Santi v. Roxbury Town School District

Santi v. Roxbury Town School District  (96-093); 165 Vt 476; 685 A.2d 301

[Opinion Filed 27-Sep-1996]
                   

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.


                                 No. 96-093


Amedeo Santi, et al.                              Supreme Court

                                                  On Appeal from
    v.                                            Washington Superior Court

Roxbury Town School District, et al.              April Term, 1996


John P. Meaker, J.

       Ann Danseyar Gelfon, Roxbury, for plaintiffs-appellants

       Anthony B. Lamb and Mary L. Desautels, Law Offices of Anthony B. Lamb,
  Burlington, for defendants-appellees


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


       DOOLEY, J.   Plaintiffs, voters of the Town of Roxbury, seek an
  injunction to compel the Roxbury Town School District to hold a second
  reconsideration vote on the 1995 school budget.  The Washington Superior
  Court held that a second reconsideration vote was not available to them. 
  We affirm.

       The town's school budget was first voted by conventional ballot at
  town meeting on March 7, 1995.  The voters at the meeting approved the
  following question: "Shall the Roxbury Town School District vote a sum of
  money in the amount of $897,084.00 for current expenses of which
  $482,074.00 is to be raised from property taxes?"

       On March 21, 1995, more than five percent of the qualified voters of
  the town filed a petition for reconsideration.  On May 24, 1995, the town
  convened a special school district meeting to vote upon the reconsideration
  petition.  By conventional ballot, a majority of the voters present voted
  to reconsider the budget.

       As a result of the reconsideration vote, the school board revised the
  school budget and

 

  resubmitted it to the voters for approval.  On July 19, 1995, by Australian
  ballot, the voters disapproved a revised budget in an amount of $871,799
  for current expenses, of which $477,188 was to be raised from property
  taxes.  The school board again revised the budget and resubmitted it to the
  voters.  On September 12, 1995, by Australian ballot, the voters
  disapproved a budget of $825,742, with $431,131 to be raised from property
  taxes.

       On October 26, 1995, again by Australian ballot, the voters approved
  the following question: "Shall the Roxbury Town School District vote to
  approve a revised budget in the amount of $815,758.00 for current expenses,
  of which $421,147.00 is to be raised from property taxes?"

       On November 16, 1995, more than five percent of the voters filed a
  petition for a reconsideration vote on the question adopted on October
  26th.  The refusal of the school district to schedule the reconsideration
  vote led to this litigation.

       On January 16, 1996, plaintiffs sued the Roxbury Town School District,
  three members of the school board and the tax collector for the Town of
  Roxbury seeking an injunction preventing any tax collection while the suit
  was pending, preventing expenditures in excess of the district borrowing
  authority, and requiring the reconsideration vote demanded.  The court
  dismissed the tax collector as a defendant1 (F) and added the members of the
  selectboard.  After hearing, the court dismissed the action, concluding
  that plaintiffs had no right to a second reconsideration vote.

       The question of whether plaintiffs are entitled to a new
  reconsideration vote turns on the proper construction of two statutes.  16
  V.S.A. § 711e sets forth the procedure when a school district elects to
  have its budget determined by Australian ballot, as has occurred here. 
  Under this section, the "budget shall be established if a majority of the
  votes cast are in favor."  Id. § 711e(d) & (e).  If the budget is rejected,
  the board must "prepare a revised budget" and

 


       resubmit it to the voters, repeating the process, if necessary, until
  a budget is adopted.  Id. § 711e(f).  Two general provisions are important:
  (a) the vote occurs "under the provisions of section 2680 of Title 17," id.
  § 711e(a), and (b) "[u]nless clearly inconsistent, the provisions of
  chapter 55 of Title 17 shall apply to actions taken under this section,"
  id. § 711e(g).

       17 V.S.A. § 2680, part of Vermont's general election law, provides for
  Australian ballot in terms entirely consistent with 16 V.S.A. § 711e. 
  Within chapter 55 of Title 17, however, is the statute relied upon by
  plaintiffs, 17 V.S.A. § 2661(b):

     (b) Where a petition signed by not less than five percent of the
     qualified voters of a municipality requesting reconsideration or
     rescission of a question considered or voted on at a previous
     annual or special meeting is filed with the clerk of the municipality
     within thirty days following the date of that meeting, the legislative
     body shall provide for a vote by the municipality in accordance
     with the petition within sixty days of the submission at an annual
     or special meeting duly warned for that purpose.

