2020 Georgia Code
Title 16 - Crimes and Offenses
Chapter 5 - Crimes Against the Person
Article 2 - Assault and Battery
§ 16-5-21. Aggravated Assault

1. A person commits the offense of aggravated assault when he or she assaults:
   1. With intent to murder, to rape, or to rob;
   2. With a deadly weapon or with any object, device, or instrument which, when used offensively against a person, is likely to or actually does result in serious bodily injury;
   3. With any object, device, or instrument which, when used offensively against a person, is likely to or actually does result in strangulation; or
   4. A person or persons without legal justification by discharging a firearm from within a motor vehicle toward a person or persons.
2. Except as provided in subsections (c) through (k) of this Code section, a person convicted of the offense of aggravated assault shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than 20 years.
3. 1. A person who knowingly commits the offense of aggravated assault upon a public safety officer while he or she is engaged in, or on account of the performance of, his or her official duties shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished as follows:
      1. When such assault occurs by the discharge of a firearm by a person who is at least 17 years of age, such person shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than ten nor more than 20 years and shall be sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of ten years and no portion of the mandatory minimum sentence imposed shall be suspended, stayed, probated, deferred, or withheld by the sentencing court; provided, however, that in the court's discretion, the court may depart from such mandatory minimum sentence when the prosecuting attorney and defendant have agreed to a sentence that is below such mandatory minimum;
      2. When such assault does not involve the discharge of a firearm by a person who is at least 17 years of age, and does not involve only the use of the person's body, such person shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than five nor more than 20 years and, for persons who are at least 17 years of age, shall be sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of three years and no portion of the mandatory minimum sentence imposed shall be suspended, stayed, probated, deferred, or withheld by the sentencing court; provided, however, that in the court's discretion, the court may depart from such mandatory minimum sentence when the prosecuting attorney and defendant have agreed to a sentence that is below such mandatory minimum; or
      3. When such assault occurs only involving the use of the person's body, by imprisonment for not less than five nor more than 20 years.
   2. A person convicted under this subsection shall be punished, in addition to any term of imprisonment imposed, by a fine as provided by law which shall be at least $2,000.00. With respect to $2,000.00 of the fine imposed, after distributing the surcharges and deductions required by Chapter 21 of Title 15, Code Sections 36-15-9 and 42-8-34, and Title 47, it shall be earmarked for the Georgia State Indemnification Fund for purposes of payment of indemnification for death or disability as provided for in Part 1 of Article 5 of Chapter 9 of Title 45.
   3. As used in this subsection, the term "firearm" means any handgun, rifle, shotgun, or similar device or weapon which will or can be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive or electrical charge.
4. Any person who commits the offense of aggravated assault against a person who is 65 years of age or older shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by imprisonment for not less than three nor more than 20 years.
5. Any person who commits the offense of aggravated assault in a public transit vehicle or station shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by imprisonment for not less than three nor more than 20 years.
6. Any person who commits the offense of aggravated assault upon a person in the course of violating Code Section 16-8-2 where the property that was the subject of the theft was a vehicle engaged in commercial transportation of cargo or any appurtenance thereto, including without limitation any such trailer, semitrailer, container, or other associated equipment, or the cargo being transported therein or thereon, shall upon conviction be punished by imprisonment for not less than five nor more than 20 years, a fine not less than $50,000.00 nor more than $200,000.00, or both such fine and imprisonment. For purposes of this subsection, the term "vehicle" includes without limitation any railcar.
7. Except as provided in subsection (c) of this Code section, a person convicted of an offense described in paragraph (4) of subsection (a) of this Code section shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than five nor more than 20 years.
8. Any person who commits the offense of aggravated assault involving the use of a firearm upon a student or teacher or other school personnel within a school safety zone as defined in Code Section 16-11-127.1 shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by imprisonment for not less than five nor more than 20 years.
9. If the offense of aggravated assault is committed between past or present spouses, persons who are parents of the same child, parents and children, stepparents and stepchildren, foster parents and foster children, or other persons excluding siblings living or formerly living in the same household, the defendant shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than three nor more than 20 years.
10. Any person who commits the offense of aggravated assault with intent to rape against a child under the age of 14 years shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than 25 nor more than 50 years. Any person convicted under this subsection shall, in addition, be subject to the sentencing and punishment provisions of Code Section 17-10-6.2.
11. A person who knowingly commits the offense of aggravated assault upon an officer of the court while such officer is engaged in, or on account of the performance of, his or her official duties shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by imprisonment for not less than five nor more than 20 years.

(Laws 1833, Cobb's 1851 Digest, pp. 787-789; Laws 1840, Cobb's 1851 Digest, p. 788; Code 1863, §§ 4250, 4258, 4259, 4260; Ga. L. 1866, p. 151, § 1; Code 1868, §§ 4285, 4293, 4294, 4295; Code 1873, §§ 4351, 4359, 4360, 4361; Code 1882, §§ 4351, 4359, 4360, 4361; Penal Code 1895, §§ 97, 98, 99, 100; Penal Code 1910, §§ 97, 98, 99, 100; Code 1933, §§ 26-1403, 26-1404, 26-1405, 26-1406; Code 1933, § 26-1302, enacted by Ga. L. 1968, p. 1249, § 1; Ga. L. 1976, p. 543, § 1; Ga. L. 1982, p. 1242, § 2; Ga. L. 1984, p. 900, § 1; Ga. L. 1985, p. 628, § 1; Ga. L. 1991, p. 971, §§ 3, 4; Ga. L. 1994, p. 1012, § 8; Ga. L. 1994, p. 1920, §§ 1, 2; Ga. L. 1996, p. 988, § 1; Ga. L. 1997, p. 1453, § 1; Ga. L. 1999, p. 381, § 3; Ga. L. 2000, p. 1626, § 1; Ga. L. 2003, p. 140, § 16; Ga. L. 2004, p. 1072, § 1; Ga. L. 2006, p. 379, § 4/HB 1059; Ga. L. 2010, p. 999, § 1/HB 1002; Ga. L. 2011, p. 752, § 16/HB 142; Ga. L. 2014, p. 432, § 2-2/HB 826; Ga. L. 2014, p. 441, § 1/HB 911; Ga. L. 2014, p. 599, § 3-1/HB 60; Ga. L. 2015, p. 422, § 5-19/HB 310; Ga. L. 2016, p. 582, § 1/HB 979; Ga. L. 2017, p. 500, § 3-2/SB 160.)

The 2017 amendment, effective July 1, 2017, deleted subsection (a), which read: "As used in this Code section, the term 'strangulation' means impeding the normal breathing or circulation of blood of another person by applying pressure to the throat or neck of such person or by obstructing the nose and mouth of such person."; redesignated former subsections (b) and (c) as present subsections (a) and (b), respectively; substituted "subsections (c) through (k)" for "subsections (d) through (n)" in subsection (b); redesignated former subsections (d) and (e) as present subsections (c) and (d), respectively; rewrote present subsection (c); deleted former subsection (f), relating to defining the term "correctional officer"; redesignated former subsection (g) as present subsection (e); deleted the second sentence of subsection (e), which read: "For purposes of this Code section, 'public transit vehicle' has the same meaning as in subsection (c) of Code Section 16-5-20."; redesignated former subsections (h) and (i) as present subsections (f) and (g), respectively; in subsection (g), substituted "Except as provided in subsection (c) of this Code section, a" for "A" at the beginning, and substituted "subsection (a)" for "subsection (b)" in the middle; redesignated former subsections (j) through (m) as present subsections (h) through (k), respectively; deleted the former second sentence in subsection (k), which read: "As used in this subsection, the term 'officer of the court' means a judge, attorney, clerk of court, deputy clerk of court, court reporter, court interpreter, community supervision officer, county or Department of Juvenile Justice juvenile probation officer, or probation officer serving pursuant to Article 6 of Chapter 8 of Title 42."; and deleted former subsection (n), which read: "A person who knowingly commits the offense of aggravated assault upon an emergency health worker while the worker is engaged in, or on account of the performance of, his or her official duties shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by imprisonment for not less than five nor more than 20 years. As used in this subsection, the term 'emergency health worker" means hospital emergency department personnel and emergency medical services personnel.".

Cross references.

- Indemnification program for law enforcement officers, firefighters, and prison guards killed or injured on duty, § 45-9-80 et seq.

Code Commission notes.

- Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1994, since both Ga. L. 1994, p. 1012 and p. 1920 enacted a new subsection (g), the amendment by Ga. L. 1994, p. 1012 has been redesignated as subsection (h).

Editor's notes.

- Ga. L. 1994, p. 1012, § 1, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that the Act shall be known and may be cited as the "School Safety and Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 1994."

Ga. L. 1994, p. 1012, § 2, not codified by the General Assembly, sets forth legislative findings and determinations for the "School Safety and Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 1994."

Ga. L. 1994, p. 1012, § 29, not codified by the General Assembly, provides for severability.

Ga. L. 1999, p. 381, § 1, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: "This Act shall be known and may be cited as the 'Crimes Against Family Members Act of 1999'."

Ga. L. 1999, p. 381, § 7, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: "Nothing herein shall be construed to validate a relationship between people of the same sex as a 'marriage' under the laws of this State."

Ga. L. 2006, p. 379, § 1/HB 1059, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: "The General Assembly finds and declares that recidivist sexual offenders, sexual offenders who use physical violence, and sexual offenders who prey on children are sexual predators who present an extreme threat to the public safety. Many sexual offenders are extremely likely to use physical violence and to repeat their offenses; and some sexual offenders commit many offenses, have many more victims than are ever reported, and are prosecuted for only a fraction of their crimes. The General Assembly finds that this makes the cost of sexual offender victimization to society at large, while incalculable, clearly exorbitant. The General Assembly further finds that the high level of threat that a sexual predator presents to the public safety, and the long-term effects suffered by victims of sex offenses, provide the state with sufficient justification to implement a strategy that includes:

"(1) Incarcerating sexual offenders and maintaining adequate facilities to ensure that decisions to release sexual predators into the community are not made on the basis of inadequate space;

"(2) Requiring the registration of sexual offenders, with a requirement that complete and accurate information be maintained and accessible for use by law enforcement authorities, communities, and the public;

"(3) Providing for community and public notification concerning the presence of sexual offenders;

"(4) Collecting data relative to sexual offenses and sexual offenders;

"(5) Requiring sexual predators who are released into the community to wear an electronic monitoring system for the rest of their natural life and to pay for such system; and

"(6) Prohibiting sexual predators from working with children, either for compensation or as a volunteer.

"The General Assembly further finds that the state has a compelling interest in protecting the public from sexual offenders and in protecting children from predatory sexual activity, and there is sufficient justification for requiring sexual offenders to register and for requiring community and public notification of the presence of sexual offenders. The General Assembly declares that in order to protect the public, it is necessary that the sexual offenders be registered and that members of the community and the public be notified of a sexual offender's presence. The designation of a person as a sexual offender is neither a sentence nor a punishment but simply a regulatory mechanism and status resulting from the conviction of certain crimes. Likewise, the designation of a person as a sexual predator is neither a sentence nor a punishment but simply a regulatory mechanism and status resulting from findings by the Sexual Offender Registration Review Board and a court if requested by a sexual offender."

Ga. L. 2006, p. 379, § 30(c)/HB 1059, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: "The provisions of this Act shall not affect or abate the status as a crime of any such act or omission which occurred prior to the effective date of the Act repealing, repealing and reenacting, or amending such law, nor shall the prosecution of such crime be abated as a result of such repeal, repeal and reenactment, or amendment."

Ga. L. 2014, p. 599, § 1-1/HB 60, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: "This Act shall be known and may be cited as the 'Safe Carry Protection Act.'"

Ga. L. 2015, p. 422, § 6-1/HB 310, not codified by the General Assembly, provides, in part, that the amendment by this Act shall apply to sentences entered on or after July 1, 2015.

Ga. L. 2017, p. 500, § 1-1/SB 160, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: "This Act shall be known and may be cited as the 'Back the Badge Act of 2017.'"

Law reviews.

- For survey article on criminal law and procedure, see 34 Mercer L. Rev. 89 (1982). For article, "Criminal Law," see 53 Mercer L. Rev. 209 (2001). For article on 2006 amendment of this Code section, see 23 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 11 (2006). For survey article on evidence law, see 60 Mercer L. Rev. 135 (2008). For annual survey on death penalty law, see 61 Mercer L. Rev. 99 (2009). For article on the 2014 amendment of this Code section, see 31 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 47 (2014). For article on the 2015 amendment of this Code section, see 32 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 231 (2015). For annual survey of criminal law, see 67 Mercer L. Rev. 31 (2015). For annual survey on criminal law, see 69 Mercer L. Rev. 73 (2017). For article on the 2017 amendment of this Code section, see 34 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 89 (2017). For note contrasting assault with intent and attempt in food poisoning cases, see 25 Ga. St. B. J. 199 (1962). For note on the 1994 amendment of this Code section, see 11 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 110 (1994). For review of 1996 children and youth services legislation, see 13 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 314 (1996).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

ANALYSIS

• General Consideration
• Indictment
• Included Crimes
• Assault with Deadly Weapon
• Assault With Gun
• Assault With Automobile
• Assault With Hands, Fists, or Other Body Parts
• Assault With Other Objects
• Assault with Intent to Murder
• Assault with Intent to Rob
• Assault with Intent to Rape
• Jury Instructions

General Consideration

Constitutionality.

- Legislature, in not providing for defense of opprobrious language, did not act unconstitutionally. Watkins v. State, 254 Ga. 267, 328 S.E.2d 537 (1985).

Prior violent felony conviction for purposes of Armed Career Criminal Act.

- When the defendant pled guilty to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, defendant's application for leave to file a second or successive motion to vacate, set aside, or correct the defendant's federal sentence was denied as the defendant had three prior violent felony convictions under the elements clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924, because the defendant had two separate Georgia convictions for felony obstruction of a law enforcement officer and a Georgia conviction for aggravated assault, which constituted violent felonies for purposes of the ACCA. In re White, F.3d (11th Cir. June 15, 2016).

Qualifies as crime of violence under federal provisions.

- Because the elements of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) sufficiently match the elements of generic aggravated assault, it qualifies as a crime of violence under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.2. United States v. Huling, 741 Fed. Appx. 702 (11th Cir. 2018)(Unpublished).

Venue.

- Adjudication of delinquency was reversed as the state presented no evidence of venue and the juvenile court did not take judicial notice that the location of an aggravated assault described at a hearing was in Sumter County; the county in which the offense was committed was not established and the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction, but retrial was not barred by the double jeopardy clause so long as venue was properly established at retrial. In the Interest of T.W., 280 Ga. App. 693, 634 S.E.2d 854 (2006).

Because the element of venue was sufficiently testified to by the victim's parent, the state adequately proved that element as part of its aggravated assault charges. Boyd v. State, 289 Ga. App. 342, 656 S.E.2d 864 (2008), cert. denied, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 498 (Ga. 2008).

Victim's testimony was sufficient evidence to prove venue in Henry County because the victim testified that the aggravated assault offense occurred at the house of the defendant's father, which was located in Henry County; the responding officer likewise testified that the house was located in Henry County. Ellis v. State, 316 Ga. App. 352, 729 S.E.2d 492 (2012).

Elements of aggravated assault.

- Offense of aggravated assault has two essential elements: (1) that an assault, (see O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20), was committed on the victim; and (2) that it was aggravated by (a) an intention to murder, to rape, or to rob, or (b) use of a deadly weapon. Harper v. State, 127 Ga. App. 359, 193 S.E.2d 259 (1972); Hardin v. State, 137 Ga. App. 391, 224 S.E.2d 82 (1976); Smith v. State, 140 Ga. App. 395, 231 S.E.2d 143 (1976); King v. State, 178 Ga. App. 343, 343 S.E.2d 401 (1986).

O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21 proscribes the commission of assault with the intent to accomplish the more serious crime of murder, robbery, or rape. No more need be alleged or proved. The statute deliberately sets out the offense of having intent, as disjunctive to an assault with a deadly weapon. Scroggins v. State, 198 Ga. App. 29, 401 S.E.2d 13 (1990), cert. denied, 198 Ga. App. 898, 401 S.E.2d 13 (1991).

Trial court properly denied defendant's motion to dismiss the aggravated assault count of the indictment under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a) where it charged that defendant made an assault upon the person of the victim with a pistol, a deadly weapon, by shooting the victim with said pistol; the language was sufficient to charge the elements of aggravated assault. Sallie v. State, 276 Ga. 506, 578 S.E.2d 444, cert. denied, 540 U.S. 902, 124 S. Ct. 251, 157 L. Ed. 2d 185 (2003).

Person commits the offense of aggravated assault when the person assaults another with a deadly weapon which, when used offensively against a person, is likely to or actually does result in serious bodily injury. There is no requirement that the victim sustain an actual injury, and the crime is complete without proof thereof. Turbeville v. State, 268 Ga. App. 88, 601 S.E.2d 461 (2004).

Juvenile court's adjudication entered against a juvenile on charges of aggravated assault and terroristic threats was upheld on appeal, given sufficient evidence that: (1) the state adequately showed venue; and (2) the victim's testimony described the juvenile's act of pointing a gun, threatening to use the gun, and that such caused fear that something could happen as a result of those acts. In the Interest of J.A.L., 284 Ga. App. 220, 644 S.E.2d 162 (2007).

Defendant's convictions for felony murder and aggravated assault on victims were supported by sufficient evidence despite the lack of evidence of the victims' mental state; assault included an attempt to commit a violent injury to the person of another, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a)(1), so when two gang members attempted to commit violent injuries on their pursuers by intentionally firing guns at the pursuers, the defendant could be guilty as a party to these aggravated assaults and felony murder. Hayes v. State, 298 Ga. 339, 781 S.E.2d 777 (2016).

Identification of defendant.

- With regard to defendant's convictions for armed robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, and false imprisonment, the trial court did not err by denying the motion to suppress the out-of-court identifications of the defendant because the court found that the simultaneous lineup was not impermissibly suggestive as a matter of law based on the testimony of the officer who prepared and presented the lineup that the victims were admonished that the suspect may not be in the array. McCowan v. State, 325 Ga. App. 509, 753 S.E.2d 775 (2014).

Intent to injure is not an element of the offense of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. Ganaway v. State, 282 Ga. 297, 647 S.E.2d 590 (2007).

Aiding and abetting.

- After defendant-A hijacked a victim's car at gunpoint, defendant-B's actions in punching the victim in the face while defendant-A waited in the car constituted aggravated assault, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(1), as defendant-B aided and abetted the commission of the carjacking pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(b)(3) for purposes of the aggravated nature of the assault conviction. Johnson v. State, 279 Ga. App. 182, 630 S.E.2d 778 (2006).

Trial court did not err in convicting the defendant and the defendant's codefendant of aggravated assault because based on the circumstantial evidence, the jury was entitled to infer that the defendant and the codefendant accompanied their accomplice to a convenience store knowing that the accomplice intended to assault the victim because of their past differences, that the defendant had specifically served as the getaway driver, and that the codefendant had accompanied the accomplice inside the store as a lookout, making both individuals parties to the crime of aggravated assault. Romero v. State, 307 Ga. App. 348, 705 S.E.2d 195 (2010).

Failure to merge error.

- Trial court erred by failing to merge all of the aggravated assault convictions into the armed robbery conviction because all of the aggravated assault convictions were based on the defendant's commission of an assault with a deadly weapon. Irving v. State, 351 Ga. App. 779, 833 S.E.2d 162 (2019).

Conduct of third parties not admissible to support self-defense claim.

- During a defendant's trial for aggravated assault and other charges arising out of a road rage incident, the defendant was properly precluded from testifying about a prior attempted robbery in which the defendant was the victim and allegedly used a pistol in self-defense; because the defendant was asserting self-defense, other specific acts of violence committed by a victim would have been admissible if any such acts existed, but the defendant could not support the defense by the proffer of any evidence based upon the commission of extraneous acts of violence committed by others because it would have been difficult or impossible for the state to rebut, refute, or test the credibility of such evidence. Adams v. State, 282 Ga. App. 819, 640 S.E.2d 329 (2006).

Intent element of aggravated assault was shown by evidence of the victim's fearful reactions to defendant's actions and words when defendant forced the victim to surrender the victim's purse by pointing a gun at the victim's chest. Cole v. State, 232 Ga. App. 795, 502 S.E.2d 742 (1998).

In a prosecution for aggravated assault, under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, and possession of a knife during the commission of a crime, under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b)(1), evidence that the defendant stabbed another in an incident eight years previously was admissible to show whether the defendant intended to threaten or harm the victim when the defendant brandished a knife, and the evidence was not more prejudicial than probative, given the prior incident's relevance to a necessary element of the current crimes. Ledford v. State, 275 Ga. App. 107, 620 S.E.2d 187 (2005).

Defendant's convictions for felony murder and the underlying crime of aggravated assault were supported by sufficient evidence because no proof of the defendant's criminal intent to murder was required for the felony murder conviction, and the aggravated assault conviction did not require proof that the defendant intended to injure the victim, as only proof that the defendant intended to do the act which placed the victim in reasonable apprehension of harm was required. Smith v. State, 280 Ga. 490, 629 S.E.2d 816 (2006).

Trial court properly denied the defendant's motion for a new trial on grounds that the state failed to prove that the defendant intentionally threatened two deputies the defendant forced off the road with a car, given evidence that prior to driving directly at the deputies, the car was being used offensively toward others by forcing those individuals off the road, and thereafter, in driving toward the two deputies at 90 miles per hour, a jury could infer that the defendant intended to threaten the deputies in hopes of forcing them from the road. Adams v. State, 280 Ga. App. 779, 634 S.E.2d 868 (2006).

Trial court did not err by denying a defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal on the charge of aggravated assault as the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction on that count in that the state proved that the defendant, while engaging the victim in an altercation, choked the victim so that the victim could not breath and, in fact, lost consciousness briefly. As such, the state proved that the defendant intended to injure the victim. Hall v. State, 292 Ga. App. 544, 664 S.E.2d 882, cert. denied, No. S08C1841, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 926 (Ga. 2008).

Victim's apprehension of receiving a violent injury was not an essential element of aggravated assault in which the defendant intentionally fired a gun at the victim; sufficient evidence supported the defendant's conviction for aggravated assault, despite the failure of the victim to testify, because witnesses established that during a dispute with the victim over drugs, the defendant pointed a gun at the victim, struck the victim in the head, and shot the victim. Anthony v. State, 276 Ga. App. 107, 622 S.E.2d 450 (2005).

Simple assault becomes aggravated when it is perpetrated by use of a deadly weapon. Gentry v. State, 212 Ga. App. 79, 441 S.E.2d 249 (1994).

Defendant could not be convicted for "criminal attempt to commit aggravated assault" where the victim was asleep or passed out; there is no law authorizing conviction for an attempt to commit a crime which itself is a particular type of attempt to commit a crime. Patterson v. State, 192 Ga. App. 449, 385 S.E.2d 311, cert. denied, 192 Ga. App. 902, 385 S.E.2d 311 (1989).

Neither simple nor aggravated assault requires physical contact with victim. Tuggle v. State, 145 Ga. App. 603, 244 S.E.2d 131 (1978).

O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) does not make a battery an essential element of the offense of aggravated assault. Watkins v. State, 254 Ga. 267, 328 S.E.2d 537 (1985).

Physical contact is required for simple battery but not for aggravated assault, and hence the crime of simple battery is not necessarily included in the crime of aggravated assault. Tuggle v. State, 145 Ga. App. 603, 244 S.E.2d 131 (1978); Anderson v. State, 170 Ga. App. 634, 317 S.E.2d 877 (1984).

Indictment charging the defendant with making an assault "with [the defendant's] hands and fists, objects which when used offensively . . . were likely to result in serious bodily injury" contained all of the essential elements of the crime, even though it did not expressly allege that the defendant's hands were used as deadly weapons. Moore v. State, 246 Ga. App. 163, 539 S.E.2d 851 (2000).

Aggravated assault does not require that injury be in fact inflicted. Radford v. State, 140 Ga. App. 451, 231 S.E.2d 365 (1976), rev'd on other grounds, 238 Ga. 532, 233 S.E.2d 785 (1977).

In every assault there must be intent to injure. The test is: was there a present purpose of doing bodily injury? Riddle v. State, 145 Ga. App. 328, 243 S.E.2d 607 (1978), overruled on other grounds, Adsitt v. State, 248 Ga. 237, 282 S.E.2d 305 (1981).

Assault against several persons.

- After the defendant fired a pistol into a group of nine people, the defendant's act of firing into the group made each individual in the group a separate victim and, thus, the seven aggravated assault convictions of which the defendant was found guilty did not merge. Pace v. State, 239 Ga. App. 506, 521 S.E.2d 444 (1999).

When a defendant intentionally shoots several times into a group of people intending to harm only one of them, a jury would be authorized to find defendant guilty of aggravated assault against each person in the group. Robertson v. State, 245 Ga. App. 649, 538 S.E.2d 755 (2000).

Assault with shotgun.

- Evidence supported the defendant's conviction for armed robbery, possession of a weapon during the commission of a crime, aggravated assault, burglary, aggravated battery, and impersonating an officer because the defendant kicked in the door of a home while shouting that the defendant was a "federal agent," fired a shotgun through a door, shooting off a victim's thumb, inserted the barrel of the shotgun in the same person's mouth, and demanded money, which the victims turned over, two codefendants identified the defendant as the user of the shotgun, and the defendant's DNA was found on a ski mask recovered from the getaway car and the defendant's fingerprints were found on the car. Garrison v. State, 276 Ga. App. 243, 622 S.E.2d 910 (2005).

Elderly victims.

- Proof that the victim was at least 65 years old was not necessary to establish a prima facie case of aggravated assault, however, such evidence was required to enhance the penalty under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(d). Howard v. State, 230 Ga. App. 437, 496 S.E.2d 532 (1998).

Photographs depicting victim's injuries.

- Photographs depicting the victim's injuries were admissible because, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), proving serious bodily injury is a part of the state's burden of proof. Clay v. State, 214 Ga. App. 160, 447 S.E.2d 156 (1994).

Defendant's amended motion for a new trial was properly denied, and an aggravated assault conviction was upheld on appeal as the trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in admitting three photographs depicting the victim's knife wounds; the photographs were not inadmissible merely because the photographs also showed alterations to the victim's body made by medical personnel. McRae v. State, 282 Ga. App. 852, 640 S.E.2d 323 (2006), cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 200 (Ga. 2007).

Injury requiring hospital stay and removal of part of brain deemed "serious."

- Defendant's challenge of aggravated assault provisions on grounds of vagueness, in that O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21 requires a subjective evaluation by law enforcement personnel as to what constitutes "serious injury," was not viable where injury required removal of part of brain and a month-long hospital stay. Watkins v. State, 254 Ga. 267, 328 S.E.2d 537 (1985).

There are wanton or reckless states of mind sometimes equivalent to specific intention to kill, and which may and should be treated by the jury as amounting to such intention, when productive of violence likely to result in the destruction of life. Messer v. State, 120 Ga. App. 747, 172 S.E.2d 194 (1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 866, 91 S. Ct. 107, 27 L. Ed. 2d 105 (1970).

Homicide occurring during aggravated assault not accident.

- Evidence that the defendant had cocked a gun and pointed the gun at her husband's head in order to scare him, and that the gun discharged when the victim struck the gun with his arm, was sufficient to authorize a conviction for felony-murder and the defense of "accident" was inapplicable. Stiles v. State, 264 Ga. App. 446, 448 S.E.2d 172 (1994).

Victim's awareness of danger is not essential element of crime of aggravated assault. Sutton v. State, 245 Ga. 192, 264 S.E.2d 184 (1980).

When the defendant was charged with the offense of aggravated assault by making an assault upon the victim's person with a gun, it was not incumbent upon the prosecution to prove that the victim was aware the defendant was shooting at the victim. Brown v. State, 200 Ga. App. 537, 408 S.E.2d 836 (1991).

Appropriate test of mental capacity in trial for murder and aggravated assault is whether the accused is capable of distinguishing between right and wrong at the time the offense was committed. Duck v. State, 250 Ga. 592, 300 S.E.2d 121 (1983).

Intent need not be directed toward person actually injured.

- Offenses of murder, voluntary manslaughter, and aggravated assault do not require that the necessary element of intent, to kill or injure as the case may be, must have been directed toward the person who actually was killed or injured. Cook v. State, 255 Ga. 565, 340 S.E.2d 843, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 871, 107 S. Ct. 241, 93 L. Ed. 2d 166 (1986).

Jury was authorized to find that the defendant intended to assault the first victim with a deadly weapon and that, in the course of that assault the second victim was injured. Similarly, the jury was also authorized to find the original intent was transferred in law to the second victim as well. Fussell v. State, 187 Ga. App. 134, 369 S.E.2d 511 (1988).

Trial court did not err in adjudicating a defendant juvenile delinquent based upon the defendant's commission of aggravated assault in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) because evidence that the defendant deliberately fired a BB gun in the direction of the victim and the victim's family established the offense, since, by intentionally firing the gun in the direction of the family, the defendant was likely to seriously injure any of the family members present, including the victim; the defendant's intent to assault any one of the family members was transferred to the victim, who suffered the harm, regardless of whether the defendant knew that the victim was in the line of fire or whether the victim was aware of the shooting as the shooting occurred. In the Interest of I.C., 300 Ga. App. 683, 686 S.E.2d 279 (2009).

Convictions as aider and abettor proper despite lack of personal involvement.

- Defendant's contention that the crimes against a stabbing victim were solely committed by a codefendant was rejected, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(a), as ample evidence existed to conclude that defendant either committed the crimes or was a party to the crimes, including that both defendant and the codefendant drove to the stabbing victim's home, that victim was stabbed to death, and the victim's wallet and checkbook were stolen so that both defendants could have money to buy more drugs. Odom v. State, 279 Ga. 599, 619 S.E.2d 636 (2005).

"Intent" aspect of attempted vehicular suicide by colliding with another vehicle.

- Evidence supported conclusion that defendant, who crossed center line at 68 miles per hour without braking, intended to injure the occupants of an oncoming vehicle, despite defendant's contention that defendant was attempting suicide and therefore was intending only to inflict bodily injury on self. Anderson v. State, 254 Ga. 470, 330 S.E.2d 592 (1985).

Intent to perform illegal act.

- It was unnecessary to prove that the defendant intended to injure the victim to sustain an aggravated assault conviction under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) as long as it was proved that the defendant intended to perform the illegal act which caused the intended victim to be apprehensive of receiving a violent injury. Gray v. State, 257 Ga. App. 393, 571 S.E.2d 435 (2002).

Evidence as to weapon's character.

- In an aggravated assault case, since no witness saw a weapon or "sharp instrument" as alleged in the indictment, evidence that as a result of the defendant's attack, the victim suffered a clean cut from the forehead to the lip was sufficient to allow the jury to infer that the wound was caused by a sharp instrument. Evidence as to wounds inflicted was sufficient for a jury to infer a weapon's character. Miller v. State, 292 Ga. App. 641, 666 S.E.2d 35 (2008), cert. denied, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 903 (Ga. 2008).

No requirement that assault must be with deadly weapon in order to convict under Ga. L. 1968, pp. 1249, 1280 (see O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21). Thadd v. State, 231 Ga. 623, 203 S.E.2d 230 (1974).

"Assault with a deadly weapon" and "assault with intent to murder" compared.

- While an assault with intent to commit murder is usually manifested by the use of some deadly weapon, yet the offense of an assault with intent to commit murder may be committed without a weapon likely to produce death. Wright v. State, 40 Ga. App. 118, 149 S.E. 153 (1929).

Aggravated assault was intended to include former offense of stabbing provided the weapon was in fact of the denominated character. A knife "designed for the purpose of offense and defense" is a deadly weapon almost by definition. Wells v. State, 125 Ga. App. 579, 188 S.E.2d 407 (1972); Johnson v. State, 185 Ga. App. 167, 363 S.E.2d 773 (1987).

Offense of shooting at another is form of aggravated assault. Bentley v. State, 131 Ga. App. 425, 205 S.E.2d 904 (1974).

Offense of shooting at another is replaced by aggravated assault under Ga. L. 1968, pp. 1249, 1280 et seq. (see O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21). Wells v. State, 125 Ga. App. 579, 188 S.E.2d 407 (1972).

Deliberately firing gun in direction of another constitutes aggravated assault.

- When defendant admitted deliberately firing a gun in the direction of a victim to scare the victim, such action constitutes use of a deadly weapon to commit an act which places another in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury and amounts to aggravated assault, absent justification. Williams v. State, 249 Ga. 6, 287 S.E.2d 31 (1982).

Intentionally firing a gun at another, absent justification, is sufficient in and of itself to support a conviction of aggravated assault. Steele v. State, 196 Ga. App. 330, 396 S.E.2d 4 (1990); Belins v. State, 210 Ga. App. 259, 435 S.E.2d 675 (1993); Lewis v. State, 215 Ga. App. 161, 450 S.E.2d 448 (1994); Creson v. State, 218 Ga. App. 184, 460 S.E.2d 83 (1995); Tiller v. State, 267 Ga. 888, 485 S.E.2d 720 (1997); Goodman v. State, 237 Ga. App. 795, 516 S.E.2d 824 (1999).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for directed verdict of acquittal, as direct evidence that the defendant fired at the victim and the defendant's own admission that the defendant fired at the victim was sufficient to submit the question of whether the defendant was guilty of aggravated assault to the jury; no error occurred pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-6), involving a conviction based solely on circumstantial evidence, as the state offered more than circumstantial evidence to support the state's case against the defendant. Cobb v. State, 268 Ga. App. 66, 601 S.E.2d 443 (2004).

Because former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8) provided that a victim's testimony, standing alone, was sufficient, the victim's testimony that defendant twice shot at the victim was sufficient to find defendant guilty of violating O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) despite testimony to the contrary. Hartley v. State, 299 Ga. App. 534, 683 S.E.2d 109 (2009).

That defendant did not initiate fight does not necessarily show that defendant was not guilty of aggravated assault. Russell v. State, 152 Ga. App. 693, 263 S.E.2d 689 (1979).

Admission of evidence of drug use was proper.

- Defendant was properly convicted for felony murder, malice murder, and aggravated assault where the defendant was seen twice beating someone with a pipe and yelling at the person regarding drugs, and where the person died as a result of injuries from that beating two days later. Admission at the defendant's trial of use of drugs was proper because it was not admitted purely to impugn the defendant's character, but was relevant as to motive. Dyers v. State, 277 Ga. 859, 596 S.E.2d 595 (2004).

Extrinsic evidence held harmless.

- Defendant's conviction for armed robbery and aggravated assault was affirmed because, given the overwhelming evidence, it was highly unlikely that the admission of the testimony concerning the subsequent burglary contributed to the verdict in this case, even if it was erroneous to allow such evidence. Hutchinson v. State, 318 Ga. App. 627, 733 S.E.2d 517 (2012).

Because evidence of the defendant's prior drug use, and history of crimes committed against family members fueled by that drug usage, were properly admitted as relevant to the crimes charged, despite incidentally placing the defendant's character in issue, convictions for both aggravated assault and simple assault were upheld on appeal. Jones v. State, 283 Ga. App. 812, 642 S.E.2d 887 (2007).

Pre- and post-Miranda statements properly admitted.

- In a prosecution for aggravated assault and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, despite testimony from the arresting officer that the defendant was complaining of physical problems and under the influence of alcohol, both the pre- and post-Miranda statements made, as well as the numerous voluntary and unsolicited remarks which were not made in response to any form of interrogation, were properly admitted. Dorsey v. State, 285 Ga. App. 510, 646 S.E.2d 713 (2007).

Defendant's statements admissible.

- With regard to the defendant's conviction for aggravated assault, the trial court did not err by admitting the defendant's statements because the defendant was not in custody at the time the statements were made as the detective met with the defendant at the hospital, no arrest occurred, the defendant was not restrained in any way, and was free to go. Davis v. State, 320 Ga. App. 753, 740 S.E.2d 707 (2013).

Evidence of victim's character properly excluded.

- In a prosecution for aggravated assault, to the extent that the defendant sought to attack the victim's character through testimony about the victim's use of alcohol during pregnancy, whether the victim hid the defendant from the police, and the victim's alleged jealousy over the defendant's new relationship, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the scope of cross-examination to the issues directly related to the incidents. Massey v. State, 278 Ga. App. 303, 628 S.E.2d 706 (2006).

Evidence was properly excluded under rape shield law.

- Trial court properly applied O.C.G.A. § 23-2-3 by refusing to allow testimony that a victim of domestic violence had been seen working as a prostitute because that information had no relevance to the aggravated assault and false imprisonment charges for which a defendant was convicted, and further, the defendant failed to produce any evidence that could have provided a nexus between the alleged prostitution and a conclusion that someone else might have inflicted the victim's injuries. Moorer v. State, 290 Ga. App. 216, 659 S.E.2d 422 (2008).

No speedy trial violation.

- Convictions for armed robbery, aggravated assault with the intent to rob, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon were proper because the defendant's right to a speedy trial was not violated by the 20-month delay between the date the indictment was issued to the date of the defendant's actual trial as the delay was due to a higher priority of statutory speedy trial demands, so it was not a deliberate delay on the part of the state, and as the defendant failed to show any prejudice from the delay. Herndon v. State, 277 Ga. App. 374, 626 S.E.2d 579 (2006).

Denial of motion to sever.

- In a prosecution on two counts of attempting to hijack a motor vehicle, four counts of aggravated assault, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, and criminal trespass, because the offenses committed by a defendant and a codefendant amounted to a series of continuous acts connected together both in time and the area in which committed, and there was no likelihood of confusion, the trial court did not abuse of discretion in denying the defendant's motion to sever the trial from that of the codefendant; furthermore, the mere fact that the codefendants' defenses were antagonistic was insufficient in itself to warrant separate trials. Diaz v. State, 280 Ga. App. 413, 634 S.E.2d 160 (2006).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to sever the charges of rape, aggravated assault, kidnapping with bodily injury, and aggravated sodomy arising out of three sexual assaults against three different women because the charges against the defendant clearly showed a recurring pattern of conduct suggesting a common scheme or modus operandi as the victims of the three sexual assaults were adult women who did not know the defendant, all three incidents occurred in DeKalb County within six months of each other, each victim was taken by vehicle to a secluded location before the victims were raped, all three incidents involved a handgun, and semen matching the defendant's DNA profile was found on each victim. Ray v. State, 329 Ga. App. 5, 763 S.E.2d 361 (2014).

State's peremptory strikes were valid.

- While defendant made out a prima facie case of racial discrimination regarding the state's use of three peremptory strikes, sufficient race-neutral reasons existed for those strikes; thus, given the court's jury charges and recharge to the jury, the court's responses to questions from the jury, and waiver of improper bolstering objection on appeal, defendant's aggravated assault and armed robbery convictions were upheld on appeal, as was the court's denial of a motion for a new trial. LeMon v. State, 290 Ga. App. 527, 660 S.E.2d 11 (2008).

Jury determinations.

- Whether the defendant's means of attack was deadly and whether the defendant's acts were punishable as an aggravated assault or as simple battery were matters properly left to the jury. Guevara v. State, 151 Ga. App. 444, 260 S.E.2d 491 (1979).

Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the defendant's aggravated assault conviction was upheld on appeal as conflicts in the evidence between the defendant's version of the facts and that version offered by the other witnesses were for the jury, not the appeals court, to resolve. Hicks v. State, 281 Ga. App. 461, 636 S.E.2d 183 (2006).

Sufficient evidence was presented to the jury to support the defendant's convictions for armed robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, criminal attempt to commit aggravated sodomy, and possession of a knife during the commission of a crime because the victim's testimony alone was sufficient to support the convictions; regardless of any inconsistencies in the victim's testimony, it was for the jury to assess witness credibility, and the jury chose to believe the victim's identification of the defendant as the individual who committed the crimes. Williams v. State, 300 Ga. App. 839, 686 S.E.2d 446 (2009).

Testimony of the victim and other state witnesses was sufficient to authorize a rational jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravated assault, criminal damage to property in the second degree, and battery because it was the role of the jury, not the court of appeals, to resolve conflicts in the evidence, assess witness credibility, and decide whether to believe the victim's or the defendant's version of events; the defendant punched the victim, drew a handgun from the defendant's pants, and fired at the victim, and at trial, the victim, the responding officers, and the state's ballistic expert testified to the events. Bryant v. State, 309 Ga. App. 649, 710 S.E.2d 854 (2011).

Evidence was sufficient for a rational factfinder to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of false imprisonment, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-41(a), burglary, O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1(a), and aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), because, although the defendant argued that there was insufficient credible and admissible evidence to show that the defendant was the victim's attacker, determinations of witness credibility and the weight to give the evidence presented was solely within the province of the jury; defense counsel thoroughly cross-examined the victim, the responding officers, and the investigator regarding the victim's demeanor after the attack, the victim's description of the attack and the attacker, and the inconsistencies between what the victim told each of them. Pennington v. State, 313 Ga. App. 764, 723 S.E.2d 13 (2012).

Jury charge on justification not plain error.

- Defendant failed to show plain error in the jury charge on justification because the defendant could not demonstrate that the alleged error in the jury charge likely affected the outcome of the proceedings as the evidence was overwhelming that the defendant was the initial aggressor who attacked the unarmed victim with the metal bar and, thus, that the defendant did not act in self-defense and was guilty of aggravated assault. Tremblay v. State, 329 Ga. App. 139, 764 S.E.2d 163 (2014).

Guilty plea free and voluntary.

- Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in denying the defendant's motion to withdraw a guilty plea to two counts of kidnapping and two counts of aggravated assault as the trial court was well aware of the medications the defendant was taking when the plea was entered, the medications did not affect the defendant's ability to understand the proceedings, and an expert opined that the defendant was feigning hallucinations and was competent to stand trial; hence, at that point, the trial court had no duty to make any further inquiries into the defendant's ability to competently tender a plea. McDowell v. State, 282 Ga. App. 754, 639 S.E.2d 644 (2006).

Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in denying the defendant's motion to withdraw a guilty plea to aggravated assault because the defendant was thoroughly questioned about the plea, fully informed and cognizant of the rights the defendant was waiving, and fully aware of the consequences of the plea; the purported recantation evidence proffered at the hearing was very weak, and at the plea hearing, the defendant admitted under oath that the defendant committed two acts of aggravated assault. Williams v. State, 315 Ga. App. 704, 727 S.E.2d 532 (2012).

Double jeopardy since aggravated assault was underlying offense in felony murder.

- Second prosecution on an aggravated assault charge was barred by double jeopardy because the assault charge served as the underlying offense to the felony murder charge and was a lesser included offense of felony murder; the court of appeals erred by failing to consider the implications of the modified merger rule when reviewing the defendant's double jeopardy claim because the aggravated assault charge was perpetrated against the victim and was an integral part of the homicide, and the evidence authorized a charge on voluntary manslaughter on which the defendant was convicted. Williams v. State, 288 Ga. 7, 700 S.E.2d 564 (2010).

Double jeopardy did not bar retrial.

- Defendant's acquittal on felony murder under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-1(c) and aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21 did not bar retrial on a voluntary manslaughter charge under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-2(a) as the collateral estoppel doctrine under the Double Jeopardy Clause, U.S. Const., amend. 5, and Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XVIII, did not apply because voluntary manslaughter required proof of an element not found in felony murder or aggravated assault, and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and voluntary manslaughter were mutually exclusive. Roesser v. State, 316 Ga. App. 850, 730 S.E.2d 641 (2012).

Aggravated assault is not a capital felony. Jones v. State, 246 Ga. 109, 269 S.E.2d 6 (1980).

State was not required to prove victim's certification as a police officer under the Georgia Peace Officer Standards and Training Act, O.C.G.A. § 35-8-1 et seq., in order to make a prima facie showing that the victim was acting as a peace officer within the contemplation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(c). Cornwell v. State, 193 Ga. App. 561, 388 S.E.2d 353, cert. denied, 193 Ga. App. 909, 388 S.E.2d 353 (1989).

