a statute consistent with
its purpose, subject matter, effects and consequences, and the reason and
spirit of the law. In re Spring Brook Farm Found., Inc., 164 Vt. 282,
287, 671 A.2d 315, 318 (1995). We avoid construing statutory language in
a way that produces an irrational result. State v. Quinn, 165 Vt. 136,
140, 675 A.2d 1336, 1338 (1996).
While § 552 does not specifically apply to subsequent amendments to
union school district agreements, the language of the statute should be
broadly read to effect a legislative desire for stability of both the
existence of union school districts and the legality and validity of bonds
issued by school districts. The section's language does not limit its
coverage only to initial formations of union school districts; indeed, its
language covers both the formation and the existence of the school
district, which, liberally construed, includes amendments to an already
existing body politic. We find it would be inconsistent with the express
legislative purpose of § 552 to construe the section to prohibit attacks
on the original formation of a union school district after the expiration
of the six month time limitation but to allow for attacks on their
expansion and continued existence. Consistent with the statutory
construction principles outlined above, we hold that the time limitation
of six months expressed in § 552 governs amendments to union school
district formation agreements, as well as the original agreements
themselves.
It is apparent from other provisions in Title 16, of which § 552 is a
part, that the legislature is expressly concerned with the formation of
union school districts, their initial operation, and the certainty of
their continued existence. See Galkin v. Town of Chester, 168 Vt. 82, 87,
716 A.2d 25, 29 (1998) (explaining that specific sections of statutes are
read in context and entire scheme read in pari materia). For example, 16
V.S.A. § 721a(d) provides that a vote of withdrawal after a union school
district has become a body politic as provided in § 706g, but less than one
year after that date, shall be null and void. In Appelget v. Baird, 126
Vt. 503, 508, 236 A.2d 671, 674 (1967), this Court
found a town's attempt to withdraw from a district within one year to be a
nullity under this section (FN1) and recognized that "[i]t is the peculiar
nature of a union school district's beginnings that there are always other
towns or districts simultaneously involved, whose rights, duties and
obligations are. . . at stake. With such an intertwining of interests, the
unrestricted application of the general right to reconsider may create an
impossibly confused situation . . . ." The limitations of § 721a(d) on
the general right to reconsideration of the vote and this Court's
recognition of the complex nature of a school district's formation
emphasize the importance of giving effect to the legislative purpose
outlined in § 552, of validating and making certain the legal existence of
all school districts in this state.
Section 552 also expresses a legislative desire to make certain the
validity and legality of bonds issued by school districts. The express
legislative protection for the fiscal stability of school districts found
in § 552 is also apparent in other sections of Titles 16 and 17 and in our
past decisions. For example, in Santi v. Roxbury School District, 165 Vt.
476, 476, 685 A.2d 301, 301 (1996), this Court held that town voters were
not entitled to a new reconsideration vote on the 1995-96 school budget
under 16 V.S.A. § 711e, which sets forth the procedure for when a school
district elects to have its budget determined by Australian ballot. In
denying the voter's request and holding that 17 V.S.A. § 2661(c) (FN2)
prevented further re-votes without approval of the legislative body of the
district, this Court recognized the necessary tension between "the
democratic principles supported by allowing reconsideration and the need
for finality if the district is to deliver the educational services upon
which its families depend." Id. at 480, 685 A.2d at 304. We described a
school district as a "living organism that must open and run its schools
irrespective of the fiscal indecision of its electorate." Id. at 481, 685 A.2d at 304. This recognition of the dependence of families on school
districts and the need for districts, as "living organisms," to run despite
fiscal indecision, further supports our interpretation of § 552 and its
application to the 1998 amendment.
It may be that the Appellant could argue that the amendment to add a
sixth grade to the union school agreement ultimately concerned the "method
of allocating capital and operating expenses of the union," and thus would
require that the amendment be adopted by each of the respective member
districts by a vote of a majority of the qualified voters of the districts
voting on the question, see 16 V.S.A. § 706n, but that challenge is made
too late.
Appellant's attempt to undo the amendment to the district agreement,
filed more than three years after its certification, and more than six
months after the $20 million bond approval, is untimely under 16 V.S.A. §
552.
Affirmed.
BY THE COURT:
_______________________________________
Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Chief Justice
_______________________________________
James L. Morse, Associate Justice
_______________________________________
Denise R. Johnson, Associate Justice
_______________________________________
Marilyn S. Skoglund, Associate Justice
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Footnotes
FN1. The statute in effect when Appelget v. Baird was decided, 16 V.S.A. §
612(a), was repealed in 1967 and replaced by 16 V.S.A. § 721(a). 16
V.S.A. § 612(a) differs only slightly from 16 V.S.A. § 721(a).
FN2. 17 V.S.A. § 2661(c) provides that a question voted on shall not be
presented for reconsideration or rescission at more than one subsequent
meeting within the succeeding twelve months except with the approval of
the legislative body.
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