  It is followed by a proviso relied upon by defendants:

     (c) A question voted on shall not be presented for reconsideration
     or rescission at more than one subsequent meeting within the
     succeeding twelve months except with the approval of the
     legislative body.

  Id. § 2661(c).

       Plaintiffs argue that 17 V.S.A. § 2661(b)(FN2) governs and gives them a
  right to the reconsideration vote because (a) the right to reconsideration
  is not "clearly inconsistent" with the provisions of 16 V.S.A. § 711e and
  therefore applies to the school district by virtue of § 711e(g), and (b)
  the question of the budget amount of $815,758, as adopted on October 26th,
  had never been presented for reconsideration before, and therefore, §
  2661(c) does not apply.

 

  Defendants respond that (a) the right to reconsideration under 17 V.S.A. §
  2661(b) is "clearly inconsistent" with provisions of 16 V.S.A. § 711e
  because that section provides that the "budget shall be established" if a
  majority of voters approve it, and (b) the "question" being voted on is the
  budget for the 1995-96 school year so that § 2661(c) prohibits a second
  reconsideration of that question without approval of the legislative body. 
  We agree with defendants in part.

       The first issue is whether the right of reconsideration is clearly
  inconsistent with the provisions of 16 V.S.A. § 711e, particularly the
  language that the "budget shall be established" if voted by a majority of
  those voting.  We considered a comparable question in Pominville v. Addison
  Cent. Supervisory Union, 154 Vt. 299, 575 A.2d 196 (1990).  There, voters
  sought to require the school district to present to the voters an
  alternative school budget, different from that being presented by the
  school board.  They claimed the right to do so under 17 V.S.A. § 2642(a),
  authorizing five percent of the voters to place an article on the agenda of
  the annual meeting.  We rejected this provision, concluding that the
  provisions of § 711e were sufficiently inconsistent with a general
  referendum right that § 711e had to control.  Specifically, we held that
  provisions of § 711e gave the school board control over the questions to be
  put to the voters and the referendum right was inconsistent with that
  control.  Pominville, 154 Vt. at 301, 575 A.2d  at 197.  We reasoned:

     [T]he Legislature did not want to risk having a school budget
     gutted by what our Court has called "`the uncertain disposal of the
     "fierce democracie."'"  Buttolph v. Osborn, 119 Vt. 116, 119, 119 A.2d 686, 688 (1956) (quoting Chittenden v. School District No.
    1, 56 Vt. 551, 554 (1884)).  If a budget proposed by the entity
    charged with running the school is defeated by the voters, the
    statute calls for budgetary revision by the same entity.  This is a
    commonsense balanced approach to resolving competing interests
    by giving recognition both to the expertise of the board and the
    taxing concerns of the community.

  Id. at 302, 575 A.2d  at 197-98.

       Although many of the concerns expressed in Pominville are present
  here, we cannot find that the right of reconsideration is clearly
  inconsistent with the provisions of § 711e.  The risks

 

  from reconsideration are not as great as from referendum, and the statutory
  inconsistency is less clear.  The statute can be taken to mean that the
  budget is established if a majority of the voters approve at the final
  vote, whether that is on first consideration or reconsideration.  We agree
  with plaintiffs that the provisions of 17 V.S.A. § 2661(b) apply.

       We must, therefore, consider whether the reconsideration vote sought
  by plaintiffs is authorized by 17 V.S.A. § 2661(b) and not barred by §
  2661(c).  It is helpful, at the outset, to look at how we have treated
  reconsideration votes in the past.

       As early as 1850, in the absence of clear statutory direction, we
  recognized the right of a town to reconsider a vote of its citizens. 
  Stoddard v. Gilman, 22 Vt. 568 (1850).  In Stoddard, the citizens of the
  Town of Westmore had voted to spend $500 for making roads, and thereafter,
  on reconsideration rescinded the appropriation.  This Court upheld the
  reconsideration vote:

          A vote to raise money for town purposes is a mere
     declaration, or resolution, on the part of the town alone, and not
     in the nature of a grant, or contract between the town and an
     individual. . . .  So long as this rests in mere resolution, and has
     not been acted upon, we think the town must have the power to
     rescind or reconsider it.  Until something has been done under the
     vote, the towns are alone interested in it, and may alter their
     resolve at their own pleasure.