Victim's apprehension of violent injuries.

- In a prosecution for felony murder, where defendant was charged with the underlying felony of aggravated assault by stabbing the victim with a knife, a deadly weapon, it was unnecessary for the state to show the victim's apprehension of the violent injuries inflicted. Brinson v. State, 272 Ga. 345, 529 S.E.2d 129 (2000).

Evidence was sufficient to allow the court to adjudicate the defendant a delinquent for committing an act which would have been an aggravated assault, under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), if committed by an adult, because a police officer testified that the juvenile pointed a gun at the officer. In the Interest of M.F., 276 Ga. App. 402, 623 S.E.2d 234 (2005).

Because sufficient evidence was presented supporting the jury's determination that the defendant's act of shooting the victim was not an accident and was not justified, the victim testified to knowing defendant had a gun, and the presence of a gun normally placed a victim in reasonable apprehension of being injured violently, the defendant's convictions for aggravated assault and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime were supported by the record. Dukes v. State, 285 Ga. App. 172, 645 S.E.2d 664 (2007).

Evidence was sufficient to support a finding of juvenile delinquency based on aggravated assault. The defendant committed an act with a deadly weapon, advancing on a deputy with a baton in the defendant's hand, putting the deputy in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury. In the Interest of J.A.C., 291 Ga. App. 728, 662 S.E.2d 811 (2008).

Evidence was sufficient to uphold the defendant's conviction for aggravated assault because all of the victims were together in a group, and one of the victim's testified that guns were pointed at everybody; the defendant's act of firing the weapon into the group made each individual a separate victim, and testimony that the victims were crying and screaming when the defendant fired was sufficient for the jury to conclude that the group too had a reasonable apprehension of receiving a violent injury, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a)(2). Gaither v. State, 312 Ga. App. 53, 717 S.E.2d 654 (2011), cert. denied, No. S12C0337, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 216 (Ga. 2012).

Violence against a parent.

- When the defendant, while cursing and screaming at the defendant's parent, stood near the parent, holding a pot of boiling water and staring at the parent, the defendant's acts constituted aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2). The acts constituted both a substantial step toward committing a battery and a demonstration of violence against the parent, and showed a present ability to inflict injury that placed the parent in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury under § 16-5-21(a)(2). In the Interest of T.Y.B., 288 Ga. App. 610, 654 S.E.2d 688 (2007).

Prior transaction evidence properly admitted.

- Trial court did not err in admitting prior transaction evidence sufficiently similar to the charged aggravated assault offense in order to disprove the defendant's claim of accident and to show intent and course of conduct as proof of the prior offense helped prove an element of the aggravated assault. Mack v. State, 283 Ga. App. 172, 641 S.E.2d 194 (2007).

Similar transaction evidence of an eight-year-old incident in which the defendant robbed two victims at gunpoint was not too remote in time or dissimilar to the armed robbery and aggravated assault charges the defendant was being tried for, and was thus properly admitted to show course of conduct, bent of mind, motive, and identity. Wallace v. State, 295 Ga. App. 452, 671 S.E.2d 911 (2009).

Evidence of an earlier altercation between the defendant and a former girlfriend was admissible in the aggravated assault of the victim, the former girlfriend's brother, because the state of mind required for the charged offense of aggravated assault against the victim was the same as the state of mind required for the uncharged act against the former girlfriend, which could have constituted an aggravated assault; the other act was probative of the issue of the defendant's intent, which defense counsel argued to the jury was the biggest issue in the case; and the evidence was sufficient to show that the prior bad act occurred and that the defendant was the person who accosted and threatened the former girlfriend with the knife. Wilson v. State, 336 Ga. App. 60, 783 S.E.2d 662 (2016).

Error in admitting similar transaction evidence required reversal.

- While state presented sufficient evidence of the victim's age to support assault charge under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(1), because the trial court clearly erred in admitting evidence of two burglaries defendant committed in 1998 as similar transactions to help prove the issue of identity, defendant's aggravated assault, burglary, robbery, theft, and battery convictions were reversed. Usher v. State, 290 Ga. App. 710, 659 S.E.2d 920 (2008).

Evidence of previous crimes improperly admitted to show intent.

- Appellant's convictions for felony murder, aggravated assault, and knife-possession offenses were reversed because the Georgia Supreme Court could not say that the trial court's erroneous admission of the voluminous evidence that the appellant had previously committed multiple serious violent acts did not contribute to the guilty verdicts that the jury returned. Strong v. State, Ga. , 845 S.E.2d 653 (2020).

Prior convictions properly admitted for both impeachment and sentencing purposes.

- Trial court properly admitted certified copies of the defendant's two prior convictions of aggravated assault and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony as: (1) the court carefully balanced the competing interests; (2) the prior offenses had a substantial probative value which outweighed their prejudicial effect; and (3) nothing prevented the use of a defendant's convictions for both impeachment and sentencing purposes. Moreover, the court rejected the defendant's claim that by adding the word "substantially" to the balancing test, the Georgia legislature meant to incorporate the standard for admissibility embodied in Fed. R. Evid. 609(b). Newsome v. State, 289 Ga. App. 590, 657 S.E.2d 540 (2008), cert. denied, No. S08C1042, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 494 (Ga. 2008).

Comment in closing did not warrant new trial.

- Aggravated assault conviction was upheld on appeal, and the defendant was not entitled to a new trial, as the prosecution's closing argument, utilizing an analogy between the defendant's case and a similar separate case involving other parties, was within the parameters of an appropriate closing argument. Moss v. State, 278 Ga. App. 221, 628 S.E.2d 648 (2006).

Guilty verdicts were of aggravated assaults of peace officers.

- Defendant was convicted of aggravated assault of a peace officer where: (1) the evidence showed that the defendant attempted to run law enforcement officers off the road; (2) the indictment was sufficient to charge aggravated assault of a peace officer; (3) the jury was instructed to determine whether any guilty verdict was aggravated assault or aggravated assault of a peace officer; (4) the jury did not specify whether the guilty verdicts were of assaults against peace officers; and (5) the defendant did not object to the jury's failure to specify whether the convictions were for assaults against peace officers at the time the verdicts were announced. Dupree v. State, 267 Ga. App. 561, 600 S.E.2d 654 (2004).

Aggravated assault on security guard.

- When, in an obvious attempt to incapacitate an armed security guard, the defendant pulled the trigger of the defendant's own weapon in that direction, an aggravated assault was committed. Lambert v. State, 157 Ga. App. 275, 277 S.E.2d 66 (1981).

Lawful discharge of official duties.

- Officers who were summoned to the scene of a domestic disturbance and saw defendant forcibly march defendant's family into their dwelling, quite possibly at gunpoint, had probable cause to effectuate a warrantless arrest for a battery constituting a family violence and, thus, were engaged in the performance of official duties for purposes of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21. Duitsman v. State, 212 Ga. App. 348, 441 S.E.2d 888 (1994).

Defendant was properly convicted of aggravated assault on a police officer, under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(c), when, under the totality of the circumstances, the officer had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the defendant of criminal activity. Ramirez v. State, 279 Ga. 569, 619 S.E.2d 668 (2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1217, 126 S. Ct. 1435, 164 L. Ed. 2d 138 (2006).

Police officer moonlighting as security guard performing "official duties."

- State proved every element of crime charged although indictment charged defendant with aggravated assault on a police officer engaged in the performance of the officer's official duties where the officer was moonlighting as a security guard at the time of the assault, as the officer had an "official duty" to take action when defendant breached the peace. Loumakis v. State, 179 Ga. App. 294, 346 S.E.2d 373 (1986).

Merger required with aggravated assault on peace officer.

- Record clearly showed that the crime of obstruction was established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the crime of aggravated assault on a peace officer; thus, the convictions for aggravated assault on a peace officer and felony obstruction of a peace officer should have merged. Reid v. State, 339 Ga. App. 772, 792 S.E.2d 732 (2016), overruled on other grounds by Collier v. State, 834 S.E.2d 769, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 708 (Ga. 2019).

Conviction for assault authorized though intended criminal act is completed.

- It is the intent of the Legislature that, although an assault may be a criminal attempt, and even though the intended criminal act be completed, a conviction for an assault is authorized. Williams v. State, 141 Ga. App. 201, 233 S.E.2d 48 (1977).

Aggravated assault conviction approved although battery completed. Williams v. State, 141 Ga. App. 201, 233 S.E.2d 48 (1977).

Assault with pistol not completed.

- When defendant was arrested, indicted, and tried on three counts of aggravated assault: (1) shooting at another with a pistol; (2) attempting to shoot another with a pistol; and (3) attempting to run over another with an automobile, the assault with the automobile was clearly completed (the car had been stopped and placed in "park") before the assault with the pistol began. However, the evidence did not authorize the jury to conclude that the assault with the pistol was "completed" between the time that defendant fired shots while on the run and the time when defendant caught up with defendant's quarry and attempted to fire additional shots from a stationary position, so that the two charges involving the use of a pistol referred to acts that were parts of a single transaction and defendant therefore could not properly be convicted on both charges. Davis v. State, 186 Ga. App. 491, 367 S.E.2d 884 (1988).

Aggravated assault and hit-and-run are not mutually exclusive crimes.

- Aggravated assault with a motor vehicle and hit-and-run with that same vehicle are not mutually exclusive crimes, since an aggravated assault includes a finding of intent which is not an element of hit-and-run. Gutierrez v. State, 235 Ga. App. 878, 510 S.E.2d 570 (1998).

Conduct outside scope of involuntary manslaughter.

- Whether the conduct of an accused is lawful at the outset, e.g., in self-defense or unlawful, when what takes place thereafter discloses felonious conduct in committing either an aggravated assault with an instrument likely to produce death or an aggravated battery which causes the death of another, such conduct is not within the scope of involuntary manslaughter. Trask v. State, 132 Ga. App. 645, 208 S.E.2d 591 (1974).

Defendant was not entitled to a sentence reduction because the aggravated assault and aggravated stalking statutes did not define the same offense and did not address the same criminal conduct, the former offense addressing assault with the object likely to result in serious bodily injury and the latter offense addressing harassment and intimidation of a victim. Myrick v. State, 325 Ga. App. 607, 754 S.E.2d 395 (2014).

Cruelty to children conviction did not merge with aggravated assault or false imprisonment.

- Defendant's cruelty to children in the first degree charge did not merge with the aggravated assault or false imprisonment charge because neither aggravated assault nor false imprisonment required proof that the victim suffered cruel or excessive physical or mental pain. Kirt v. State, 309 Ga. App. 227, 709 S.E.2d 840 (2011).

No merger with family violence battery.

- Family violence aggravated assault and the family violence aggravated battery convictions did not merge because the evidence showed that the defendant completed one crime before committing the other and that the crimes were based on different conduct as the aggravated battery charge was based on the defendant striking the victim with the defendant's fist and depriving the victim of two upper incisors, and the aggravated assault charge was based on the defendant striking the victim with a wire hanger and pouring lighter fluid on the victim's person and setting the victim on fire. Outz v. State, 344 Ga. App. 616, 810 S.E.2d 678 (2018).

Merger not appropriate.

- Trial court did not err in failing to merge an aggravated assault count into a kidnapping with bodily injury count, the aggravated assault count into an aggravated battery count, and the aggravated battery count into the kidnapping count, as each count referred to a separate cut of the victims with a decorative sword that the defendant had pulled off the wall during a domestic dispute with the defendant's spouse and child. Brown v. State, 275 Ga. App. 99, 619 S.E.2d 789 (2005).

Due to the entry of a guilty plea over 20 years before the filing of a motion to correct alleged illegal sentences, the defendant's merger claim was waived, and since the sentences imposed were not void, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the motion for correction. Sanders v. State, 282 Ga. App. 834, 640 S.E.2d 353 (2006).

Because the jury could reasonably have concluded that the victim's first two injuries from two non-fatal shots resulted from a separate offense than the third, the earlier shots were sufficient to support the aggravated assault conviction, separate from the third and fatal shot, and there was no merger of the aggravated assault offense with a separate charge of malice murder. Parker v. State, 281 Ga. 490, 640 S.E.2d 44 (2007).

Because separate cruelty to children and aggravated assault counts were based upon acts committed by the defendant on the day preceding the death of the victim, neither of those convictions merged into the felony murder count also filed against the defendant and, accordingly, separate sentences for those crimes were authorized. Christian v. State, 281 Ga. 474, 640 S.E.2d 21 (2007).

Defendant's aggravated assault conviction did not merge into a felony murder conviction because neither the murder nor the underlying felony of criminal attempt to commit armed robbery required the state to prove the element of reasonable apprehension of receiving a violent injury, which was a required element of the aggravated assault count as indicted. Willingham v. State, 281 Ga. 577, 642 S.E.2d 43 (2007).

Defendant's convictions of involuntary manslaughter while in the commission of a simple battery, aggravated assault, aggravated battery, cruelty to children, and reckless conduct were not mutually exclusive, and the trial court did not err in not merging the nonhomicide counts upon sentencing. Waits v. State, 282 Ga. 1, 644 S.E.2d 127 (2007), overruled on other grounds by State v. Lane, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 98 (Ga. 2020).

Aggravated assault with a rope and kidnapping with bodily injury offenses did not merge for sentencing purposes as one crime was completed before the other took place, and the crimes were established by separate and distinct facts. McCaskell v. State, 285 Ga. App. 592, 646 S.E.2d 761 (2007).

An aggravated assault conviction did not merge as a matter of fact with a murder conviction because the evidence presented at trial showed that the defendant inflicted a severe, but non-fatal, beating upon the victim that was separate and distinct from the choking and strangling which resulted in the victim's death. Starks v. State, 283 Ga. 164, 656 S.E.2d 518 (2008).

Because the evidence presented against the defendant showed two distinct acts of aggravated assault, separated by time and motive, the two offenses did not merge. Boyd v. State, 289 Ga. App. 342, 656 S.E.2d 864 (2008), cert. denied, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 498 (Ga. 2008).

Because charges alleging aggravated assault did not amount to lesser-included offenses as a matter of fact of a charge of first-degree criminal damage to property, and the property offense was not a lesser-included offense of any aggravated assault offense, merger of the offenses was unwarranted. Louis v. State, 290 Ga. App. 106, 658 S.E.2d 897 (2008).

When a defendant pulled out a gun and demanded money from a cab driver, the offense of criminal attempt armed robbery was complete, and the defendant's subsequent acts, including striking the driver on the head, were not necessary to prove that offense; thus, the attempt offense did not merge with aggravated assault offenses for sentencing purposes. Duncan v. State, 290 Ga. App. 32, 658 S.E.2d 780 (2008).

Because: (1) different facts were used to prove an aggravated assault and an armed robbery, specifically, that the armed robbery was complete after the defendant laid a handgun on the counter in the convenience store, demanded that the victim open the register, and a codefendant took money from the a register; and (2) the separate offense of aggravated assault occurred when the defendant struck the victim in the head with the gun, the offenses did not merge as a matter of fact. Thus, the separate sentences imposed for each offense were upheld, and no double jeopardy violation occurred. Garibay v. State, 290 Ga. App. 385, 659 S.E.2d 775 (2008).

As the offense of aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(1), required proof of at least one additional fact which the offense of robbery by intimidation, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a), did not, under the "required evidence" test of O.C.G.A. § 16-1-7, a defendant's aggravated assault conviction did not merge into the defendant's robbery by intimidation conviction. Elamin v. State, 293 Ga. App. 591, 667 S.E.2d 439 (2008).

Defendant's aggravated assault and aggravated battery convictions under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21(a) and16-5-24(a) did not merge under O.C.G.A. § 16-1-7(a), although both stemmed from the same act. The aggravated assault charge required proof that the defendant attempted to commit a violent injury with the intent to murder using a deadly weapon, while the aggravated battery charge required proof that the defendant maliciously caused bodily harm to the victim by rendering a member of the victim's body useless; thus, the offenses were distinct, with each requiring proof of a fact which the other did not. Robbins v. State, 293 Ga. App. 584, 667 S.E.2d 684 (2008).

Defendant's aggravated assault convictions under both O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(1) and (a)(2) did not merge because the state presented evidence that two separate assaults on the victim occurred at separate times and in different ways; from the evidence, the jury could reasonably infer that the defendant used the defendant's hands to choke the victim and that at a separate time and a different location, the defendant also jammed a curling iron down the victim's throat. Lord v. State, 297 Ga. App. 88, 676 S.E.2d 404 (2009).

Trial court did not err in refusing to merge six aggravated assault counts into one count or in charging the jury that it could find the defendant guilty on the six separate counts because the act of firing a weapon into a group made each individual in the group a separate victim and justified a separate count of aggravated assault for each victim. Scott v. State, 302 Ga. App. 111, 690 S.E.2d 242 (2010).

Defendant's convictions for aggravated assault in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) and feticide in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-80(a) did not merge for sentencing purposes because the victim of the aggravated assault was the defendant's girlfriend, while the victim of the feticide was the girlfriend's unborn child; the merger doctrine does not apply if each of the charged crimes was committed against a different victim. Carmichael v. State, 305 Ga. App. 651, 700 S.E.2d 650 (2010).

Defendant's guilty pleas for aggravated assault with intent to rape in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(1) and kidnapping in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-40(a) were not accepted in violation of the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy because the offenses did not merge as a matter of law since each of the offenses were separate and required proof of different facts; the state asserted that the defendant had dragged the victim from the front of a laundromat facility into a bathroom in the back of the facility, which formed a basis for the kidnapping charge, and that the defendant had sexually assaulted the victim while holding the victim in the bathroom, which formed a basis for the aggravated assault with the intent to rape charge. Shelton v. State, 307 Ga. App. 599, 705 S.E.2d 699 (2011), overruled on other grounds by Collier v. State, 834 S.E.2d 769, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 708 (Ga. 2019).

Defendant's aggravated assault convictions did not merge because the counts of the indictment requiring the state to prove that the defendant slashed the victim's neck with a sharp-edged instrument, hit the victim with a hammer and wrapped a cord around the victim's neck with the intent to murder were based on different conduct and merger of those convictions was not required. Thomas v. State, 310 Ga. App. 404, 714 S.E.2d 37 (2011).

Trial court was correct not to merge the defendant's convictions for armed robbery and aggravated assault because although the defendant's conviction for the armed robbery of the victim resulted from a holdup, the conviction for aggravated assault was based on the defendant's forcing the shotgun down the victim's throat later in a bathroom. Thomas v. State, 289 Ga. 877, 717 S.E.2d 187 (2011).

Trial court did not err in failing to merge the defendant's aggravated assault convictions because, although the convictions arose from the same acts, the convictions did not merge as a matter of fact or law since each count was based upon harm to a different victim. Gaither v. State, 312 Ga. App. 53, 717 S.E.2d 654 (2011), cert. denied, No. S12C0337, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 216 (Ga. 2012).

Aggravated assault and armed robbery convictions did not merge for sentencing purposes because the trial court was authorized to conclude that the assault with a gun was a separate act from the armed robbery, which occurred after the victim had been pistol-whipped. McGlasker v. State, 321 Ga. App. 614, 741 S.E.2d 303 (2013).

Trial court erred by merging all four of the family violence aggravated assault verdicts into the malice murder verdict as the family violence aggravated assault verdict will not merge into a verdict for murder. Jeffrey v. State, 296 Ga. 713, 770 S.E.2d 585 (2015).

Trial court did not err in declining to merge the defendant's aggravated assault and aggravated battery convictions for sentencing as the aggravated assault was a separate act from the ensuing act of aggravated battery because the aggravated assault occurred when the defendant pointed the gun at the victim's head, while the aggravated battery did not occur until after the aggravated assault caused the victim to move defensively, and the defendant then took a separate action of moving toward the victim, which led to the struggle that resulted in the victim getting shot in the spine. Williams v. State, 332 Ga. App. 805, 775 S.E.2d 178 (2015).

Trial court did not err by failing to merge the rape count with a count of aggravated assault as the defendant's choking of the victim, which supported the assault, occurred prior to the rape and was a separate and distinct act of force and intimidation outside of that necessary to accomplish the rape. Bolden v. State, 335 Ga. App. 653, 782 S.E.2d 708 (2016), overruled on other grounds by Quiller v. State, 338 Ga. App. 206, 789 S.E.2d 391 (2016).

Trial court did not err by failing to merge the convictions for aggravated assault and felony obstruction because each offense required proof of an additional element that the other did not. Gordon v. State, 337 Ga. App. 64, 785 S.E.2d 900 (2016).

Merger appropriate.

- Two counts of aggravated assault merge since both convictions were based on the same act. Smith v. State, 279 Ga. App. 211, 630 S.E.2d 833 (2006).

Upon the concession by the state on appeal, the two aggravated-assault counts the defendant was convicted of should have merged because there was no ensuing interval between the defendant's first act of pointing the gun at the victim's head and the later act of lowering the gun's aim and shooting that victim in the leg. Mack v. State, 283 Ga. App. 172, 641 S.E.2d 194 (2007).

Although an armed robbery served as the predicate felony for one count of felony murder, there was a separate felony murder count predicated on aggravated assault; hence, when the jury found the defendant guilty of both counts, it was within the trial court's discretion to choose to merge the aggravated assault rather than the armed robbery into the felony murder count for which appellant was sentenced. Hill v. State, 281 Ga. 795, 642 S.E.2d 64 (2007).

One of defendant's aggravated assault convictions merged as a matter of fact with armed robbery. Fagan v. State, 283 Ga. App. 784, 643 S.E.2d 268 (2007).

When the defendant pulled out a gun and demanded money from a cab driver, put the vehicle in park, hit the driver on the head with the gun and shot the gun into the floor, then ordered the driver out of the cab, the offenses of aggravated assault with intent to rob and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon merged as a matter of fact for sentencing purposes, as the evidence did not support a separate conviction for assault with intent to rob; since any reasonable apprehension of receiving a violent or bodily injury related to the threat posed by the gun, not to the actions of putting the vehicle into park and directing the driver out of the cab, no separate aggravated assault occurred. Duncan v. State, 290 Ga. App. 32, 658 S.E.2d 780 (2008).

Defendant's aggravated assault convictions were to be merged with armed robbery and kidnapping convictions as the same set of facts were used to prove the offenses. Lenon v. State, 290 Ga. App. 626, 660 S.E.2d 16 (2008).

Because a defendant's convictions for armed robbery (O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a)) and aggravated assault (O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)) were based on the same conduct - the defendant's pointing a gun at the victim with the intent to rob the victim - merger was required. Therefore, the sentence for the aggravated assault was vacated. Reed v. State, 293 Ga. App. 479, 668 S.E.2d 1 (2008).

Trial court erred in failing to merge a defendant's offenses of aggravated battery under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24(a) and aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a), for sentencing purposes, because the assault was a lesser included offense of the battery offense under O.C.G.A. § 16-1-6(1), given the defendant's single attack on the victim with a golf club. Allen v. State, 302 Ga. App. 190, 690 S.E.2d 492 (2010).

Defendant's convictions for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and aggravated assault with intent to murder merged for sentencing because both counts of the indictment alleged that the defendant committed aggravated assault by slashing the victim's neck; although one count alleged that the assault was done with a deadly weapon and the other alleged that it was done with the intent to commit murder, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(1) and (a)(2), the counts were clearly based on a single act since the razor or knife used in that assault broke while it was pressed against the victim's neck, and thus, the counts merely charged the same act of aggravated assault being committed in two of the multiple ways set out in O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21. Thomas v. State, 310 Ga. App. 404, 714 S.E.2d 37 (2011).

Defendant's conviction for aggravated assault should have been merged into a malice murder conviction pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-1-7(a)(1), based on the "required evidence" test, as the aggravated assault, as pled, did not require proof of a fact not required to have been proved in the malice murder. Culpepper v. State, 289 Ga. 736, 715 S.E.2d 155 (2011).

Defendant's convictions for armed robbery and aggravated assault should have been merged for sentencing, as a co-defendant's actions, which occurred either concurrently or in rapid succession, were committed as part of one uninterrupted criminal transaction and in pursuit of a specific, predetermined goal: the armed robbery of a single victim. Crowley v. State, 315 Ga. App. 755, 728 S.E.2d 282 (2012).

Trial court erred in failing to merge defendant's conviction for aggravated assault into defendant's conviction for armed robbery. Williams v. State, 316 Ga. App. 821, 730 S.E.2d 541 (2012).

Trial court erred by not merging the aggravated assault offense into the armed robbery offense for sentencing purposes, as the evidence showed one transaction, where the defendant pointed the revolver at the victim and took the victim's money and cell phone, and there was not break between that time and when the defendant asked if the defendant should also take the keys to the vehicle. Dean v. State, 327 Ga. App. 9, 755 S.E.2d 245 (2014).

Defendant's conviction for aggravated assault should have merged with the conviction for criminal attempt to commit armed robbery because those acts were predicated upon the same act, the defendant's use of a handgun to overpower and intimidate the victim for the purpose of attempting to rob the victim of the victim's belongings. Morris v. State, 340 Ga. App. 295, 797 S.E.2d 207 (2017).

Merger with malice murder conviction.

- Trial court did not err in failing to merge the aggravated assault for which the defendant was sentenced into defendant's malice murder conviction because the two crimes were not established by the same conduct; the defendant's conduct did not establish the commission of both the aggravated assault and the murder because the aggravated assault was established by evidence that the defendant and the codefendant beat and strangled the victim, whereas the murder was established by evidence that they killed the victim by stabbing the victim's body. Hall v. State, 286 Ga. 358, 687 S.E.2d 819 (2010).

Separate judgments of conviction and sentences for aggravated assault were vacated because the defendant was convicted of and sentenced for both the malice murders of the two victims and the aggravated assaults of those victims, and although there was no merger of those crimes as a matter of law, the record established that the aggravated assault convictions merged into the malice murder convictions as a matter of fact. Vergara v. State, 287 Ga. 194, 695 S.E.2d 215 (2010).

Defendant's conviction and sentence for aggravated assault was vacated and the case was remanded to the trial court for resentencing because the aggravated assault conviction merged into the defendant's malice murder conviction as a matter of fact even though there was no merger of those crimes as a matter of law. Sharpe v. State, 288 Ga. 565, 707 S.E.2d 338 (2011).

Defendant's conviction on a second aggravated assault should have merged into the malice murder conviction because the victim sustained two shots to the arm and one fatal shot to the back of the head, and the evidence did not authorize the finding of an additional "deliberate interval" between the second shot to the arm and the shot to the head; both were inflicted in close succession as the defendant confronted the victim. Ortiz v. State, 291 Ga. 3, 727 S.E.2d 103 (2012).

Merger with felony murder.

- Defendant's conviction for aggravated assault was not authorized because the count of the indictment that alleged aggravated assault had to be merged into the felony murder count; although the felony murder and the underlying felony were committed on different victims, the count of the indictment alleging felony murder set forth the aggravated assault against a victim as the underlying felony supporting the charge of felony murder. Glass v. State, 289 Ga. 542, 712 S.E.2d 851 (2011).

Aggravated assault did not merge with armed robbery.

- As the armed robberies and aggravated assaults the defendant was charged with were committed against different victims, the crimes did not merge as a matter of law or fact. Verdree v. State, 299 Ga. App. 673, 683 S.E.2d 632 (2009).

Trial court did not err when the court refused to merge the defendant's aggravated assault and armed robbery convictions because the armed robbery and aggravated assault were separate and distinct acts; the victim's testimony showed that the armed robbery was complete before the commission of the aggravated assault. Brown v. State, 314 Ga. App. 198, 723 S.E.2d 520 (2012).

Because an attempted armed robbery began when the defendant kicked down the victim's door, entered the victim's home with a firearm, and demanded that the victim give it up, and continued as the victim and a co-defendant struggled outside; after the victim was able to run away, the co-defendant shot the victim twice; the robbery and aggravated assault were separate offenses and did not merge. Cuyler v. State, 344 Ga. App. 532, 811 S.E.2d 42 (2018), cert. denied, No. S18C0874, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 482 (Ga. 2018).

Aggravated assault and armed robbery should merge.

- Trial court erred in failing to merge aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), and armed robbery, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41, counts because the state relied on the same act of assault to establish defendant's guilt of aggravated assault and armed robbery, and although the state would have been able to indict the defendant for aggravated assault based on conduct separate and distinct from the defendant's act of hitting the victim in the head with a baseball bat, the indictment specifically charged the defendant with the offense of aggravated assault; while armed robbery requires proof of additional facts, like aggravated assault with intent to rob, aggravated assault under § 16-5-21(a)(2) does not require proof of a fact not required to establish armed robbery. Taylor v. State, 304 Ga. App. 395, 696 S.E.2d 686 (2010).

Because the defendant's convictions for armed robbery and aggravated assault arose from the same act or transaction, the defendant's taking money from the victim at gunpoint, the defendant's aggravated assault conviction against that victim merged with the armed robbery conviction. Thomas v. State, 289 Ga. 877, 717 S.E.2d 187 (2011).

Conviction for aggravated assault should have been merged with the defendant's conviction for armed robbery because the convictions both required proof of the same elements. Bradley v. State, 292 Ga. 607, 740 S.E.2d 100 (2013).

Aggravated assault offense did not merge with kidnapping charge.

- Defendant's conviction for aggravated assault, which was based on the defendant's striking the victim with a pistol, did not merge with the defendant's kidnapping conviction, which was based on the defendant's forcing the victim upstairs, because the assault occurred prior to the kidnapping and was not necessary to accomplish the kidnapping. Williams v. State, 295 Ga. App. 9, 670 S.E.2d 828 (2008).

Trial court did not err under O.C.G.A. § 16-1-7 in failing to merge convictions for aggravated assault and aggravated battery with a conviction for kidnapping with bodily injury, as each crime required proof of at least one different element, and the state presented independent evidence to prove each individual crime as set out in the indictment. Evidence that the defendant pointed a gun at the victim and fired the gun at the floor near the victim, that the defendant used a wooden stick resembling a baseball bat to repeatedly hit the victim, and that the defendant hit and kicked the victim while the victim was tied up supported the three aggravated assault counts; aggravated battery was established by evidence that the defendant broke the victim's nose, wrist, and shoulder and knocked out two teeth and by evidence that the defendant burned the victim's hand and caused the victim to be bitten by fire ants; and kidnapping with bodily injury was proven by evidence of injuries to the victim due to being bound by rope. Rouse v. State, 295 Ga. App. 61, 670 S.E.2d 869 (2008).

Trial court correctly sentenced the defendant for both aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, and kidnapping with bodily injury, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-40, because the crimes did not merge since each of the two crimes required proof of at least one fact that the other did not, and the state provided such proof. Kidnapping required proof of asportation, holding the victim against the victim's will, and bodily injury, which was not required to prove aggravated assault; and aggravated assault required proof that the defendant used the defendant's hands, with either the intent to cause a violent injury or which placed the victim in reasonable fear of receiving a violent injury, but the kidnapping charge did not require such proof. Mayberry v. State, 301 Ga. App. 503, 687 S.E.2d 893 (2009).

Convictions for aggravated assault, under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), and kidnapping, under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-40, did not merge because the aggravated assault was completed when the defendant pointed a gun at the victim and grabbed the victim around the neck, while the asportation for the kidnapping occurred when the defendant then dragged the victim into another room. The movement of the victim from one room to another within the hotel room, even though of minimal duration, created an additional danger to the victim by enhancing the defendant's control over the victim, and it was not an inherent part of the aggravated assault. Williams v. State, 307 Ga. App. 675, 705 S.E.2d 906 (2011).

Merger with involuntary manslaughter.

- Defendant's sufficiency challenge became moot on appeal as the trial court merged the involuntary manslaughter count into the aggravated assault count for sentencing purposes. Ramirez v. State, 288 Ga. App. 249, 653 S.E.2d 837 (2007).

Merger with voluntary manslaughter.

- Trial court erred in entering a judgment of conviction against the defendant for aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), because that conviction should have been merged into the defendant's conviction for voluntary manslaughter, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-2(a); the defendant was charged in the indictment with voluntary manslaughter and aggravated assault for the stabbing of the victim, and the undisputed evidence at trial showed that the victim was stabbed one time in the chest, causing the victim's death. Muckle v. State, 307 Ga. App. 634, 705 S.E.2d 721 (2011).

Trial court erred in failing to merge both defendants' convictions for voluntary manslaughter and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon because the indictments charged the defendants with felony murder by alleging that the defendants committed aggravated assault, but the court then charged the defendants with aggravated assault based on the exact same conduct; and, although the jury convicted the defendants of voluntary manslaughter as a lesser-included offense of felony murder, it, nevertheless, followed that the defendants' convictions for aggravated assault merged as a matter of fact into the defendants convictions for voluntary manslaughter. Hamlette v. State (two cases), 353 Ga. App. 640, 839 S.E.2d 161 (2020).

Rule of lenity not applicable.

- Because the defendant could commit felony obstruction only if the defendant offered violence against an officer while the officer was in the lawful discharge of the officer's official duties and felony obstruction could occur regardless of whether it involved the use of an offensive weapon likely to result in serious bodily injury, unlike aggravated assault, the two offenses were not proved by the same evidence and the rule of lenity did not apply. Gordon v. State, 337 Ga. App. 64, 785 S.E.2d 900 (2016).

Trial court did not err by not applying the rule of lenity in sentencing the defendant on criminal attempt to commit a felony, rather than on aggravated assault, because the statutory language and indictment showed that the two counts did not address the same criminal conduct as the criminal attempt (of murder) included the substantial step of pulling the trigger of the handgun aimed at the victim's head, which additional step was not required for the commission of aggravated assault. Gonzalez v. State, 352 Ga. App. 83, 833 S.E.2d 727 (2019).

Corroborating accomplice testimony sufficient to support conviction.

- Because defendant's four accomplices in commission of multiple armed robberies and aggravated assaults corroborated each other as to defendant's participation in the crimes, convictions on those offenses were upheld on appeal. Hawkins v. State, 290 Ga. App. 686, 660 S.E.2d 474 (2008).

Because of the corroborating testimony from the defendant's two accomplices, the accomplice testimony was admissible to support the defendant's conviction for aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(3), and aggravated battery, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24(a). Scott v. State, 302 Ga. App. 111, 690 S.E.2d 242 (2010).

There was sufficient corroboration of the defendant as a perpetrator of the principal crime, and, ultimately, sufficient evidence to support the defendant's convictions for armed robbery, aggravated assault, false imprisonment, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and burglary because there was circumstantial evidence to show that the defendant committed a similar transaction after the first incident, that the same gun an accomplice bought and used in the first crime was used in the second crime and ended up in a car at the house of the defendant's mother afterwards, and that the defendant was nervous and felt guilty about events that the defendant participated in with the accomplice, whom the defendant had only known a short time; that corroborative evidence connected the accomplice to the crimes. Ward v. State, 304 Ga. App. 517, 696 S.E.2d 471 (2010).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for armed robbery, burglary, aggravated assault, criminal attempt to commit armed robbery, criminal attempt to commit burglary, and sexual battery because two codefendant's testified that the defendant participated in the home invasion, and that testimony was sufficient to sustain the defendant's conviction for the crimes committed at the home. Martinez v. State, 306 Ga. App. 512, 702 S.E.2d 747 (2010).

Evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find the defendants guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of malice murder and aggravated assault because the independent corroborating evidence in the case was substantial; an accomplice's testimony implicating the defendants was corroborated by the aggravated assault victim, who positively identified one of the defendants, that defendant's own admission to a woman in the defendant's apartment, evidence that the second defendant had sustained shotgun wounds on the evening of the crimes, ballistics evidence tying that defendant to the crime scene, and the presence of that defendant's blood on the first defendant's clothing and in the getaway vehicle. Ward v. State, 288 Ga. 641, 706 S.E.2d 430 (2011).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for armed robbery, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon beyond a reasonable doubt, and the trial court properly denied the defendant's motions for directed verdict and new trial because the jury could have determined that a witness's testimony provided corroboration for the codefendant's identification of the defendant; further, corroboration for the testimony of the witness and the codefendant was provided by a neighbors' description of the robbery and shooting, by the description of the codefendant's wife of the codefendant's demeanor and behavior that day, and by physical evidence found at the scene. Williamson v. State, 308 Ga. App. 473, 708 S.E.2d 57 (2011).

Parties to crime.

- Evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendants were parties to the aggravated assault because the defendants supplied the shooter with the weapons and the bullets knowing that the shooter intended to use those items for a personal avengance against the intended victim and the shooter also attempted to fire at the occupants of the van. Cammon v. State, 269 Ga. 470, 500 S.E.2d 329 (1998).

Evidence that the defendant was seen making notes at the crime scene the day of the shooting, that the defendant accompanied the coconspirator knowing that the coconspirator intended to rob a cab driver, and that the defendant drove the coconspirator away after the shooting of the cab driver authorized the jury to find the defendant was a party to the crime of aggravated assault committed with a deadly weapon, and hence to felony murder. Brown v. State, 278 Ga. 724, 609 S.E.2d 312 (2004).

Evidence was sufficient to show that a juvenile was a party to aggravated assault on the victim when the defendant and three other men approached the victim with guns, placing the victim in reasonable apprehension of immediate injury, and the victim identified the juvenile to police as one of the men. In the Interest of M.D.L., 271 Ga. App. 738, 610 S.E.2d 687 (2005).

Despite the defendant's claim of innocence, convictions for armed robbery and two counts of aggravated assault were upheld on appeal, given sufficient evidence showing that the defendant waited at the scene of the robbery and then assisted the codefendants in an attempted escape; hence, the defendant was not entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal and the state was not required to exclude every reasonable hypothesis except guilt as required by former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-6). Jordan v. State, 281 Ga. App. 419, 636 S.E.2d 151 (2006).

Defendant's aggravated assault and robbery convictions were upheld on appeal, as evidence including the defendant's admission and flight from the scene authorized the jury to conclude that the defendant went to an apartment complex intending to participate in the robbery, and in fact participated in the robbery by acting as a lookout and an additional show of force; hence, the jury was authorized to infer criminal intent from the defendant's conduct before, during, and after the commission of the crime. Millender v. State, 286 Ga. App. 331, 648 S.E.2d 777 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1717, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 80 (Ga. 2008).

Evidence supported a conviction of aggravated assault with a knife when two codefendants repeatedly struck the victim, the defendant struck the victim and threatened the victim's life, the defendant and the first codefendant entered a pharmacy to buy duct tape, and while alone with the victim, the second codefendant held a knife on the victim where the second codefendant could reach the knife and where the victim could see the knife; this authorized the conclusion that the second codefendant committed aggravated assault and that the defendant was a party. Rhines v. State, 288 Ga. App. 128, 653 S.E.2d 500 (2007).

Evidence established more than the mere presence of the defendant during the commission of the offense of aggravated assault and felony murder predicated on aggravated assault: (1) the defendant assaulted the victim during the drive to the murder scene; (2) the defendant participated in a plot to burn the victim's body and stood lookout while the body was buried; (3) the defendant did not attempt to report the crime; and (4) the defendant watched as another person stabbed the victim before attempting to intervene. Navarrete v. State, 283 Ga. 156, 656 S.E.2d 814 (2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 104, 172 L. Ed. 2d 33 (2008).

Evidence that the defendant drove a codefendant away from the crime scene in a subdivision after the codefendant shot the victim and that a box of bullets was found in the defendant's car when the defendant was later arrested did not support the defendant's convictions of aggravated assault and of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. The defendant's possession of a box of bullets of the same caliber as those used in the murder weapon in no way proved the defendant's possession of the weapon during the commission of the assault; driving the codefendant away with knowledge that the codefendant had committed the crime did not, in and of itself, render the defendant guilty as a party to the crime under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20; and to the extent that the evidence that the defendant's car had been parked at some point with the car's front end facing in the direction going out of the subdivision constituted circumstantial evidence of guilt, the evidence did not exclude every other reasonable hypothesis, as required by former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-6). Ratana v. State, 297 Ga. App. 747, 678 S.E.2d 193 (2009).

Evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty as a party to malice murder, aggravated assault, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, and tampering with evidence because the evidence showed that before, during, and after the commission of the crimes, the defendant was present and shared companionship with the defendant's brothers; the state's evidence authorized the inferences that the defendant, who had assisted the defendant's brothers in attacking the cousin of one of the victims, was not an innocent bystander, that the defendant drove the defendant's brothers to the crime scene knowing that one of the brothers was armed, that the defendant willingly stayed with the defendant's brothers while the brothers tried to start a fight and threatened to kill someone, and that the defendant ran to the defendant's car and drove the brothers away immediately after the brothers had shot one of the victims. Teasley v. State, 288 Ga. 468, 704 S.E.2d 800 (2010).

State proved that the defendant possessed the intent required to commit the predicate aggravated assault and conspiracy felonies for the felony murder conviction because evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational jury to conclude that the defendant, with a coparty and coconspirator, intended to rob the victim using a deadly weapon, that the victim was reasonably apprehensive of receiving a violent injury as a result of their intentional acts, and that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as a party to the crimes for which the defendant was convicted pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-2-2. Johnson v. State, 289 Ga. 498, 713 S.E.2d 376 (2011).

State did not have to prove the defendant had knowledge of the weapon to be convicted of felony murder, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, armed robbery, hijacking a motor vehicle, possession of a firearm during a felony, conspiracy to commit armed robbery, and conspiracy to commit hijacking a motor vehicle. The evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational jury to find that the defendant conspired to rob the victims and murder was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the conspiracy. Hicks v. State, 295 Ga. 268, 759 S.E.2d 509 (2014).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant as a party to the crime of the aggravated assaults of the two victims because the jury could have concluded that the defendant accompanied the others to a house with the intent to invade a rival gang's neighborhood and that the defendant brought a gun in a black bag for that purpose; the co-defendants and other witnesses testified that the defendant had a gun at the time of the shooting, supporting an inference that the defendant displayed the gun, even if the defendant did not shoot the gun; and, after the shooting, the defendant came into the house, wiping off a gun. Taylor v. State, 331 Ga. App. 577, 771 S.E.2d 224 (2015).

Coercion defense rejected.

- In a bench trial for armed robbery and aggravated assault, the evidence authorized the trial court to conclude that the state had sufficiently disproved the defendant's defense that the defendant had been coerced by one of the defendant's companions into committing the crimes; the defendant had not mentioned coercion in either of the defendant's two statements to police, one in which the defendant had admitted to committing the crimes, and it was not until trial that the defendant claimed coercion. Edwards v. State, 285 Ga. App. 227, 645 S.E.2d 699 (2007).

Identification of defendant.

- Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of aggravated assault, as defendant's challenge to that conviction was meritless; defendant's contention that the evidence was insufficient had to be rejected because it was premised on the argument that the victims' identification of defendant as a perpetrator was tainted by an impermissibly suggestive photographic lineup and the photographic lineup procedure was not impermissibly suggestive. Evans v. State, 261 Ga. App. 22, 581 S.E.2d 676 (2003).

Because a burglary victim recognized the defendant before a photographic lineup was introduced, the defendant did not show deficient performance or prejudice based on trial counsel's failure to object to the lineup; in any event, the evidence was sufficient to sustain the convictions for armed robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, making terroristic threats, and possession of a firearm during the commission of the felonies under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21(a)(1), (a)(2),16-7-1(a),16-8-41(a),16-11-37(a), and16-11-106(b)(1). Williams v. State, 270 Ga. App. 845, 608 S.E.2d 310 (2004).

Sufficient evidence supported convictions for aggravated assault, kidnapping, armed robbery, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106, even though none of the victims could identify the defendant as the gunman in the robbery due to the fact that the defendant wore a mask, because defendant was found shortly after the robbery with cash, weapons, a ski mask, a car and clothing matching the victims' description; surveillance videotape of the robbery was shown to the jury to determine whether defendant was the person on the videotape. Johnson v. State, 277 Ga. App. 41, 625 S.E.2d 411 (2005).

Defendant's aggravated assault conviction was upheld on appeal, as the victim's identification of the defendant as the perpetrator of the aggravated assault, both during and after the altercation, was sufficient evidence to uphold the conviction, and evidence of a subsequent altercation between the two, like evidence of a prior difficulty, was probative evidence that the victim immediately identified the defendant to police on the day of the incident. Bond v. State, 283 Ga. App. 620, 642 S.E.2d 223 (2007).

Because the evidence showed that the victim sufficiently identified the defendant as the perpetrator of an aggravated assault and armed robbery (1) to officers at the scene; (2) by means of a photographic lineup; and (3) at trial, the appeals court rejected the defendant's sufficiency challenge as to that element. Wallace v. State, 289 Ga. App. 497, 657 S.E.2d 874 (2008).

Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's convictions of armed robbery, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a), rape, O.C.G.A. § 16-6-1(a)(1), aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), aggravated sexual battery, O.C.G.A. § 16-6-22.2(b), kidnapping, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-40(a), and aggravated sodomy, O.C.G.A. § 16-6-2(a)(2), involving four different victims on three separate dates; both the husband and the wife, the victims in the first criminal incident, identified the defendant in court as the perpetrator of the crimes. Two separate DNA analyses testified to by two forensic biologists showed that the defendant's sperm was present in the vaginas of the other two female victims. Robins v. State, 298 Ga. App. 70, 679 S.E.2d 92 (2009).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for new trial under O.C.G.A. § 5-5-21 after a jury convicted the defendant of kidnapping with bodily injury, aggravated assault, and false imprisonment because the evidence was legally sufficient to support the crimes of which the defendant was convicted; the victim was shown a photo array containing six photographs and immediately picked the defendant's photo as the person who held a gun to the victim's head during the incident, and the victim also identified the defendant in court. Delgiudice v. State, 308 Ga. App. 397, 707 S.E.2d 603 (2011).

Trial court authorized to find defendant guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

- See McKinney v. State, 166 Ga. App. 718, 305 S.E.2d 446 (1983).

Defendant's admission sufficient.

- Defendant's recorded admission to a co-worker that the defendant killed the victim with the assistance of a codefendant was sufficient to support a convictions for murder and aggravated assault. Williams v. State, 280 Ga. 539, 630 S.E.2d 410 (2006).

Evidence sufficient for conviction.

- See Carter v. State, 168 Ga. App. 177, 308 S.E.2d 438 (1983); Davis v. State, 168 Ga. App. 272, 308 S.E.2d 602 (1983); Hall v. State, 172 Ga. App. 371, 323 S.E.2d 261 (1984); Hambrick v. State, 174 Ga. App. 444, 330 S.E.2d 383 (1985); Lucas v. State, 174 Ga. App. 580, 330 S.E.2d 792 (1985); Rucker v. State, 177 Ga. App. 779, 341 S.E.2d 228 (1986); Maxwell v. State, 178 Ga. App. 20, 342 S.E.2d 8 (1986); Gilstrap v. State, 256 Ga. 20, 342 S.E.2d 667 (1986); Laidler v. State, 180 Ga. App. 213, 348 S.E.2d 739 (1986); Roberson v. State, 180 Ga. App. 406, 349 S.E.2d 39 (1986); Hall v. State, 180 Ga. App. 366, 349 S.E.2d 255 (1986); Nelson v. State, 181 Ga. App. 455, 352 S.E.2d 636 (1987); Hanvey v. State, 186 Ga. App. 690, 368 S.E.2d 357 (1988); Conley v. State, 258 Ga. 339, 368 S.E.2d 502 (1988); Mapp v. State, 258 Ga. 273, 368 S.E.2d 511 (1988); Beal v. State, 186 Ga. App. 806, 368 S.E.2d 567 (1988); Roberson v. State, 186 Ga. App. 808, 368 S.E.2d 568 (1988); Jackson v. State, 258 Ga. 322, 368 S.E.2d 771 (1988); Walker v. State, 258 Ga. 443, 370 S.E.2d 149 (1988); Adams v. State, 187 Ga. App. 340, 370 S.E.2d 197 (1988); McKenzie v. State, 187 Ga. App. 840, 371 S.E.2d 869 (1988); Young v. State, 188 Ga. App. 601, 373 S.E.2d 837 (1988); Fowler v. State, 188 Ga. App. 873, 374 S.E.2d 805 (1988); Benford v. State, 189 Ga. App. 761, 377 S.E.2d 530 (1989); Seagraves v. State, 191 Ga. App. 207, 381 S.E.2d 523 (1989); Davis v. State, 192 Ga. App. 47, 383 S.E.2d 615 (1989); Arnold v. State, 193 Ga. App. 206, 387 S.E.2d 417 (1989); Henderson v. State, 200 Ga. App. 200, 407 S.E.2d 448 (1991); Brown v. State, 200 Ga. App. 537, 408 S.E.2d 836 (1991); Turner v. State, 205 Ga. App. 745, 423 S.E.2d 439 (1992); In re J.K.D., 211 Ga. App. 776, 440 S.E.2d 524 (1994); Brown v. State, 215 Ga. App. 544, 451 S.E.2d 787 (1994); Adside v. State, 216 Ga. App. 129, 453 S.E.2d 139 (1995); Humphrey v. State, 218 Ga. App. 574, 462 S.E.2d 641 (1995); Durden v. State, 219 Ga. App. 732, 466 S.E.2d 641 (1995); Matthews v. State, 224 Ga. App. 407, 481 S.E.2d 235 (1997); Dukes v. State, 224 Ga. App. 305, 480 S.E.2d 340 (1997); Livingston v. State, 225 Ga. App. 512, 484 S.E.2d 311 (1997); Johnson v. State, 225 Ga. App. 863, 485 S.E.2d 551 (1997); McSears v. State, 226 Ga. App. 90, 485 S.E.2d 589 (1997); Taylor v. State, 226 Ga. App. 254, 485 S.E.2d 830 (1997); Miller v. State, 228 Ga. App. 754, 492 S.E.2d 734 (1997); Osborne v. State, 228 Ga. App. 758, 492 S.E.2d 732 (1997), overruled on other grounds, Dunagan v. State, 269 Ga. 590, 502 S.E.2d 726 (1998); Rivers v. State, 229 Ga. App. 12, 493 S.E.2d 2 (1997); Hawkins v. State, 230 Ga. App. 627, 497 S.E.2d 386 (1998); Louis v. State, 230 Ga. App. 897, 497 S.E.2d 824 (1998); In re J.J.K., 232 Ga. App. 470, 502 S.E.2d 313 (1998); Cheney v. State, 233 Ga. App. 66, 503 S.E.2d 327 (1998); Vick v. State, 237 Ga. App. 762, 516 S.E.2d 815 (1999); Butura v. State, 239 Ga. App. 132, 519 S.E.2d 18 (1999); Favors v. State, 238 Ga. App. 234, 518 S.E.2d 444 (1999); Anderson v. State, 238 Ga. App. 866, 519 S.E.2d 463 (1999); Young v. State, 238 Ga. App. 555, 519 S.E.2d 481 (1999); Grant v. State, 239 Ga. App. 608, 521 S.E.2d 654 (1999); Wright v. State, 240 Ga. App. 763, 525 S.E.2d 143 (1999); Lowery v. State, 242 Ga. App. 375, 530 S.E.2d 22 (2000); Carr v. State, 243 Ga. App. 557, 533 S.E.2d 756 (2000); Allen v. State, 243 Ga. App. 730, 534 S.E.2d 190 (2000); White v. State, 244 Ga. App. 54, 537 S.E.2d 364 (2000), aff'd, 273 Ga. 787, 546 S.E.2d 514 (2001); Green v. State, 244 Ga. App. 697, 536 S.E.2d 565 (2000); Strange v. State, 244 Ga. App. 635, 535 S.E.2d 315 (2000); Self v. State, 245 Ga. App. 270, 537 S.E.2d 723 (2000); Shepherd v. State, 245 Ga. App. 386, 537 S.E.2d 777 (2000); McLeod v. State, 245 Ga. App. 668, 538 S.E.2d 759 (2000); Hodges v. State, 248 Ga. App. 23, 545 S.E.2d 157 (2000); Johnson v. State, 247 Ga. App. 157, 543 S.E.2d 439 (2000); Young v. State, 245 Ga. App. 684, 538 S.E.2d 760 (2000); Free v. State, 245 Ga. App. 886, 539 S.E.2d 213 (2000); Durrance v. State, 250 Ga. App. 185, 549 S.E.2d 406 (2001); In the Interest of C.A., 249 Ga. App. 280, 548 S.E.2d 37 (2001); Etheridge v. State, 249 Ga. App. 111, 547 S.E.2d 744 (2001); Thurman v. State, 249 Ga. App. 390, 547 S.E.2d 715 (2001); Davis v. State, 249 Ga. App. 579, 548 S.E.2d 678 (2001); Allsup v. State, 250 Ga. App. 53, 550 S.E.2d 465 (2001); Hill v. State, 276 Ga. 220, 576 S.E.2d 886 (2003); Jackson v. State, 259 Ga. App. 727, 578 S.E.2d 298 (2003); Duckett v. State, 259 Ga. App. 814, 578 S.E.2d 524 (2003); Rust v. State, 264 Ga. App. 893, 592 S.E.2d 525 (2003); Wallace v. State, 279 Ga. 26, 608 S.E.2d 634 (2005); Miller v. State, 271 Ga. App. 524, 610 S.E.2d 156 (2005); Tiggs v. State, 287 Ga. App. 291, 651 S.E.2d 209 (2007); John v. State, 282 Ga. 792, 653 S.E.2d 435 (2007); Walker v. State, 282 Ga. 774, 653 S.E.2d 439 (2007), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 481, 172 L. Ed. 2d 344 (2008), overruled on other grounds, No. S10P1859, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 267 (Ga. 2011); Bradley v. State, 283 Ga. 45, 656 S.E.2d 842 (2008); McGordon v. State, 298 Ga. App. 161, 679 S.E.2d 743 (2009); Hargrove v. State, 299 Ga. App. 27, 681 S.E.2d 707 (2009); Clark v. State, 299 Ga. App. 558, 683 S.E.2d 93 (2009); In the Interest of J. W., 306 Ga. App. 339, 702 S.E.2d 649 (2010).

Evidence was sufficient to find the defendant guilty of aggravated assault when the defendant, a passenger in a taxicab, put a knife to the throat of the driver and forced the driver to a different destination, and a struggle ensued resulting in the driver restraining the defendant. Fair v. State, 172 Ga. App. 49, 321 S.E.2d 790 (1984); Black v. State, 261 Ga. 791, 410 S.E.2d 740 (1991), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 839, 113 S. Ct. 118, 121 L. Ed. 2d 74 (1992).

When the defendant was found inside his former girlfriend's broken-into apartment, hid in a bathroom enclosure, with a removed kitchen knife and a letter recognizing defendant's own propensity for violence, the evidence was sufficient to authorize the jury to conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of burglary since there was sufficient evidence that the defendant intended to commit an aggravated assault. Johnson v. State, 207 Ga. App. 34, 427 S.E.2d 29 (1993).

Rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty of murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Walden v. State, 264 Ga. 92, 441 S.E.2d 247 (1994).

In light of the overwhelming evidence produced at trial, even though one victim expressed some uncertainty regarding defendant's identity, a rational trier of fact could determine defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt of armed robbery, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Billings v. State, 212 Ga. App. 125, 441 S.E.2d 262 (1994).

Viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, evidence that the defendant identified the defendant as the person who shot the victim was sufficient to support a conviction for aggravated assault. Cyrus v. State, 231 Ga. App. 71, 498 S.E.2d 554 (1998).

Evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find defendant guilty of aggravated assault beyond a reasonable doubt. Lattimer v. State, 231 Ga. App. 594, 499 S.E.2d 671 (1998).

Voice identification testimony, along with circumstantial evidence showing invaders were familiar with the internal operations and layout of the store, allowed the jury to reach the conclusion that defendant was guilty of armed robbery, aggravated assault and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Whitehead v. State, 232 Ga. App. 140, 499 S.E.2d 922 (1998).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of robbery, aggravated assault, felony obstruction of a law enforcement officer, attempting to elude a law enforcement officer and driving under the influence of drugs. Chisholm v. State, 231 Ga. App. 835, 500 S.E.2d 14 (1998).

Evidence, which included a positive identification by two eyewitnesses who testified that the defendants kicked the victim repeatedly, was sufficient to support the guilty verdicts. Cox v. State, 242 Ga. App. 334, 528 S.E.2d 871 (2000).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime against a person because: (1) the codefendant jumped out of the car defendant was driving and told the victim and two other men to empty their pockets as the codefendant was robbing the victims and then the codefendant began shooting; and (2) the victim was shot in the head and later died. Thomas v. State, 275 Ga. 882, 572 S.E.2d 537 (2002).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21 where four victims testified that they either saw or heard shots fired from defendant's truck and were frightened as a result. Tanner v. State, 259 Ga. App. 94, 576 S.E.2d 71 (2003).

Evidence was sufficient to support convictions for felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime where the record revealed that the defendant was riding in a car, made a gang sign to some people on the street, and in response to their obscene gesture, the defendant took out a gun and fired at them, killing two people and wounding one; the defendant's contention that the defendant was acting to protect the defendant and others in the car, that the defendant fired into the air, and that the defendant did not mean to hurt anyone was found to lack merit. Ingram v. State, 276 Ga. 223, 576 S.E.2d 855 (2003).

Evidence was sufficient to allow a rational trier of fact to find defendant guilty of aggravated assault beyond a reasonable doubt where defendant reached around the victim and cut the victim's throat, and then stabbed the victim twice in the back. Bell v. State, 276 Ga. 206, 576 S.E.2d 876 (2003).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of aggravated assault where defendant repeatedly hit the victim with a skillet, and knocked the victim unconscious. Lord v. State, 259 Ga. App. 449, 577 S.E.2d 103 (2003).

Evidence, including the victim's unequivocal identification of defendant from a book of 150 pictures and the victim's identification of defendant at trial, was sufficient to allow a rational trier of fact to find defendant guilty of aggravated assault beyond a reasonable doubt. Baker v. State, 259 Ga. App. 433, 577 S.E.2d 282 (2003), overruled on other grounds, Schofield v. Holsey, 281 Ga. 809, 642 S.E.2d 56 (2007), overruled on other grounds by State v. Lane, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 98 (Ga. 2020).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction of malice murder, felony murder, burglary, aggravated assault, kidnapping with bodily injury, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony where the defendant: (1) planned the crimes, and was armed with a gun and handcuffs; (2) broke into the defendant's in-laws' house after severing their phone line; (3) shot and killed the defendant's father-in-law and wounded the defendant's mother-in-law while they lay in bed; (4) handcuffed the defendant's bleeding mother-in-law to the mother-in-law's nine-year-old child and left them tethered to a bed rail in a room with the mother-in-law's dead spouse and the defendant's two-year-old child; and (5) abducted the defendant's estranged spouse and the spouse's 17 year-old sibling to a mobile home where the defendant made them take showers while the defendant watched, and then raped them both. Sallie v. State, 276 Ga. 506, 578 S.E.2d 444, cert. denied, 540 U.S. 902, 124 S. Ct. 251, 157 L. Ed. 2d 185 (2003).

Evidence was sufficient to support convictions of aggravated assault with a knife, aggravated assault with defendant's fists and feet, and false imprisonment, where the police found defendant's love interest laying on the floor of a hotel room, bruised, with knives in the hotel room, and the love interest testified that defendant had kicked and hit the love interest. Banks v. State, 260 Ga. App. 515, 580 S.E.2d 308 (2003).

Circumstantial evidence supported defendant's convictions for aggravated assault, burglary, armed robbery, cruelty to children, theft by receiving stolen property, and possession of a firearm as: (1) defendant was driving a stolen car that defendant knew was not defendant's own; (2) defendant returned to the victims' house, which defendant had left only a short time before, slowly circling the victims' residence, pointing at the house; (3) defendant appeared to let codefendants out of the car for a specific purpose, since defendant saw them enter the victims' home and waited for them, demonstrating that defendant knew they would return shortly; (4) when codefendants ran back to the car and jumped in, defendant drove off in response to their rapid return; and (5) shortly thereafter, defendant abandoned the stolen car. Parnell v. State, 260 Ga. App. 213, 581 S.E.2d 263 (2003).

Evidence that defendant unlawfully entered the victim's residence with intent to commit assault therein and was in possession of a gun was sufficient for conviction. Simmons v. State, 262 Ga. App. 164, 585 S.E.2d 93 (2003).

Defendant was properly found guilty of aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, aggravated assault with intent to rob under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106 where the footprints observed along the path between the crime scene and the area where defendant was apprehended matched the size and soles of defendant's shoes and defendant was identified as the robber based on defendant's clothing, shoes and "build." Mack v. State, 263 Ga. App. 186, 587 S.E.2d 132 (2003).

Even though the store clerk did not testify, the evidence of the store surveillance videotape of defendant waiving a gun at the store clerk was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for aggravated assault, despite the defendant's contentions that the videotape was ambiguous as the weight and credibility to be assigned to the videotape was solely within the purview of the jury. Cecil v. State, 263 Ga. App. 48, 587 S.E.2d 197 (2003).

Evidence that defendant, who was seated in the passenger seat of an automobile, and the victim, who was standing outside the automobile, argued, that the victim hit defendant, and that defendant then shot the victim, paralyzing the victim, was sufficient to sustain defendant's aggravated assault conviction. Bailey v. State, 263 Ga. App. 614, 588 S.E.2d 807 (2003).

Defendant was properly convicted of aggravated assault for participating in breaking down the door of an apartment belonging to the victim and the victim's spouse because the spouse was dizzy and crying during the incident in which shots were fired. Meadows v. State, 264 Ga. App. 160, 590 S.E.2d 173 (2003).

Rational trier of fact was authorized to find that both defendants burglarized the victims' residence; that, once inside, they took money, clothing, and other personal property by use of a gun; that the first defendant also committed an aggravated assault on the victim by striking the victim in the head with a handgun and was, therefore, in possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime; and that both defendants, along with their cohorts, had been in possession of the cocaine which was tossed out the vehicle they were riding in and found along the roadway. Davis v. State, 264 Ga. App. 221, 590 S.E.2d 192 (2003).

When defendant robbed victims at gunpoint with two accomplices, the testimony of one accomplice that defendant was involved in the robbery was sufficient to corroborate testimony to the same effect from defendant's other accomplice and sustain defendant's convictions for armed robbery and aggravated assault, under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-8-41(a) and16-5-21(a)(1), (2). Gallimore v. State, 264 Ga. App. 629, 591 S.E.2d 485 (2003).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for arson, felony murder, and aggravated assault, resulting from a fire set at a residence occupied by defendant's sister-in-law, her four children, and her 12-year-old brother where: (1) defendant confronted defendant's sister-in-law at her home, alleging that she had stolen items from defendant's mobile home; (2) a physical altercation ensued between defendant and the sister-in-law; (3) defendant retrieved a gasoline can from defendant's car, poured gasoline onto the back door of the sister-in-law's home, and ignited it; and (4) the sister-in-law's three-year-old child died from the injuries sustained in the fire. Tarvin v. State, 277 Ga. 509, 591 S.E.2d 777 (2004).

Evidence was sufficient to affirm defendant's aggravated assault conviction; whether defendant engaged in unprovoked attacks, acted in self-defense, or acted in defense of the defendant's love interest was for the jury to resolve, and it obviously resolved the question in defendant's disfavor. Chalvatzis v. State, 265 Ga. App. 699, 595 S.E.2d 558 (2004).

Since the jury was to weigh the credibility of the witnesses testimony and was instructed on self defense, accident, and criminal intent, its decision to believe the victim's and the victim's love interest's story regarding how a stabbing occurred instead of defendant's version of the events and its subsequent decision related to defendant's intent in the stabbing, were controlling on appeal and was sufficient for defendant's conviction for aggravated assault. Hazelwood v. State, 265 Ga. App. 709, 595 S.E.2d 564 (2004).

Evidence was sufficient to show that defendant committed an aggravated assault against the victims where it showed that after one victim separated defendant and defendant's sibling, who were involved in a minor altercation, defendant left and came back with a gun, which defendant fired into the truck in which the victims were sitting; accordingly, the evidence showed defendant intended to commit violence to the person of another. Bishop v. State, 266 Ga. App. 129, 596 S.E.2d 674 (2004).

Evidence of defendant's voluntary and willing participation in the crimes, through providing the use of defendant's car to transport the other three named in the indictment to and from the scene and waiting in the vehicle while two of them committed aggravated assault, burglary, murder, and aggravated robbery, supported defendant's convictions for the same as a co-conspirator. Silvers v. State, 278 Ga. 45, 597 S.E.2d 373 (2004).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's convictions as a party to the offenses of armed robbery, kidnapping, false imprisonment, burglary, and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21,16-5-40,16-5-41,16-7-1, and16-8-41, because: (1) defendant received information from the defendant's love interest, about the victims' house, the location of safes, where money was located, and about the alarm system; (2) the day after the home invasion the love interest saw defendant and defendant showed the love interest a stack of cash, and defendant told the love interest it might be the victim's money; and (3) an FBI informant met with defendant and defendant told the informant that defendant had been shorted money from the robbery, and that defendant got the layout of the house from the former daughter-in-law. Pope v. State, 266 Ga. App. 658, 598 S.E.2d 48 (2004).

Victim's testimony that the victim saw defendant remove what the victim thought was a gun from defendant's waistband, heard a clicking noise, and was so afraid that defendant would shoot victim that the victim jumped from a moving car, after which the victim heard what sounded like a shot being fired as the victim jumped, was sufficient to allow a rational jury to convict defendant of aggravated assault, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2). Jefferies v. State, 267 Ga. App. 694, 600 S.E.2d 753 (2004).

Defendant's statements to police and the victim's prior inconsistent statements were sufficient to support conviction for aggravated assault, despite the fact that the victim recanted at trial. Wyche-Hinkle v. State, 268 Ga. App. 898, 602 S.E.2d 902 (2004).

There was sufficient credible evidence to support a jury's verdict finding the defendant guilty of committing voluntary manslaughter and aggravated assault in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-2 and16-5-21, respectively, because there was testimony from three surviving witnesses that the defendant shot at their car as they drove by, killing one of the occupants; there was further testimony that the parties had a history of disputes between themselves, that the victim's brother had fired a shot at the defendant earlier in the day, and the defendant's claim that the defendant thought that as the car drove by, the victim was reaching for a gun, was not found credible. Mullins v. State, 270 Ga. App. 271, 605 S.E.2d 913 (2004).

There was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravated assault in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21 and of malice murder in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-1, because the defendant saw the victim trying to break up a fight between the victim's sibling and another person, the defendant became angry and followed the victim and the victim's sibling after the fight broke up, the defendant then swore at them and shot at them, and the defendant's claim of self-defense was not found to be credible. Harris v. State, 278 Ga. 596, 604 S.E.2d 788 (2004).

Evidence was sufficient to support felony murder and aggravated assault convictions because: (1) defendant, after exchanging blows with the defendant's spouse while in a car, left the area but returned shortly thereafter in the car; (2) one eyewitness saw defendant strike the defendant's spouse with the front of the car, back up striking the defendant's spouse again with the rear of the car, and drive off; (3) other witnesses saw two people brought to the scene by defendant beating and stomping the victim; and (4) the medical examiner testified that the victim died from blunt force head trauma consistent with being struck by a vehicle and that the force of the fatal blow would most likely have left the victim unconscious or unable to walk around. Rankin v. State, 278 Ga. 704, 606 S.E.2d 269 (2004).

Sufficient evidence, including testimony from the child victim identifying defendant's vehicle, evidence of defendant's DNA matching that of the victim and expert testimony that the frequency of such occurrence was approximately one in two billion in the Caucasian population, and similar transaction evidence, supported defendant's kidnapping with bodily injury, rape, aggravated sodomy, aggravated child molestation, aggravated assault, and first-degree cruelty to children convictions. Morita v. State, 270 Ga. App. 372, 606 S.E.2d 595 (2004).

In addition to the second codefendant's testimony, the state showed that, shortly after the murder, defendant was in possession of the victim's cab, that the victim's blood was found in the vehicle and on defendant, and that defendant made incriminating admissions to others; thus, the evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find proof beyond a reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt of malice murder, armed robbery, aggravated assault, hijacking a motor vehicle, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Wicks v. State, 278 Ga. 550, 604 S.E.2d 768 (2004).

Evidence that the defendant's vehicle was seen at the victim's residence around the time the victim was murdered, the defendant's subsequent arrest in a hotel room paid for with the victim's credit card, and the presence of the victim's blood on the defendant's boots when arrested was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Moore v. State, 279 Ga. 45, 609 S.E.2d 340 (2005).

Defendant's multiple convictions for armed robbery, aggravated assault, kidnapping, possessing a firearm during the commission of a felony, burglary, and kidnapping with bodily injury, were supported by sufficient evidence because defendant and another robbed a store while holding the two owners at gunpoint, the defendant led police on a high-speed car chase, and the defendant broke into and robbed two homes, one of which had an occupant that the defendant beat; only one store owner's testimony was needed to establish the facts to support the aggravated assault conviction. Owens v. State, 271 Ga. App. 365, 609 S.E.2d 670 (2005).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for felony murder, aggravated assault, and giving a false statement when the defendant and the codefendant were arrested when the codefendant sought medical treatment for a gunshot wound sustained in the incident, the codefendant gave police a false name and said the codefendant was shot when someone tried to rob the codefendant, the codefendant told a neighbor who saw the wound that someone else was worse off than the codefendant was, the defendant asked the neighbor's niece to tell police the codefendant was at the niece's house on the night of the crime and was robbed when the codefendant left, and, while in jail, the defendant told one inmate the defendant shot someone in the incident and told another inmate the defendant was involved in a robbery of this victim that went bad, and that the defendant and the codefendant had been looking for a safe with money and marijuana. Styles v. State, 279 Ga. 134, 610 S.E.2d 23 (2005).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for aggravated assault and burglary, after the defendant threatened and broke a window in the victim's home, reached in and tried to grab the victim, and the victim positively identified the defendant in a show-up identification that was found to be fair under the totality of the circumstances. Taylor v. State, 271 Ga. App. 701, 610 S.E.2d 668 (2005).

Sufficient evidence supported aggravated assault conviction because both the victim and another witness testified that defendant stabbed the victim, and a nurse testified that the victim's injury was serious. Hampton v. State, 272 Ga. App. 273, 612 S.E.2d 96 (2005).

Defendant's rape conviction was proper, even though defendant was acquitted of kidnapping with bodily injury, false imprisonment, and aggravated assault, as Georgia did not recognize the inconsistent verdict rule; further, the convictions were not necessarily inconsistent as the jury could have found that defendant raped the victim, but did not commit the other crimes. Stevenson v. State, 272 Ga. App. 335, 612 S.E.2d 521 (2005).

Because the victim's statement of sexual abuse was sufficient under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8) to convict defendant of kidnapping with bodily injury, aggravated child molestation, rape, aggravated sodomy, aggravated assault, and possession of a knife during the commission of a crime, the victim's testimony did not have to be corroborated by physical evidence. Gartrell v. State, 272 Ga. App. 726, 613 S.E.2d 226 (2005).

Evidence supported defendant's conviction for aggravated assault and voluntary manslaughter because: (1) defendant and the victim had threatened to kill each other; (2) the victim died from a gunshot wound inflicted when the victim "stepped in" to a fight between defendant and another; (3) the victim did not have a gun or own a gun; and (4) the fatal head wound was inflicted from at least two-and-a-half to three feet away and rendered the victim unconscious. Hall v. State, 273 Ga. App. 203, 614 S.E.2d 844 (2005).

Trial court properly denied the defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-9-1, because there was sufficient evidence to support the convictions for aggravated assault and reckless conduct, in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21(a)(2) and16-5-60(b), respectively; the defendant and the codefendants were involved in a physical altercation with two restaurant patrons, and a codefendant's testimony that the defendant retrieved a gun and shot the victim was sufficiently repeated by the testimony of other witnesses, who also connected the defendant with the shooting pursuant to the corroboration requirement in former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8). Baker v. State, 273 Ga. App. 297, 614 S.E.2d 904 (2005).

Evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for felony murder, voluntary manslaughter, and aggravated assault, as an eyewitness testified that the defendant was the only person to pull out a weapon in a confrontation at a nightclub, that the defendant fired a weapon at the victim, who had previously struck the defendant's love interest, and at two other victims who were attempting to leave. Rodriguez v. State, 274 Ga. App. 549, 618 S.E.2d 177 (2005).

Because defendant fatally stabbed the estranged spouse's love interest, stabbed the spouse in the head, and then bragged about the actions, the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of malice murder and aggravated assault. Henry v. State, 279 Ga. 615, 619 S.E.2d 609 (2005).

Defendant's convictions for aggravated assault, aggravated battery, kidnapping with bodily injury, and possession of a knife during the commission of a felony, in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21(a)(2),16-5-24,16-5-40, and16-11-106, respectively, were supported by the evidence, as defendant was engaged in a domestic dispute with defendant's spouse and child, wherein defendant argued, threatened to kill them, and locked them in a bathroom, punched and hit the spouse, and stabbed them each multiple times with a decorative sword that defendant had removed from the wall; there was sufficient evidence to show that defendant did not stab them in the midst of a struggle over possession of the sword, but instead, that defendant intended to stab or cut them. Brown v. State, 275 Ga. App. 99, 619 S.E.2d 789 (2005).

Defendant's convictions of aggravated stalking, burglary, aggravated assault, and false imprisonment, in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-91,16-7-1,16-5-21, and16-5-41, were supported by sufficient evidence because, despite the victim's recantation at trial, the victim stated to police earlier that defendant broke into the victim's apartment, scratched and damaged furniture and other property, tied the victim up, locked the victim in the bedroom for several hours, harmed the victim, threatened that defendant and defendant's friends were going to lock the victim in a basement for a few months, and defendant had been waiting for the victim to arrive home. Andrews v. State, 275 Ga. App. 426, 620 S.E.2d 629 (2005).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for felony and malice murder, and aggravated assault, in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-1 and16-5-21, as well as a possession of a firearm conviction, because defendant helped a sibling retaliate against the victim, who had previously sold the sibling fake drugs, by going to the victim's place of work, fatally shooting the victim multiple times, and planting fake drugs on the body; defendant's claim that defendant was in another state at the time of the incident was refuted by a copy of the criminal history which showed that defendant was out on bail just days before the incident, as well as testimony from the victim's roommate. Copprue v. State, 279 Ga. 771, 621 S.E.2d 457 (2005).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for malice murder and aggravated assault, in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-1 and16-5-21, respectively, as well as for possession of a firearm during a felony, because defendant was identified by multiple witnesses as having fatally shot the victim; defendant and the friends joined the victim's basketball game and when their team lost, defendant took the bet money, pulled out a gun, and started firing at the victim and the teammates. Agee v. State, 279 Ga. 774, 621 S.E.2d 434 (2005).

Circumstantial evidence was sufficient to allow a jury to find defendant committed felony murder and aggravated assault beyond a reasonable doubt when there was testimony that defendant was seen wearing a trench coat, waved down the victim's vehicle, leaned in through an open window in the vehicle, fled after firing two shots, saying, "I believe I shot him," forensic evidence was consistent with this testimony, defendant and a codefendant were earlier seen trying to sell a gun, a trench coat with missing buttons was found in the codefendant's house, and its buttons matched a button found in the victim's car. Burns v. State, 280 Ga. 24, 622 S.E.2d 352 (2005).

Evidence regarding defendant's holding a knife to a love interest's throat and demanding money sustained defendant's conviction for aggravated assault. Smith v. State, 276 Ga. App. 41, 622 S.E.2d 413 (2005).

After defendant and the victim were engaged in a heated verbal exchange, defendant went to a room and obtained a serrated knife, returned to where the victim was and stabbed the victim in the chest, which resulted in the victim's heart being punctured, and defendant later admitted to the stabbing, the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict of finding defendant guilty of felony murder and aggravated assault, in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-1 and16-5-21, as well as possession of a knife during the commission of a felony; the jury was authorized to find defendant's claim of self-defense lacking in credibility. Delanoval v. State, 280 Ga. 36, 622 S.E.2d 811 (2005).

Defendant's convictions for felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a knife during the commission of a felony were supported by sufficient evidence; while defendant argued that defendant acted in self-defense in stabbing the victim in the chest during a confrontation, the jury was authorized to disbelieve defendant's testimony in favor of the testimony of the state's witnesses. Delanoval v. State, 280 Ga. 36, 622 S.E.2d 811 (2005).

Defendant's convictions for malice murder, burglary, robbery, aggravated assault, and concealing the death of another were supported by sufficient evidence because: (1) defendant broke into the office where the victim was living; (2) defendant hit the victim several times on the head and body with a pair of pliers; (3) defendant choked the victim with the defendant's hands and arms, and with the pliers, until the victim was dead; (4) defendant took the victim's credit card and driver's license; and (5) defendant disposed of the victim's body. Young v. State, 280 Ga. 65, 623 S.E.2d 491 (2005).

Denial of defendant's motions for a directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict was proper as the evidence established the essential elements of attempted arson and aggravated assault; the evidence showed that defendant poured gasoline near two ignition sources (a light bulb and hot water heater) in the crawlspace of the estranged love interest's house and then told the estranged love interest's adult children to light the water heater's pilot flame. McGraw v. State, 276 Ga. App. 607, 624 S.E.2d 232 (2005).

Convictions of murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon were supported by sufficient evidence showing that while the victim was in the process of buying drugs from a third party, the defendant approached the driver's side of the victim's car, demanded the victim's money, and shot the victim several times, killing the victim and injuring a passenger in the car; the seller of the drugs testified that the seller had observed the defendant carrying a gun, and both the codefendant and another witness identified the defendant as the shooter. Major v. State, 280 Ga. 746, 632 S.E.2d 661 (2006).

Evidence supported a defendant's conviction for malice murder and aggravated assault as: (1) when a cab driver arrived to pick up a passenger at the defendant's apartment, the defendant was waiting outside and told the cab driver to wait while the defendant returned to the apartment; (2) the cab driver heard several gunshots immediately before the defendant ran to the cab and told the cab driver to "go"; (3) during the ride, the cab driver observed drops of blood on the defendant's clothing and overheard the defendant state in a cell phone call that the defendant "got the guy who owed (the defendant) money"; (4) the police traced the phone call to the defendant's uncle; and (5) the defendant later confided to a friend that the defendant shot and killed someone, that the defendant left in a cab, and that the defendant made a phone call with the cab driver's phone. Puga-Cerantes v. State, 281 Ga. 78, 635 S.E.2d 118 (2006).

Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's convictions of two counts of felony murder under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-1, armed robbery under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41, aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106, and possession of a firearm by a first offender probationer under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-131; two witnesses testified that the defendant had told them that the defendant shot the victim, and one of the witnesses testified that the defendant stated that the shooting occurred during a robbery, the defendant discarded a gun that was later found to be the murder weapon while fleeing police on another crime, and the defendant admitted to police that the murder weapon was the defendant's, that the defendant stole $100 from the victims, and that the defendant shot the murder victim. Chenoweth v. State, 281 Ga. 7, 635 S.E.2d 730 (2006).

Evidence that there was an 80 to 90 percent chance that injuries that caused the death of a defendant's 10-month-old child were inflicted within an hour of the child's death, that the defendant left the apartment at 4:10 P.M., that an attending physician was called to the emergency room at 5:46 P.M., and that the child was dead on arrival at the emergency room was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for felony murder while in commission of cruelty to a child in the second degree, aggravated assault, and cruelty to a child in the first degree; the evidence permitted the jury to conclude that the time frame in which the child's injuries were inflicted included the time before the defendant left for work, there was evidence concerning the defendant's actions before and after the child's death that indicated the defendant's guilt, and the jury was not required to accept the defendant's version of events. White v. State, 281 Ga. 276, 637 S.E.2d 645 (2006).

Aggravated assault conviction was upheld, as supported by sufficient evidence, including: (1) properly admitted similar transaction evidence; (2) the indictment charging the defendant was not defective; (3) the court's slip of the tongue did not mislead or confuse the jury; (4) a justification instruction was not warranted; and (5) the defendant failed to support an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Scott v. State, 281 Ga. App. 813, 637 S.E.2d 751 (2006).

Because the state showed that the victim had an apprehension, reasonable under the circumstances, of immediately receiving a violent injury, this testimony, if believed, together with a finding that the defendant intended to drive rapidly out of the car wash while dragging the victim, was sufficient to authorize the jury to find the defendant guilty of aggravated assault; further, an assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a)(2) did not require that a defendant act with criminal intent in regard to the victim, but did require that an intentional act be shown. Kirkland v. State, 282 Ga. App. 331, 638 S.E.2d 784 (2006).

Because conflicts and inconsistencies in the testimony of the witnesses, including the state's witness, were a matter of credibility for the jury to decide, and because the defendant cited no authority suggesting that the instructions in question were incorrect statements of the law, and did not explain an assertion that they were confusing, convictions armed robbery, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony were upheld on appeal as supported by sufficient evidence. Lattimore v. State, 282 Ga. App. 435, 638 S.E.2d 848 (2006).

Because the victim's testimony, standing alone, was sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, when said evidence showed: (1) two separate aggravated assaults, one with a knife and one with a hammer; (2) two separate instances of simple battery; and (3) a hours-long detention of the victim by the defendant, said evidence amply supported the jury's conviction on the charges of false imprisonment, aggravated assault, and simple battery. Brigman v. State, 282 Ga. App. 481, 639 S.E.2d 359 (2006).

Even though the victim was the only witness who could testify that the defendant was the perpetrator of the crimes of robbery by force and aggravated assault, said testimony was enough to establish the defendant's identity as one of the assailants; moreover, the lack of corroboration went only to the weight of the evidence and the victim's credibility, matters which were solely within the purview of the jury. Thomas v. State, 282 Ga. App. 522, 639 S.E.2d 531 (2006).

Pictures of a defendant withdrawing money from a victim's ATM account and evidence that the defendant repeatedly asked the victim for the PIN number for the victim's ATM card, held a knife to the victim's neck, cut the cord used to tie the victim, and had cash, an ATM receipt, and the victim's car keys when the defendant was arrested were sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for armed robbery, two counts of aggravated assault, kidnapping with bodily injury, and two counts of possessing a knife during the commission of a crime. Wright v. State, 282 Ga. App. 649, 639 S.E.2d 581 (2006).

Defendant's convictions for aggravated assault, aggravated battery, and first-degree child cruelty pursuant to O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21(a),16-5-24(a), and16-5-70(b) for participating in a drive-by shooting were supported by sufficient evidence because the testimony of a single witness was generally sufficient to establish a fact pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8) and it was the function of the jury to evaluate the credibility of witnesses; based on the testimony of the witnesses to the shooting, a reasonable jury could have rejected the defendant's claims and determined that the defendant was a party to each of the crimes. Hill v. State, 282 Ga. App. 743, 639 S.E.2d 637 (2006).

There was sufficient evidence to support the defendant's convictions of felony murder and aggravated assault resulting from an incident when shots were fired from a van at the victims, who were riding in a car that had formerly belonged to a drug dealer; the defendant had argued with the drug dealer the day of the shooting, the defendant's wrecked car was found in the same place as the van, the surviving victim identified the defendant as the driver of the van, the van had been traded to the defendant's brother, and even if the defendant did not actually fire the shots, being the driver would authorize the defendant's conviction under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(a). Yancey v. State, 281 Ga. 664, 641 S.E.2d 524 (2007).

There was sufficient evidence to support the defendant's convictions of malice murder and aggravated assault; after an argument at the victims' house over money, the defendant returned to the house with a concealed pistol, demanded money from the first victim, pulled out the pistol after the first victim said that the first victim was not afraid of the defendant, and shot the two victims. Shelton v. State, 281 Ga. 660, 641 S.E.2d 536 (2007).

Given that sufficient evidence was presented that the defendant planned and attempted an armed robbery, and the victim was killed during that attempted robbery with the defendant's gun, when such was coupled with evidence that the defendant threatened the victim with a reasonable apprehension of a violent attack, both an aggravated assault and felony murder conviction were upheld on appeal. Willingham v. State, 281 Ga. 577, 642 S.E.2d 43 (2007).

As the evidence provided by the state at defendants' criminal trial demonstrated that based on information from defendant-B regarding a large quantity of marijuana possessed by a victim, defendant-A and another man forcibly entered the victim's residence while defendant-A was armed, pushed the victim to the ground, demanded to know where the marijuana was, and a physical struggle resulted, the evidence supported defendants' convictions for burglary, armed robbery, and aggravated assault; defendant-B was convicted as a party to the crimes under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(4). Garland v. State, 283 Ga. App. 622, 642 S.E.2d 320 (2007), rev'd on other grounds, 282 Ga. 201, 657 S.E.2d 842 (2008).

When the victim was killed during the theft of the victim's vehicle, the evidence was sufficient for a jury to convict the defendant of felony murder, aggravated assault, and armed robbery; the defendant told others where the vehicle was, then stripped the vehicle; a call was placed from the victim's cell phone to the house of one of the defendant's grandparents; police found some of the victim's belongings at the home of the defendant's cousin; and a witness and two cousins of the defendant stated that the defendant admitted shooting the victim. Paige v. State, 281 Ga. 504, 639 S.E.2d 478 (2007).

Defendant's felony murder and aggravated assault convictions were both upheld on appeal as evidence of the victim's prior violent acts was properly excluded given that at the time of the confrontation with the defendant, the victim was no longer the aggressor, and the defendant failed to show prejudice resulting from the admission of a knife that was not used in the altercation, into evidence, and in fact, the knife had been removed from the scene by police before the incident involving the defendant and the victim occurred. Milner v. State, 281 Ga. 612, 641 S.E.2d 517 (2007).

Evidence of a prior aggravated assault conviction was sufficiently similar to be admissible to show a defendant's bent of mind in initiating the stabbing of a victim and to rebut the defendant's assertion of self-defense. Cockrell v. State, 281 Ga. 536, 640 S.E.2d 262 (2007).

When the unarmed victim advanced on the defendant, who had a baseball bat, and the defendant swung twice at the victim, then hit the victim on the head with the bat after the victim lost the victim's balance, the jury at the defendant's aggravated assault trial was entitled to conclude that the defendant was not justified in using force greater than that necessary for self-defense; the evidence, including the defendant's bragging at a party that night about the incident and telling an acquaintance a few days later that the acquaintance was "riding with a murderer," supported the conviction. Fields v. State, 285 Ga. App. 345, 646 S.E.2d 326 (2007).

Upon the overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt provided by the victim supporting a charge of aggravated assault, despite the trial court's erroneous act requiring the defendant to introduce a certified copy of the victim's prior conviction to impeach, the defendant's aggravated assault conviction was upheld; moreover, the evidence in the record revealed that the jury chose to believe the victim, despite the issues involving the victim's prior record. Johnson v. State, 284 Ga. App. 724, 644 S.E.2d 544, cert. denied, No. S07C1179, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 538 (Ga. 2007).

Evidence supported the defendant's convictions of aggravated assault, aggravated battery, cruelty to children, and reckless conduct in connection with the death of the 16-month-old victim since: the defendant repeatedly fed the victim tomatoes despite the victim's allergic reactions to the tomatoes; two days before the victim's fatal injuries, the victim had numerous bruises, a black eye, and a split bottom lip; while the victim was in the hospital for the fatal injuries, the defendant repeatedly asked a babysitter to persuade the defendant's five-year-old child to say that the child had taken the victim out of the bathtub; the defendant asked medical personnel whether it could be proven that the victim was shaken; and medical evidence showed that the victim's death was consistent with violent shaking by a person of adult strength. Waits v. State, 282 Ga. 1, 644 S.E.2d 127 (2007), overruled on other grounds by State v. Lane, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 98 (Ga. 2020).