  Id. at 573.  More recently, we reiterated this holding in Denicore v. City
  of Burlington, 116 Vt. 138, 140, 70 A.2d 582, 584 (1950), summarizing that
  "voters have the unlimited right of rescission in the absence of
  legislation and where the rights of third parties have not vested or
  intervened." Id. at 145, 70 A.2d  at 586.  Other courts have applied this
  limited rule even where legislation specifically recognized the right of
  reconsideration.  See, e.g., Ogden v. Allen, 200 N.E.2d 559, 561 (N.Y.
  1964).

       The general principles reflected in Stoddard v. Gilman have meaning
  today although the complexities of modern life present the conflicting
  considerations in a different context.  There is necessarily a tension
  between the democratic principles supported by allowing reconsideration

 

  and the need for finality if the district is to deliver the educational
  services upon which its families depend.  In the absence of an approved
  budget on or before the start of the fiscal year on July 1st, the school
  district is authorized to borrow funds to operate, but only "up to 87
  percent of the most recently approved school budget."  16 V.S.A. § 566. 
  See also 16 V.S.A. § 711a(b).

       An endless cycle of votes and reconsiderations, as the result is
  determined by which of a divided electorate shows up at the polls on any
  day, gives no weight to the need for finality. A school district is a
  living organism that must open and run its schools irrespective of the
  fiscal indecision of its electorate.  Inevitably, as the process drags on
  and the school year passes, the budget is determined by the limited
  borrowing authority and not the will of the electorate.  The rights of
  innocent third parties, led by the children to be educated by the district,
  are inextricably involved.

       Plaintiffs argue that despite these considerations, we have already
  construed the statute in Baird v. Town of Berlin, 126 Vt. 348, 231 A.2d 110
  (1967), and that that decision requires that they prevail.  Baird involved
  an earlier version of the reconsideration statute and a vote on an
  authorization for a town school board to purchase land for a school.  The
  plaintiffs sought reconsideration of the vote, and the defendants argued
  that because of earlier votes the plaintiffs were in effect seeking a
  second reconsideration, which was barred by the statute.  We rejected the
  argument, noting that earlier votes related to the purchase of a
  differently described site, purchase under option, authorization of a bond
  issue to purchase the site and build a school on it, and a higher price. 
  Id. at 353, 231 A.2d  at 114.

       We do not believe Baird governs this case.  Baird, like Stoddard v.
  Gilman, involves a single discrete expense, and not the operating budget of
  the school district.  Thus, the intervening effects on other persons are
  not involved, as they are here.  Moreover, nothing in Baird states that a
  difference of price alone would have been sufficient to allow another
  reconsideration vote.  It was the combined effect of numerous differences
  in the proposal that

 

  caused us to hold that the reconsideration request was "not substantively
  the same question considered at the other meetings referred to."  Id.

       We construe a statute consistent with its purpose, subject matter,
  effects and consequences, and the reason and spirit of the law.  See In re
  Spring Brook Farm Found., ___ Vt. ___, ___, 671 A.2d 315, 318 (1995).  We
  avoid construing statutory language in a way that produces an irrational
  result.  State v. Quinn, ___ Vt. ___, ___, 675 A.2d 1336, 1338 (1996).
  Consistent with these principles, we hold that the term "question voted
  on," as used in 17 V.S.A. § 2661(c), means the budget of the school
  district and is not changed as different budget amounts are submitted to
  the voters.  Since there has been one reconsideration vote of the 1995-96
  Roxbury school budget, § 2661(c) prevents further revotes without the
  approval of the legislative body of the district.  The legislative body has
  not approved the reconsideration vote sought by plaintiffs, and therefore,
  it is barred by § 2661(c).

       Affirmed.


                              FOR THE COURT:



                              _______________________________________
                              Associate Justice





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                                 Footnotes


FN1.  In view of our disposition, we do not reach plaintiffs' claim
  that the dismissal of the tax collector was error.

FN2.  Section 2661(b) applies to questions voted on "at a previous
  annual or special meeting." According to plaintiffs' theory, however, the
  "question" was voted on October 26, 1995 by Australian ballot without a
  meeting.  Defendants have not contested the application of § 2661(b) on
  this basis.  We also note that in 1992, the Legislature added a form of
  ballot for reconsideration by Australian ballot, thus indicating that this
  method of reconsideration was expected.  See 17 V.S.A. § 2661(d).