Defendant's claim on appeal that convictions for aggravated assault and kidnapping had to be reversed because the victim's testimony was unworthy of belief lacked merit as it was the role of the fact finder, not the appellate court, to determine whether a witness was credible; moreover, the testimony of the victim alone was sufficient to support a finding of guilt. Bragg v. State, 285 Ga. App. 408, 646 S.E.2d 508 (2007).

There was sufficient evidence to support the defendant's convictions of child molestation, kidnapping with bodily injury, kidnapping, and aggravated assault when the defendant, who lived with an ex-girlfriend and her teenage daughter, called them into a bedroom and bound the ex-girlfriend's arms, legs, and mouth with duct tape, threatened the women with a hatchet, and led the daughter to another bedroom where the defendant duct-taped her hands and feet and forced her to have intercourse with him. Phillips v. State, 284 Ga. App. 683, 644 S.E.2d 535 (2007).

Evidence was sufficient to support the three defendants' convictions of malice murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony after: the victims were shot from a gold SUV and the first defendant owned a gold SUV; the first defendant, who had been robbed the day before, stated that the first defendant "wanted to straighten about the money"; the third defendant met the first two defendants at a hotel and transferred weapons into the gold SUV; the first defendant pointed to a person outside the hotel and said "Let him have it"; and the third defendant later wondered if one of the victims was dead. Stokes v. State, 281 Ga. 875, 644 S.E.2d 116 (2007).

Because the testimony from the aggravated assault victim's girlfriend about observing the defendant stab the victim was sufficient, standing alone, to support an aggravated assault conviction, the conviction was upheld on appeal. Diop v. State, 285 Ga. App. 312, 645 S.E.2d 756 (2007).

In a case when a defendant was adjudicated delinquent based on aggravated assault, the court rejected the defendant's argument that the evidence was insufficient to support the finding that the defendant was the one who shot the victim because the victim was unable to identify the defendant after the incident and because the defendant's gunshot residue test came back negative; an officer testified that the victim's failure to identify the defendant after the shooting was likely due to the victim's medical condition at the time, and the victim identified the defendant as the shooter at the hearing. In the Interest of B.S., 284 Ga. App. 680, 644 S.E.2d 527 (2007).

Given that the circumstantial evidence presented against the defendant sufficiently showed that: (1) the victim shot one of the intruders who committed the burglary; (2) shortly after the burglary, the defendant was treated for a gunshot wound and arrived at the hospital in a vehicle matching the description of the automobile seen leaving the crime scene; (3) the DNA evidence on ski masks found at the scene matched that of the owner of the car and the other passenger, who was also the defendant's brother; and (4) according to the defendant's brother, the driver of the car admitted to shooting the victim, the defendant's convictions for aggravated assault, burglary, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony were affirmed on appeal. Sherman v. State, 284 Ga. App. 809, 644 S.E.2d 901 (2007).

Evidence supported the defendant's convictions of malice murder, felony murder, armed robbery, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony after the defendant went to the victim's laundromat and waited until the victim opened a change machine, pointed a gun at the victim's head and ordered the victim to put the money in a bag, told the victim, "Hell, yeah, I'll kill you," and shot the victim multiple times; eyewitnesses, including two who knew the defendant, identified the defendant as the perpetrator. Cooper v. State, 281 Ga. 760, 642 S.E.2d 817 (2007).

Evidence supported the defendant's conviction of aggravated assault even though the defendant claimed that the defendant merely accidentally fired a gun at the victim, the evidence indicated that the defendant intentionally fired at and struck the victim.

Because sufficient evidence was presented consisting of the victim's identification of the defendant as the perpetrator of a burglary, who threatened the victim with a sharp, knife-like letter opener, forcing the victim into a closet, and stealing the victim's camera upon fleeing, sufficient evidence supported the defendant's burglary, armed robbery, aggravated assault, and kidnapping convictions. Bryant v. State, 286 Ga. App. 493, 649 S.E.2d 597 (2007).

There was sufficient evidence to convict the defendant of aggravated assault when after the victim flicked a cigarette that landed on the defendant's car seat, the defendant said "I'll shoot you," and pointed a gun at the victim; although the defendant claimed that the defendant and the victim were just joking around, the evidence presented was sufficient to support a finding that the defendant's act placed the victim in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a)(2). Moore v. State, 286 Ga. App. 313, 649 S.E.2d 337 (2007).

There was sufficient evidence to support the defendant's conviction of aggravated assault when about 15 minutes after arguing with the victim, the defendant returned and shot the victim after the defendant's companion tried to hit the victim with a car; the victim, who had previously known the defendant, picked the defendant's picture from a photographic lineup, and the defendant admitted shooting at the victim.

There was sufficient evidence to support the defendant's convictions of felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and the jury was entitled to disbelieve family members who testified that the defendant was out of state when the crimes occurred; the defendant pointed a handgun at the two victims and told the victims to give the defendant the keys to the van in which the victims were loading scooters, shot one victim in the chest, and ran away, after which the defendant's companions drove the van after the defendant. Edwards v. State, 282 Ga. 259, 646 S.E.2d 663 (2007).

There was sufficient evidence to support an adjudication of juvenile delinquency based on convictions of aggravated assault and of felony and misdemeanor obstruction of an officer; after threatening to slash the victim's throat, the defendant produced a knife and opened the blade, and when officers arrived at the defendant's residence to arrest the defendant, the defendant screamed obscenities and fled to another home before assuming a "fighting stance," placing the defendant's fists in front of the defendant's face, and yelling obscenities at officers while refusing to obey the officers' commands. In the Interest of D.D., 287 Ga. App. 512, 651 S.E.2d 817 (2007).

Evidence was sufficient to support a conviction of aggravated assault based on the defendant's attack on a fellow prison inmate when, although an officer who allegedly witnessed the attack was not called as a witness, both the victim and another eyewitness testified that the defendant attacked the victim; even without the actual weapon being introduced into evidence, the testimony that the defendant used a metal knife or shank to stab the victim was sufficient to support the conviction and the jury was authorized to conclude that defendant's alibi witnesses, who gave inconsistent alibis for the defendant and who all had felony convictions, were not credible. Cail v. State, 287 Ga. App. 547, 652 S.E.2d 190 (2007), overruled on other grounds by State v. Lane, 838 S.E.2d 808, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 98 (Ga. 2020).

Evidence from eyewitnesses that the defendant had been in a heated argument with the victim, the defendant left the scene and returned with a gun, the defendant again argued with the victim, pulling out the gun and shooting the victim three times, and that the bullets recovered from the victim confirmed that the bullets were fired from the defendant's weapon, was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to reject the defendant's self-defense claim and to support the defendant's convictions for felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Bolston v. State, 282 Ga. 400, 651 S.E.2d 19 (2007).

Evidence supported the defendant's aggravated assault conviction when the defendant came to a married couple's home, grabbed the wife and threatened to cut her throat, then struggled with the husband over a gun and tried to shoot the husband and both the husband and the wife identified the defendant as the perpetrator in separate photo lineups and at trial; discrepancies regarding the clothes that the perpetrator was wearing and what the defendant was wearing when the defendant was apprehended were for the jury to resolve, and inconsistencies in a witness's statement regarding time were for the jury to resolve and did not make it impossible that the defendant could have been at the crime scene. Brown v. State, 287 Ga. App. 115, 650 S.E.2d 780 (2007).

Victim's testimony that the defendant forcibly entered the victim's house and accused the victim of sexually assaulting a sibling of the defendant, then beat the victim with a bat and kicked the victim, established the essential elements of aggravated assault and burglary; a single witness's testimony was generally sufficient to establish a fact. Gonzales v. State, 286 Ga. App. 821, 650 S.E.2d 401 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1765, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 70 (Ga. 2008).

Evidence supported the defendant's convictions of malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony; the two surviving victims testified that the defendant began shooting at the victims after arriving at an apartment, and the testimony of the victims, the location of shell casings, and the evidence showing that the deceased victim was shot from a distance of over three feet, significantly refuted the defendant's claim of self-defense. Jackson v. State, 282 Ga. 494, 651 S.E.2d 702 (2007).

In a case involving a defendant's cohort shooting a man at a gas station, the evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as a party to the crime of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, since the evidence showed that the defendant willingly drove the cohort to the gas station, waited in a stolen truck while armed with an assault rifle as the cohort pulled the victim out of the victim's car and then shot the victim, and then rescued the injured cohort and fled the police; the defendant's criminal intent was properly inferred from the defendant's conduct before, during, and after the commission of the crime. McClendon v. State, 287 Ga. App. 238, 651 S.E.2d 165 (2007).

Defendant retrieved a loaded pistol from defendant's apartment and returned to the parking lot where defendant pointed the pistol at the boyfriend's head. A bystander then told the defendant to put the gun down, at which point the defendant pointed the gun at the bystander, and the boyfriend snatched the gun from the defendant. These two acts were sufficient to allow a jury to convict defendant of two counts of aggravated assault. Gaines v. State, 289 Ga. App. 339, 656 S.E.2d 871 (2008), cert. denied, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 379 (Ga. 2008); overruled in part by Worthen v. State, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 22 (Ga. 2019).

Because sufficient evidence was presented showing that the defendant cut a correctional officer's face with either a razor blade or other sharp object, requiring more than 150 stitches and cosmetic surgery to repair, the defendant's convictions of aggravated assault and aggravated battery upon a correctional officer were upheld on appeal. White v. State, 289 Ga. App. 224, 656 S.E.2d 567 (2008).

Testimony of both an aggravated assault victim and another witness, which demonstrated that the defendant shot the victim in the leg, coupled with the defendant's flight after the incident, was sufficient to support the defendant's aggravated assault conviction and, furthermore, defendant was subject to an enhanced sentence under the family violence provision of the aggravated assault statute, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(j), since the crime was committed between persons "living or formerly living in the same household." Jones v. State, 289 Ga. App. 219, 656 S.E.2d 556 (2008), cert. denied, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 381 (Ga. 2008).

Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's convictions of aggravated assault, two counts of aggravated battery, and possessing a firearm during the commission of a felony; the defendant told the victim, who had walked into a common hallway in the defendant's apartment building, to leave, went inside, retrieved a gun, and shot the victim twice after the victim refused to leave, and then shot at the victim while the victim was fleeing. Johnson v. State, 289 Ga. App. 435, 657 S.E.2d 333 (2008).

Evidence supported defendant's convictions of malice murder and two counts of aggravated assault; witnesses testified that a person wearing a red bandana went into a bar, pointed a pistol at one victim, left, and later returned and began shooting, and other witnesses testified that defendant was the shooter and that defendant was wearing a red bandana. Felton v. State, 283 Ga. 242, 657 S.E.2d 850 (2008).

Evidence supported defendant's convictions of felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Witnesses saw the defendant walk with the victim from a store to the victim's car and later run from the scene following the sounds of a gunshot and a car crash, and the defendant admitted pulling a gun on the victim and said that the gun had gone off during a struggle, after which the victim tried to drive away. Petty v. State, 283 Ga. 268, 658 S.E.2d 599 (2008).

Evidence supported convictions of malice murder, aggravated assault, burglary, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. The victim was struck twice in the head with a pistol, strangled, and shot twice in the head; the victim's wallet and keys were missing; and the defendant, who told police where the wallet could be found, admitted shooting the victim and claimed that the defendant had done so after the victim tried to hug and kiss the defendant and things got "ugly." Brown v. State, 283 Ga. 327, 658 S.E.2d 740 (2008).

Evidence supported the defendant's convictions for malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, armed robbery, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. The four victims were found dead in two hotel rooms from gunshot wounds to the back of their heads; identification documents belonging to the four victims were found in the defendant's car; there was expert testimony that the defendant's gun had been used to kill the victims; the defendant's baseball cap contained one victim's deoxyribonucleic acid; there was evidence that the defendant and two friends used three victims' tickets to attend a football game after the victims were murdered; the defendant was identified as being in an elevator with one victim; the defendant was seen leaving the hotel with one victim's cooler; and a duffle bag belonging to one victim was in the defendant's car when the defendant was arrested on weapons charges. Dawson v. State, 283 Ga. 315, 658 S.E.2d 755 (2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 169, 172 L. Ed. 2d 122 (2008).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions of armed robbery, aggravated assault, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, and kidnapping under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21,16-5-40,16-8-41, and16-11-106 as: (1) a robber ordered two store employees at gunpoint to give the robber money, then ordered the employees to go into a back room; (2) the employees described the robber and the robber's vehicle in detail; (3) the employees positively identified the defendant as the robber 15 to 20 minutes after the crime following a pursuit during which the defendant fled from police first in the defendant's vehicle, then on foot; and (4) the defendant had $281 in a pocket at the time of arrest. Lenon v. State, 290 Ga. App. 626, 660 S.E.2d 16 (2008).

Evidence supported defendant's convictions of felony murder during commission of aggravated assault and of possessing a firearm while committing the murder; after defendant argued with the victim and hit the victim while they were riding in a car, defendant and the victim got out of the car where defendant shot at the victim multiple times, defendant fled the scene but later surrendered to authorities and stated that defendant had murdered the victim, and at trial defendant claimed that the gun accidentally discharged when defendant was trying to return the gun to the victim. Lashley v. State, 283 Ga. 465, 660 S.E.2d 370 (2008).

Evidence supported convictions on three counts of aggravated assault when the first victim testified that after the first victim and the second victim chased defendant, defendant began firing at them, eyewitness testified that defendant was shooting at the two victims' vehicle, and there was testimony that a bystander was hit at the scene where defendant was the shooter. Burden v. State, 290 Ga. App. 734, 660 S.E.2d 481 (2008).

Although victim gave statements that conflicted with victim's own statements and those of others involving a shooting in a parking lot, gunshot residue tests were inconclusive, bystanders each testified that defendant was standing at a different location, and no specific weapon was traced to any participant, evidence was sufficient to support a conviction of aggravated assault when the victim testified that defendant shot the victim in the foot, two bystanders testified that defendant shot at the victim, and a third bystander testified that defendant admitted to having a gun at the time of the incident. Banks v. State, 290 Ga. App. 887, 660 S.E.2d 873 (2008).

Sufficient evidence supported convictions of aggravated assault, aggravated assault on a peace officer, obstruction of a law enforcement officer, interference with government property, and criminal trespass when defendant admitted obstructing officers and damaging a patrol car and the victim's vehicle; although the defendant denied assaulting the victim and responding officer, the jury was authorized to reject the defendant's testimony in favor of theirs. Gartrell v. State, 291 Ga. App. 21, 660 S.E.2d 886 (2008).

Under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8), the victim's testimony that the defendant pulled a knife out of the defendant's pocket with the defendant's right hand and lunged at the victim was sufficient in itself to support convictions for aggravated assault and carrying a concealed weapon under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21 and16-11-126. Testimony that the defendant had arthritis in the right hand at most created a conflict in the evidence, as there was also testimony that the defendant, a carpenter, used both hands in the defendant's trade. Carder v. State, 291 Ga. App. 265, 661 S.E.2d 632 (2008).

There was sufficient evidence to support armed robbery and aggravated assault convictions. Two masked persons entered a restaurant, pointed a gun at the employees, forced the manager to give the persons money, including rolls of change, ordered everyone to get on the floor, and then fled; an officer saw two people running, including the defendant, who were wearing the type of boots worn by the robbers; the defendant had a BB gun and $201 in cash, including several rolls of quarters; two restaurant employees identified the gun as the weapon used in the robbery; and a detective testified that when the defendant was arrested, the defendant was wearing the jacket and boots depicted on the surveillance videotape played for the jury. Williams v. State, 291 Ga. App. 279, 661 S.E.2d 658 (2008).

There was sufficient evidence to support an aggravated assault conviction when after the defendant and the victim got into an argument that escalated into a fistfight, paramedics found that the victim had five elongated, open wounds that appeared to be stab wounds, bruises, and a bite mark on the shoulder and that one of the victim's lungs had been punctured. Jackson v. State, 291 Ga. App. 287, 661 S.E.2d 665 (2008).

There was sufficient evidence to support convictions for aggravated assault, aggravated battery, and burglary when the victim unhesitatingly identified the defendant as one of the people who attacked the victim with a bat or a pipe; the victim's roommate was about "70 percent sure" that the defendant was one of the attackers; the defendant came to the victim's door earlier in the evening and told someone in the street, "Oh no, not now"; one of the attackers threatened the victim because the victim befriended the attacker's paramour; the paramour, who was a friend of the defendant and who had called the victim to the victim's door before the attack, knew that the victim had come into some cash; and the parent of the defendant's child testified that the defendant and others left the house saying that they were going to get into a fight. Furthermore, the victim sustained a stab wound in the liver, a shattered jaw, a broken foot, a stab to the elbow, damage to the facial nerves, and a double hernia and was in constant pain and could not work. Drew v. State, 291 Ga. App. 306, 661 S.E.2d 675 (2008).

There was sufficient evidence to support convictions of aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21 and of third-degree cruelty to children under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-70. The victim, who had formerly been romantically involved with the defendant, was leaving a motel with the victim's two children, three other children, and two friends when the defendant approached the victim from behind, put a gun to the victim's head, and told the victim that when the defendant did not care about the children anymore, the defendant was going to kill the victim, and the state introduced prior difficulties evidence about an earlier incident where the victim was asleep at a parent's house when the victim woke up to a punch in the face and saw the defendant running out the front door. McCullors v. State, 291 Ga. App. 393, 662 S.E.2d 197 (2008).

Evidence supported the defendant's convictions of burglary, kidnapping with bodily injury, rape, aggravated assault, robbery, and theft by taking when a treating physician stated that the 86-year-old victim's injuries, including blood inside her vagina and bruises and contusions on her vagina, were consistent with forcible penetration; when the defendant admitted entering the victim's home, removing her clothing, restraining her with electrical cords, hitting her, putting a plastic bag over her head, forcing her from one room to another, and taking her money and her car; and when DNA from the defendant matched the DNA of two hair roots found on the victim's living room floor. Smith v. State, 291 Ga. App. 545, 662 S.E.2d 323 (2008).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain a defendant's convictions of two counts of aggravated assault and two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21 and16-11-106 because the defendant's admission that defendant was holding a rifle throughout the crimes' commission, along with evidence of the defendant's flight, authorized the jury to conclude that the defendant participated in the crimes by acting as a lookout. Gant v. State, 291 Ga. App. 823, 662 S.E.2d 895 (2008).

Defendant's convictions on charges of malice murder, aggravated assault, and obstruction were supported by evidence that showed, inter alia, that the defendant was upset because the victim owed the defendant money, that the defendant got into an argument with the victim that culminated in the defendant shooting the victim, that a shell casing from the gun used to shoot the victim was found in the defendant's room, and that when the defendant was arrested, the defendant lied about the defendant's identity. Williams v. State, 284 Ga. 94, 663 S.E.2d 179 (2008).

Evidence was legally sufficient to convict a defendant on charges of armed robbery, aggravated assault, false imprisonment, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime; the testimony of one of the defendant's accomplices, which implicated the defendant in the crimes, was corroborated by evidence that the defendant was captured with the two accomplices shortly after the robbery, that defendant had a large amount of cash, a gun, and a roll of duct tape, and that the victim was able to identify all three men as the ones who robbed and assaulted the victim. Spragg v. State, 292 Ga. App. 37, 663 S.E.2d 389 (2008).

Evidence was sufficient to convict a defendant on a charge of aggravated assault since the defendant failed to carry the initial burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was involuntarily intoxicated at the time of the aggravated assault, and there was at least some evidence before the jury of each element of aggravated assault that the state was required to prove. Stewart v. State, 291 Ga. App. 846, 663 S.E.2d 278 (2008).

Sufficient evidence supported convictions of aggravated assault and possession of a firearm during commission of a felony under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21 and16-11-106 when competent evidence showed that the defendant put a gun to the victim's chest and pulled the trigger. Furthermore, a jury could conclude that this was not the result of an accident. Jones v. State, 293 Ga. App. 218, 666 S.E.2d 738 (2008).

Testimony from two eyewitnesses that the defendant fatally shot the victim with an assault rifle and aimed the rifle at one of the witnesses, and evidence that the defendant then fled and tried to elude authorities, was sufficient to convict the defendant of felony murder, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. McKenzie v. State, 284 Ga. 342, 667 S.E.2d 43 (2008).

Evidence showed the defendant broke into a victim's home while the victim was asleep and then pulled a knife on the victim in the kitchen and began waving the knife at the victim, who testified that the victim was afraid because the defendant "was looking wild and acting a little wild and I didn't know what he might would do" and that the victim was concerned the victim might get injured. Under these circumstances, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that the victim had a reasonable apprehension of receiving an immediate, violent injury, to support the defendant's conviction for aggravated assault. Atwell v. State, 293 Ga. App. 586, 667 S.E.2d 442 (2008).

Since the evidence established the defendant shot three people and took money from one of them, and two of the people survived and identified the defendant as the shooter, the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of two counts of aggravated assault. Abdullah v. State, 284 Ga. 399, 667 S.E.2d 584 (2008).

Pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8), defendant juvenile's statements to the police corroborated an accomplice's testimony that the juvenile struck a woman unconscious, caused her serious bodily injury, used force to steal her pocketbook, and dragged her down onto her front yard; accordingly, the evidence was sufficient to adjudicate the juvenile delinquent under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21(a)(2),16-5-40(a), and16-8-40(a)(1). In re D. T., 294 Ga. App. 486, 669 S.E.2d 471 (2008).

Although the defendant argued that the defendant's conviction for aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, was not supported by sufficient evidence, the facts asserted by the defendant in support of this claim were of no consequence on appeal because the appellate court did not speculate as to which evidence the jury chose to believe; thus, the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction. Jones v. State, 294 Ga. App. 564, 669 S.E.2d 505 (2008).

Evidence supported convictions for aggravated assault, theft by taking, and felony murder when the evidence showed that the defendant pulled the victim out of the victim's car, beat the victim with a pistol, stole the car, and deliberately backed over the victim; before the crime, the defendant told an eyewitness to those acts that the defendant planned to rob the victim; and the defendant used the victim's phone after the victim's death. Lupoe v. State, 284 Ga. 576, 669 S.E.2d 133 (2008).

Defendant's conviction for aggravated assault was proper as several eyewitnesses, including the defendant's sister, testified that the defendant kicked the victim while the victim was lying on the ground. At best, the defendant's arguments were based on disagreement with the credibility determinations made by the trial judge. McDowell v. State, 284 Ga. 666, 670 S.E.2d 438 (2008).

There was sufficient evidence to support two juveniles' adjudications of delinquency for the offenses of armed robbery, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime based on the victim identifying the juveniles and the evidence that one of the juveniles used a gun to intimidate the victim into handing over the cash from the register of a gas station, shot the victim in the face causing severe injuries, and possessed a firearm during the commission of the crimes. In the Interest of R. S., 295 Ga. App. 772, 673 S.E.2d 280 (2009).

Evidence that showed that during an argument with the victim, the defendant dragged the victim off a couch by the victim's hair and threw a table at the victim, that the victim fled on foot and attempted to make a9-1-1 call, that the defendant pursued the victim in the defendant's truck, reached the victim, and held a knife to the victim, retreating only after another vehicle drove up, was sufficient to convict the defendant of family violence aggravated assault. Stone v. State, 296 Ga. App. 305, 674 S.E.2d 31 (2009).

Contrary to a defendant's contention that the state presented only circumstantial evidence under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-6) that did not exclude all reasonable hypotheses except that of the defendant's guilt, the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction for felony murder and aggravated assault; the defendant's infant child died of a massive closed head trauma complicated by blunt force chest trauma, and the defendant had the sole care of the child just before the child suffered rib injuries allegedly due to the defendant pushing on the child's chest while the child was choking and just before the child suffered seizure-like symptoms. Berryhill v. State, 285 Ga. 198, 674 S.E.2d 920 (2009).

As the defendant drove a car slowly by a house where rival gang members were while a car passenger repeatedly fired an assault rifle at the house, resulting in the death of two victims and injuries to two others, the defendant's convictions for felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony were supported by the evidence. Deleon v. State, 285 Ga. 306, 676 S.E.2d 184 (2009).

Convictions of two defendants of, inter alia, malice murder, felony murder, and aggravated assault were supported by sufficient evidence because eyewitnesses saw the defendants point guns at the victim, shoot, and flee. Daniel v. State, 285 Ga. 406, 677 S.E.2d 120 (2009).

Sufficient evidence was presented to support a defendant's conviction for aggravated assault based on the victim's testimony that the defendant struck the victim in the head, a neighbor's testimony that the defendant stated that the defendant struck the victim in the head for failing to pay the defendant and that the neighbor found the victim lying on the ground, and the fact that, while the defendant claimed self defense, the blow was to the back of the victim's head. Howard v. State, 297 Ga. App. 316, 677 S.E.2d 375 (2009).

As the victim testified that "he pointed it at me," and that "he never pointed the gun at my head, but he did point the gun at me," the jury was authorized to find from the evidence that the victim was placed in reasonable apprehension of violent injury and that the defendant was therefore guilty of aggravated assault. Lewis v. State, 297 Ga. App. 517, 677 S.E.2d 723 (2009).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions of aggravated assault and aggravated battery. It showed that the defendant and other gang members opened fire on a crowd of rival gang members and that the bullets also wounded two people inside a duplex; the jury chose to disbelieve the defendant's alibi witnesses and to believe that of the eyewitnesses. Lopez v. State, 297 Ga. App. 618, 677 S.E.2d 776 (2009), overruled on other grounds, State v. Gardner, 286 Ga. 633, 690 S.E.2d 164 (2010).

Evidence supported the defendant's aggravated assault conviction when the defendant confronted the victim while holding a claw hammer and the victim defended the victim's self with a baseball bat based on the victim's fear that the defendant was going to strike the victim. Although the defendant argued that the defendant had no intent of hitting the victim with the hammer and that the victim attacked the defendant, the jury opted to believe the victim; furthermore, it was the victim's reasonable apprehension of injury from an assault by a deadly weapon that established the crime of aggravated assault, not the assailant's intent to injure. Crane v. State, 297 Ga. App. 880, 678 S.E.2d 542 (2009).

Defendant's aggravated assault conviction under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) was supported by evidence that the codefendant took a running kick at the victim's face while the defendant was present and that the defendant kicked the back of the victim's legs. Wilkinson v. State, 298 Ga. App. 190, 679 S.E.2d 766 (2009).

Conviction of aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), was supported by sufficient evidence and the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for a directed verdict on this basis under circumstances in which the defendant became angry over some statements the defendant heard about the victim, punched the victim in the face, causing the victim to bleed, and knocked the victim to the ground; as the victim attempted to run, the defendant caught the victim and punched the victim in the side of the face, pulled the victim's hair, drove the victim's face into the defendant's knee, and repeatedly hit the victim in the face with the defendant's fist. The evidence of the extent of the damage inflicted on the victim by the defendant's repeated punches was sufficient to authorize the jury's verdict. Walker v. State, 298 Ga. App. 265, 679 S.E.2d 814 (2009).

Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's armed robbery and aggravated assault convictions because the victim recognized the defendant as one of the people who, while armed with a gun, pushed their way into the victim's home, pushed the victim down, and demanded money when a mask the defendant was wearing fell down; the victim also identified the defendant from earlier occasions when the defendant was visiting the victim's neighborhood. Dubose v. State, 298 Ga. App. 335, 680 S.E.2d 193 (2009).

Because the evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as a party to aggravated assault with a deadly weapon under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), the trial court did not err in failing to direct a verdict of acquittal. Artis v. State, 299 Ga. App. 287, 682 S.E.2d 375 (2009).

Evidence was sufficient to support convictions for aggravated assault, aggravated battery, armed robbery, and kidnapping. The victims' in-court identifications of the defendant and the codefendant were buttressed by the evidence that a cell phone in the defendants' possession matched that taken from the victims, that a car of the type used by the robbers contained guns similar to those used in the robbery, and the fact that the codefendant had a key to that car. Wright v. State, 300 Ga. App. 32, 684 S.E.2d 102 (2009).

Evidence supported the jury's determination that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravated assault and aggravated battery, O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21 and16-5-24, because although the victim was under the influence of alcohol and in severe pain when making statements to the police and the emergency room physician, it was within the jury's province to find the victim's statements more credible than the victim's trial testimony; the victim's statements in a request to dismiss the charges, which acknowledged that the defendant was the individual who attacked the victim, did not occur while the victim was under any physical impairment. Works v. State, 301 Ga. App. 108, 686 S.E.2d 863 (2009), cert. denied, No. S10C0458, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 251 (Ga. 2010).

Evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime because a witness identified the defendant as the person the witness saw shooting and running, and witnesses testified that the day of the shooting the defendant told the witnesses that the victim had robbed the defendant; the mother of the defendant's children testified that, on the night of the shooting, the defendant came to her apartment in the same complex where the shooting took place, breathing heavily, and wearing a shirt with bullet holes in the shirt. Allen v. State, 286 Ga. 392, 687 S.E.2d 799 (2010).

Evidence that defendant and another person burst into a home after they had lured the victim brandishing an automatic gun and wearing black t-shirts that said "Sheriff," handcuffed the victim, took the victim's money, and forced the victim to write a bill of sale for the victim's motorcycle was sufficient to support convictions for robbery by intimidation, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a), false imprisonment, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-41(a), aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), and impersonating a peace officer, O.C.G.A. § 16-10-23.23. Powers v. State, 303 Ga. App. 326, 693 S.E.2d 592 (2010).

Evidence adduced was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of felony murder, armed robbery, and aggravated assault for attacking six people in a home because one of the victims stated that the victim saw defendant in the doorway after shots had been fired; whether the deal a codefendant made with the state rendered the codefendant's testimony biased to a degree that left the codefendant less creditworthy was a determination to be made by the jury. Mikell v. State, 286 Ga. 434, 689 S.E.2d 286, overruled on other grounds, Manley v. State, 287 Ga. 338, 698 S.E.2d 301 (2010).

Because testimony about the circumstances of the victim's visit to a home where defendant was shot was relevant and admissible to explain defendant's motive in shooting the victim, the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of malice murder, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Taylor v. State, 287 Ga. 440, 696 S.E.2d 652 (2010).

Defendant's convictions for aggravated child molestation, aggravated assault, enticing a child for an indecent purpose, kidnapping, false imprisonment, cruelty to children, burglary, theft by taking, and striking an unattended vehicle were authorized because at trial, the defendant was positively identified as the perpetrator of the crimes; a nurse and doctor testified that the victim had an injury that was consistent with the molestation allegation, and a videotape depicted the defendant driving a maintenance truck that the defendant did not have authority to take. Bearfield v. State, 305 Ga. App. 37, 699 S.E.2d 363 (2010).

Since the victim was cut and hit by a shotgun during a struggle with defendant in defendant's attempt to obtain money for drugs, the evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's convictions for armed robbery, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21(a)(2),16-8-41(a), and16-11-106(b)(1). Johnson v. State, 305 Ga. App. 838, 700 S.E.2d 726 (2010).

Evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of murder and aggravated assault because the defendant's conduct before, during, and after the crimes supported the finding that the defendant was a party thereto, notwithstanding the jury's acquittal of the defendant on three weapons charges. Allen v. State, 288 Ga. 263, 702 S.E.2d 869 (2010).

Trial court did not err in determining that the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) because overwhelming evidence adduced at trial showed that the defendant was at the scene, that the defendant had a handgun in the defendant's possession, and that the defendant drew the defendant's handgun and pointed the gun at the victim and the victim's companions as they were sitting in the victim's car, thereby placing them in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury. White v. State, 308 Ga. App. 38, 706 S.E.2d 570 (2011).

Evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty of malice murder, armed robbery, and aggravated assault beyond a reasonable doubt because although the defendant denied to police that the defendant had any contact with the silver car that was connected to the robbery, the defendant's fingerprints were found on the outside of the car, and an eyewitness's physical description of the second gunman from the robbery matched the defendant. Carter v. State, 289 Ga. 51, 709 S.E.2d 223 (2011).

Evidence was sufficient under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-6) to support the defendant's convictions for malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, possession of a knife during the commission of a crime, financial transaction card fraud, and recidivism because there was evidence placing the defendant at the victim's home during the time of the murder and evidence of the victim's blood on the defendant's shoes, which the defendant intentionally chose not to wear when being questioned by police; the evidence, together with the defendant's own statements regarding the defendant's use of the victim's debit card, was sufficient to authorize the jury to determine that the state excluded all reasonable hypotheses save that of the defendant's guilt and to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes of which the defendant was convicted. Johnson v. State, 288 Ga. 771, 707 S.E.2d 92 (2011).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions of armed robbery under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a), aggravated battery under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24(a), aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a), burglary under O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1(a)(2), possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b), and conspiracy to possess cocaine under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-4-8 and16-13-30(a) as a conspirator because, while the uncorroborated testimony of one accomplice was insufficient under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8), the evidence sufficed to sustain defendant's conviction when an additional accomplice provided testimony to corroborate that of the first accomplice. Both codefendants testified that the defendant was present from the robbery's inception through the robbery's execution, that the defendant was aware of the conspiracy to obtain the victim's money and cocaine by armed robbery, and that the defendant willingly participated in the crimes and shared the criminal intent of those who committed the crimes inside the victim's residence by supplying the defendant's car and acting as a get-away driver. Watson v. State, 308 Ga. App. 871, 708 S.E.2d 703 (2011).

Evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for aggravated assault since, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, the defendant intentionally committed an act that placed an apartment resident in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury. Craft v. State, 309 Ga. App. 698, 710 S.E.2d 891 (2011).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for aggravated assault because evidence was presented that the defendant and a codefendant entered a restaurant to rob the restaurant and shot two employees of the restaurant. In a statement to the police, the defendant admitted that the defendant entered the restaurant with a handgun to rob the restaurant, but the defendant claimed that the defendant heard gunshots and left the restaurant, while the codefendant gave a similar statement to the police. Watkins v. State, 289 Ga. 359, 711 S.E.2d 655 (2011).

Rational jury could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravated assault in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) because the evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the state disproved the defendant's self-defense claim; the jury was entitled to reject the defendant's version of events, and even if the jury found that the victim threw a bottle at the defendant's car, the jury could have concluded that the defendant struck the victim after any danger had passed and that the defendant's response was excessive. Hill v. State, 310 Ga. App. 695, 713 S.E.2d 891 (2011).

Evidence of the circumstances was sufficient to establish the defendant's identity as the perpetrator and the defendant's guilt of armed robbery, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41, aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106, because the defendant matched the description of the perpetrator given by both a convenience store clerk and another store employee; when the defendant was apprehended, an officer recovered next to the defendant's person the contraband and instrumentalities used in the commission of the robbery. Daniels v. State, 310 Ga. App. 562, 714 S.E.2d 91 (2011).

Defendant's convictions for armed robbery, aggravated assault, and malice murder were based on sufficient evidence where a victim in an apartment next to the defendant's apartment was fatally stabbed multiple times, there was physical evidence that tied the defendant to the criminal incident, and the defendant confessed to committing the crimes. Culpepper v. State, 289 Ga. 736, 715 S.E.2d 155 (2011).

Because the defendant pointed a gun at the victim while defendant's accomplices robbed the victim, and thereafter shot at the victim's trailer, hitting a child and killing the victim's sister-in-law, the evidence was sufficient to find defendant guilty of felony murder, aggravated assault, armed robbery, cruelty to children, possession of a gun during the commission of a crime, and possession of a revolver by a person under the age of 18. Lytle v. State, 290 Ga. 177, 718 S.E.2d 296 (2011).

Evidence was sufficient to authorize the defendant's convictions for hijacking a motor vehicle, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-44.1(b), armed robbery, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41, aggravated assault, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, and possession of a knife during the commission of a crime, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b), based on the defendant's involvement as a party to the crimes, or as a coconspirator under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(b). The evidence presented was that: (1) when two people walked past the victim's parked vehicle, one of the people held a knife to the victim's stomach and ordered the victim to give the person the victim's wallet and keys; (2) the victim complied; (3) the person with the knife got into the driver's seat and the defendant, who had stood nearby during the incident, got into the passenger seat; (3) the victim identified the defendant as the person who got into the passenger seat; (4) the people drove away, but were apprehended; (5) the victim's wallet was recovered, on the ground to the rear of the vehicle, on the passenger side; and (6) the defendant wanted to leave the area because there was a warrant for the defendant's arrest. Harrelson v. State, 312 Ga. App. 710, 719 S.E.2d 569 (2011).

Sufficient evidence showed the defendant committed aggravated assault, under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, in the process of hijacking a victim's vehicle because: (1) the defendant showed a gun when the victim resisted the defendant's attempt to take the victim's car; (2) the victim grabbed the gun and tussled with the defendant showed a reasonable apprehension of harm; and (3) the victim was seriously injured. Campbell v. State, 314 Ga. App. 299, 724 S.E.2d 24 (2012).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain the defendant's convictions for armed robbery, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a), aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b), because the victim testified about the assault and identified the defendant as the person who committed the assault; the competent testimony of even a single witness can be enough to sustain a conviction. Brown v. State, 314 Ga. App. 198, 723 S.E.2d 520 (2012).

Evidence that the defendant was in the victim's home after a neighbor heard glass breaking and called9-1-1, that a ribbon from the defendant's home was used to strangle the victim, that both the victim's and the defendant's DNA were on the ribbon, and that the victim's wedding ring was found in the defendant's pocket supported the defendant's convictions for aggravated assault. Muhammad v. State, 290 Ga. 880, 725 S.E.2d 302 (2012).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for felony murder, aggravated assault, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, and participation in criminal street gang activity. The defendant and fellow gang members walked toward a group of teenagers in a front yard while yelling and making gang signals; the defendant fired once into the crowd, killing the victim, who was unarmed; and the defendant, who fled the scene, was the only person who fired a weapon and was identified to police as the shooter by witnesses who knew the defendant by name. Jackson v. State, 291 Ga. 25, 727 S.E.2d 120 (2012).

Evidence was sufficient to support a finding that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime against another person, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b)(1), because a witness and a friend testified that they had seen the defendant shoot the victim. Redinburg v. State, 315 Ga. App. 413, 727 S.E.2d 201 (2012).

Testimony that the defendant forced the defendant's way into a victim's house, kissed the victim against the victim's will, and attempted to pull the victim's pants down, stopping only when a car drove up, was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for aggravated assault. Murrell v. State, 317 Ga. App. 310, 730 S.E.2d 675 (2012).

Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's aggravated assault conviction, despite the defendant's claim that the defendant took nothing from the victim and did not point a weapon at the victim because: (1) it was undisputed that the crime occurred; and, (2) whether the defendant or the defendant's accomplice pointed the gun and took the property, the defendant could be convicted through the defendant's role as a party, under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-21. Bush v. State, 317 Ga. App. 439, 731 S.E.2d 121 (2012).

Witness's testimony that the witness and the defendant had been smoking crack cocaine down the street from the victim's apartment, the defendant left the house to get more drugs, and the defendant returned agitated and told the witness an old man stole the defendant's crack but the defendant "took care of him," and testimony the victim went head first through a window after being burned supported convictions for voluntary manslaughter and aggravated assault. Haymer v. State, 323 Ga. App. 874, 747 S.E.2d 512 (2013).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for armed robbery, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony because, although the two passengers of the car committed the actual armed robbery, there was evidence that the defendant, the driver of the car, knew that the two passengers were armed and that the defendant "kind of sort of" knew what they were going to do, which supported a finding that the defendant participated in the robbery as the getaway driver. Smith v. State, 325 Ga. App. 745, 754 S.E.2d 788 (2014).

Evidence, including the defendant's statement to police that the defendant had shot the victim, had meant to shoot the victim, and would have shot the victim again, was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for aggravated assault and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. Taylor v. State, 327 Ga. App. 288, 758 S.E.2d 629 (2014).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of two counts of aggravated battery, aggravated assault, and cruelty to children in the first degree because, when the defendant and the defendant's girlfriend brought their 11-week-old daughter to the emergency room, the infant had extensive bruises all over the infant's body, the infant's skull was fractured on both sides, and the infant was having seizures; the skull fractures were caused by two separate impacts; and a physician who was qualified as an expert in assessing abuse and intentional injury to children testified that the physician could think of no accidental force that would account for all of the infant's injuries. Busby v. State, 332 Ga. App. 646, 774 S.E.2d 717 (2015).

Since the admission of the victim's identification of the defendant was not improper, the defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence based on that identification failed and the jury was authorized, based on the identification and the existence of the defendant's fingerprints on the victim's van, to find that the defendant committed both armed robbery and aggravated assault. Jackson v. State, 335 Ga. App. 500, 782 S.E.2d 287 (2016).

Testimony that the victim demanded the return of the victim's motorcycle, while the victim's hands were on the motorcycle, the defendant started the motorcycle, and the victim had to move to avoid being hit when the defendant took off on the motorcycle was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for aggravated assault. Newby v. State, 338 Ga. App. 588, 791 S.E.2d 92 (2016).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of armed robbery and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon as a party to the crimes because a codefendant pointed a gun at the victim's side and demanded money; the codefendant told the defendant that they were going to kill the victim; the codefendant took the victim's cell phone, ordered the victim to disrobe, and raped the victim in the front seat of the car; during the rape, the victim could not escape from the car as the defendant was standing in front of the driver's door; and, after the victim transferred the victim's number to a new cell phone, the victim received calls for the defendant. Carter v. State, 339 Ga. App. 140, 793 S.E.2d 459 (2016).

Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's convictions for armed robbery, false imprisonment, kidnapping, and aggravated assault based on the state showing that the defendant held the four boys at gunpoint, forced the boys into the pool to restrict their ability to flee, and stole two cell phones and money from the boys before fleeing. Smith v. State, 342 Ga. App. 656, 805 S.E.2d 251 (2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of family violence aggravated assault and family violence aggravated battery because the victim's testimony that the victim and the defendant were romantically involved and had met 10 years before through mutual friends allowed the jury to conclude that they were not siblings; the defendant hit the victim with the defendant's fist and knocked out two of the victim's teeth; the defendant beat the victim with a wire clothes hanger; and the defendant squirted lighter fluid on the victim's head and chest, and used a lighter to set the victim on fire. Outz v. State, 344 Ga. App. 616, 810 S.E.2d 678 (2018).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of malice murder, felony murder, and family violence aggravated assault because the defendant, who had a turbulent and troubled history with the victim, the defendant's father, got into an argument with the victim; the defendant then shot the victim six times with a semi-automatic handgun, killing the victim; the defendant's son heard the argument and witnessed the shooting; the defendant told one of the defendant's sisters that the defendant did not mean to kill the victim and only wanted to hurt the victim; and the defendant's son testified at the trial about witnessing the defendant shoot the victim, the son's grandfather. Puckett v. State, 303 Ga. 719, 814 S.E.2d 726 (2018).

Trial court did not err in determining that the state carried the state's burden of introducing evidence that disproved the defendant's alleged justification for the defendant's use of deadly force because the defendant intentionally fired a gun at the defendant's fiancee and the fiancee's three children while they were sitting in the fiancee's car and it was within the jury's province to reject the defendant's contention that the defendant was afraid the fiancee was trying to run the defendant over. Williams v. State, 347 Ga. App. 171, 818 S.E.2d 88 (2018).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of malice murder of the first victim, aggravated assault of the second victim, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime because the defendant pulled alongside the second victim's car at an intersection and shot into the passenger side of the car several times, killing the first victim; the second victim identified the defendant as the shooter; and the video recordings from the gas station's surveillance system and the city's street surveillance system that showed the incident that took place at the gas station before the shooting and showed the shooting were played for the jury. Johnson v. State, 305 Ga. 475, 826 S.E.2d 89 (2019).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of aggravated assault of the victim with a deadly weapon and possession of a firearm during the commission of that crime because the victim testified that a passenger in a vehicle shot the victim; and the victim positively identified the defendant as the driver of the vehicle. Perdomo v. State, 307 Ga. 670, 837 S.E.2d 762 (2020).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the second defendant of voluntary manslaughter and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon because the second defendant, the first defendant, and some of their friends engaged in a heated argument with the victim that escalated into a physical altercation, in which the defendants knocked the victim to the ground; the victim escaped from the fight by pulling a knife and cutting the second defendant; and the second defendant and the first defendant pulled handguns and fired at the victim as the victim tried to walk away with three bullets striking and ultimately killing the victim. Hamlette v. State (two cases), 353 Ga. App. 640, 839 S.E.2d 161 (2020).

Slapping is sufficient for aggravated assault.

- Allegation alleged that the defendant committed aggravated assault with intent to rape in that the defendant assaulted the girlfriend's daughter with the intent to rape her when the defendant slapped the daughter across the face with the defendant's hands. The evidence supported this accusation, showing that shortly after 6:30 A.M., the defendant threatened and slapped the daughter on the face as the defendant repeatedly attempted to penetrate the daughter. The defendant's argument on appeal that the slapping of the daughter's face did not constitute an assault is simply wrong. Boyd v. State, 289 Ga. App. 342, 656 S.E.2d 864 (2008), cert. denied, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 498 (Ga. 2008).

Evidence sufficient for conviction of aggravated assault with gun.

- Evidence supported defendant's conviction for aggravated assault because: (1) defendant thrust a handgun in the door of an ex-love interest's apartment, pointed it at the ex-love interest, and asked the ex-love interest if the ex-love interest was going to call the defendant anymore; (2) the ex-love interest said no and shut the door; (3) defendant then shot two rounds through the door; (4) two shell casings were found on the apartment floor; and (5) a matching shell casing and a photograph of defendant with a handgun were found at another love interest's house. Johnson v. State, 274 Ga. App. 641, 618 S.E.2d 716 (2005).

Trial court properly denied defendant's motion for acquittal as a matter of law, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-9-1, as the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction on four counts of assault, in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-20 and16-5-21(a)(2), as defendant and the codefendant committed two home invasions, whereupon the victims therein were fearful, some were harmed, and during the incidents, defendant held a night stick and instructed the victims to cooperate with the codefendant, who brandished a handgun. Moyer v. State, 275 Ga. App. 366, 620 S.E.2d 837 (2005), overruled on other grounds, Vergara v. State, 283 Ga. 175, 657 S.E.2d 863 (2008).

Because sufficient evidence was presented that the defendant was provoked by an attack on a sibling, and that the defendant had a history of abusive relationships with several men, the voluntary manslaughter of the male victim was supported by the evidence; moreover, evidence of the victim's stabbing and death also supported the jury's verdict with respect to the aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, felony murder, and possession of a knife during the commission of a felony charges. Breland v. State, 285 Ga. App. 251, 648 S.E.2d 389 (2007).

Trial court properly denied the defendant's motion for a new trial, and an aggravated assault conviction was upheld on appeal, as the state was not required to show that the defendant expressed an intent to rob or declared a purpose to carry that intent into effect, for the jury to arrive at the conclusion that such was the defendant's intent; moreover, the defendant's intention could be gathered from the circumstances of the case as proved, and in seeking the motives of human conduct, inferences and deductions could properly be considered when the inferences and deductions flowed naturally from the facts proved. Squires v. State, 286 Ga. App. 141, 648 S.E.2d 696 (2007).

The O.C.G.A. § 17-10-30(b)(8) statutory aggravating circumstance does not require knowledge on the part of the defendant that the victim was a peace officer or other designated official engaged in the performance of official duties. Fair v. State, 284 Ga. 165, 664 S.E.2d 227 (2008).

Evidence that: (1) a sister of one of two shooting victims described the defendant to police; (2) the defendant admitted having held a gun near the crime scene at the time of the shooting; and (3) a victim, who knew the defendant and had seen the defendant from a distance of three to four feet, identified the defendant as the shooter, was sufficient to sustain the defendant's convictions of two counts of aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21. Carlos v. State, 292 Ga. App. 419, 664 S.E.2d 808 (2008).

Testimony by a victim that the defendant and an accomplice, armed with handguns, forcibly entered the victim's apartment, raped and sodomized the victim, struck the victim with a gun, stole jewelry, bound the victim, and escaped in a car owned by the victim's prospective spouse, and evidence that 24 fingerprints lifted from the apartment and car matched the defendant's was sufficient to convict the defendant of aggravated assault. Crawford v. State, 292 Ga. App. 463, 664 S.E.2d 820 (2008).

Brandishing a gun, a masked individual moved a wheelchair-bound restaurant manager to a hidden safe and ordered the manager to open the safe. The manager's identification of the perpetrator as the defendant, a former employee, from the defendant's distinctive voice, and the perpetrator's knowledge of the safe's location, authorized the jury to find defendant guilty of aggravated assault by placing a gun to the victim's head. Johnson v. State, 293 Ga. App. 728, 667 S.E.2d 637 (2008).

With regard to a defendant's conviction for aggravated assault, there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction based on the victim's testimony that the defendant was the individual who approached the victim's car with a gun and ordered the victim out, causing the victim to be in fear. Kashamba v. State, 295 Ga. App. 540, 672 S.E.2d 512 (2009).

Evidence that the defendant shot the victim at close range; that the victim, who knew the defendant well, identified the defendant from a photo line-up and at trial; and that a witness told police of driving the defendant to find the victim and of witnessing the shooting, was sufficient to convict the defendant of aggravated battery, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of those crimes. Spencer v. State, 296 Ga. App. 828, 676 S.E.2d 274 (2009).

Evidence authorized the jury to conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of malice murder, armed robbery, and aggravated assault because defendant and defendant's codefendants entered an apartment masked and armed with an assault rifle, and the defendant fired the rifle at the victim and fatally wounded the victim. Zackery v. State, 286 Ga. 399, 688 S.E.2d 354 (2010).

Evidence that a defendant threatened to and then intentionally returned with armed associates to the scene of an unsatisfactory marijuana purchase and participated in a shootout, causing a chest wound to a 16-year-old boy in a nearby house, supported the defendant's conviction for aggravated assault in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2). Dennis v. State, 304 Ga. App. 510, 696 S.E.2d 333 (2010).

Evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty of aggravated assault in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) beyond a reasonable doubt because a witness to the incident testified that the defendant intentionally fired the defendant's gun in a guest's direction after the defendant became upset with the guest's jokes; a bullet hole was also found inside the refrigerator where the guest had been sitting. Williams v. State, 307 Ga. App. 577, 705 S.E.2d 332 (2011).

Evidence was sufficient to support the convictions of murder, aggravated assault, and firearm possession in connection with the shooting death of the victim because the evidence showed that: (1) the defendant's teenage children made a cell phone call to the children's parents' home to tell them that the children were being followed by a motorcycle rider; (2) as the children arrived home, the defendant exited from the house with a handgun; (3) the defendant fired two warning shots at the rider when the rider rode past; (4) the rider turned the motorcycle around and when the rider rode past the house again, the defendant fired again as the defendant claimed that the rider swerved toward the defendant; and (5) this shot struck the victim, resulting in the victim's death. Gear v. State, 288 Ga. 500, 705 S.E.2d 632 (2011), overruled on other grounds by State v. Lane, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 98 (Ga. 2020).

In an action for aggravated assault, testimony from a victim that the defendant shot a handgun toward the victim and others and testimony that the defendant had been texting a victim and caused the victim to be afraid that the defendant was coming to the victim's apartment and there would be a problem was sufficient for the jury to conclude that the defendant was guilty as indicted. Sullins v. State, 350 Ga. App. 83, 828 S.E.2d 142 (2019).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of three counts of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon because, after verbal and physical altercations with the defendant's live-in girlfriend and the girlfriend's brother, the defendant fired several shots from a gun toward a departing car carrying the three aggravated assault victims named in the indictment - the defendant's girlfriend, the girlfriend's brother, and the girlfriend's mother; a bullet struck the car near where one of the victims was sitting; and a jury could find that the defendant intentionally fired the gun in the three victims' direction. Bashir v. State, 350 Ga. App. 852, 830 S.E.2d 353 (2019).

Evidence that the defendant fired several shots at the victim outside of the pool hall and that one of those shots struck the victim in the back was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for aggravated assault. Sherrod v. State, 355 Ga. App. 441, 844 S.E.2d 508 (2020).

Evidence sufficient when air pistol pointed at victim.

- Evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of aggravated assault in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) because the defendant pointed an air pistol at the victim and threatened to kill the victim. Leeks v. State, 309 Ga. App. 724, 710 S.E.2d 908 (2011).

Jury was authorized to find the defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-2(a), aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b)(1), carrying a concealed weapon, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-126(b), and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-131(b), because during an argument with the victims, the defendant shot the victims and threatened to kill the victims. White v. State, 312 Ga. App. 421, 718 S.E.2d 335 (2011).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of aggravated assault and aggravated battery because the victim turned to see the defendant pointing a gun to the victim's head; the victim pushed the defendant's hand away; the defendant came back swinging and hit the victim with the pistol; the victim grabbed the defendant and they tussled; the defendant then shot the victim, severing the victim's spine; and the victim was now confined to a wheelchair. Williams v. State, 332 Ga. App. 805, 775 S.E.2d 178 (2015).

Aggravated assault against grandparents.

- As a victim's grandparent was present in the victim's home when the defendant shot the victim three times, the jury could have inferred that the grandparent reasonably feared suffering a violent injury during the shooting. Therefore, the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21 as to the grandparent. Hollis v. State, 295 Ga. App. 529, 672 S.E.2d 487 (2009).

Evidence sufficient for conviction of aggravated assault upon peace officer.

- See Brown v. State, 180 Ga. App. 361, 349 S.E.2d 250 (1986); Reddin v. State, 223 Ga. App. 148, 476 S.E.2d 882 (1996).

Defendant committed aggravated assault on a police officer in an offensive manner, resulting in injuries to the officer; it was a jury question as to whether defendant's testimony that defendant intended no harm was believed or not. Dyer v. State, 261 Ga. App. 289, 585 S.E.2d 81 (2003).

There was sufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction for aggravated assault on a peace officer in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21 where deputies testified that defendant was pointing defendant's pistol at all of them as defendant made defendant's way towards a trailer in defendant's backyard and then ran off into the woods; one deputies conflicting testimony as to whether the officer feared for the officer's life was a matter of credibility that was determined by the jury, and there was evidence that the deputies had identified themselves as peace officers to defendant. Logan v. State, 265 Ga. App. 134, 593 S.E.2d 14 (2003).

Evidence was sufficient to show that a juvenile was a party to aggravated assault on a victim when one or more of four gunmen including the juvenile shot into another person's residence because the victim's car was parked; the presence of the victim's car at the house was circumstantial evidence from which the court could find the shooters believed someone was in the house and that they intended to commit a violent injury to the victim by firing their weapons. In the Interest of M.D.L., 271 Ga. App. 738, 610 S.E.2d 687 (2005).

Evidence that defendant, who was driving a vehicle being pursued by law enforcement officers' vehicles, after an officer unsuccessfully attempted to arrest defendant for domestic violence, called the spouse and told the spouse to call off the officers or defendant would try to kill them by colliding the defendant's vehicle with theirs and then tried to run an officer off the road was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for aggravated assault upon a police officer, and any conflict in the testimony was for the jury to resolve. Razinha v. State, 273 Ga. App. 583, 615 S.E.2d 649 (2005).

Evidence that a defendant, after bringing the defendant's vehicle to a complete stop and making eye contact with a police officer, accelerated and struck a patrol car, causing damage to the vehicle, supported the defendant's conviction for aggravated assault on a peace officer under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) and (c). Branton v. State, 292 Ga. App. 104, 663 S.E.2d 414 (2008), cert. denied, No. S08C1771, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 873 (Ga. 2008).

On a charge for aggravated assault of a peace officer, the court rejected the defendant's argument that the officer was never in immediate apprehension of harm. The officer testified that the officer was in fear of receiving a violent injury when the defendant suddenly pulled away from a traffic stop, which was sufficient for the jury to find that the defendant committed aggravated assault. Little v. State, 298 Ga. App. 298, 680 S.E.2d 154 (2009).

Evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed an assault upon a corporal with the county sheriff's department with a knife while the corporal was engaged in official duties because, while the defendant cited to testimony implying that a deputy had secured the knife by the time the corporal joined the struggle, other testimony indicated that the corporal was lying on top of the defendant and attempting to restrain the defendant while the defendant continued to wield the knife against police officers; even if the Court of Appeals considered the testimony the police officers provided to be inconsistent, conflict in the testimony of witnesses was for resolution by the jury and not the Court of Appeals. Dobbs v. State, 302 Ga. App. 628, 691 S.E.2d 387 (2010).

Knowledge that victim was peace officer as part of jury instruction.

- In a prosecution for aggravated assault upon a police officer, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(c), the trial court's instructions regarding the defense of misapprehension of fact, and that intent was an essential element of any crime, were insufficient to convey to the jury the requirement that the defendant had to have known that the victim was a peace officer. The error was not harmless as the entire defense was based on the defendant's alleged lack of knowledge that the defendant's assault victim was a peace officer. Fedd v. State, 298 Ga. App. 508, 680 S.E.2d 453 (2009), cert. denied, No. S09C1776, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 793 (Ga. 2009).

Aggravated assault with intent to rob supported by evidence.

- Identification testimony was sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was the perpetrator of the offenses of theft by sudden snatching and aggravated assault with intent to rob. Tolbert v. State, 180 Ga. App. 703, 350 S.E.2d 51 (1986).

Aggravated assault, possession of firearm, and discharge of firearm sufficient to support felony murder conviction.

- Because defendant and an accomplice ordered the victim and another individual against a wall, took the victim's money at gunpoint, and defendant began to point and wave the gun when it fired, resulting in the victim being shot and subsequently dying, the evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find defendant guilty of felony murder while committing aggravated assault and of possession of a firearm. Taylor v. State, 279 Ga. 706, 620 S.E.2d 363 (2005).

Aggravated assault and felony murder.

- Evidence in support of the state's theory that the defendant killed the victim in an unprovoked aggravated assault, based on expert testimony that the victim died from a deliberate and forceful strike with a knife, and evidence that discounted any possible accident or lack of intent, was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for felony murder during the commission of an aggravated assault Nichols v. State, 281 Ga. 483, 640 S.E.2d 40 (2007).

Jury was authorized to find that the evidence was sufficient to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of felony murder during the commission of aggravated assault in the manner alleged in the indictment because at trial the medical examiner testified that the cause of the victim's death was suffocation; although the defendant told an ex-spouse over the phone that the defendant choked the victim, there was no other evidence to corroborate that statement while there was much physical and scientific evidence that pointed to the cause of death as suffocation. Davis v. State, 290 Ga. 421, 721 S.E.2d 886 (2012).

Rule against mutually exclusive verdicts did not apply.

- Rule against mutually exclusive verdicts did not apply to the verdicts returned by the jury of guilty on a charge of malice murder, but not guilty by reason of insanity on a charge of aggravated assault. Taylor v. State, 282 Ga. 502, 651 S.E.2d 715 (2007).

Conviction for multiple felonies appropriate.

- Evidence presented by the prosecution was sufficient to enable any rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty of armed robbery, kidnapping, and aggravated assault with intent to rob. Conway v. State, 183 Ga. App. 573, 359 S.E.2d 438 (1987).

Evidence was sufficient to support convictions of murder, aggravated assault, armed robbery, burglary, and possession of a firearm in the commission of a felony. Baty v. State, 257 Ga. 371, 359 S.E.2d 655 (1987).

Evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find the appellant guilty of malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in the shooting deaths of two victims. Burtts v. State, 269 Ga. 402, 499 S.E.2d 326 (1998).

Evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find each defendant guilty of malice murder, felony murder predicated on aggravated assault and aggravated assault. Whitaker v. State, 269 Ga. 462, 499 S.E.2d 888 (1998).

Trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to correct illegal sentence, pursuant to O.C.G.A. §§ 16-1-6 and16-1-7, as defendant's convictions for aggravated assault and kidnapping, in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21 and16-5-40(a), respectively, did not merge as a matter of law, as only aggravated assault and kidnapping with bodily injury merged as a matter of law; further, the crimes did not merge as a matter of fact, as they were based on separate and distinct facts, and due to the timing of defendant's actions during the incident, the separate convictions were proper. Walker v. State, 275 Ga. App. 862, 622 S.E.2d 64 (2005).

Testimony of a single witness sufficient.

- Testimony of a single witness was sufficient to authorize a jury's verdict that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of committing aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and that the defendant committed simple battery by intentionally kicking the victim on the ankle, causing a bruise. Ringo v. State, 236 Ga. App. 38, 510 S.E.2d 893 (1999).

Witness's testimony was sufficient to authorize a factfinder to determine that the witness was not an accomplice, obviating the need for the testimony to be corroborated under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8) , and based on that testimony, a rational trier of fact could have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the juvenile had committed the act of aggravated assault. In re A.Z., 301 Ga. App. 524, 687 S.E.2d 887 (2009), cert. denied, No. S10C0492, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 335 (Ga. 2010).

Prospective juror properly excluded on basis of bias.

- When the defendant was convicted of aggravated assault, the trial court did not err in excusing for cause a prospective juror who was acquainted with defense counsel as the juror's statement that the juror worked with a criminal defense firm, and could not give the state a fair hearing clearly established a leaning or bias on the part of the juror, which made the juror subject to being excused for cause. Bell v. State, 276 Ga. 206, 576 S.E.2d 876 (2003).

Verdict of guilty but mentally ill supported by evidence.

- When the defendant was indicted for assault with intent to rape and the evidence showed that the defendant was a paranoid schizophrenic with borderline mental retardation at the time of the crime but that the defendant knew the difference between right and wrong at that time, the evidence supported a verdict of guilty but mentally ill. Jackson v. State, 166 Ga. App. 477, 304 S.E.2d 560 (1983).

Inconsistent verdicts.

- Fact that jury acquitted defendant of charges of kidnapping and armed robbery arising out of the same incident in which defendant committed aggravated assault did not mean that the evidence was insufficient to convict defendant of the aggravated assault where the other two alleged offenses occurred before the aggravated assault such that the verdicts were not necessarily inconsistent; in any event, the inconsistent verdict rule does not apply in criminal cases. Thomas v. State, 257 Ga. App. 350, 571 S.E.2d 178 (2002).

Jury's verdict finding defendants guilty of reckless conduct against a victim after one of the defendants fired a shot at a car was factually inconsistent with the jury's verdict finding defendants guilty of aggravated assault against the same victim; because the appellate court could not determine if the jury reached inconsistent verdicts, it reversed defendants' convictions for both offenses and remanded the case for a new trial on those charges. Reddick v. State, 264 Ga. App. 487, 591 S.E.2d 392 (2003), overruled on other grounds by State v. Springer, 297 Ga. 376, 774 S.E.2d 106 (2015).

Evidence that the defendant fired a gun in the victim's direction from within a vehicle, thereby frightening the victim, was sufficient to sustain a conviction for aggravated assault as defined by O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(3); the result was not changed by the fact that the defendant was acquitted of aggravated assault under § 16-5-21(a)(2). Hardeman v. State, 277 Ga. App. 180, 626 S.E.2d 138 (2006).

There was no merit to a defendant's argument that a guilty verdict on an aggravated assault charge as to one of the victims was inconsistent with a not guilty verdict on an armed robbery charge as to that victim. The inconsistent verdict rule was abolished; moreover, since the crimes had different elements, the jury could have found that the defendant was guilty of assaulting both victims but robbing only one of the victims. Bethune v. State, 291 Ga. App. 674, 662 S.E.2d 774 (2008).

Evidence insufficient for conviction.

- See Montford v. State, 254 Ga. App. 524, 564 S.E.2d 216 (2002).

Insufficient evidence supported the defendant's conviction of aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a); in superficially wounding the victim after the fatal stabbing had occurred and after the victim was either dead or unconscious, there was no evidence that the defendant intended to violently injure the victim or that the victim was placed in reasonable apprehension of being violently injured. Perez v. State, 281 Ga. 175, 637 S.E.2d 30 (2006).

Convictions of aggravated battery, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24, aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106, were not supported by sufficient evidence because, although the defendant's conduct before the crime was suspicious, the circumstantial evidence against the defendant was insufficient under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-6); the state did not show that the defendant was anywhere near the scene at the time of the shooting, did not present evidence connecting a weapon used in the shooting to the defendant, and, although a witness testified that three days before the shooting, the witness saw the defendant's brother hand the defendant a gun, the witness could not identify the type of gun involved, and this testimony did not connect the defendant with the shooting. The state also failed to adduce evidence that the defendant intentionally aided, abetted, or encouraged the commission of the crimes of which the defendant was convicted. Gresham v. State, 298 Ga. App. 136, 679 S.E.2d 344 (2009).

Evidence insufficient to convict juvenile defendant.

- Evidence was insufficient to support a juvenile's adjudication of delinquency for aggravated assault with the intent to rob under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21 when the juvenile placed the juvenile's hands in the victim's pockets to see what the victim was carrying. In the Interest of D.M., 308 Ga. App. 589, 708 S.E.2d 550 (2011).

Evidence did not support self-defense claim.

- Evidence was sufficient for the jury to reject the defendant's claim of self-defense and to support the defendant's aggravated assault and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime conviction because, inter alia, two witnesses yelled at the defendant to put the gun away, but the defendant shot the victim a second time, the defendant testified that the defendant believed that the victim was holding a weapon behind the victim's leg when the victim got out of the car and that the defendant heard someone yell "bust," which the defendant understood to mean "shoot," and another witness heard no such statement and did not see anything in the victim's hands when the victim exited the car. Hill v. State, 276 Ga. App. 874, 625 S.E.2d 108 (2005).

Felony murder and aggravated assault convictions were upheld on appeal as the defendant's defense of self-defense lacked merit given evidence that any imminent threat posed against the defendant had passed, the victim was shot in the head after the confrontation ended, and the victim retreated to the victim's car and was being driven away at the time the fatal shot was dealt. Woolfolk v. State, 282 Ga. 139, 644 S.E.2d 828 (2007).

Despite the defendant's claim that the state failed to disprove a claim of self-defense, the appeals court upheld the defendant's aggravated assault conviction, because sufficient evidence was presented to allow the jury to decide that the defendant's act of stabbing the weaponless victim amounted to excessive force. Thus, the defendant's motion for a new trial on the issue was properly denied. Richards v. State, 288 Ga. App. 814, 655 S.E.2d 690 (2007).

Justification defense.

- In defendant's trial on a charge of aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a), the trial court did not err under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-64 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-6-611) in precluding the defendant from cross-examining the victim about what the victim meant when the victim said that there was tension in the victim's relationship with the defendant and that the victim was going through a transitional period in the victim's life; while the defendant contended that the defendant wanted to examine the victim about the victim's failure to comply with a drug rehabilitation program in which the victim was enrolled and that the defendant was upset about the possibility that the victim would leave Georgia if the victim failed to complete the program, thereby ending the relationship, such evidence was irrelevant to the defendant's justification defense because it was not evidence either of the victim's general reputation for violence or of specific acts of violence perpetrated by the victim. Evidence about the status of the couple's relationship and the nature of the couple's arguments in the week leading up to their fight would not have shed any light on whether the defendant was in reasonable fear of suffering immediate serious harm personally when the defendant choked the victim and threatened to kill the victim. As such, the trial court did not err in ruling that the evidence was irrelevant. Chambers v. State, 308 Ga. App. 748, 708 S.E.2d 651 (2011).

Improper comment on evidence by court was reversible error.

- On appeal from an aggravated assault conviction, because the trial judge improperly commented on the evidence in violation of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 by telling the jury that the parties agreed that there was no gun involved in the incident, the comment amounted to reversible error entitling the defendant to a new trial. Brimidge v. State, 287 Ga. App. 23, 651 S.E.2d 344 (2007).

Claim of error waived on appeal when exclusion of evidence not raised at trial.

- On appeal from convictions for murder and aggravated assault, the defendant waived any error regarding the exclusion of a videotaped statement on appeal, which the defendant claimed would have supported a voluntary manslaughter theory, by failing to raise the claim specifically at trial. Johnson v. State, 282 Ga. 96, 646 S.E.2d 216 (2007).

Withdrawal of guilty pleas properly denied.

- Because: (1) the facts of the case as narrated by the prosecutor presented a sufficient factual basis for the defendant's pleas to both aggravated assault and two battery counts; (2) the trial court informed the defendant of the consequences of the guilty pleas, waiver of certain constitutional and statutory rights, and the minimum and maximum possible sentences for the crimes charged; and (3) the defendant admitted guilt and to entering the guilty plea freely and voluntarily, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying withdrawal of the pleas. Foster v. State, 281 Ga. App. 584, 636 S.E.2d 759 (2006).

Defendant's motion to withdraw the defendant's guilty plea was properly denied as withdrawal of the plea was not necessary to correct a manifest injustice since: (1) the defense counsel was not ineffective; (2) the state showed that the defendant's plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary; (3) the trial court was entitled to discredit contradictory testimony given by the defendant at the motion to withdraw the plea hearing; and (4) the defendant's claim that the defendant had nothing to gain by entering a "blind" plea failed as even assuming, that an aggravated assault conviction would have merged with an armed robbery conviction and that five convictions of possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime would have merged with each other for sentencing purposes, the defendant still would have faced an additional five years' to serve if the defendant had not pled guilty. Brown v. State, 280 Ga. App. 767, 634 S.E.2d 875 (2006).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to withdraw the guilty plea to armed robbery, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a), aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), cruelty to children in the first degree, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-70(b), and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b)(1), because the state met the state's burden of showing that the defendant understood the constitutional rights the defendant was giving up by pleading guilty, that the defendant understood that since the plea was non-negotiated, the trial court would sentence the defendant to at least ten years imprisonment and could sentence the defendant to a maximum sentence of life in prison, and that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily entered the guilty plea in order to avoid a trial on the indicted charges. Carson v. State, 314 Ga. App. 225, 723 S.E.2d 516 (2012), overruled on other grounds, Nazario v. State, 293 Ga. 480, 746 S.E.2d 109 (2013).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to withdraw a guilty plea to aggravated assault because the victim suffered a burning sensation in the victim's eyes and face, was in a great deal of pain, and was temporarily blinded after the defendant sprayed the victim with mace. Weaver v. State, 325 Ga. App. 51, 752 S.E.2d 128 (2013).

Sentencing.

- When defendant was convicted of aggravated assault, defendant's prior convictions for aggravated assault and criminal damage to property, which had been used during the guilt-innocence phase of defendant's trial for impeachment purposes, could be used at sentencing because a repeat offender convicted of aggravated assault could be sentenced as a recidivist, under O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7(a), and there was no restriction in the aggravated assault statute, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, that limited the use of prior convictions to the guilt-innocence phase of trial such that they could not be used again at the sentencing phase of trial. Carswell v. State, 263 Ga. App. 833, 589 S.E.2d 605 (2003).

Trial court did not err in sentencing defendant because the sentence it imposed on defendant was 10 years in prison and 10 years probation for aggravated assault, 10 years in prison to run concurrently for aggravated battery, and five years confinement to run consecutively for possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, as each part of defendant's sentence was well within the statutory limits for the respective crime involved; accordingly, defendant's sentences would not be modified on appeal. King v. State, 269 Ga. App. 658, 605 S.E.2d 63 (2004).

Because the trial court set aside the defendant's aggravated assault conviction, a claim that the trial court erred in failing to merge the aggravated assault with an armed robbery conviction for sentencing purposes, lacked merit. Lawrence v. State, 289 Ga. App. 163, 657 S.E.2d 250 (2008).

Because the Supreme Court of Georgia had already affirmed the defendant's convictions and sentences for felony murder predicated on aggravated assault by striking the victim with a gun with the intent to rob and felony murder predicated on aggravated assault by striking the victim with a gun, an instrument when used offensively against a person is likely to result in serious bodily injury, the trial court properly denied a subsequent pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence. Brady v. State, 283 Ga. 359, 659 S.E.2d 368 (2008).

As the defendant was not sentenced as a recidivist under O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7(c) or to the maximum term pursuant to § 17-10-7(a) for a conviction of aggravated assault, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(b), the defendant's claim that the sentencing imposed was improper lacked merit. Tatum v. State, 297 Ga. App. 550, 677 S.E.2d 740 (2009).

Trial court did not impose an unjustifiably lengthy sentence merely because a defendant chose to require the prosecution to prove the defendant's guilt at trial rather than to enter a plea of guilty because the trial court sentenced defendant to the maximum term of 20 years in prison for kidnapping and on each of the aggravated assault counts, the trial court also exercised the court's discretion to run all of the counts concurrently instead of consecutively; the defendant's claim that the trial court punished the defendant for exercising the defendant's right to a jury trial was not supported by the transcript, which revealed that the sentence imposed by the trial court was based on the defendant's lack of remorse. Brown v. State, 299 Ga. App. 782, 683 S.E.2d 874 (2009).

Defendant's sentence of 20 years to serve for armed robbery, 20 years probation for aggravated assault, and 5 years probation for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, each to run consecutively, did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment because the trial court's sentence fell within the statutory range of punishment, O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21(b),16-8-41(b), and16-11-106(b); under O.C.G.A. § 17-10-10(a), it was within the trial court's discretion to order that the defendant's sentences on armed robbery and aggravated assault run consecutively. McKenzie v. State, 302 Ga. App. 538, 691 S.E.2d 352 (2010).

Defendant's life sentence for armed robbery was within the statutory limits, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(b), and the 20-year sentences imposed for the defendant's aggravated assaults were within the statutory range of punishment under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(b). Therefore, the sentences were not void, and the court had no basis for disturbing the sentences. Gillespie v. State, 311 Ga. App. 442, 715 S.E.2d 832 (2011).

Defendant's sentence, as a recidivist, of concurrent 20 year terms on each of three counts of aggravated assault, concurrent five year terms on each of three counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, to run consecutive to the aggravated assault sentence, and concurrent 15 year terms on each of two counts of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, to run consecutive to the aggravated assault sentence, was not cruel, inhumane, and unusual punishment because each sentence was within the statutory limits of the crimes charged, and the sentence was not grossly disproportionate to the underlying crimes. Willis v. State, 316 Ga. App. 258, 728 S.E.2d 857 (2012).

State did not have the right to appeal sentences imposed by the trial court contrary to a plea agreement under O.C.G.A. § 5-7-1(a)(6) because the 15-year sentences, with five years to serve and the remainder on probation, were not void; they were within the 20-year range of punishments for robbery and aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21(b) &16-8-40(b). State v. Harper, 279 Ga. App. 620, 631 S.E.2d 820 (2006) was overruled. State v. King, 325 Ga. App. 445, 750 S.E.2d 756 (2013).

In an aggravated assault case, the defendant was not entitled to a new trial because the trial court did not indicate that the court could not sentence the defendant to 20 years in prison as a recidivist, but, rather, the trial court clearly indicated that the court could sentence the defendant to 20 years in prison; and the colloquy clearly alerted the defendant that the consequences of refusing the state's plea offer could be harsher than the consequences of accepting the plea. Crews v. State, Ga. App. , S.E.2d (Sept. 10, 2020).

Sentence improper.

- Trial court erred in sentencing the defendant on the count of the indictment charging the defendant with making an assault upon the victim with intent to murder in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a) after sentencing the defendant to life in prison for malice murder because the aggravated assault upon the victim and the murder of the victim occurred simultaneously; thus, the evidence used to prove the aggravated assault offense was established by the same, but not all, of the facts required to prove malice murder. Gresham v. State, 289 Ga. 103, 709 S.E.2d 780 (2011).

Defendant was incorrectly sentenced on the aggravated assault charge which was the underlying offense for one of the felony murder charges. Kipp v. State, 294 Ga. 55, 751 S.E.2d 83 (2013).

Four consecutive 20-year sentences not excessive.

- Trial court's imposition of four separate 20-year sentences upon the defendant for each of the four aggravated-assault convictions and ordering those sentences to be served consecutively was not excessive punishment because the 20-year sentence for each separate aggravated assault fell within the statutory range and the defendant failed to demonstrate that the punishment was so excessive in proportion to the offenses as to shock the conscience. Miller v. State, 351 Ga. App. 757, 833 S.E.2d 142 (2019).

Sentence not void.

- Defendant's 10-year sentence for violation of the Georgia Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-15-1 et seq., and aggravated assault was not void as the sentence fell within the range of permitted sentences and, thus, did not amount to a punishment that the law did not allow. Garza v. State, 325 Ga. App. 505, 753 S.E.2d 651 (2014).

Conduct sufficient for sentence enhancement.

- Four-level enhancement under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2K2.1(b)(6) was proper because the district court found that the defendant shot at people allegedly intending to rob the defendant's store, the act constituted the felony offense of aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, and the discharge of the gun was relevant conduct under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 1B1.3(a)(1) because the discharge occurred during the commission of the offense of conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922. United States v. Sako, F.3d (11th Cir. Apr. 2, 2008)(Unpublished).

Sufficient findings warranting restrictive custody for juvenile.

- Juvenile court did not err in determining that a defendant juvenile was in need of restrictive custody with thirty months of confinement in a youth detention center because: (1) the court complied with O.C.G.A. § 15-11-63(c) by making specific written findings of fact as to each of the statutory elements; (2) the court's findings analyzed the defendant's needs and best interest; and (3) the court properly considered the report of a psychological evaluation performed on the defendant, along with the defendant's background and prior juvenile history, in making the court's determination that the defendant's needs would be better served with restrictive custody; the juvenile court's findings accurately reflected the nature and circumstances of the aggravated assault the defendant committed, including the facts that the victim did receive a serious injury when the defendant shot her in the head and that she had to receive medical treatment for her head injury, and the juvenile court's findings as to those basic facts were supported by the trial evidence and showed circumstances that authorized the order for restrictive custody. In the Interest of I.C., 300 Ga. App. 683, 686 S.E.2d 279 (2009).

Ineffective counsel not established.

- In a prosecution for aggravated assault, despite the fact that defendant failed to satisfy defendant's responsibility under the Rules of the Georgia Court of Appeals, after a review of the record in the appellate court's discretion, defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel failed, as defendant's trial counsel's stipulation to a witness' prior testimony, made under oath, before the judge, and subject to trial counsel's searching cross-examination on defendant's behalf regarding this same case, did not constitute an unreasonable or incompetent strategy. Stuart v. State, 274 Ga. App. 120, 616 S.E.2d 855 (2005).

Given the overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt with respect to an aggravated assault charge, and because no reasonable probability existed that the outcome of the trial with respect to that charge would have been different had the jury not been presented evidence of the temporary protective order, and the result would not have changed even if trial counsel had stipulated to the existence of the temporary protective order to avoid its presentment to the jury, trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel in defending the charge. Ford v. State, 283 Ga. App. 460, 641 S.E.2d 671 (2007).

Because defense counsel was not ineffective in: (1) failing to investigate the victim's reputation for violence and introduce evidence of that victim's prior violent acts; (2) failing to investigate the defendant's medical records; (3) failing to investigate a state witness's convictions for crimes of moral turpitude and request an impeachment charge concerning that witness; (4) advising defendant not to testify; and (5) failing to present evidence or argument at sentencing, the defendant's motion for a new trial was properly denied and the aggravated assault conviction was upheld. Cross v. State, 285 Ga. App. 518, 646 S.E.2d 723 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1479, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 680 (Ga. 2007).

Ineffective counsel established as to aggravated assault but not as to other charge.

- Because the defendant presented sufficient evidence to show that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to stipulate to the defendant's felon status or to obtain a jury charge limiting the jury's consideration of the defendant's criminal history, such failures prejudiced the defendant's defense sufficiently to require a new trial on a charge of aggravated assault; however, given the defendant's admission to possessing a gun at the time of the altercation, no prejudice resulted to warrant reversal and a new trial on the possession of a firearm by a convicted felon conviction. Starling v. State, 285 Ga. App. 474, 646 S.E.2d 695 (2007).

Prior conviction properly admitted.

- Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in allowing the state to introduce evidence of the defendant's prior aggravated assault conviction under O.C.G.A. § 24-9-84.1 because the trial court specifically addressed the relevant factors including the kind of felony involved, the date of the conviction, and the importance of the witness's credibility and properly considered the specific facts and circumstances of the defendant's prior aggravated assault conviction, as required by O.C.G.A. § 24-9-84.1(b), before concluding that the probative value of evidence of the conviction substantially outweighed the evidence's prejudicial effect; the statute itself contains no distinction between defendants and witnesses when more than ten years has passed since the applicable conviction or release. Dozier v. State, 311 Ga. App. 713, 716 S.E.2d 802 (2011), overruled on other grounds, Clay v. State, 290 Ga. 822, 725 S.E.2d 260 (2012).

Cited in Middlebrooks v. State, 107 Ga. App. 587, 130 S.E.2d 798 (1963); Vanleeward v. Rutledge, 369 F.2d 584 (5th Cir. 1966); Lingo v. State, 226 Ga. 496, 175 S.E.2d 657 (1970); Teal v. State, 122 Ga. App. 532, 177 S.E.2d 840 (1970); Barrett v. State, 123 Ga. App. 210, 180 S.E.2d 271 (1971); Summerour v. State, 124 Ga. App. 484, 184 S.E.2d 365 (1971); Hobbs v. State, 229 Ga. 556, 192 S.E.2d 903 (1972); Hewitt v. State, 127 Ga. App. 180, 193 S.E.2d 47 (1972); Smith v. State, 127 Ga. App. 468, 193 S.E.2d 921 (1972); Collins v. State, 129 Ga. App. 87, 198 S.E.2d 707 (1973); Ward v. State, 231 Ga. 484, 202 S.E.2d 421 (1973); Cain v. State, 232 Ga. 804, 209 S.E.2d 158 (1974); Harvey v. State, 233 Ga. 41, 209 S.E.2d 587 (1974); Lowe v. State, 133 Ga. App. 420, 210 S.E.2d 869 (1974); Barker v. State, 233 Ga. 781, 213 S.E.2d 624 (1975); Long v. State, 233 Ga. 926, 213 S.E.2d 853 (1975); Chappell v. State, 134 Ga. App. 375, 214 S.E.2d 392 (1975); Jackson v. State, 234 Ga. 549, 216 S.E.2d 834 (1975); Jones v. State, 234 Ga. 648, 217 S.E.2d 597 (1975); Hale v. State, 135 Ga. App. 625, 218 S.E.2d 643 (1975); Davis v. State, 136 Ga. App. 749, 222 S.E.2d 188 (1975); Baker v. State, 236 Ga. 754, 225 S.E.2d 269 (1976); Spriggs v. State, 139 Ga. App. 586, 228 S.E.2d 727 (1976); Ledford v. State, 237 Ga. 628, 229 S.E.2d 403 (1976); Fountain v. York, 237 Ga. 784, 229 S.E.2d 629 (1976); Smith v. State, 140 Ga. App. 395, 231 S.E.2d 143 (1976); Gillespie v. State, 140 Ga. App. 408, 231 S.E.2d 154 (1976); Robertson v. State, 140 Ga. App. 506, 231 S.E.2d 367 (1976); Bruce v. State, 142 Ga. App. 211, 235 S.E.2d 606 (1977); Carroll v. State, 143 Ga. App. 230, 237 S.E.2d 703 (1977); Leach v. State, 143 Ga. App. 598, 239 S.E.2d 177 (1977); Braxton v. State, 240 Ga. 10, 239 S.E.2d 339 (1977); Tucker v. State, 144 Ga. App. 30, 240 S.E.2d 304 (1977); Hardwick v. Doolittle, 558 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1977); Smith v. State, 144 Ga. App. 785, 242 S.E.2d 376 (1978); Rush v. State, 145 Ga. App. 745, 245 S.E.2d 34 (1978); Murphy v. State, 146 Ga. App. 721, 247 S.E.2d 186 (1978); White v. State, 147 Ga. App. 260, 248 S.E.2d 540 (1978); Webster v. State, 147 Ga. App. 322, 248 S.E.2d 697 (1978); Peterkin v. State, 147 Ga. App. 437, 249 S.E.2d 152 (1978); Garrett v. State, 147 Ga. App. 500, 249 S.E.2d 315 (1978); Sprouse v. State, 242 Ga. 831, 252 S.E.2d 173 (1979); Ballard v. State, 150 Ga. App. 704, 258 S.E.2d 331 (1979); Martin v. State, 151 Ga. App. 9, 258 S.E.2d 711 (1979); Savage v. State, 152 Ga. App. 392, 263 S.E.2d 218 (1979); Bill v. State, 153 Ga. App. 131, 264 S.E.2d 582 (1980); Dean v. State, 245 Ga. 503, 265 S.E.2d 805 (1980); Henderson v. State, 153 Ga. App. 801, 266 S.E.2d 522 (1980); Marable v. State, 154 Ga. App. 115, 267 S.E.2d 837 (1980); Hayslip v. State, 154 Ga. App. 835, 270 S.E.2d 61 (1980); Johnson v. State, 156 Ga. App. 411, 274 S.E.2d 778 (1980); State v. Williams, 247 Ga. 200, 275 S.E.2d 62 (1981); McMillan v. State, 157 Ga. App. 694, 278 S.E.2d 478 (1981); Delano v. State, 158 Ga. App. 296, 279 S.E.2d 743 (1981); Craft v. State, 158 Ga. App. 745, 282 S.E.2d 203 (1981); Garard v. State, 159 Ga. App. 248, 283 S.E.2d 27 (1981); Jackson v. State, 248 Ga. 480, 284 S.E.2d 267 (1981); Fletcher v. State, 159 Ga. App. 789, 285 S.E.2d 762 (1981); Bundren v. State, 160 Ga. App. 367, 287 S.E.2d 248 (1981); Goodman v. Davis, 249 Ga. 11, 287 S.E.2d 26 (1982); Shelton v. State, 161 Ga. App. 524, 289 S.E.2d 768 (1982); Carter v. State, 162 Ga. App. 44, 290 S.E.2d 143 (1982); Miller v. State, 162 Ga. App. 759, 292 S.E.2d 481 (1982); Dunbar v. State, 163 Ga. App. 243, 292 S.E.2d 897 (1982); Merrell v. State, 162 Ga. App. 886, 293 S.E.2d 474 (1982); Smith v. State, 249 Ga. 801, 294 S.E.2d 525 (1982); Chastain v. State, 163 Ga. App. 678, 296 S.E.2d 69 (1982); Talley v. State, 164 Ga. App. 150, 296 S.E.2d 173 (1982); Jester v. State, 250 Ga. 119, 296 S.E.2d 555 (1982); Simmons v. State, 164 Ga. App. 643, 298 S.E.2d 313 (1982); Richardson v. State, 250 Ga. 506, 299 S.E.2d 715 (1983); Rozier v. State, 165 Ga. App. 178, 300 S.E.2d 194 (1983); Brown v. State, 165 Ga. App. 799, 302 S.E.2d 630 (1983); Bert v. State, 169 Ga. App. 628, 314 S.E.2d 466 (1984); Hartman v. State, 170 Ga. App. 195, 316 S.E.2d 820 (1984); Graham v. State, 171 Ga. App. 242, 319 S.E.2d 484 (1984); Fobbs v. State, 171 Ga. App. 352, 319 S.E.2d 522 (1984); McWilliams v. State, 172 Ga. App. 55, 322 S.E.2d 87 (1984); Lester v. State, 173 Ga. App. 300, 325 S.E.2d 912 (1985); Shepherd v. State, 173 Ga. App. 499, 326 S.E.2d 596 (1985); Howard v. State, 173 Ga. App. 585, 327 S.E.2d 554 (1985); Miller v. State, 174 Ga. App. 703, 331 S.E.2d 616 (1985); Green v. State, 175 Ga. App. 92, 332 S.E.2d 385 (1985); Stevens v. State, 176 Ga. App. 583, 336 S.E.2d 846 (1985); McCrary v. State, 176 Ga. App. 683, 337 S.E.2d 442 (1985); Gabler v. State, 177 Ga. App. 3, 338 S.E.2d 469 (1985); Turner v. State, 178 Ga. App. 274, 342 S.E.2d 759 (1986); Hiers v. State, 179 Ga. App. 181, 345 S.E.2d 900 (1986); Allen v. State, 180 Ga. App. 701, 350 S.E.2d 478 (1986); Parrish v. State, 182 Ga. App. 247, 355 S.E.2d 682 (1987); Johnson v. State, 182 Ga. App. 822, 357 S.E.2d 161 (1987); Jackson v. State, 182 Ga. App. 885, 357 S.E.2d 321 (1987); Allison v. State, 184 Ga. App. 294, 361 S.E.2d 271 (1987); Williams v. State, 185 Ga. App. 633, 365 S.E.2d 491 (1988); Curtis v. State, 190 Ga. App. 173, 378 S.E.2d 516 (1989); Ross v. State, 192 Ga. App. 65, 383 S.E.2d 627 (1989); Lubiano v. State, 192 Ga. App. 272, 384 S.E.2d 410 (1989); Blackmon v. State, 197 Ga. App. 133, 397 S.E.2d 728 (1990); State v. McBride, 261 Ga. 60, 401 S.E.2d 484 (1991); Tate v. State, 198 Ga. App. 276, 401 S.E.2d 549 (1991); Jones v. State, 198 Ga. App. 377, 401 S.E.2d 584 (1991); Strickland v. State, 198 Ga. App. 570, 402 S.E.2d 532 (1991); Brooks v. State, 199 Ga. App. 525, 405 S.E.2d 343 (1991); Moore v. State, 207 Ga. App. 892, 429 S.E.2d 335 (1993); Davis v. State, 209 Ga. App. 187, 433 S.E.2d 366 (1993); Smiley v. State, 263 Ga. 716, 438 S.E.2d 75 (1994); Williams v. State, 214 Ga. App. 834, 449 S.E.2d 532 (1994); Shorter v. State, 270 Ga. 280, 507 S.E.2d 757 (1998); Mangham v. State, 234 Ga. App. 567, 507 S.E.2d 806 (1998); Busch v. State, 234 Ga. App. 766, 507 S.E.2d 868 (1998); Cockrell v. State, 248 Ga. App. 359, 545 S.E.2d 600 (2001); Reyes v. State, 250 Ga. App. 769, 552 S.E.2d 918 (2001); Cannon v. State, 250 Ga. App. 777, 552 S.E.2d 922 (2001), overruled in part by Willis v. State, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 685 (Ga. 2018); In the Interest of A.A., 253 Ga. App. 858, 560 S.E.2d 763 (2002); Montford v. State, 254 Ga. App. 524, 564 S.E.2d 216 (2002); Webb v. State, 256 Ga. App. 653, 569 S.E.2d 596 (2002); Anderson v. State, 257 Ga. App. 602, 571 S.E.2d 815 (2002); Adams v. State, 275 Ga. 867, 572 S.E.2d 545 (2002); Shields v. State, 259 Ga. App. 906, 578 S.E.2d 566 (2003); Jackson v. State, 262 Ga. App. 451, 585 S.E.2d 745 (2003); Eidson v. State, 262 Ga. App. 664, 586 S.E.2d 362 (2003); Hewitt v. State, 277 Ga. 327, 588 S.E.2d 722 (2003); Hill v. State, 268 Ga. App. 642, 602 S.E.2d 348 (2004); Blake v. State, 272 Ga. App. 181, 612 S.E.2d 33 (2005); Price v. State, 281 Ga. App. 844, 637 S.E.2d 468 (2006); Rivera v. State, 282 Ga. 355, 647 S.E.2d 70 (2007); Dalton v. State, 282 Ga. 300, 647 S.E.2d 580 (2007); Spiller v. State, 282 Ga. 351, 647 S.E.2d 64 (2007); Whitaker v. State, 287 Ga. App. 465, 652 S.E.2d 568 (2007); Miller v. Martin, F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Ga. Aug. 20, 2007); Robinson v. State, 288 Ga. App. 219, 653 S.E.2d 810 (2007); Beals v. State, 288 Ga. App. 815, 655 S.E.2d 687 (2007); Grant v. State, 289 Ga. App. 230, 656 S.E.2d 873 (2008); Smith v. State, 289 Ga. App. 742, 658 S.E.2d 156 (2008), cert. denied, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 462 (Ga. 2008); Mitchell v. State, 283 Ga. 341, 659 S.E.2d 356 (2008); Louis v. State, 290 Ga. App. 106, 658 S.E.2d 897 (2008); Hyde v. State, 291 Ga. App. 662, 662 S.E.2d 764 (2008); Sillah v. State, 291 Ga. App. 848, 663 S.E.2d 274 (2008); Lemming v. State, 292 Ga. App. 138, 663 S.E.2d 375 (2008)

Jennings v. State, 292 Ga. App. 149, 664 S.E.2d 248 (2008); Moran v. State, 293 Ga. App. 279, 666 S.E.2d 726 (2008); Greene v. State, 295 Ga. App. 803, 673 S.E.2d 292 (2009); Hayes v. State, 298 Ga. App. 338, 680 S.E.2d 182 (2009); Gonzales v. State, 298 Ga. App. 821, 681 S.E.2d 248 (2009); Bonker v. State, 298 Ga. App. 867, 681 S.E.2d 256 (2009); Jacobs v. State, 299 Ga. App. 368, 683 S.E.2d 64 (2009); Crawford v. State, 301 Ga. App. 633, 688 S.E.2d 409 (2009); Smith v. State, 304 Ga. App. 708, 699 S.E.2d 742 (2010); Smith v. State, 309 Ga. App. 241, 709 S.E.2d 823 (2011); Russell v. State, 319 Ga. App. 472, 735 S.E.2d 797 (2012); Hyman v. State, 320 Ga. App. 106, 739 S.E.2d 395 (2013); McGlasker v. State, 321 Ga. App. 614, 741 S.E.2d 303 (2013); Vann v. State, 322 Ga. App. 148, 742 S.E.2d 767 (2013); Avila v. State, 322 Ga. App. 225, 744 S.E.2d 405 (2013); Young v. State, 329 Ga. App. 70, 763 S.E.2d 735 (2014); State v. Owens, 296 Ga. 205, 766 S.E.2d 66 (2014); Williams v. State, 330 Ga. App. 606, 768 S.E.2d 788 (2015); In the Interest of C. M., 331 Ga. App. 16, 769 S.E.2d 737 (2015); Turner v. State, 331 Ga. App. 78, 769 S.E.2d 785 (2015); Howard v. State, 334 Ga. App. 7, 778 S.E.2d 19 (2015); McGil v. State, 339 Ga. App. 130, 793 S.E.2d 442 (2016); Johnson v. State, 341 Ga. App. 384, 801 S.E.2d 82 (2017); Cade v. State, 351 Ga. App. 637, 832 S.E.2d 453 (2019); Dodson v. State, 353 Ga. App. 412, 838 S.E.2d 87 (2020); Robinson v. State, 353 Ga. App. 420, 838 S.E.2d 92 (2020); Morgan v. State, 354 Ga. App. 754, 841 S.E.2d 430 (2020); Marcus v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., Ga. App. , 845 S.E.2d 782 (2020); Caldwell v. State, 355 Ga. App. 608, 845 S.E.2d 345 (2020); Brooks v. State, Ga. , S.E.2d (Aug. 24, 2020); Eggleston v. State, Ga. , S.E.2d (Sept. 28, 2020).

Indictment

Indictment must charge methods conjunctively.

- Although the aggravated assault statute contains disjunctively several methods by which the crime may be committed, proof of any one of which is sufficient to constitute the crime, an indictment must charge such methods conjunctively if it charges more than one of them. Gutierrez v. State, 235 Ga. App. 878, 510 S.E.2d 570 (1998).

Written waiver of grand jury indictment required.

- Defendant's conviction for aggravated assault was void for lack of jurisdiction and had to be reversed because the evidence showed that the defendant verbally waived the defendant's right to a grand jury indictment at the start of trial and a written waiver was required by O.C.G.A. § 17-7-70(a). Martinez v. State, 322 Ga. App. 63, 743 S.E.2d 621 (2013).

Consolidation of indictments proper.

- Trial court properly consolidated the indictments charging the defendant with armed robbery, criminal attempt to commit armed robbery, aggravated assault, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, and theft by receiving stolen property because joinder was not prejudicial or erroneous since evidence of the various intertwined crimes would have been admissible against the defendant had the indictments been tried separately; the trial court was authorized to find that the events in the indictments committed within a two-day period and involving guns and a car constituted a series of connected acts, and the connection between the robberies and the assaults helped identify the defendant. Jackson v. State, 309 Ga. App. 796, 714 S.E.2d 584 (2011).

Indictment sufficient to charge aggravated assault.

- Indictment alleging that defendant made "an assault upon the person of Joe Jones, with a handgun, a deadly weapon" was sufficient to charge the crime of aggravated assault. Wallace v. State, 216 Ga. App. 718, 455 S.E.2d 615 (1995); Sam's Wholesale Club v. Riley, 241 Ga. App. 783, 527 S.E.2d 577 (1999).

Indictment charging that defendant's fists were likely to result in serious bodily injury was sufficient, and no reference to deadly weapons was required. Jay v. State, 232 Ga. App. 661, 503 S.E.2d 563 (1998).

In an indictment alleging that defendant assaulted the victim "by kicking her in the head and shoulder area and by striking her with his hands and feet," it was unnecessary to further allege that defendant used defendant's own hands and feet as deadly weapons or that there was intent to injure. Gafford v. State, 240 Ga. App. 251, 523 S.E.2d 336 (1999).

Indictment was sufficient to charge aggravated assault, which stated that defendant "did unlawfully make an assault upon the person of [victim], with a knife, the same being an object which when used offensively against a person is likely to result in serious bodily injury. . . ." Merneigh v. State, 242 Ga. App. 735, 531 S.E.2d 152 (2000).

Indictment which alleged that defendant assaulted another person with a box cutter by chasing the other person with the box cutter was sufficient to apprise defendant of the charge. Hogan v. State, 261 Ga. App. 261, 582 S.E.2d 210 (2003).

Defendant's conviction for aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21 was affirmed because the trial court did not err when it instructed the jury on the full definition of aggravated assault under § 16-5-21 and there was no reasonable probability that the jury convicted defendant on a portion of the offense that was not charged in the indictment. Hughes v. State, 266 Ga. App. 203, 596 S.E.2d 697 (2004).

Defendant's conviction for aggravated assault was affirmed because the trial court did not err when it denied defendant's motion for a directed verdict on the grounds that there was a fatal variance between the indictment and the proof at trial; under the circumstances the terms "choke" and "strangulation" were synonymous. Hughes v. State, 266 Ga. App. 203, 596 S.E.2d 697 (2004).

Indictment charging defendant with "aggravated assault (family violence)" and "family violence battery (felony)" in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21 was sufficient as it informed defendant of the charges and protected defendant against double jeopardy; it was the description in the indictment that characterized the offense charged, not the name given to the offense in the bill of indictment, and mere surplusage did not vitiate an otherwise sufficient indictment. State v. Barnett, 268 Ga. App. 900, 602 S.E.2d 899 (2004).

In two actions charging the defendant with being a party to the crime of aggravated assault allegedly committed with a codefendant, given that the first of two indictments failed to set out the elements of aggravated assault, and the state offered to nolle pros the same, the indictment was properly dismissed; however, a second and superseding indictment survived demurrer, as the elements of aggravated assault were sufficiently set out therein, and the disjunctive way that the offense was charged was not fatally defective as to the defendant, but simply limited the state's option of proving at trial the manner in which the aggravated assault was committed. State v. Daniels, 281 Ga. App. 224, 635 S.E.2d 835 (2006).

Because an indictment, which included charging language that the defendant "unlawfully, and with malice aforethought, caused the death of the victim by striking," placed the defendant on notice of a possible conviction of an assault upon the victim with the intent to murder or commit a violent injury, the defendant could be convicted of aggravated assault as a lesser included crime of malice murder; the only difference was that the malice murder indictment alleged that the defendant actually accomplished the murder, in addition to having intended to accomplish the murder. Reagan v. State, 281 Ga. App. 708, 637 S.E.2d 113 (2006).

There was no deficiency in an indictment charging the defendant with aggravated assault by making an assault upon the person of the victim with a certain semiautomatic pistol; the charge of aggravated assault tracked the statutory language of the offense, contained the elements thereof, and gave the defendant sufficient notice of the charge that the defendant needed to be prepared to defend. Garza v. State, 285 Ga. App. 902, 648 S.E.2d 84 (2007), vacated, in part, 300 Ga. App. 352, 685 S.E.2d 366 (2009).

Court of appeals rejected the defendant's claim that the indictment filed was fatally defective as the indictment properly charged the defendant with aggravated assault, specifying that the defendant's hands and feet "were likely to result in serious bodily injury." May v. State, 287 Ga. App. 407, 651 S.E.2d 510 (2007).

With respect to an aggravated assault conviction, a trial court did not err by denying defendant's motion in arrest of the judgment on the basis that the rule of lenity required that defendant be sentenced to a lesser charge of simple battery as the evidence was sufficient to support the aggravated assault conviction, and the indictment was not void on the indictment's face or otherwise deficient. Armstrong v. State, 292 Ga. App. 145, 664 S.E.2d 242 (2008).

As an indictment against the defendant inmate charged aggravated assault, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), based on the striking of a victim with an object likely to result in serious bodily injury, all of the essential elements were stated and the indictment was not deficient; the indictment was not void for failing to expressly allege the criminal intent. Powell v. State, 297 Ga. App. 833, 678 S.E.2d 524 (2009).

Indictment charged the defendant with the aggravated assault of the victim by assaulting the victim with the defendant's hands, which when used offensively against another person was likely to result in serious bodily injury, by striking the victim repeatedly about the head and face with the defendant's hands; thus, it was unnecessary for the indictment to allege that the defendant used hands as a deadly weapon. Walker v. State, 298 Ga. App. 265, 679 S.E.2d 814 (2009).

Trial court did not err in denying a defendant's motion for an out-of-time appeal on the grounds that a count in the indictment alleging aggravated assault was void because the indictment set forth all of the necessary elements of aggravated assault, specifically citing the aggravated assault statute, and informing the defendant that the defendant was accused of unlawfully assaulting the person of defendant's daughter, with objects, to wit: hands and an object, the description of which being unknown, which when used offensively against a person was likely to and did result in serious bodily injury. Johnson v. State, 286 Ga. 432, 687 S.E.2d 833 (2010), overruled on other grounds by Collier v. State, 834 S.E.2d 769, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 708 (Ga. 2019).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal on the ground that there was insufficient evidence that the crimes for which the defendant was charged, aggravated assault, making terroristic threats, and cruelty to children in the third degree, were committed on the date alleged in the indictment because there was sufficient evidence to support the allegations of the indictment; the exact date of the crimes was not a material allegation of the indictment because the exact date was not an essential element with respect to any of the charged offenses, and the date of the crimes proved at trial was prior to the return of the indictment and within the limitation periods for the crimes. Coats v. State, 303 Ga. App. 818, 695 S.E.2d 285 (2010), overruled on other grounds by McClure v. State, 306 Ga. 856, 834 S.E.2d 96 (2019).

There was no defect in the aggravated assault counts of an indictment a grand jury returned against the defendant because those counts alleged that the defendant did make an assault upon the person of a five-year-old boy and his mother with a knife, a deadly weapon; the language of the indictment tracked that of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) and was not too vague to inform the defendant of the charges against the defendant. Belcher v. State, 304 Ga. App. 645, 697 S.E.2d 300 (2010).

In charging aggravated assault with a deadly weapon under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) as the predicate offense to felony murder, it was sufficient for the indictment implicitly to allege the use of a hatchet as a weapon which, when used offensively, was likely to result in serious bodily injury. Reed v. State, 291 Ga. 10, 727 S.E.2d 112 (2012).

There was no basis to grant the defendant a special demurrer on the counts for aggravated assault and felony murder based on assault as the indictment informed the defendant that the state intended to prove that on a day when the defendant admitted the victim was in the defendant's custody, the defendant used an object that was likely to result in serious bodily injury to fatally injure the victim by causing damage to the victim's brain, which was sufficient notice for the defendant to prepare a defense. State v. Wyatt, 295 Ga. 257, 759 S.E.2d 500 (2014).

Indictment adequately alleged aggravated assault as the indictment alleged that the defendant and the codefendant made an assault on others by discharging, without legal justification, a firearm from a vehicle in the direction of the others. Downey v. State, 298 Ga. 568, 783 S.E.2d 622 (2016).

Indictment charging the defendant with knocking the victim to the ground causing a serious wound to the victim's head and doing so by a means likely to cause serious bodily injury when used offensively against a person was sufficient to place the defendant on notice that the defendant was charged with aggravated assault. Smith v. State, 335 Ga. App. 639, 781 S.E.2d 400 (2016), overruled on other grounds by Collier v. State, 834 S.E.2d 769, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 708 (Ga. 2019).

Indictment was sufficient to withstand a general demurrer because the indictment charged the defendant with felony murder-having caused the death of the victim while committing the felony of aggravated assault, which was a felony; and the defendant could not admit the defendant caused the death of the victim while in the commission of aggravated assault and not be guilty of the crime. Brooks v. State, 299 Ga. 474, 788 S.E.2d 766 (2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 573, 196 L. Ed. 2d 451 (U.S. 2016).

Indictment insufficient to charge aggravated assault.

- An indictment did not set forth the elements of this crime where it failed to state that defendant placed defendant's own hands around the victim's neck in an attempt to use them as deadly weapons, or in an attempt to rape, rob, or murder the victim, and failed to state that, in placing defendant's hands around the victim's neck, defendant intended to inflict a violent injury or place the victim in reasonable apprehension of being injured violently. Smith v. Hardrick, 266 Ga. 54, 464 S.E.2d 198 (1995).

Because an indictment did not charge the defendant with all the elements of aggravated assault, it could not support a conviction under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2); therefore, the trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion for an out-of-time appeal. Fleming v. State, 276 Ga. App. 491, 623 S.E.2d 696 (2005).

Admissions in indictment.

- Because the defendant could not admit the charges of aggravated assault and terroristic threats in the indictment and still be innocent, the indictment returned was not defective. Dudley v. State, 283 Ga. App. 86, 640 S.E.2d 677 (2006).

One count indictment was sufficient.

- One-count indictment against the defendant was held sufficient and did not violate the defendant's due process rights, because the indictment charged the defendant with felony murder by causing the death of the victim while committing the felony of aggravated assault and was sufficient to have withstood a general demurrer; the fact that the defendant failed to raise a special demurrer to the indictment prior to pleading to the merits of the indictment was a waiver of that argument. Stinson v. State, 279 Ga. 177, 611 S.E.2d 52 (2005).

Indictment not required to allege party status.

- Indictment's failure to allege that a defendant was a party to aggravated assault, aggravated battery, and first-degree child cruelty under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21(a),16-5-24(a), and16-5-70(b) did not require a showing that the defendant was the principal perpetrator under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-21; the defendant's status as a party to the crimes was not an essential element used to increase the sentences for the crimes, and the trial court did not err in instructing the jury that the defendant could be convicted either as the principal perpetrator of the crimes or as a party thereto. Hill v. State, 282 Ga. App. 743, 639 S.E.2d 637 (2006).

Indictment sufficient for assault by dentist against patient.

- Count nine in an indictment charging a defendant, allegedly an oral surgeon, with aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) was sufficient under O.C.G.A. § 17-7-54(a) because the general intent required under § 16-5-21(a)(2) did not need to be expressly alleged and the use of the phrase "serious bodily harm" was substantially the same as the statutory language; additional pleading was not required simply because the case involved a doctor and a patient. State v. Austin, 297 Ga. App. 478, 677 S.E.2d 706 (2009).

Indictment alleging offensive use of fists also sufficient allegation of simple battery.

- After the defendant was indicted for aggravated assault and convicted of simple battery, language of the indictment tracking the aggravated assault statute by alleging that the offensive use of fists and feet resulted in bodily injury was also a sufficient allegation of simple battery. Buchanan v. State, 173 Ga. App. 554, 327 S.E.2d 535 (1985).

No fatal variance.

- Fact that an indictment charged the defendant with aggravated assault and battery by slicing the victim's neck with a knife, but the evidence showed the defendant used a box cutter, did not constitute a fatal variance between the indictment and the proof, because the defendant was sufficiently informed of the charges and faced no danger of further prosecution arising out of the incident. Lawson v. State, 278 Ga. App. 852, 630 S.E.2d 131 (2006).

In a case when the defendant, a juvenile, was adjudicated delinquent based on aggravated assault, there was not a fatal variance between the allegations and the proof. The petition alleged that the defendant's use of a baton against a deputy amounted to an assault with an object likely to cause serious bodily injury when used offensively, and the proof supported this conclusion; any variance between the allegation that the defendant actually hit the deputy and proof that the defendant merely advanced on the deputy was thus immaterial. In the Interest of J.A.C., 291 Ga. App. 728, 662 S.E.2d 811 (2008).

There was not a fatal variance between an allegation that the defendant committed aggravated assault against all three members of a group and evidence that defendant only struck one member of the group because: (1) the evidence showed all three were in a group when the defendant fired a gun at the group; and (2) it was well established that the act of firing a weapon into a group made each individual in the group a separate victim and justified a separate count of aggravated assault for each victim. Martin-Argaw v. State, 311 Ga. App. 609, 716 S.E.2d 737 (2011).

Charge of entire aggravated assault statute not required.

- Trial court did not charge the entire aggravated assault statute, but defined aggravated assault as an "assault done in an aggravated manner," committed when a person assaulted another with a deadly weapon as alleged in the indictment; thus, there was no reasonable probability that the defendant was convicted of aggravated assault in a manner not charged in the indictment. Garza v. State, 285 Ga. App. 902, 648 S.E.2d 84 (2007), vacated, in part, 300 Ga. App. 352, 685 S.E.2d 366 (2009).

Indictment alleging rape and aggravated assault.

- Evidence showed that the kidnapping conviction, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-40(a), was based on evidence showing that when the victim attempted to escape the initial attack, defendant grabbed the victim and dragged the victim to a more secluded area of the trailer park and the aggravated assault with intent to rape conviction, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, was based on evidence that defendant beat the victim with the defendant's hands and fists with the intention of raping the victim; thus, the two crimes were separate offenses supported by different facts that did not merge as a matter of law. McGuire v. State, 266 Ga. App. 673, 598 S.E.2d 55 (2004).

Indictment alleging aggravated assault and aggravated battery.

- Because a conviction on a charge of aggravated assault could be based on the defendant's act of cutting of the victim's throat, while a conviction on a charge of aggravated battery could be based on the serious disfigurement of the victim's arms, a conviction could be entered on each count; hence, merger did not apply. Goss v. State, 289 Ga. App. 734, 658 S.E.2d 168 (2008).

Sufficient to withstand general demurrer.

- Indictment alleging that the defendant unlawfully made an assault upon a peace officer engaged in the performance of the officer's official duties with a motor vehicle, an object, which, when used offensively against a person, is likely to or actually does result in serious bodily injury, was sufficient to withstand a general demurrer because the defendant could not admit to the facts other than the fact that the individual was a peace officer without being guilty of the lesser included offense of aggravated assault. State v. Wilson, 318 Ga. App. 88, 732 S.E.2d 330 (2012).

Failure to file demurrer to indictment charging aggravated assault provided no basis for ineffective assistance of counsel.

- Trial court did not err in denying a defendant's motion for new trial based on the defendant's claim that the defendant was rendered ineffective assistance of counsel as a result of defense counsel failing to file a demurrer to an aggravated assault count on the premise that the allegations in the indictment did not adequately track the language of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21 as, although the indictment did not state that the defendant used the defendant's hands as deadly weapons, that omission did not render the charge flawed since specific reference to a deadly weapon in an indictment must be seen as a general reference to the aggravating circumstance in § 16-5-21. As a result, any objection or demurrer would have been futile and, as such, the defendant's contention provided no basis for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Hall v. State, 292 Ga. App. 544, 664 S.E.2d 882, cert. denied, No. S08C1841, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 926 (Ga. 2008).

Failure to file demurrer to indictment.

- Defendant's motions for a new trial and in arrest of judgment challenging the wording of the indictment charging the defendant with aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), (3), were properly denied because the defendant could not have admitted the allegations of the indictment without admitting that the defendant was guilty of a crime, and, under O.C.G.A. § 17-7-110, having failed to file a timely special demurrer, the defendant waived the right to a perfect indictment. McDaniel v. State, 298 Ga. App. 558, 680 S.E.2d 593 (2009).

Trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to challenge the felony murder count of an indictment because the indictment contained sufficient facts to put the defendant on notice that the defendant was accused of the death of the victim as a result of an aggravated assault when the indictment alleged a specific, offensive use of the defendant's hands and feet and that when the defendant's hands and feet were used in a particular way they were objects which were likely to and actually did result in serious bodily injury; the absence of self-defense, like general intent, did not have to be expressly alleged in an indictment, and even if some such allegation were necessary, language in the indictment asserting that defendant acted unlawfully and contrary to the laws of the state, the good order, peace, and dignity thereof was sufficient. Lizana v. State, 287 Ga. 184, 695 S.E.2d 208 (2010).

Waiver of challenge to indictment.

- Felony murder indictment was not deficient because the indictment did not contain all the essential elements of the underlying crime of aggravated assault because the defendant's failure to file a special demurrer seeking additional information before pleading guilty to the indictment constituted a waiver of the defendant's right to be tried on a perfect indictment. Brooks v. State, 299 Ga. 474, 788 S.E.2d 766 (2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 573, 196 L. Ed. 2d 451 (U.S. 2016).

Included Crimes

Which offense to sentence on.

- When the same facts were used to support aggravated assault and aggravated battery charges, the trial court erred in sentencing defendant on the aggravated assault count, the lesser included offense. Riden v. State, 226 Ga. App. 245, 486 S.E.2d 198 (1997).

Legislative intent as to aggravated assault upon police officer.

- Aggravated assault and aggravated assault upon police officer are separate and distinct crimes. Language in the caption to the bill which stated that the purpose of the statute was to define "the crime of aggravated assault upon a police officer" clearly indicated the intent of the General Assembly. Bundren v. State, 247 Ga. 180, 274 S.E.2d 455 (1981); but see Lambert v. State, 157 Ga. App. 275, 277 S.E.2d 66 (1981).

Simple assault is lesser included offense of aggravated assault.

- Simple assault or assault (synonymous terms) is necessarily a lesser included offense of the greater crime of aggravated assault and is an essential part thereof. Smith v. State, 140 Ga. App. 395, 231 S.E.2d 143 (1976).

Reckless conduct is a lesser included offense of aggravated assault. Bowers v. State, 177 Ga. App. 36, 338 S.E.2d 457 (1985).

In the defendant's trial on a charge of aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a), the trial court did not err in failing to instruct the jury on reckless conduct under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-60(b) because the latter was not a lesser-included offense of the former; while both offenses proscribed the same general conduct, i.e., subjecting another to actual injury or the possibility of injury, aggravated assault required proof that the forbidden act was intentional, while in the case of reckless conduct, the forbidden act is the product of criminal negligence. Chambers v. State, 308 Ga. App. 748, 708 S.E.2d 651 (2011).

Crimes included in aggravated assault with deadly weapon.

- Simple assault under former Code 1933, § 26-1301 (see O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20) and pointing a gun or pistol at another under former Code 1933, § 26-2908 (see O.C.G.A. § 16-11-102) are both misdemeanors and included in the greater crime of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. Morrison v. State, 147 Ga. App. 410, 249 S.E.2d 131 (1978).

Possession of firearm.

- Trial court properly refused to merge convictions for possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime and aggravated assault. Pace v. State, 239 Ga. App. 506, 521 S.E.2d 444 (1999).

Cruelty to children can be lesser included crime under indictment for aggravated assault with deadly weapon. Williams v. State, 144 Ga. App. 130, 240 S.E.2d 890 (1977).

Cruelty to children count merged into count alleging aggravated assault, where both counts alleged the same facts, i.e., that defendant shot daughter. Cranford v. State, 186 Ga. App. 862, 369 S.E.2d 50 (1988).

Aggravated assault and false imprisonment did not merge.

- Defendant's conviction on a charge of false imprisonment did not merge with the defendant's conviction for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon because each offense required proof of facts which the other did not: an assault and a weapon were not required for false imprisonment, and violation of liberty through arrest, confinement, or detention was not required for aggravated assault. Jackson v. State, 305 Ga. 614, 825 S.E.2d 188 (2019).

Unauthorized possession of weapon by inmate is not a lesser included offense of aggravated assault. Weaver v. State, 176 Ga. App. 639, 337 S.E.2d 420 (1985).

Pointing weapon at another.

- In a homicide trial, defendant's act was clearly the felony of aggravated assault, not the misdemeanor of pointing a weapon at another, where the testimony showed that victim, as well as the three passengers in the victim's car, were aware of and understandably apprehensive of immediate violent injury, and defendant's own testimony revealed that defendant's purpose in pointing the weapon was to place victim in apprehension of immediate violent injury. Thus, the request for a charge on misdemeanor manslaughter was properly denied. Rhodes v. State, 257 Ga. 368, 359 S.E.2d 670 (1987); Rameau v. State, 267 Ga. 261, 477 S.E.2d 118 (1996).

Although pointing a firearm at another is an offense included in aggravated assault, it is not error to refuse a charge on it when the evidence does not reasonably raise the issue that defendant may be guilty of only the lesser crime. Head v. State, 233 Ga. App. 655, 504 S.E.2d 499 (1998); Stobbart v. State, 272 Ga. 608, 533 S.E.2d 379 (2000).

Offense merged with attempted armed robbery.

- Since the defendant was indicted for aggravated assault for pointing a handgun at a victim, which was also a substantial step toward commission of the armed robbery, the trial court properly merged the defendant's aggravated assault conviction with the attempted armed robbery conviction. McKinney v. State, 274 Ga. App. 32, 619 S.E.2d 299 (2005).

Defendant's conviction for aggravated assault merged into the defendant's conviction for attempted armed robbery because the relevant aggravated assault provision did not require proof of any fact that was not also required to prove the attempted armed robbery as that offense could have been proved under the indictment in the case. Garland v. State, 311 Ga. App. 7, 714 S.E.2d 707 (2011).

Merger with armed robbery proper.

- Evidence identifying the defendant as the perpetrator who stole a victim's car and purse at gunpoint, coupled with evidence of the defendant's flight from police, possession of the stolen car, and possession of the revolver used in the crimes, was sufficient to support convictions for hijacking a motor vehicle, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, armed robbery, and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon; however, the conviction and sentence for aggravated assault merged as a matter of fact into the armed robbery conviction and sentence. Doublette v. State, 278 Ga. App. 746, 629 S.E.2d 602 (2006).

Merger of an aggravated assault count into an armed robbery count was required when the only evidence was that the defendant used a gun to rob the victim. There was not a separate aggravated assault before the robbery began; thus, there having been no additional violence used against the victim, it followed that the evidentiary basis for the aggravated assault conviction was "used up" in proving the armed robbery. Howard v. State, 298 Ga. App. 98, 679 S.E.2d 104 (2009).

Defendant's aggravated assault convictions merged into the defendant's armed robbery convictions because there was no element of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), that was not contained in armed robbery, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41; aggravated assault with a deadly weapon does not require proof of a fact that armed robbery does not, and because the assault requirement of aggravated assault is the equivalent of the "use of an offensive weapon" requirement of armed robbery, the "deadly weapon" requirement of this form of aggravated assault is the equivalent of the "offensive weapon" requirement of armed robbery. Long v. State, 287 Ga. 886, 700 S.E.2d 399 (2010).

Plea counsel performed deficiently in failing to argue for the merger of the defendant's convictions and sentences for armed robbery, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a), and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), because the aggravated assault with a deadly weapon charges did not require proof of a fact that the armed robbery charges did not likewise require, and the defendant's aggravated assault convictions unquestionably merged into the defendant's armed-robbery convictions; the armed robbery counts in the indictment provided that the defendant unlawfully, with intent to commit theft, did take property from the person of the victim, by use of an offensive weapon, and the aggravated assault counts provided that the defendant did unlawfully make an assault upon the person of the victim with a steel rod, a deadly weapon, an object, which, when used offensively against a person, was likely to or actually did result in serious bodily injury, by beating the victim about the head and face with the steel rod. Murray v. State, 307 Ga. App. 621, 705 S.E.2d 726 (2011).

Trial court erred in not merging a defendant's aggravated assault with attempt to rob conviction, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a), into the defendant's armed robbery conviction, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41. The offense of armed robbery contained a requirement, the taking of property, that aggravated assault did not, but aggravated assault with intent to rob did not require proof of a fact which armed robbery did not. Daniels v. State, 310 Ga. App. 541, 713 S.E.2d 689 (2011).

Trial court's failure to merge the defendant's aggravated assault conviction with the defendant's armed robbery conviction in imposing the sentence was erroneous because there was no element of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon that was not contained in armed robbery; both crimes required proof of an intent to rob because the elements of the defendant's armed robbery charge under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a) included an intent to rob, the use of an offensive weapon, and the taking of property from the person or presence of another, and the elements of the defendant's aggravated assault charge under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a) included an assault upon the victim, an intent to rob, and the use of a deadly weapon. Daniels v. State, 310 Ga. App. 562, 714 S.E.2d 91 (2011).

Trial court erred by failing to merge an aggravated assault charge into an armed robbery charge because the victim testified repeatedly that the defendant was in the victim's apartment when the defendant shot the victim and that the victim fired a gun as soon as the victim saw the defendant point a gun at the victim while forcing the defendant's way in; both crimes were complete when the defendant pointed the gun at the victim while simultaneously entering the apartment, and there was no separate aggravated assault before the armed robbery began. Davis v. State, 312 Ga. App. 328, 718 S.E.2d 559 (2011).

Trial court erred in failing to merge the defendant's conviction for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), into the defendant's conviction for armed robbery conviction, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a), because the act of using an offensive weapon for the purposes of committing an armed robbery was the legal equivalent of assault for the purposes of committing an aggravated assault; it is not determinative under the merger analysis that the desired object of a defendant's armed robbery was something other than that which he or she actually took, but instead, what dictates merger is the fact that both crimes for which the defendant was convicted were predicated upon the same conduct. Hall v. State, 313 Ga. App. 66, 720 S.E.2d 181 (2011).

Defendant's conviction and sentence on one count for aggravated assault against the manager of a fast food restaurant as a party to co-defendant's acts had to be vacated because that count was alleged to have been committed by the act of co-defendant striking the manager about the head with the gun during the armed robbery, thus, the aggravated assault arose out of the same act or transaction as the armed robbery and it was included in and merged with the armed robbery as a matter of fact. Broyard v. State, 325 Ga. App. 794, 755 S.E.2d 36 (2014).

Aggravated assault count merged into conviction for armed robbery because the trial court failed to recognize that both charges arose from the same conduct, that of threatening the victim at gunpoint to make the victim open the cash register so the assailants could take cash and checks inside. Chambers v. Hall, 305 Ga. 363, 825 S.E.2d 162 (2019), cert. denied, 2019 U.S. LEXIS 5561, 205 L. Ed. 2d 174 (U.S. 2019).

Merger with armed robbery not proper.

- Trial court did not err in failing to merge counts of armed robbery, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a), and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), because the assault was completed before the armed robbery; the evidence showed that the defendant confronted the victim by entering the room with a pistol and threatening the victim, at which point, the crime of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon was completed. The evidence further showed that after threatening the victim, presumably to prevent the victim from retaliating against the defendant for a prior altercation, the defendant ordered the victim to empty the victim's pockets at gunpoint and took $200 from the victim, which comprised the armed robbery. Ransom v. State, 298 Ga. App. 360, 680 S.E.2d 200 (2009).

Defendant's sentence for armed robbery, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a), and aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), was not void as a result of the trial court's failure to merge the convictions because the convictions did not merge for sentencing purposes since they did not involve the same conduct; the crime of armed robbery was complete when the defendant entered a restaurant and, with the use of a handgun, demanded and took money from a waitress, and, after completion of the armed robbery, the defendant pushed the gun against the waitress's neck and asked whether the waitress wanted to die, which formed the basis of the aggravated assault conviction. McKenzie v. State, 302 Ga. App. 538, 691 S.E.2d 352 (2010).

Because the defendant's conviction under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a) for armed robbery could be sustained based upon the defendant's conduct with a shotgun, and because the defendant's conviction under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) for aggravated assault could be sustained based upon the defendant's conduct with a knife, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-1-7(a), the two convictions did not merge. Johnson v. State, 305 Ga. App. 838, 700 S.E.2d 726 (2010).

Defendant's convictions for armed robbery and aggravated assault did not merge because each crime required proof of conduct that the other did not; the armed robbery as charged in the indictment required proof of intent to rob and that the victim's wallet was taken, while the aggravated assaults required proof that the victim's neck was slashed with a sharp weapon. Thomas v. State, 310 Ga. App. 404, 714 S.E.2d 37 (2011).

Trial court did not err in failing to merge the aggravated assault count of the indictment with the armed robbery count because the defendant knowingly and voluntarily pled guilty to each of the crimes for which the defendant was indicted, and as a consequence, the defendant waived all defenses except that the indictment charged no crime, including the issue of whether the offenses merged as a matter of law or fact; the defendant chose to admit that the defendant committed the acts so the defendant could avoid a trial on the question of guilt or innocence, and having accepted the benefits of such a bargain, it would be contrary to public policy and the ends of justice to allow the defendant to avoid the consequences of the agreement. Carson v. State, 314 Ga. App. 225, 723 S.E.2d 516 (2012), overruled on other grounds, Nazario v. State, 293 Ga. 480, 746 S.E.2d 109 (2013).

Trial court erred by failing to merge the defendant's convictions for aggravated assault with a deadly or offensive weapon and armed robbery for sentencing purposes because hitting a victim in the head with a handgun while demanding money were not separate and distinct acts but one uninterrupted criminal transaction. Haynes v. State, 322 Ga. App. 57, 743 S.E.2d 617 (2013).

Reckless conduct as lesser included offense of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon.

- Where evidence indicated that defendant might have merely fired a gun up into the air while the police were chasing the car in which defendant was riding, the trial court erred in refusing to charge the jury on the offense of reckless conduct as a lesser included offense of an aggravated assault by attempting to injure. Shaw v. State, 238 Ga. App. 757, 519 S.E.2d 486 (1999).

Charge on reckless conduct not warranted.

- When the evidence, including defendant's own admissions, clearly established that the defendant repeatedly fired the weapon with the intention of scaring the victims, even if the defendant did not intend to hit them, the evidence established aggravated assault and there was no error in the failure to give an instruction on reckless conduct. Huguley v. State, 242 Ga. App. 645, 529 S.E.2d 915 (2000).

Rape includes lesser offense of assault with intent to rape or aggravated assault. Wingfield v. State, 231 Ga. 92, 200 S.E.2d 708 (1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 942, 94 S. Ct. 1949, 40 L. Ed. 2d 294 (1974).

Aggravated assault and kidnapping.

- Aggravated assault, with intent to rob as the factor in aggravation, is not a lesser included offense of kidnapping with bodily injury. Brown v. State, 232 Ga. App. 787, 504 S.E.2d 452 (1998).

Evidence that was required to convict defendant of three counts of aggravated assault differed from that which was required to prove the three kidnapping charges against defendant, as the aggravated assaults occurred when deadly weapons were pointed at the victims shortly after defendant and another assailant entered a certain store, whereas the kidnappings were complete when the three victims were later dragged from one room to another; thus, the aggravated assault convictions did not merge into the kidnapping convictions for sentencing purposes. Phanamixay v. State, 260 Ga. App. 177, 581 S.E.2d 286 (2003).

Trial court's decision not to merge the conviction of kidnapping, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-40, with the defendant's convictions for aggravated assault and armed robbery, in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21 and16-8-41, was proper under O.C.G.A. § 16-1-7(a), as the facts that supported the kidnapping were not the same as those that supported the convictions for the other offenses; the kidnapping occurred when the defendant forced three store employees into an office, the aggravated assaults occurred when the defendant pointed a gun at one employee's head and hit another employee with it, and the armed robbery occurred when the defendant took money from the store safe. Hill v. State, 279 Ga. App. 666, 632 S.E.2d 443 (2006).

Kidnapping, aggravated assault, and rape were separate offenses, completed individually, and did not merge as a matter of fact; thus, the trial court did not err in refusing to merge the kidnapping counts into the aggravated assault and rape counts for purposes of sentencing. Dasher v. State, 281 Ga. App. 326, 636 S.E.2d 83 (2006).

Because there was independent evidence to support each of the offenses as indicted, a defendant's aggravated assault conviction did not merge as a matter of fact with either the aggravated battery or kidnapping with bodily injury convictions. Pitts v. State, 287 Ga. App. 540, 652 S.E.2d 181 (2007).

It was error for the trial court to impose separate sentences for the defendant's aggravated assault convictions because the defendant's convictions for aggravated assault merged as a matter of fact with the defendant's conviction for kidnapping with bodily injury. Delgiudice v. State, 308 Ga. App. 397, 707 S.E.2d 603 (2011).

Aggravated assault convictions did not merge.

- Under the required evidence test, the defendant's two aggravated assault convictions did not merge because the assault with intent to murder count required the state to prove that the defendant intended to kill the victim, which the state was not required to prove for the charge of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon; and the aggravated assault with a deadly weapon count required the state to prove that the defendant used a deadly weapon, a knife, box-cutter, or other sharp-edged instrument, which the state did not have to prove for the conviction of aggravated assault with intent to murder. Howard v. State, 334 Ga. App. 229, 779 S.E.2d 5 (2015).

Aggravated assault is included offense of kidnapping with bodily injury.

- Because the elements of the crime of aggravated assault must have been proved in order to sustain a conviction for the crime of kidnapping with bodily injury, the aggravated assault is an included offense of the crime of kidnapping with bodily injury. Brown v. State, 247 Ga. 298, 275 S.E.2d 52, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 882, 102 S. Ct. 366, 70 L. Ed. 2d 192 (1981), overruled on other grounds, Wilson v. Zant, 249 Ga. 373, 290 S.E.2d 442 (1982), but see, Morgan v. State, 267 Ga. 203, 476 S.E.2d 747 (1996); Herring v. State, 224 Ga. App. 809, 481 S.E.2d 842 (1997).

When assault is committed with deadly weapon, simple assault is not lesser included offense. Hightower v. State, 137 Ga. App. 790, 224 S.E.2d 842 (1976).

When assault is committed with gun, simple assault is not a lesser included offense. Zachery v. State, 158 Ga. App. 448, 280 S.E.2d 860 (1981).

Simple assault is not a lesser included offense of an aggravated assault in which a gun or a knife is alleged to have been used as a deadly weapon. Weaver v. State, 182 Ga. App. 806, 357 S.E.2d 153 (1987).

Aggravated assault not lesser included offense.

- When the evidence used to prove the commission of an aggravated assault was not used at all in proving the commission of an aggravated battery, defendant's argument that the aggravated assault was a lesser included offense of the aggravated battery was without merit. Grace v. State, 262 Ga. 746, 425 S.E.2d 865 (1993).

When an indictment alleged that an aggravated assault was committed with a firearm by shooting the victims, and an armed robbery alleged the use of an offensive weapon, the aggravated assault charge was not a lesser included offense of armed robbery as a matter of law, and the two offenses rarely merged as a matter of fact. Silvers v. State, 278 Ga. 45, 597 S.E.2d 373 (2004).

Mutiny in a penal institution and aggravated assault require proof of different elements and, therefore, the former offense cannot be a lesser included offense of the latter. Bierria v. State, 232 Ga. App. 622, 502 S.E.2d 542 (1998).

Simple battery.

- When an assault is committed with a deadly weapon, the simple battery is not a lesser included offense under aggravated assault. Powell v. State, 140 Ga. App. 36, 230 S.E.2d 90 (1976).

When the defendant was indicted for aggravated assault upon the person of another "with a bottle, an object which when used offensively against a person is likely to or actually does result in serious bodily injury," simple battery was a lesser included offense of aggravated assault, and the jury was properly instructed as to the lesser included offense. Haun v. State, 189 Ga. App. 884, 377 S.E.2d 878, cert. denied, 189 Ga. App. 912, 377 S.E.2d 878 (1989).

Offense of battery is not necessarily a lesser included offense of aggravated assault. Although the element of physical or bodily harm is a requisite for battery, since the physical or bodily harm is committed with a deadly weapon, simple battery is not a lesser included offense. Givens v. State, 199 Ga. App. 845, 406 S.E.2d 272 (1991); Van Doran v. State, 244 Ga. App. 496, 53 S.E.2d 163 (2000).

"Affray" is not a lesser-included offense of aggravated assault. Rowland v. State, 228 Ga. App. 66, 491 S.E.2d 119 (1997).

When assault occurred after aggravated battery, and the evidence indicated that any intent defendant may have had to kill her husband before he was shot was abandoned immediately thereafter, when she prevented her son from shooting her husband a second time, it was error to deny her motion for a directed verdict of acquittal as to the offense of aggravated assault with intent to murder. Overstreet v. State, 182 Ga. App. 809, 357 S.E.2d 103 (1987).

Aggravated assault merged into aggravated battery.

- Because the indictment alleged only one act, the shooting of the victim, and because the evidence showed only that defendant's actions were the result of a single act of firing a series of shots in quick succession at the victim, the convictions for aggravated assault merged into the aggravated battery. Brown v. State, 246 Ga. App. 60, 539 S.E.2d 545 (2000).

Defendant's aggravated battery and aggravated assault convictions merged because the counts of the indictment were based on the same conduct of hitting the victim with a hammer, resulting in serious bodily injury to the victim's hand and one of the victim's fingers being rendered useless when the victim placed the victim's hands up in an attempt to protect the victim's head; the aggravated assault was a lesser included offense of the aggravated battery because the aggravated assault required proof of a less serious injury than the aggravated battery. Thomas v. State, 310 Ga. App. 404, 714 S.E.2d 37 (2011).

In an aggravated assault and aggravated battery case arising out of an incident in which the defendant twice, in quick succession, slashed the throat of the victim, the defendant's girlfriend, the trial court erred by failing to merge the defendant's convictions, and the court of appeals erroneously affirmed that decision because the record sufficiently established that the defendant's actions were part of a continuous criminal act, committed at the same time and place and inspired by the same criminal intent; and the offenses, which were based on the single criminal act of the defendant cutting the victim's throat with a knife, only differed with respect to the seriousness of the injury or risk of injury suffered by the victim. Regent v. State, 299 Ga. 172, 787 S.E.2d 217 (2016).

Trial court erred by failing to merge the defendant's aggravated assault and aggravated battery convictions for the purposes of sentencing as the aggravated assault conviction was a lesser included offense of the aggravated battery conviction because, although the aggravated battery provision required proof that the victim had the victim's body seriously disfigured, which was not a required showing under the aggravated assault provision, the latter provision did not require proof of any fact that was not also required to prove the aggravated battery; thus, the conviction and sentence for aggravated assault had to be vacated and the case remanded to the trial court for re-sentencing. Evans v. State, 344 Ga. App. 283, 810 S.E.2d 164 (2018).

Aggravated assault did not merge with aggravated battery.

- Defendant's convictions of aggravated assault and aggravated battery against the same victim did not merge for sentencing purposes, as the two offenses were proven with different facts: the assault occurred when defendant threatened the victim with a gun, and the battery occurred when defendant later shot the victim in the arm. Pennymon v. State, 261 Ga. App. 450, 582 S.E.2d 582 (2003).

Trial court did not err in refusing to merge the defendant's convictions for aggravated assault and aggravated battery, O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21 and16-5-24, because the offenses were established by proving different facts; the defendant was found guilty of aggravated assault because there was evidence that the defendant assaulted the victim with a screwdriver, and the defendant was found guilty of aggravated battery because the victim's left lung was nonfunctional for a period of time due to the stab wound. Works v. State, 301 Ga. App. 108, 686 S.E.2d 863 (2009), cert. denied, No. S10C0458, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 251 (Ga. 2010).

Separate judgments of conviction and sentences for aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), and aggravated battery, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24(a), were authorized because the evidence authorized a finding that the defendant committed an initial aggravated assault and, after a deliberate interval, committed an aggravated battery in a different location and on a different part of the victim's body; because each offense required proof of a fact that the other offense did not, the crimes did not merge legally or factually. Brockington v. State, 316 Ga. App. 90, 728 S.E.2d 753 (2012).

Because the defendant's initial act of pointing the gun at the victim's head, an aggravated assault, was a separate act from the ensuing acts of aggravated battery in which the defendant shot and injured both of the victim's hands, the crimes of aggravated assault and aggravated battery did not merge. Thomas v. State, 325 Ga. App. 682, 754 S.E.2d 661 (2014).

Under the required evidence test, the defendant's convictions for aggravated assault and aggravated battery did not merge because the aggravated battery count required the state to prove that the defendant rendered a member of the victim's body useless, which the state did not have to prove for the conviction of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon; and aggravated assault with an offensive weapon required the state to prove that the defendant used a hammer, an object likely to result in serious bodily injury, which the state did not have to prove for the aggravated battery conviction. Howard v. State, 334 Ga. App. 229, 779 S.E.2d 5 (2015).

Trial court did not err in failing to merge Count Three, charging the defendant with aggravated assault with intent to murder, into the aggravated battery convictions because the count of aggravated assault with intent to murder required proof of a fact - the intent to kill - that the aggravated battery counts did not, and the aggravated battery counts required proof of a fact - the infant's skull was rendered useless and the infant's face was disfigured - that the aggravated assault with intent to murder count did not; thus, the trial court did not err in sentencing the defendant separately for aggravated assault with intent to murder as well as two counts of aggravated battery. Busby v. State, 332 Ga. App. 646, 774 S.E.2d 717 (2015).

Battery conviction merged into aggravated assault conviction.

- Trial court correctly ruled that the defendant's conviction for battery merged into the defendant's conviction for aggravated assault because the felony of aggravated assault did not merge into the misdemeanor battery. Gross v. State, 312 Ga. App. 362, 718 S.E.2d 581 (2011).

Carrying weapon without license is not included within aggravated assault with deadly weapon. Thomas v. State, 128 Ga. App. 538, 197 S.E.2d 452 (1973).

Elements of interference with government property are not included in the elements required for aggravated assault. Hyman v. State, 222 Ga. App. 419, 474 S.E.2d 243 (1996).

Aggravated assault not lesser included offense of burglary.

- Neither burglary nor aggravated assault was established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to prove the other so the argument that an aggravated assault conviction must merge with a burglary conviction is without merit. Taylor v. State, 157 Ga. App. 212, 276 S.E.2d 691 (1981).

Attempted armed robbery and aggravated assault are separate and distinct crimes, and separate sentences were properly imposed. Lambert v. State, 157 Ga. App. 275, 277 S.E.2d 66 (1981).

Aggravated assault is not included in attempted armed robbery as a matter of law, although these two offenses may as a matter of fact merge if the same facts are used to prove both offenses. However, where the underlying facts show that one crime was completed prior to the second crime, so that the crimes are separate as a matter of law, there is no merger. Gaither v. Cannida, 258 Ga. 557, 372 S.E.2d 429 (1988).

Convictions and sentences for both armed robbery and aggravated assault were proper, where each offense charged was clearly supported by its own set of facts. Millines v. State, 188 Ga. App. 655, 373 S.E.2d 838 (1988).

Attempted armed robbery as included offense of aggravated assault.

- Trial court did not err by refusing to charge the jury that the jury could find the defendant guilty of attempted armed robbery as an included offense of aggravated assault with intent to rob since the defendant was not entitled to a charge or verdict of attempted armed robbery when that offense could only be proved by showing that the defendant brandished a weapon in the faces of the victims with the intent to rob the victims, that is, that the defendant actually committed the greater offense, a completed aggravated assault with the intent to rob. Since the evidence that proved that the defendant committed an attempted armed robbery necessarily proved that the defendant committed the greater, completed crime of aggravated assault with intent to rob, there was no evidence that the defendant committed only the offense of attempted armed robbery and, therefore, the defendant was not entitled to a charge on that lesser included offense. Pilkington v. State, 298 Ga. App. 317, 680 S.E.2d 164 (2009), cert. denied, No. S09C1717, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 54 (Ga. 2010).

Conviction for aggravated assault did not merge with conviction for armed robbery where the evidence showed that the defendant had completed the armed robbery at the time defendant assaulted the security guard. Loumakis v. State, 179 Ga. App. 294, 346 S.E.2d 373 (1986).

Offenses of aggravated assault and robbery did not merge as a matter of law, where although the occurrences happened within a short span of time, the robbery had been completed at the time defendant fired the gun and involved different actions and intents. Phelps v. State, 194 Ga. App. 493, 390 S.E.2d 899 (1990).

Aggravated assault conviction did not merge with armed robbery offenses for sentencing purposes because each crime required proof of an additional fact as the robbery required proof that defendant took the property of another, which was not required to prove aggravated assault, and assault required proof that the victim was placed in reasonable far of immediately receiving a violent injury, which armed robbery did not require. Nava v. State, 301 Ga. App. 497, 687 S.E.2d 901 (2009).

Aggravated assault did not merge with kidnapping and armed robbery charges because each count relied on separate facts. Howard v. State, 230 Ga. App. 437, 496 S.E.2d 532 (1998).

Aggravated assault with intent to rob did not merge with kidnapping offense.

- Defendant completed the act of aggravated assault with intent to rob when defendant initially approached the victim and told the victim that defendant intended to steal the car; this crime did not merge into the conviction for kidnapping, which was completed later. Robinson v. State, 271 Ga. App. 768, 610 S.E.2d 706 (2005).

Aggravated assault merged with kidnapping with bodily injury.

- An aggravated assault based on defendant's choking of the victim with an electrical cord merged into the kidnapping with bodily injury, and the sentence imposed for a count of aggravated assault was vacated. Nelson v. State, 278 Ga. App. 548, 629 S.E.2d 410 (2006).

Aggravated assault was included in armed robbery as matter of fact, when it was not the initial pointing of a pistol at the victim which prompted the victim to open a cash drawer but the subsequent cocking of the weapon by the assailant after the victim had told the assailant that the victim had no money and the actual firing of the weapon occurred virtually at the same moment as the victim was hitting the button to open the drawer. Moreland v. State, 183 Ga. App. 113, 358 S.E.2d 276 (1987).

Defendant's aggravated assault conviction should have merged with the defendant's armed robbery conviction as the two convictions were based on the same conduct in sticking a gun to a victim's head with the intent to rob the victim. Kirk v. State, 271 Ga. App. 640, 610 S.E.2d 604 (2005).

Defendants' aggravated assault convictions merged into their armed robbery convictions as simultaneous with showing the gun, defendants made clear that they intended to rob the victims, which they proceeded to do; there was not a separate aggravated assault before the robbery began. Young v. State, 272 Ga. App. 304, 612 S.E.2d 118 (2005).

Defendants' aggravated assault by striking a victim with a gun convictions merged into their armed robbery convictions as the robbery was not complete until the gunman struck the victim with the gun, thereby allowing defendant to take the victim's money. Young v. State, 272 Ga. App. 304, 612 S.E.2d 118 (2005).

Aggravated assault conviction merged with robbery conviction where victim was placed in fear of receiving bodily injury before the victim's money was taken. Luke v. State, 171 Ga. App. 201, 318 S.E.2d 833 (1984).

Defendant's five convictions of aggravated assault merged with defendant's conviction on five counts of attempted armed robbery where defendant's act of pointing a pistol at bank employees when defendant announced an intent to rob the bank was the act underlying both the convictions for attempted armed robbery and for aggravated assault. Hambrick v. State, 256 Ga. 148, 344 S.E.2d 639 (1986).

Since the evidence adduced to convict defendant of aggravated assault with intent to rob - that defendant threw the victim on the floor, hit the victim, and strangled the victim with a bed sheet - was part and parcel of the evidence underlying defendant's robbery conviction, the offenses merged as a matter of fact. Johnson v. State, 247 Ga. App. 157, 543 S.E.2d 439 (2000).

Aggravated assault merged with armed robbery, where the aggravated assault alleged separately in the indictment was the same assault alleged to have been committed in the course of the armed robbery. Cherry v. State, 178 Ga. App. 483, 343 S.E.2d 510 (1986).

When the defendant's offense of attempted armed robbery was included in the defendant's offense of aggravated assault with intent to rob a restaurant manager, only one sentence should have been imposed in connection with the two charges. Redding v. State, 193 Ga. App. 50, 386 S.E.2d 907 (1989).

Aggravated assaults did not merge with the robbery of two victims, where the robberies were completed, both victims having been deprived of their property, when they were marched off for another criminal purpose and the aggravated assaults on each victim occurred. Glass v. State, 199 Ga. App. 530, 405 S.E.2d 522 (1991).

Aggravated assault count merged into robbery count, where the only aggravated assault (committed by defendant) shown by the evidence was that by which the commission of the robbery was effectuated. Since there was no additional, gratuitous violence employed against the victim, the evidentiary basis for the aggravated assault conviction was "used up" in proving the robbery. Head v. State, 202 Ga. App. 209, 413 S.E.2d 533 (1991).

Defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on counsel's failure to ask at sentencing that defendant's convictions for aggravated assault be merged into the armed robbery convictions was rejected as the convictions were merged at the motion for a new trial hearing. Buchanan v. State, 273 Ga. App. 174, 614 S.E.2d 786 (2005).

Separate sentences for aggravated assault and assault with the intent to rape.

- When there was evidence of assaults as the defendant wielded the knife that were gratuitous and unconnected with the assault with the intent to rape the victim, it was not error to sentence the defendant separately on the jury's findings of guilt for the aggravated assaults. Woodson v. State, 242 Ga. App. 67, 530 S.E.2d 2 (2000), aff'd, 273 Ga. 557, 544 S.E.2d 431 (2001).

Aggravated assault merged with criminal attempt to commit murder.

- Aggravated assault conviction merged into a criminal attempt to commit murder conviction, where both counts were based on allegations that defendant had stabbed the victim with a knife. Kelley v. State, 201 Ga. App. 343, 411 S.E.2d 276 (1991).

Merger of aggravated assault with malice murder.

- Convictions and sentences for aggravated assault with intent to murder and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon were vacated where the evidence showed that they both merged as a matter of fact with the malice murder conviction. Williams v. State, 277 Ga. 368, 589 S.E.2d 563 (2003).

Because the evidence the state used to prove that the defendant committed aggravated assault was the same that it used to prove that defendant committed malice murder, the aggravated assault offense merged into the malice murder as a matter of fact. Thus, the separate judgment of conviction and sentence for aggravated assault had to be vacated. Ludy v. State, 283 Ga. 322, 658 S.E.2d 745 (2008).

Convictions against the defendant for both malice murder and aggravated assault were error under O.C.G.A. § 16-1-7(a)(1) as the aggravated assault was included within the malice murder conviction under O.C.G.A. § 16-1-6(1) because the same conduct established the commission of both offenses. Bell v. State, 284 Ga. 790, 671 S.E.2d 815 (2009).

With regard to a defendant's malice murder conviction arising from the suffocation death of the defendant's newborn daughter, the defendant's conviction and sentence for aggravated assault was vacated inasmuch as the evidence showed that the aggravated assault merged as a matter of fact with the malice murder conviction. Wright v. State, 285 Ga. 428, 677 S.E.2d 82 (2009), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 1123, 130 S. Ct. 1076, 175 L. Ed. 2d 903 (2010).

Defendant's conviction for aggravated assault of the victim merged into the conviction for malice murder of the victim because there was no evidence that the victim suffered a non-fatal injury prior to a deliberate interval in the attack and a fatal injury thereafter; the forensic pathologist who conducted the autopsy catalogued the victim's wounds as "chop injuries" that fractured the victim's skull and incapacitated the victim and were likely inflicted with a hatchet, punctures and superficial, deep, and very deep incisions and stab wounds that were inflicted by knives. Alvelo v. State, 290 Ga. 609, 724 S.E.2d 377 (2012).

Aggravated assault conviction should have merged into malice murder conviction because it was not clear there was any deliberate interval between the assaults. Schutt v. State, 292 Ga. 625, 740 S.E.2d 163 (2013).

Aggravated assault did not merge with malice murder.

- When the defendant fired a gun at someone and the bullet grazed the person, went through a wall, and killed another person, the aggravated assault and malice murder convictions did not merge for sentencing purposes. George v. State, 276 Ga. 564, 580 S.E.2d 238 (2003).

Aggravated assault not lesser included offense.

- Where an indictment alleged that an aggravated assault was committed with a firearm by shooting the victims, and an armed robbery alleged the use of an offensive weapon, the aggravated assault charge was not a lesser included offense of armed robbery as a matter of law, and the two offenses rarely merged as a matter of fact. Silvers v. State, 278 Ga. 45, 597 S.E.2d 373 (2004).

Trial court erred in sentencing defendant for malice murder and aggravated assault as the victim's death was caused by a combination of blunt force trauma and strangulation and the aggravated assault merged into the malice murder as a matter of fact. Young v. State, 280 Ga. 65, 623 S.E.2d 491 (2005).

Defendant's conviction and sentence for aggravated assault was vacated as the malice murder and the aggravated assault charges merged as a matter of fact because the same evidence to prove aggravated assault as indicted, stabbing the victim with a knife, was used to prove malice murder. Williams v. State, 279 Ga. 154, 611 S.E.2d 19 (2005).

Because the evidence that defendant assaulted the victim with a shotgun was used to prove both an aggravated assault and malice murder, the aggravated assault conviction merged by fact into the malice murder conviction. Nix v. State, 280 Ga. 141, 625 S.E.2d 746 (2006).

When a prisoner was convicted of malice murder under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-1(a), a jury did not return a verdict on felony murder counts because O.C.G.A. § 16-1-7 prohibited a conviction for both offenses for the death of a single victim. Further, the prisoner's crime of aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a) also merged with the malice murder offense as it was a crime included within the greater offense. Newland v. Hall, 527 F.3d 1162 (11th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1183, 129 S. Ct. 1336, 173 L. Ed. 2d 607 (2009).

Aggravated assault with intent to rob and aggravated assault with deadly weapon merged.

- Convictions for aggravated assault of a male victim with the intent to rob and aggravated assault of the male victim with a deadly weapon did not rely on distinct criminal acts, as the weapons used in the assault were also implements of the robbery and used with the same purpose and intent; since the same facts were used to prove both crimes, the different crimes merged as a matter of fact for sentencing purposes. Maddox v. State, 277 Ga. App. 580, 627 S.E.2d 166 (2006).

Armed robbery and aggravated assault with deadly weapon are separate crimes, and one is not included in other. Neither prohibits a designated kind of conduct generally while the other prohibits a specific instance of such conduct. Roberts v. State, 228 Ga. 298, 185 S.E.2d 385 (1971).

Aggravated assault and armed robbery not always different crimes.

- While aggravated assault and armed robbery are different crimes as a matter of law, they are not always so as a matter of fact. Lambert v. State, 157 Ga. App. 275, 277 S.E.2d 66 (1981).

Conviction of aggravated assault and armed robbery constitutional.

- There was no violation of defendant's protection from double jeopardy in defendant's having been convicted of and punished for both the aggravated assault and armed robbery of defendant's victim, where the indictment charged armed robbery with the specific intent to commit a theft and the two acts were in fact separate though in close succession. Taylor v. State, 177 Ga. App. 624, 340 S.E.2d 263 (1986).

Charge of aggravated assault on a peace officer merges into a mutiny conviction because the aggravated assault charge is established by proof of less than all the facts required to establish the commission of mutiny. Lummen v. State, 180 Ga. App. 204, 348 S.E.2d 584 (1986).

Aggravated assault on a police officer merged with obstruction of a police officer.

- Trial court erred in failing to merge the defendant's convictions for four counts of obstruction of a police officer into the convictions for four counts of aggravated assault on a police officer because each count of the crime of obstruction was established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish each count of the crime of aggravated assault; the state conceded that the trial court erred in failing to merge the convictions for obstruction into the convictions for aggravated assault on a police officer. Dobbs v. State, 302 Ga. App. 628, 691 S.E.2d 387 (2010).

Intent to harm victim not inconsistent with conscious disregard of risk of harming another.

- Multiple guilty verdicts for the same conduct that are based on varying levels of mens rea are not mutually exclusive; therefore, the jury's verdicts that the defendant, by shooting a gun in a parking lot and killing a bystander, was guilty of aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21 and involuntary manslaughter predicated on reckless conduct, O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-3(a) and16-5-60(b), were not inconsistent because the defendant could both commit assault with the intent to harm the victim and, at the same time, consciously disregard a substantial risk of harming another. State v. Springer, 297 Ga. 376, 774 S.E.2d 106 (2015).

Assault with Deadly Weapon

"Assault with deadly weapon" and "assault with intent to murder" compared.

- While an assault with intent to commit murder is usually manifested by the use of some deadly weapon, yet the offense of an assault with intent to commit murder may be committed without a weapon likely to produce death. Wright v. State, 40 Ga. App. 118, 149 S.E. 153 (1929).

"Assault with deadly weapon" and "assault with an object used offensively" compared.

- Despite the defendant's claim that insufficient evidence was presented that the gun used in the commission of the charged crime was used as a deadly weapon, because the defendant was indicted for committing an assault by striking the victim on the side of the victim's head with the gun, an object when used offensively was likely to result in serious injury, no evidence of a deadly weapon was required at trial. Vonhagel v. State, 287 Ga. App. 507, 651 S.E.2d 793 (2007).

Assault with deadly weapon is essential element of offense of aggravated assault. Haygood v. State, 142 Ga. App. 627, 236 S.E.2d 696 (1977).

Assault with deadly weapon constitutes aggravated assault, felony. Ruff v. State, 150 Ga. App. 238, 257 S.E.2d 203 (1979).

Assault is aggravated when made with deadly weapon, regardless of intent. Ross v. State, 131 Ga. App. 587, 206 S.E.2d 554 (1974).

When jury can be given discretion to convict of lesser included offense.

- Under the proof in a case, the jury can be given the discretion to convict of a lower offense included in a higher felony charged, if they believe the evidence does not show a specific intent to kill. Jackson v. State, 99 Ga. App. 740, 109 S.E.2d 886 (1959).

Instruction on lesser offense and authorization to so convict.

- Under an indictment for murder the accused may be convicted of a lower grade of felony, or of a misdemeanor, if the lesser offense is one involved in the homicide and is sufficiently charged in the indictment; but whether the jury should be instructed on the law of a lesser offense, or they would be authorized to convict of a lesser offense, depends on the evidence. Moore v. State, 55 Ga. App. 213, 189 S.E. 731 (1937).

When one is charged with murder by shooting and the evidence does not demand a finding that the victim died from such gunshot wounds and the defendant admits the shooting, a verdict of guilty of assault with intent to murder may be authorized and it is not error to charge the jury on such lesser crime. Kimbro v. State, 113 Ga. App. 314, 147 S.E.2d 876 (1966).

Because the evidence showed that defendant committed an assault with intent and a deadly weapon, the crime constituted an aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2); therefore, a charge on the lesser-included offenses of simple assault or reckless conduct under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-20(a)(2) and16-5-60(b) was not warranted. Paul v. State, 296 Ga. App. 6, 673 S.E.2d 551 (2009).

Felony murder based on aggravated assault committed by police sergeant.

- Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant, a former police sergeant, of felony murder based on aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, specifically a TASER, because the medical examiner determined that the victim died from hypertensive cardiovascular disease exacerbated by physical exertion and conducted electrical stimulation from the application of the TASERs in drive-stun mode; and the state presented evidence that the repeated tasing of the victim in drive-stun mode over a span of about 20 minutes when the victim was exhausted from running and handcuffed not only inflicted intense physical pain, but also materially accelerated the victim's death minutes later. Eberhart v. State, 307 Ga. 254, 835 S.E.2d 192 (2019).

Intent is a question for the jury.

- When defendant contended the evidence was not sufficient to support the verdict because defendant did not intend to shoot anyone, but only intended to scare off people who were attacking defendant's home and defendant's automobile, it was held that intent is a question for the jury, and the evidence was sufficient. Cade v. State, 180 Ga. App. 314, 348 S.E.2d 769 (1986).

State of mind of either a perpetrator or a victim, including whether a victim has been placed under reasonable apprehension of injury or fear from an event, when in issue, may be proved by indirect or circumstantial evidence. Williams v. State, 208 Ga. App. 12, 430 S.E.2d 157 (1993).

Intent to kill is not element of aggravated assault with deadly weapon. Emmons v. State, 142 Ga. App. 553, 236 S.E.2d 536 (1977); Riddle v. State, 145 Ga. App. 328, 243 S.E.2d 607 (1978), overruled on other grounds, Adsitt v. State, 248 Ga. 237, 282 S.E.2d 305 (1981).

Intent to injure is not an element of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. Collins v. State, 199 Ga. App. 676, 405 S.E.2d 892 (1991); Turner v. State, 205 Ga. App. 745, 423 S.E.2d 439 (1992); Jay v. State, 232 Ga. App. 661, 503 S.E.2d 563 (1998).

It is the reasonable apprehension of harm by the victim of an assault by a firearm that establishes the crime of aggravated assault, not the assailant's intent to injure. Collins v. State, 199 Ga. App. 676, 405 S.E.2d 892 (1991); Turner v. State, 205 Ga. App. 745, 423 S.E.2d 439 (1992).

Intent to harm the victim is not an element of aggravated assault, and the state needs only to prove that defendant committed an assault and that defendant used a deadly weapon in doing so; a jury's finding that defendant was guilty of aggravated assault was supported by evidence that defendant, armed with a knife, grabbed the victim as the victim was running; defendant and the victim struggled; the victim fell to the ground; defendant held a knife to the victim's neck, forced the victim into a near-by pick-up truck, and drove away; and while in the truck, the defendant punched the victim in the face and threatened to kill the victim. Bailey v. State, 269 Ga. App. 262, 603 S.E.2d 786 (2004).

Intent to scare victim not a defense.

- When the defendant discharged a firearm in the direction of the victim, the defendant committed aggravated assault, and defendant's claim that the defendant was just trying to scare the victim was no defense. Jordan v. State, 214 Ga. App. 598, 448 S.E.2d 917 (1994).

Actual injury not required.

- There is no requirement that a victim actually be injured by the deadly weapon before a conviction for aggravated assault is authorized, since it is the reasonable apprehension of harm by the victim from exposure to the deadly weapon that establishes the crime of aggravated assault. Gilbert v. State, 209 Ga. App. 483, 433 S.E.2d 664 (1993).

When the defendant fired shots into the cab of a single cab pickup truck containing three people, the evidence was sufficient for a conviction of aggravated assault against the two victims who were not struck by a bullet, because one of those victims testified that the defendant shot at the victim and the jury could surmise that the victims not struck suffered apprehension of being shot. Cornelius v. State, 273 Ga. App. 806, 616 S.E.2d 148 (2005), overruled on other grounds, Schofield v. Holsey, 281 Ga. 809, 642 S.E.2d 56 (2007), overruled on other grounds by State v. Lane, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 98 (Ga. 2020).

Criminal negligence cannot substitute for criminal intent in cases of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon based on either an attempt to commit violent injury to the person of another (O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a)(1)), or the commission of an act placing another in apprehension of receiving an injury (O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a)(2)). Dunagan v. State, 269 Ga. 590, 502 S.E.2d 726 (1998), overruling Osborne v. State, 228 Ga. App. 758, 492 S.E.2d 732 (1007) and Jordan v. State, 214 Ga. App. 598, 448 S.E.2d 917 (1994).

Aggravated assault with deadly weapon is completed when simple assault committed by means of deadly weapon. Scott v. State, 141 Ga. App. 848, 234 S.E.2d 685 (1977); Tuggle v. State, 145 Ga. App. 603, 244 S.E.2d 131 (1978); Hurt v. State, 158 Ga. App. 722, 282 S.E.2d 192 (1981); Doss v. State, 166 Ga. App. 361, 304 S.E.2d 484 (1983); Rust v. State, 264 Ga. App. 893, 592 S.E.2d 525 (2003).

Recanting of assault by victim.

- Investigative statements given by a passenger at the scene of a car accident and subsequent statement that defendant swung and hit the passenger with a gun constituted substantive evidence of defendant's guilt despite the passenger's subsequent recantation or equivocation. Hurst v. State, 258 Ga. App. 664, 574 S.E.2d 876 (2002).

Trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion for a directed verdict regarding an aggravated assault count involving defendant's spouse, even though the spouse testified that the spouse did not believe defendant would harm the spouse despite the fact that defendant had been carrying a gun, as the police testimony that the spouse was in a very fearful state when police found the spouse sufficiently showed that the spouse had a reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury. Gordian v. State, 261 Ga. App. 75, 581 S.E.2d 616 (2003).

Despite the recantation by a juvenile's parent at trial, because sufficient evidence that the juvenile placed the parent in reasonable apprehension of being struck with a hammer, which was in line with the allegations in the parent's complaint filed immediately following the incident, the juvenile court's adjudication against the juvenile for aggravated assault was upheld on appeal. In the Interest of C.B., 288 Ga. App. 752, 655 S.E.2d 342 (2007).

Assault on victim holding child.

- When the defendant discharged a firearm in the direction of a victim who was holding a two-year-old child in the victim's arms, the defendant's deliberate act could be found to have included an attempt to injure those at whom defendant aimed, and the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction of aggravated assault upon the child. Jordan v. State, 214 Ga. App. 598, 448 S.E.2d 917 (1994).

Assault against several people.

- Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of three counts of aggravated assault after one victim testified about being fearful and that the defendant pointed a gun at all three victims. Jackson v. State, 251 Ga. App. 578, 554 S.E.2d 768 (2001).

Conspiracy for aggravated assault against officer not shown.

- Evidence was insufficient to support the defendant's conviction of conspiracy to commit aggravated assault on a police officer because the state failed to show a mutual understanding between the defendant and anyone else to pursue the common criminal objective of shooting the officer. There was no evidence presented about how the defendant obtained the weapon from a co-indictee, and even though the defendant told the others to run after the defendant announced that the defendant was going to shoot the officer and the others ran, that evidence was insufficient to establish a conspiracy to commit aggravated assault on the officer. Frazier v. State, 349 Ga. App. 507, 826 S.E.2d 361 (2019).

Attempting injury with deadly weapon.

- Person commits aggravated assault when a person attempts to commit violent injury upon another person with a deadly weapon. Riddle v. State, 145 Ga. App. 328, 243 S.E.2d 607 (1978), overruled on other grounds, Adsitt v. State, 248 Ga. 237, 282 S.E.2d 305 (1981).

Reasonable apprehension of violent injury on part of victim must be shown.

- When the facts establish clearly that defendant committed an act with a deadly weapon which placed the victim in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury, this is sufficient to support the charge of aggravated assault; there is no requirement that a victim be actually injured, and the crime is complete without proof of injury. Daughtry v. State, 180 Ga. App. 711, 350 S.E.2d 53 (1986).

To prove an assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a)(1), the state must show that the defendant acted with specific intent to violently injure the victim; that method of assault is a specific intent crime requiring proof that the defendant intended to violently injure someone. In the Interest of L. J., 337 Ga. App. 653, 788 S.E.2d 531 (2016).

Adjudication of delinquency for aggravated assault was reversed because the evidence showed that the juvenile shot the tire on the rear-passenger side, on the opposite side from where the victim was sitting inside the truck and the victim testified that the victim no longer perceived a threat from the juvenile shooting with the bow and arrow after the juvenile moved to the passenger side of the truck and was no longer pointing the bow in the victim's general direction. In the Interest of L. J., 337 Ga. App. 653, 788 S.E.2d 531 (2016).

Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's conviction for aggravated assault because the jury was authorized to credit the victim's statement of feeling panicked and scared and infer from that statement that the victim had the necessary reasonable apprehension to support a guilty verdict on the aggravated assault charge, even though other statements of the victim did not suggest the necessary apprehension. Martin v. State, 349 Ga. App. 656, 825 S.E.2d 227 (2019).

Evidence was sufficient to support the delinquency adjudication as the evidence showed that the defendant juvenile committed an aggravated assault because a butcher knife constituted a deadly weapon; the defendant placed the defendant's sister's boyfriend in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury as the defendant charged at the boyfriend with a butcher knife, forcing the boyfriend to quickly enter a vehicle and drive off; and the defendant placed the defendant's sister in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury as the defendant pushed and shoved the sister, told the sister that the defendant was going to beat the sister up, and charged at the sister with a butcher knife. In the Interest of J. H., 354 Ga. App. 253, 840 S.E.2d 633 (2020).

Unreasonable apprehension or suspicion of harm.

- Juvenile defendant was not authorized to stab the victim under O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21(a), where defendant was attacked by the victim from behind with the victim's fists, and could see that the victim did not have a weapon; defendant's belief that defendant's own life was in danger was a mere unreasonable apprehension or suspicion of harm, which was insufficient to justify the use of deadly force, and defendant was properly adjudicated a delinquent for aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) and for carrying a weapon onto a school bus under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-127.1(b). In the Interest of Q.M.L., 257 Ga. App. 22, 570 S.E.2d 92 (2002).

Fear is not the same as reasonable apprehension.

- Simple assault is defined as an act which places another in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a)(2), an assault becomes aggravated when it is committed with a deadly weapon, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2); thus, if the victim is in reasonable apprehension of an immediate violent injury from a weapon, an aggravated assault has occurred. Because reasonable apprehension of injury is not the same as simple fear, the testimony that the victim was not afraid of the defendant does not preclude conviction. Lunsford v. State, 260 Ga. App. 818, 581 S.E.2d 638 (2003).

Conviction upheld despite accident defense.

- Court would reject the contention that injuries to one victim were caused accidentally during the assault of the other victim since the defendant explicitly threatened the first victim's life and since the defendant's conviction could otherwise be supported by the doctrine of transferred intent. Harris v. State, 233 Ga. App. 696, 505 S.E.2d 239 (1998).

Conviction upheld despite coercion defense.

- When the defendant, on appeal, conceded to being present and participating in an armed robbery and the assault that occurred along with the robbery, but contended (as defendant did at trial) that the defendant was not a voluntary participant in the crimes but acted only out of fear for the defendant's own life through the coercion of other participants in the crimes, it was held that the jury was presented with sufficient admissible evidence to establish to the satisfaction of a rational trier of fact that guilt was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. August v. State, 180 Ga. App. 510, 349 S.E.2d 532 (1986).

Conviction upheld despite self-defense argument.

- When the victim threw the hot contents of a frying pan at the defendant and the defendant then drew a knife from her blouse and stabbed the victim numerous times, but there were no eyewitnesses to the stabbing other than the victim and the defendant, and the defendant testified she stabbed the victim in self-defense in the belief that he was reaching into his pocket for a weapon and that, while she had meant to "hurt" the victim, she had not intended to kill him, a rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty of the crime of felony murder beyond a reasonable doubt by causing the victim's death while committing the felony of aggravated assault. Henderson v. State, 256 Ga. 486, 350 S.E.2d 236 (1986).

Defendant was properly convicted of aggravated assault after the defendant pulled a gun on security personnel at a tavern after they took defendant's keys because of the defendant's intoxicated condition, notwithstanding the defendant's contention that the actions were in self-defense. Richardson v. State, 233 Ga. App. 890, 505 S.E.2d 57 (1998).

Testimony of a parent and two children that a defendant allegedly pointed a gun at their vehicle and that, as a result, they were in fear of being shot was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction on three counts of aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2); given the evidence, a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of aggravated assault beyond a reasonable doubt, and the jury obviously resolved the defendant's self-defense claim against the defendant. Adams v. State, 282 Ga. App. 819, 640 S.E.2d 329 (2006).

Evidence plainly was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) and battery in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-23.1(a) because the state presented more than ample evidence that the defendant's use of force was not justified under O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21(a); based upon the victim's testimony and the victim's prior statement to the responding officer, the jury clearly was authorized to find that the defendant's acts of grabbing the victim by the hair, throwing the victim to the ground, and choking the victim to the point of unconsciousness constituted excessive force, and the prior and subsequent difficulties evidence and the similar transaction evidence the state presented supported the jury's decision to give little credence to the defendant's self-defense claim. Whitley v. State, 307 Ga. App. 553, 707 S.E.2d 375 (2011).

Words "deadly weapon," include all means or instrumentalities by which assaults with intent to commit murder may be made. Wright v. State, 40 Ga. App. 118, 149 S.E. 153 (1929).

Although hands are not per se "deadly weapons," where the defendant's hands were restrained by handcuffs, and a doctor testified that the victim's severe injuries were consistent with being struck by hands, fists, and handcuffs, there was sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction for aggravated assault. Gamble v. State, 235 Ga. App. 777, 510 S.E.2d 69 (1998).

Proving that weapon is one likely to produce death.

- When an indictment charges the commission of the offense of assault with intent to murder by using a knife such as was "likely to produce death," the proof must show that it was a weapon of this character, but this may be done by evidence as to the nature of the wound, as well as direct proof of the character of the weapon. Jackson v. State, 56 Ga. App. 374, 192 S.E. 633 (1937).

Overwhelming evidence established that a handgun used to beat the victim several times in the head constituted a deadly weapon: the victim had open, bleeding wounds; the victim's sister described the victim's head as being "split open" where the victim "could see inside and everything;" and at the hospital, the victim received numerous staples in the victim's head. Gonzalez v. State, 350 Ga. App. 297, 829 S.E.2d 385 (2019).

Assault with deadly weapon while resisting arrest constitutes prima facie case of assault with intent to kill. Garrett v. State, 89 Ga. 446, 15 S.E. 533 (1892).

Unprovoked assault by police officer with deadly weapon justifying offender's killing policeman.

- If an officer who makes a lawful arrest for a misdemeanor committed in the officer's presence does so in an unlawful manner by making an unprovoked assault with a weapon likely to produce death, and with intent to kill the offender, if the circumstances are sufficient to excite the fears of a reasonable man that a felony is intended, and the offender slays the officer, not in a spirit of revenge or for the purpose of preventing the lawful arrest, but to protect self from what is or what reasonably appears to be such a felonious assault, then, in either of such events, the killing would be justifiable. Mullis v. State, 196 Ga. 569, 27 S.E.2d 91 (1943).

Since an assault and battery is a misdemeanor and not a felony, the mere unlawful striking of an offender by an officer lawfully arresting the offender for a misdemeanor would not be sufficient to justify the offender in killing the officer, unless the conduct of the officer was such as to excite the fears of a reasonable man that a felony was in fact about to be committed, and the offender really acted on such fears. Mullis v. State, 196 Ga. 569, 27 S.E.2d 91 (1943).

Whether instrument used constitutes deadly weapon is properly for jury's determination. Quarles v. State, 130 Ga. App. 756, 204 S.E.2d 467 (1974); Ellis v. State, 137 Ga. App. 834, 224 S.E.2d 799 (1976); Harper v. State, 157 Ga. App. 480, 278 S.E.2d 28 (1981).

Because the jury viewed the weapon used in an attack subject to the underlying aggravated assault charge against the defendant, and received testimony and photographic evidence about the nature and extent of the victim's actual injuries and the manner in which the defendant used the shank to stab the victim in the area of several vital organs, the jury was authorized to infer from the evidence that the instrument was a deadly weapon. Ellison v. State, 288 Ga. App. 404, 654 S.E.2d 223 (2007).

Manner of weapon's use determinative of nature.

- Manner in which a weapon is used may determine whether that weapon is an offensive or deadly weapon for the purpose of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21. Banks v. State, 169 Ga. App. 571, 314 S.E.2d 235 (1984).

Deadly weapon depends on object's use, wounds inflicted and the like.

- An object may be found to be a deadly weapon by the jury depending on the manner and means of its use, the wound inflicted, etc. Ellis v. State, 137 Ga. App. 834, 224 S.E.2d 799 (1976).

Assault with knife.

- There was sufficient evidence to support conviction for aggravated assault, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, against a waitress after defendant jumped over the restaurant counter, held a knife to the waitress' neck, and indicated that defendant would use the knife if another employee came closer; the conviction under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21 for aggravated assault of the other employee was also supported by sufficient evidence as the employee was cut by defendant's knife, which constituted suffering of a violent injury, and although the employee testified that the employee did not perceive a threat from the knife, there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to support such a finding. Lemming v. State, 272 Ga. App. 122, 612 S.E.2d 495 (2005), overruled on other grounds, Miller v. State, 285 Ga. 285, 676 S.E.2d 173 (2009).

Sufficient evidence supported an aggravated assault conviction where the victim testified that, during a dispute, the defendant stabbed the victim several times with a knife, where defendant's sibling testified to a similar incident 11 days earlier, in which defendant assaulted the sibling during a dispute, where a witness testified that the defendant admitted to stabbing the victim because of the way the victim had treated the witness's friend, and where defendant admitted stabbing the victim, but claimed it was in self-defense. Cochran v. State, 277 Ga. App. 251, 626 S.E.2d 217 (2006).

Aggravated assault conviction was supported by sufficient evidence that, after the victim confronted the defendant about a comment made to the victim's spouse, the defendant stabbed the victim to death; witnesses saw the defendant fighting with the victim, saw the defendant fold up a knife after the victim fell, and the defendant admitted to stabbing the victim. Williams v. State, 280 Ga. 297, 627 S.E.2d 32 (2006).

Evidence was sufficient to support convictions for aggravated assault on a peace officer and making a terroristic threat or act, in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21(a)(2) and16-11-37(a), respectively, where the defendant was agitated when officers came to the residence to investigate complaints of a terroristic threat, the defendant brandished two knives at the officers which caused them to retreat outside of the residence, defendant refused to put the knives down despite being instructed to do so at gunpoint by the officers, and when the defendant threatened to stab an officer and raised the knife up, the defendant was shot in the hand. Williams v. State, 277 Ga. App. 884, 627 S.E.2d 897 (2006).

Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's convictions of aggravated assault in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21 and aggravated sodomy in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-6-2(a) although the defendant pointed to the defendant's previous sexual relationship with the victim and to alleged inconsistencies in the testimony of the victim and the victim's friend; the appellate court refused to weigh the evidence or determine witness credibility, and it found that the evidence, which included testimony that the defendant forcibly placed the victim in the defendant's truck, drove the victim across the state line to an apartment, forced the victim to have sex with the defendant, and cut the victim with a knife, was sufficient to convict. Martin v. State, 281 Ga. App. 64, 635 S.E.2d 358 (2006).

Testimony from an eyewitness that the defendant and the victim scuffled and fell to the ground, and that the defendant knelt over the victim, stabbing the victim repeatedly with a knife, was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions of felony murder and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. Lampley v. State, 284 Ga. 37, 663 S.E.2d 184 (2008).

In a trial for aggravated assault, the evidence was sufficient to establish that the defendant was armed with a knife when an apparently bloodstained knife was found on the defendant's person when the defendant was arrested, the defendant admitted both to possessing and brandishing the knife at the victim, and the victim testified that the victim was stabbed. Furthermore, the state was not required to prove the cause of the victim's injuries with medical evidence. Brown v. State, 293 Ga. App. 224, 666 S.E.2d 600 (2008).

Evidence supported the convictions of felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a knife during the commission of a felony. The victim's grandchild saw the defendant stab the victim after an argument, then went to a relative for help; the defendant then attacked the relative and fled, throwing the knife the defendant used to stab the victim in the bushes; when the defendant was found by police shortly thereafter, the defendant admitted to stabbing the victim; and a medical examiner testified that the bulk of the victim's stabs came from behind and that the cut on the defendant's hand was an offensive wound likely sustained as the defendant was stabbing the victim with enough force to break one of the victim's ribs. Butler v. State, 285 Ga. 518, 678 S.E.2d 92 (2009).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of aggravated assault because a rational trier of fact could have inferred that the defendant's girlfriend apprehended a knife attack; jury could reasonably conclude that when the defendant threatened the girlfriend's life while holding a knife, and the girlfriend reached up with her hand, she was in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury. Wilson v. State, 304 Ga. App. 743, 698 S.E.2d 6 (2010).

Evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's determination that the defendant committed the offense of aggravated assault in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) because the defendant's attempt to harm a bar patron was transferred to the manager of the bar who was injured; when the defendant retrieved a knife and the manager saw the knife the defendant had committed an act that placed the manager in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury. Brown v. State, 313 Ga. App. 907, 723 S.E.2d 115 (2012).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for aggravated assault in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) because the victim testified that the defendant held a knife when the defendant told the victim to take her clothes off and to open her legs so that the defendant could have vaginal intercourse with her against her will; pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8), that testimony alone was sufficient to support the conviction. Ellis v. State, 316 Ga. App. 352, 729 S.E.2d 492 (2012).

Defendant was properly convicted of aggravated assault in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) because the jury was authorized to conclude that the large knife the defendant held, which was introduced into evidence, was a deadly weapon and that the knife could be easily removed from the knife's sheath; the defendant threatened the victim in a way that put the victim in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury. Gunter v. State, 316 Ga. App. 485, 729 S.E.2d 597 (2012).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions of aggravated assault, aggravated battery, and burglary because the evidence showed that: (1) the defendant broke into his ex-girlfriend's home; (2) the defendant stabbed the ex-girlfriend's current boyfriend in the spine with a knife, paralyzing him; (3) the defendant cut his ex-girlfriend with a knife on the back of her head, on the side of her face, on her shoulder and back, and stabbed her in the stomach; and (4) the ex-girlfriend continued to bear scars from the knife attack. Jackson v. State, 316 Ga. App. 588, 730 S.E.2d 69 (2012).

Defendant's convictions for armed robbery and aggravated assault were supported by sufficient evidence in that, even absent fingerprint evidence, there was the identifications of two eyewitnesses as well as a bottle bearing the store's logo and the amount of cash and same denomination reported stolen found on the defendant's person and the testimony of a victim that the defendant used a knife. Hamlin v. State, 320 Ga. App. 29, 739 S.E.2d 46 (2013).

Evidence before the jury that the defendant said the victim was still alive after the victim's throat was cut because the defendant heard gurgling and testimony from the medical examiner that the victim was not necessarily dead when the victim's throat was slit was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for aggravated assault based on slitting the victim's throat. Schutt v. State, 292 Ga. 625, 740 S.E.2d 163 (2013).

Defendant's aggravated assault conviction was supported by the victim's testimony that the defendant entered the bedroom with the butcher knife, placed the knife to the victim's face, and cut the victim with the knife, causing the victim to fear for the victim's life. Petro v. State, 327 Ga. App. 254, 758 S.E.2d 152 (2014).

Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's convictions for aggravated assault, one count of kidnapping with bodily injury, and one count of rape based on the testimony of the two female victims that the defendant offered to drive the victims home, but then took the victims to a remote location and ordered the women to undress while the defendant brandished a knife and, after one victim escaped, the defendant drove to another remote location and forced the other woman to engage in sexual intercourse. Howard v. State, 340 Ga. App. 133, 796 S.E.2d 757 (2017).

Evidence that the defendant entered the victim's bedroom with a knife and that the victim suffered lacerations to the arm and head that required the victim's hospitalization was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for aggravated assault and possession of a knife during the commission of a felony. Williams v. State, 345 Ga. App. 692, 814 S.E.2d 818 (2018), overruled on other grounds by Flowers v. State, 307 Ga. 618, 837 S.E.2d 824 (2020).

Sufficient evidence supported the appellant's convictions for burglary, cruelty to children, terroristic threats, and aggravated assault as neither parent gave the appellant permission to enter their home, the appellant was identified as the intruder who held a knife to the child's neck, and struggled with one parent as the appellant tried to remove the child from the home, and the appellant threatened to kill one of the children while holding a knife to the child's neck. Cordova v. State, 351 Ga. App. 652, 832 S.E.2d 465 (2019).

Assault with knife to feet of child while allegedly removing splinters.

- From the physician's testimony regarding the puncture wounds on the child's feet and the medical opinion that the wounds were not consistent with someone attempting to remove splinters, the jury was authorized to infer that the knife used was a deadly weapon and, thus, the evidence supported the defendant's conviction for aggravated assault. Hillsman v. State, 341 Ga. App. 543, 802 S.E.2d 7 (2017).

Nature and location of wounds showing character of weapon.

- Even in absence of production or verbal description of weapon used, evidence as to nature, kind, and location of wounds inflicted by assailant is sufficient to allow jury to infer character of weapon. Wade v. State, 157 Ga. App. 296, 277 S.E.2d 292 (1981); Wright v. State, 211 Ga. App. 431, 440 S.E.2d 27 (1994).

State must show how object not per se deadly weapon is such in circumstances.

- When an object is not per se a deadly weapon within the meaning of Ga. L. 1968, pp. 1249, 1280 (see O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21), it is incumbent upon the state to show the circumstances of the object's use which made the object a deadly weapon. Talley v. State, 137 Ga. App. 548, 224 S.E.2d 455 (1976).

Evidence sufficient to allow jury to infer character of weapon.

- Lethal character of the weapon used in making an assault may be inferred from the effect and nature of the wound inflicted. Wells v. State, 125 Ga. App. 579, 188 S.E.2d 407 (1972).

Even if the actual weapon alleged to be a deadly one in an indictment is not produced or described, evidence as to the nature, kind and location of the wounds inflicted by the assailant is sufficient to allow the jury to infer the character of the weapon. Zachery v. State, 153 Ga. App. 531, 265 S.E.2d 860 (1980).

Description of the injuries sustained by the victim is admissible to prove that the pistol used by the defendant was a deadly weapon. Howard v. State, 165 Ga. App. 555, 301 S.E.2d 910 (1983).

No evidence showed that aggravated assault could have occurred other than through use of deadly weapon.

- Although the indictment only referred to the commission of the crimes through the use of a deadly weapon, defendants did not point to evidence showing that an aggravated assault could have occurred other than through the use of a deadly weapon; moreover, because the trial court instructed the jury that the state was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every material allegation of the indictment, even if the aggravated assault charge was erroneous, such error was rendered harmless in light of the additional instruction. Dunbar v. State, 273 Ga. App. 29, 614 S.E.2d 472 (2005).

Deadly weapon need not be introduced.

- It is not necessary for the state to admit into evidence the deadly weapon used by the defendant in order for the defendant to be found guilty of aggravated assault. Lattimer v. State, 231 Ga. App. 594, 499 S.E.2d 671 (1998).

With regard to the sufficiency of the evidence to uphold a defendant's conviction for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, because two police officers testified that the defendant fired a gun, the testimony was sufficient to infer the presence of a weapon even though no weapon was introduced into evidence. Johnson v. State, 287 Ga. App. 352, 651 S.E.2d 450 (2007).

It is not essential for state to locate bullets, bullet holes, or expended shells to establish the crime of aggravated assault. Radford v. State, 251 Ga. 50, 302 S.E.2d 555 (1983).

Admissible evidence of res gestae.

- Evidence was sufficient to find the defendant guilty of assault with a deadly weapon, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, and kidnapping; the victim's statement that the victim's sister was afraid of the defendant because the defendant had done the same thing to the sister was clearly admissible as part of the res gestae even if it incidentally placed the defendant's character in evidence. McLendon v. State, 258 Ga. App. 133, 572 S.E.2d 763 (2002).

Evidence sufficient for conviction.

- When the state's evidence shows that the victim was standing outside the victim's apartment when the defendant approached, the defendant accused the victim of stealing the defendant's television and attacked the victim, stabbing the victim with a knife, and after stabbing the victim, the defendant left the scene, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, a rational trier of fact reasonably could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the offense charged. Jackson v. State, 180 Ga. App. 363, 349 S.E.2d 252 (1986).

Although expressing concern for personal safety, the defendant admitted seeing nothing but the victim's closed fist and that the defendant stabbed the victim with an eight-inch long butcher knife, the wound to the victim was in the victim's back, between the victim's shoulder blades and puncturing the victim's lung, although the defendant said the defendant stabbed the victim in the shoulder, and the sole defense was self-defense, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, there was sufficient evidence to authorize the trial judge, as trier of fact, to find appellant guilty of aggravated assault beyond a reasonable doubt. Roberts v. State, 180 Ga. App. 646, 350 S.E.2d 39 (1986).

See Johnson v. State, 185 Ga. App. 167, 363 S.E.2d 773 (1987); Nash v. State, 222 Ga. App. 766, 476 S.E.2d 69 (1996); Littleton v. State, 225 Ga. App. 900, 485 S.E.2d 230 (1997); Harris v. State, 233 Ga. App. 696, 505 S.E.2d 239 (1998); Jones v. State, 233 Ga. App. 291, 503 S.E.2d 902 (1998); Head v. State, 233 Ga. App. 655, 504 S.E.2d 499 (1998); Tolliver v. State, 243 Ga. App. 180, 531 S.E.2d 383 (2000); Bartlett v. State, 244 Ga. App. 49, 537 S.E.2d 362 (2000).

When the record showed that defendant pointed a gun at the defendant's father and brothers-in-law during the kidnapping of his wife, the evidence was sufficient to render a conviction. Williams v. State, 207 Ga. App. 371, 427 S.E.2d 846 (1993).

Intentionally firing a gun at another, absent justification, is sufficient in and of itself to support a conviction of aggravated assault. Quinn v. State, 209 Ga. App. 480, 433 S.E.2d 592 (1993).

Testimony by the victim, in which the victim positively identified defendant as the person who entered the victim's home, and committed the crimes of robbery by intimidation, kidnapping, aggravated assault, aggravated assault with a knife, aggravated battery and possession of a knife during the commission of a crime, charged in the indictment and eyewitness testimony that defendant entered the victim's premises minutes before the attack of the victim was sufficient to authorize the jury's finding that defendant was guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt, of committing the crimes charged in the indictment. Mobley v. State, 211 Ga. App. 709, 441 S.E.2d 73 (1994).

Evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find appellant guilty of murder, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon beyond a reasonable doubt. Hall v. State, 264 Ga. 85, 441 S.E.2d 245 (1994).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain the defendant's conviction of aggravated assault, when the victim was attacked and beaten with fists and a round "fence pipe," the victim identified the defendant at trial as the victim's principal assailant, a witness testified to seeing the defendant pick up an object like a pole or stick and repeatedly strike the victim, and a wooden fence post with blood on the post was located a short distance from where the police found the victim. Peek v. State, 234 Ga. App. 731, 507 S.E.2d 553 (1998).

Victim's in-court identification of defendant as the assailant was sufficient to authorize the jury's verdict that defendant committed aggravated assault with a handgun, a deadly weapon, as alleged in the indictment. Graham v. State, 236 Ga. App. 673, 512 S.E.2d 921 (1999).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction for a violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) where: (1) an officer observed a broken truck window and saw the defendant disappearing into the woods behind grandmother's home; (2) one of the defendant's friends warned the officer that the defendant would probably shoot at the officer; (3) that friend testified that the friend had seen the defendant break the glass and take the gun from the truck; (4) the officers testified that they were able to identify the general type of weapon and the direction of travel of the first bullet; (5) the area was desolate and remote; and (6) no evidence showed the presence of any other person in the area at that time of night which was approaching midnight. Yawn v. State, 237 Ga. App. 206, 515 S.E.2d 182 (1999).

Evidence was sufficient to support a conviction since the victim testified that the defendant stabbed the victim in the arm and that the knife the victim observed in the defendant's possession was "maybe six or eight inches long with a handle on it," and two witnesses testified that they saw the defendant stab the victim with a large knife. Silas v. State, 247 Ga. App. 792, 545 S.E.2d 358 (2001).

Evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for aggravated assault since: (1) the defendant snatched a woman's purse in the parking lot of a restaurant as she and her husband walked to the restaurant; (2) the husband pursued the defendant and managed to attach himself to the driver's side of the pick-up in which defendant sped away; and (3) the defendant nonetheless drove off, dragging the husband with him, managing to shake him from the vehicle, and leaving him injured on the ground. Bogan v. State, 249 Ga. App. 242, 547 S.E.2d 326 (2001).

Evidence that defendant threatened a daycare owner and two daycare workers with a handgun when they tried to stop defendant from taking defendant's daughter supported defendant's convictions of two aggravated assaults in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) and possessing a firearm during the commission of a felony in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b)(1). Diaz v. State, 255 Ga. App. 288, 564 S.E.2d 872 (2002).

Evidence was sufficient to establish aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a), because defendant placed his wife in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury, which assault was aggravated by the use of a shotgun in a threatening manner. Weaver v. State, 256 Ga. App. 573, 568 S.E.2d 836 (2002).

Evidence that defendant intentionally stabbed a man in the side with a knife after a confrontation was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2). Townsend v. State, 256 Ga. App. 837, 570 S.E.2d 47 (2002).

Evidence that defendant knew people lived inside a home and that there was a truck parked next to the home when defendant fired four or five shots from a .30 caliber rifle into the home at 10:30 A.M. was sufficient to sustain defendant's convictions for aggravated assault and using a firearm in the commission of a felony. Maynor v. State, 257 Ga. App. 151, 570 S.E.2d 428 (2002).

Although the victim's statement to the police was sufficient to prove that defendant threatened to kill the victim as alleged in the indictment, proof that defendant threatened to kill the victim was not a necessary element of the charge of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2); evidence that defendant caused the victim to be very much afraid by pointing a pistol at the victim was sufficient to prove the offense. Thomas v. State, 257 Ga. App. 350, 571 S.E.2d 178 (2002).

Evidence that defendant pulled a knife out, struck it against the neck of a woman defendant was dating, and told the woman that defendant should have killed the woman was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for aggravated assault as it showed defendant assaulted the woman with a deadly weapon. Alvarado v. State, 257 Ga. App. 746, 572 S.E.2d 18 (2002).

Eyewitnesses saw defendant standing by the door of the barber shop shooting repeatedly at the murder victim, who died from those wounds, and the police recovered the pistol from defendant that shot the victim; thus, the evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of malice murder, felony murder, and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-1 and16-5-21. Roberts v. State, 276 Ga. 258, 577 S.E.2d 580 (2003).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for aggravated assault where the record revealed that the defendant admitted to being in the apartment of the victim, who was the defendant's former love interest, the defendant admitted to having the gun, and the defendant's only defense was that the gun went off accidentally, which was contradicted by the evidence of the defendant's intentional punching and shooting of the victim. Milton v. State, 259 Ga. App. 660, 577 S.E.2d 862 (2003).

Defendant's conviction for aggravated assault in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) was supported by sufficient evidence after the victim testified as to the attack, there were photographs which showed the victim's cuts, and the jury's decision was based in part on its weighing of the credibility of the witnesses; it was also determined that the sentence imposed was within the statutory guidelines of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(g) and was not more severe merely because defendant had requested a jury trial. Benham v. State, 260 Ga. App. 243, 581 S.E.2d 586 (2003).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions of two counts of armed robbery, two counts of theft by taking, three counts of aggravated assault in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), three counts of simple battery, three counts of kidnapping, and two counts of possessing a firearm during the commission of a crime since: (1) there was evidence that the defendant entered a store, placed a knife to the neck of one of the three victims, forced that victim to the back of the store, aided another assailant who was armed with a gun to bind the victims and drag them to the back of the store, and stole money and other items from two of the victims; (2) the defendant confessed to the crimes during interviews with law enforcement officials; and (3) the defendant's confessions were corroborated by the testimony of one of the victims who, despite earlier being unable to identify the robbers, ultimately identified the defendant as one of the robbers. The corroborating victim's initial inability to identify the defendant posed an issue of credibility for the jury's resolution and did not require reversal. Phanamixay v. State, 260 Ga. App. 177, 581 S.E.2d 286 (2003).

When a jury could believe that defendant shot a victim without aggravation rather than defendant's claim that a gun went off by accident during a struggle, ample evidence sustained the conviction for aggravated assault pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2). Wilson v. State, 261 Ga. App. 28, 581 S.E.2d 625 (2003).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of aggravated assault, a violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), because the State of Georgia presented evidence that the defendant stabbed the defendant's love interest's child several times with a butcher knife. Even though the defendant argued that the defendant was merely defending against the child's attack with a bat, the jury was authorized by O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21(b)(2) to reject the defendant's justification claim; the evidence showed that the love interest's child hit the defendant with a bat to protect the child's parent from the defendant, who forcefully entered their house and then charged the love interest's child, pushed the child down, and stabbed the child. Williams v. State, 268 Ga. App. 384, 601 S.E.2d 833 (2004).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction of aggravated assault because: (1) the defendant was in an altercation with the victim at a dance; (2) eyewitnesses saw the defendant make a stabbing motion at the victim; (3) the victim died of a nine stab wounds, including one to the heart; (4) the defendant's burned blue jeans were found in the defendant's love interest's backyard; (5) the defendant provided an investigator with clean clothes the defendant allegedly wore at the dance; and (6) the victim's blood and DNA were found on the defendant's leather jacket and on the shirt the defendant's love interest wore to the dance. Rakestrau v. State, 278 Ga. 872, 608 S.E.2d 216 (2005).

Evidence supported defendant's conviction for malice murder and aggravated assault because the victim had defensive wounds on a hand, the victim's blood was found on defendant's shoe, a mixture of the victim's and defendant's blood was found on defendant's shirt, and the victim planned to ask defendant to leave the apartment. Williams v. State, 279 Ga. 154, 611 S.E.2d 19 (2005).

There was sufficient evidence to support defendants' convictions for armed robbery, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a), aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), burglary, O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1(a), and possession of a firearm during the commission of certain crimes, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b)(2), because evidence was seen in one of the defendant's vehicles during a traffic stop, defendants were identified from the videotape of the stop, and the shotgun used by the assailant in the home invasion was found in one of the defendant's homes. Dunbar v. State, 273 Ga. App. 29, 614 S.E.2d 472 (2005).

Evidence was sufficient to support the convictions of murder, armed robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, and a statutory violation, all in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-1,16-5-21,16-7-1,16-8-41, and16-11-106, respectively, where the defendant and the codefendant went to a club with the intention of robbing someone, met the victim and drove the victim back to the victim's home, beat and fatally stabbed the victim, and upon leaving the victim's apartment, took some of the victim's belongings. Willoughby v. State, 280 Ga. 176, 626 S.E.2d 112 (2006).

Victim's testimony that the defendant threatened the victim with a knife and struck the victim with a lamp, and evidence that the victim was found in a bathroom with an electrical cord wrapped tightly around the victim's neck, and that the defendant's finger and palm prints were lifted from blood on the bathroom wall, allowed any rational trier of fact to find defendant guilty of three counts of aggravated assault, under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2). Nelson v. State, 278 Ga. App. 548, 629 S.E.2d 410 (2006).

Evidence was sufficient to find the defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-2, felony murder predicated on possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-1, two counts of aggravated assault in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-131, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony murder in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106, as the defendant was angered by the victim's presence in the residence, the defendant assaulted the victim with a baseball bat and threatened to kill the victim if the victim did not leave the residence, and when the victim returned to the residence, the defendant fatally shot the victim in the stomach. Lawson v. State, 280 Ga. 881, 635 S.E.2d 134 (2006).

Evidence supported a defendant's convictions for malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony as: (1) the defendant repeatedly followed the victim in and out of a restaurant, and eventually chased the victim from the restaurant, firing at the victim at least nine times; (2) after the shooting, the defendant jumped into a silver truck and sped away; (3) the victim died as a result of the gunshot wounds; and (4) two witnesses identified the defendant from photographic lineups. Waters v. State, 281 Ga. 119, 636 S.E.2d 538 (2006).

In spite of the defendant's contrary testimony, a conviction on a charge of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon upon a police officer, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) and (c), was supported by sufficient evidence; the trial judge, as the trier of fact, was authorized to credit testimony that the defendant's act of pointing a gun at the victim's midsection caused that person a reasonable apprehension of fear, over testimony presented by the defendant. Defrancisco v. State, 289 Ga. App. 115, 656 S.E.2d 238 (2008).

Evidence of the defendant's shooting a victim, striking the victim's companion with a motorcycle helmet, the defendant's sibling's pointing a gun at the companion, and the sibling's pointing a gun at the victim and pulling the trigger, was sufficient to convict the defendant of four counts of aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), as the defendant was responsible for the sibling's acts as an aider and abetter under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(b)(3). Serchion v. State, 293 Ga. App. 629, 667 S.E.2d 624 (2008).

Defendant's new trial motion based on insufficient evidence lacked merit, as the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for aggravated assault and a weapons possession charge under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21(a)(2) and16-11-106(b)(1); issues of credibility regarding witnesses' identification of defendant as the shooter were within the jury's province pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-80 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-6-620). Williams v. State, 317 Ga. App. 248, 730 S.E.2d 726 (2012).

Evidence that the defendant, who threatened to kill the victim in the past, took the victim to a retention pond, shot the victim, wrapped the body with a large boulder, placed the victim in a retention pond, and, for days, misled the victim's mother and authorities about the victim's whereabouts was sufficient to support convictions for malice murder, felony murder, feticide, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm. Platt v. State, 291 Ga. 631, 732 S.E.2d 75 (2012).

Evidence that the defendant and others were present at the scene of the offense, shot at the victims' vehicle, and wounded two of the victims was sufficient to find the defendant guilty of aggravated assault. Jones v. State, 318 Ga. App. 26, 733 S.E.2d 72 (2012).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of aggravated assault of the victim because the victim saw the defendant pointing the rifle in the victim's vicinity, the defendant fired the gun in the victim's direction, and the victim heard the shot and fell to the ground to avoid being shot at again; and the evidence supported a jury finding that the defendant intentionally placed the victim in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury from a deadly weapon. Sears v. State, 298 Ga. 400, 782 S.E.2d 259 (2016).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of aggravated assault because after the defendant pulled a knife on the former girlfriend, the former girlfriend told police and the defendant that the former girlfriend wanted the defendant out of the apartment; when the defendant came to retrieve the defendant's belongings, the defendant entered the bedroom the defendant had shared with the former girlfriend and began throwing things about and destroying the former girlfriend's personal property; when the victim entered the room and told the defendant to leave, the defendant reached for the defendant's knife and charged at the victim; and, during their fight, the defendant stabbed the victim five times with the knife. Wilson v. State, 336 Ga. App. 60, 783 S.E.2d 662 (2016).

Evidence including the victim's testimony that, while they were married, the defendant put his hands around the victim's throat and choked the victim, testimony from the victim's doctor and nurse about the victim's visible neck injuries, photographs of the victim's injuries, and the defendant's admission to putting the defendant's hands around the victim's throat was sufficient for the jury to find the defendant guilty of aggravated assault (family violence). Moore v. State, Ga. App. , S.E.2d (Sept. 21, 2020).

Identification of defendant.

- Defendant's convictions for armed robbery, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, burglary, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime were supported by sufficient evidence. While the defendant contended that the evidence against the defendant was purely circumstantial, an eyewitness's identification of the defendant as the second gunman during the photographic lineup constituted direct evidence of the defendant's guilt. Williams v. State, 316 Ga. App. 821, 730 S.E.2d 541 (2012).

Conviction of aggravated assault, murder, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon was justified.

- See Brooks v. State, 250 Ga. 739, 300 S.E.2d 810 (1983).

Instruction on defense of accident or misfortune properly refused.

- Trial court properly refused to give a requested jury instruction on the defense of accident or misfortune, where defendant's own testimony showed that defendant was engaged in an attempt to commit an aggravated assault upon the victim when defendant's pistol discharged and the victim was struck by a bullet. Grude v. State, 189 Ga. App. 901, 377 S.E.2d 731 (1989).

Instruction using phrase "deadly weapon" correct.

- Trial court's use of the phrase "deadly weapon" in the jury instructions was a general reference to the aggravating circumstance in former O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(b)(2)), which also included any object, device, or instrument which, when used offensively against a person, is likely to or actually does result in serious bodily injury and was a correct instruction. State v. Easter, 297 Ga. 171, 773 S.E.2d 181 (2015).

Sentencing for aggravated assault with deadly weapon.

- Federal district court properly sentenced defendant to 86 months in prison for being a felon in possession of a firearm because the defendant's 2012 and 2016 Georgia convictions for aggravated assault and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon qualified as crimes of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines' enumerated-offenses clause, defendant did not object to the presentence investigation report, which included a description of the defendant's convictions and the fact that both included the use of a deadly weapon, the district court considered the Sentencing Guidelines Manual factors, and the sentence was six months below the bottom of the advisory guideline range. United States v. Berry, 808 Fed. Appx. 857 (11th Cir. 2020)(Unpublished).

Assault With Gun

Stun gun.

- Victim's acts of cooperation when the victim recognized that assailants were armed with a stun gun, the testimony of the victim's intense reaction to being repeatedly assaulted by the gun's electronic discharge, and the legal recognition that the stun gun was an "offensive weapon" constituted sufficient evidence from which the jury could conclude that the victim was assaulted with a weapon likely to result in serious bodily injury. Harwell v. State, 270 Ga. 765, 512 S.E.2d 892 (1999).

Evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravated assault, armed robbery, and attempted armed robbery because, during the confrontation, the defendant stated to one of the victims that the defendant had shot a person the day before; shooting the victims when the defendant was frustrated in the robbery attempts was consistent with the defendant's behavior toward the other victims. Lewis v. State, 291 Ga. 273, 731 S.E.2d 51 (2012).

An unloaded gun pointed at another in a threatening manner is a deadly weapon. Daughtry v. State, 180 Ga. App. 711, 350 S.E.2d 53 (1986).

When it reasonably appears to an assault victim that the firearm is or might be loaded, then the assailant should be held to consequences of using a deadly weapon whether or not the weapon in fact is loaded. An unloaded shotgun pointed at another in a threatening manner is a "deadly weapon" as a matter of law within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21. Adsitt v. State, 248 Ga. 237, 282 S.E.2d 305 (1981).

Empty pellet gun in the shape of an automatic weapon was per se a deadly weapon. Clark v. State, 191 Ga. App. 386, 381 S.E.2d 763 (1989).

When a pellet gun that could not be fired reasonably appeared to the victims to be a deadly weapon, such evidence authorized defendant's conviction of aggravated assault. Mitchell v. State, 222 Ga. App. 866, 476 S.E.2d 639 (1996).

Toy pistol can be offensive or deadly weapon under certain circumstances but is not necessarily a deadly weapon. Butts v. State, 153 Ga. App. 464, 265 S.E.2d 370 (1980).

Toy gun having appearance of real gun.

- Defendant did not object to the officer's direct testimony that the toy gun the defendant used to assault defendant's former girlfriend looked like a real gun and defendant did not challenge admission of that testimony on appeal; so, the testimony was properly admitted to prove aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21. Further, defendant had stated to friends who were witnesses that the defendant used the toy gun since the toy looked like a real gun; therefore, the defendant did not show prejudice since the officer's opinion was also cumulative of other evidence. Jackson v. State, 270 Ga. App. 166, 605 S.E.2d 876 (2004).

Reassembled rifle.

- Regardless of whether the reassembled rifle the defendant used in committing an aggravated assault was loaded and capable of firing, the gun reasonably appeared to be a deadly weapon, despite testimony from the defendant's sibling that the sibling later informed the victim that the defendant's rifle was broken. Stancil v. State, 278 Ga. App. 843, 630 S.E.2d 130 (2006).

Armed robbery can be committed either with a real weapon or with a toy or replica weapon having appearance of being real. Adsitt v. State, 248 Ga. 237, 282 S.E.2d 305 (1981).

Pistol as deadly weapon.

- Pistol was a "deadly weapon" within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a) as a matter of law even though it was loaded only with blanks. Veal v. State, 191 Ga. App. 445, 382 S.E.2d 131, cert. denied, 191 Ga. App. 923, 382 S.E.2d 131 (1989).

Whether pistol was deadly weapon is jury question.

- If the jury were to find that there was an assault, then whether the pistol used was a weapon likely to produce death when used in such manner was a jury question. Kerbo v. State, 230 Ga. 241, 196 S.E.2d 424 (1973).

Defendant's use of police officer's pistol involved jury question.

- Whether the defendant's use of a police officer's pistol by placing the defendant's hand on the pistol and trying to pull the pistol from the pistol's holster constituted use of a deadly weapon under the circumstances was properly for the jury's determination. Hall v. State, 189 Ga. App. 107, 375 S.E.2d 50 (1988).

Evidence supported the defendant's aggravated assault upon a police officer conviction as whether to credit the defendant's testimony that the defendant acted in self-defense and that the defendant did not have control of or fire the officer's weapon was a matter for the jury. Mills v. State, 273 Ga. App. 699, 615 S.E.2d 824 (2005).

Discharging firearm from within vehicle.

- Evidence did not support a charge for involuntary manslaughter as the defendant's act of firing from the car clearly established the felony of aggravated assault and not mere reckless conduct. Browder v. State, 294 Ga. 188, 751 S.E.2d 354 (2013).

Indictment alleging "shooting" by defendant adequately denotes use of deadly weapon.

- An indictment charging aggravated assault and alleging that the defendant committed an aggravated assault on the victim by commission of an act of "shooting" clearly denotes the use of a deadly weapon and, therefore, is not fatally defective. Rushin v. State, 180 Ga. App. 276, 348 S.E.2d 910 (1986).

Assault during bank robbery.

- Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for armed robbery, aggravated assault, false imprisonment, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-8-41,16-5-21,16-5-41, and16-11-106, based on testimony from witnesses inside the bank, the defendant's clothing, a text message between the defendant and the defendant's accomplice, and the defendant's accomplice's testimony, which was corroborated as required by O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8. Odle v. State, 331 Ga. App. 146, 770 S.E.2d 256 (2015).

Shooting a shotgun towards others.

- Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion by denying the defendant's motion for a new trial because sufficient evidence supported the defendant's convictions for arson and aggravated assault based on the testimony of the witnesses who testified that the witnesses could see the defendant starting the fire through the kitchen windows and witnessed the defendant shoot a shotgun in the direction of a neighbor and four law enforcement officers who were at the scene as well as the defendant's admission that the defendant set the fire. Jackson v. State, 347 Ga. App. 199, 818 S.E.2d 268 (2018).

Sufficiency of circumstantial evidence.

- Defendant's convictions of aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, and burglary, O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1, were affirmed, as there was sufficient circumstantial evidence under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-6) to prove that the defendant was the person who committed the acts in question, based on witness testimony and the discovery of clothes and a gun used in the robbery in the defendant's room. Moore v. State, 277 Ga. App. 474, 627 S.E.2d 107 (2006).

Sufficient evidence existed to support the defendant's convictions for armed robbery and aggravated assault based on the victims' testimony that guns were used in the commission of the crimes, the testimony of the defendant's girlfriend and the presence of a cell phone found near the scene of the crimes, and the victims identifying the defendant's accent was sufficient for the jury to infer that the defendant was an armed participant in the crimes. Jordan v. State, 320 Ga. App. 265, 739 S.E.2d 743 (2013).

Evidence was sufficient to enable a juvenile court to reject as unreasonable the hypothesis from the victim's testimony that a juvenile stood in a nearby park and did not participate in an assault as the third, unidentified assailant, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 24-14-6, and to adjudicate guilt for aggravated assault and possession of a firearm while committing a felony, pursuant to O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21(b)(2) and16-11-106(b)(1). In the Interest of C. S., 334 Ga. App. 153, 778 S.E.2d 396 (2015).

Evidence sufficient for assault with gun.

- Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction given testimony showing that defendant fired defendant's gun inside a game room along with a bullet hole that an officer found behind the counter where a victim was located which allowed a rational trier of fact to conclude that defendant committed the crime of aggravated assault by shooting defendant's gun toward one of the victims. Dukes v. State, 264 Ga. App. 820, 592 S.E.2d 473 (2003).

Determination of witness credibility, including the accuracy of eyewitness identification, is within the exclusive province of the jury. Evidence that defendant wielded and attempted to use a gun during the robbery of a pool hall owner was sufficient to convict defendant for aggravated assault where the question of eyewitness identification of defendant was a jury matter. Bartley v. State, 267 Ga. App. 367, 599 S.E.2d 318 (2004).

There was sufficient evidence to support defendant's convictions of burglary in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1(a), aggravated assault in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(1), (2), and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b), where evidence showed that three persons forcibly entered the victims' apartment and demanded money, that all three persons were in the car together on the way to the apartment and on the way to the hospital to drop off a bleeding codefendant, that all three persons carried guns, that one of the victims was shot, and that defendant's statement that defendant only was involved to drop off the bleeding codefendant at the hospital was in contrast to the fact that defendant had blood on defendant's pants, shirt, boxer shorts, and that defendant ejected the bloody codefendant from the car in a hurried manner at the hospital. Brown v. State, 267 Ga. App. 642, 600 S.E.2d 731 (2004).

There was sufficient evidence for the jury to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravated assault and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime because the testimony of the victim was sufficient to establish that defendant was the perpetrator. Davis v. State, 267 Ga. App. 668, 600 S.E.2d 742 (2004).

Evidence was sufficient to support burglary, aggravated assault, kidnapping, false imprisonment, and armed robbery convictions where one of the victims opened the door to the victim's home when the victim recognized one of defendant's accomplices, where defendant and another then pushed the door open and rushed inside, and where defendant grabbed the first victim, pointed a gun at the first victim's head, took money from the second victim's wallet, kept the gun pointed at both victims during the entire incident, ripped the telephone cord out of the wall, and instructed the accomplices to bind and blindfold the victims, which they did; the victims both identified defendant as the gunman from a police photo array and made an in-court identification at trial, and any conflict between the victims' testimony that the gunman had a tattoo on the gunman's arm and a trial demonstration revealing no tattoo on defendant's arm was a matter for the jury to resolve and did not affect the sufficiency of the identification. Kates v. State, 269 Ga. App. 8, 603 S.E.2d 342 (2004).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of aggravated assault, as: (1) defendant previously threatened to kill the victim; (2) defendant pointed a gun at the victim, warned the victim not to give information to the police about what they did, and said, "We own this area"; (3) the frightened victim told defendant to leave; and (4) defendant left after further words were exchanged. Husband v. State, 275 Ga. App. 246, 620 S.E.2d 479 (2005).

Trial court did not err in denying a codefendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal on two aggravated assault charges, given that sufficient evidence was presented that: (1) both the defendant and the codefendant, while armed, attempted to rob the victims; (2) off-duty police officers working as security officers identified the defendants; (3) an assault rifle and a sawed-off shotgun were fired at the police as both the defendants were pursued; and (4) the weapons were recovered after both the defendants were apprehended. Walker v. State, 281 Ga. App. 163, 635 S.E.2d 422 (2006).

Convictions for felony murder and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-1 and16-5-21, were supported by sufficient evidence, including that the defendant and the codefendant were acting in concert, and the denial of the defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-9-1 was proper; the defendant argued with the victim, a prostitute, and refused to pay for the victim's services, prompting the victim to get a gun and fire a shot into the air, whereupon the defendant and a codefendant fired their guns back at the victim in a car leaving the area, and a bullet from the codefendant's gun killed the victim. Stinchcomb v. State, 280 Ga. 170, 626 S.E.2d 88 (2006).

Convictions for kidnapping, aggravated assault, and malice murder, in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-40,16-5-21, and16-5-1, respectively, were supported by sufficient evidence where defendant got into a dispute with the victim over a drug deal, defendant and the codefendants kidnapped the victim, drove the victim to a remote area, and shot the victim several times. Morris v. State, 280 Ga. 179, 626 S.E.2d 123 (2006).

Evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for aggravated assault, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), where the defendant fired shots towards the victim, who was "having a good time" with a group of other people in the apartment parking lot; the victim's reasonable apprehensive of receiving a violent injury was sufficient to satisfy the intent element under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a)(2). Thompson v. State, 277 Ga. App. 323, 626 S.E.2d 825 (2006).

Evidence supported convictions for armed robbery and aggravated assault where using defendant's parent's telephone number, defendant contacted the victim and arranged a meeting to buy shoes, where the victim identified the car defendant was driving, which was registered to defendant's parent, where the victim identified defendant from a pretrial police photo array and at trial, and where, at the meeting arranged by defendant, the victim was shot in the face and defendant then rummaged through the victim's car where the victim kept the shoes. Waddell v. State, 277 Ga. App. 772, 627 S.E.2d 840, cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 731, 549 U.S. 1081, 166 L. Ed. 2d 567 (2006).

Evidence that three unarmed people went to talk to defendant about rumors that the defendant wanted to harm them, and that, when one approached the defendant, the defendant fired five shots in their direction, killing one of them, was sufficient to support convictions for felony murder and aggravated assault. Traylor v. State, 280 Ga. 400, 627 S.E.2d 594 (2006).

Sufficient evidence supported convictions of aggravated assault with intent to rob and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime where the defendant and two other persons tried to rob a market, one of the other persons had a pistol, which was pointed at the market's owners, the armed participant forced one of the owners to try to open the register, and during the course of the robbery, one of the owners grabbed a hidden gun and shot and killed the armed robber, where the defendant and the other participant fled. Laurel v. State, 278 Ga. App. 147, 628 S.E.2d 208 (2006).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's aggravated assault conviction, as the fact that the victim and the defendant offered opposite accounts as to the reason the defendant reached for the gun was of no consequence on appeal, and the appeals court refused to speculate as to which evidence the jury chose to believe. Moss v. State, 278 Ga. App. 221, 628 S.E.2d 648 (2006).

Evidence that the defendant and others approached two separate victims while the defendant brandished a shotgun, that defendant threatened the victims with the gun, and that defendant and the compatriots stole both of the victims' cars, sufficed to sustain convictions of two counts of hijacking a motor vehicle, two counts of armed robbery, two counts of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, and two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony; the jury was free to disbelieve defendant's testimony that defendant was coerced into threatening the victims at gunpoint and participating in the car thefts. Martinez v. State, 278 Ga. App. 500, 629 S.E.2d 485 (2006).

Evidence was sufficient to support a juvenile's delinquency adjudication based on charges of aggravated assault, possession of a firearm by a minor, and discharge of a gun or pistol near a street, in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21(a),16-11-132(b), and16-11-103, as the juvenile was at a party and went outside with a crowd of others due to a fight, and the juvenile fired a gun into the air while standing in the midst of a crowd; the juvenile was identified by three eyewitnesses, whose testimony established that they were placed in reasonable apprehension of immediate violent injury due to the juvenile's actions. In the Interest of C.D.G., 279 Ga. App. 718, 632 S.E.2d 450 (2006).

Defendant's conviction as a party for aggravated assault and aggravated battery was affirmed as: (1) the defendant drove a car knowing a gun was inside; (2) the defendant extinguished the headlights and drove slowly past a crowded corner as a passenger opened fire; (3) the defendant stopped the car next to a prone victim while the passenger continued shooting; and (4) the defendant told the police that the defendant did not care who had been shot. Ford v. State, 280 Ga. App. 580, 634 S.E.2d 522 (2006).

Defendant's motion for a new trial on the defendant's aggravated assault and possession of a firearm during the aggravated assault charges was properly denied as the defendant's actions before, during, and after a friend's aggravated assault and firearm possession crimes at a home showed not only that the defendant was a party to those crimes, but that the defendant was a fellow conspirator in the assault against the victim as the defendant: (1) forced the victim at gunpoint to drive to the home; (2) stayed in the nearby living room while the friend shot a gun and threatened the victim (and defendant looked into the bedroom after the gun was fired); (3) accompanied the friend and the handcuffed victim in the vehicle following the incident while the friend searched for the victim's love interest's residence; (4) encouraged the friend to kill the victim; and (5) did not protest any of the friend's actions throughout the evening. Sapp v. State, 280 Ga. App. 592, 634 S.E.2d 523 (2006).

Defendant's convictions for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, aggravated battery, and possessing a firearm during the commission of a felony were supported by evidence that: (1) the victim and the defendant had an acrimonious relationship; (2) the defendant threatened to hit the victim with a jug; and (3) the defendant's statement that the victim was not "dead yet" after the victim was shot in the back; the jury could reject the defendant's claim that the defendant fired a warning shot away from the victim and could convict the defendant, even though the victim did not see the defendant point the gun at the victim. Rowe v. State, 280 Ga. App. 881, 635 S.E.2d 251 (2006).

Evidence supported a defendant's conviction for malice murder, felony murder while in commission of an aggravated assault, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony as: (1) the defendant came to a tenant's apartment and told the victim that the defendant just shot someone in the backyard; (2) the tenant heard the victim calling the tenant's name; (3) another witness heard a series of gunshots and then someone being beaten, was familiar with the victim and recognized the victim's voice as the victim hollered, "You stomping me. I've been shot. You already done shot me," and saw the defendant emerge from behind the residence with a gun in the defendant's hand; (4) the defendant held the gun to the head of the witness, but then instructed the witness to leave the area; and (5) the victim's death was caused by two fatal gunshot wounds to the neck and chest and there was blunt force trauma to the head. Compton v. State, 281 Ga. 45, 635 S.E.2d 766 (2006).

Evidence supported a defendant's conviction of felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony as: (1) the defendant told the victim that the defendant was going to shoot the victim and then the defendant shot the victim in the stomach, argued with the victim some more, and shot the victim again; (2) the victim never admitted cheating on the defendant; (3) after the second shot, the defendant and a friend took the victim to a hospital in a car; (4) while en route, the defendant persisted in the defendant's efforts to get the victim to admit to cheating on the defendant; and (5) the defendant wiped down the revolver and threw it out of the car. Durham v. State, 281 Ga. 208, 636 S.E.2d 513 (2006).

Evidence supported a defendant's conviction for robbery by intimidation, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon as: (1) the defendant demanded that the victim give the defendant the victim's purse and then threatened the victim with a gun and told the victim that the defendant would use it; (2) feeling that the victim's life was in danger, the victim ran; (3) the defendant chased the victim and snatched the victim's purse; (4) two witnesses chased the defendant to an abandoned house, where the victim's purse was later found; (5) a witness obtained the tag number of the defendant's vehicle and police traced the vehicle to the defendant's parent; even assuming that the pre-trial identification procedures were unduly suggestive, the in-court identifications by a witness and the victim were admissible as they were based on independent recollections. Boatwright v. State, 281 Ga. App. 560, 636 S.E.2d 719 (2006).

Aggravated assault convictions were upheld on appeal based on the defendant's act of deliberately firing a gun in the direction of another; moreover, the fact that one of the defendant's cohorts also fired a weapon in the direction of the shooting victims was sufficient for the defendant to be guilty as a party to those criminal acts. Thompson v. State, 281 Ga. App. 627, 636 S.E.2d 779 (2006).

On appeal from the defendant's aggravated assault, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, and first-degree criminal damage to property convictions, the court held that the testimony provided by two of the victims identifying the defendant as one of the perpetrators was sufficient to uphold the same, as: (1) the testimony of a single witness was generally sufficient to establish a fact; and (2) under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-80 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-6-620), the credibility of a witness was a matter to be determined by the jury under proper instructions from the court. Reid v. State, 281 Ga. App. 640, 637 S.E.2d 62 (2006).

Evidence supported a defendant's conviction for malice murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm in the commission of a felony as: (1) during a van ride, the defendant fought with an assault victim, striking the assault victim in the head with a gun, and was told to stop hitting the assault victim; (2) a gunshot was heard and the passengers saw a murder victim lying dead and the defendant holding the gun; (3) the gun was inside the murder victim's mouth when it was fired; (4) the assault victim and another passenger fled; and (5) the defendant and an accomplice dumped the body in an industrial area. Johnson v. State, 281 Ga. 229, 637 S.E.2d 393 (2006).

Defendant's malice murder and aggravated assault convictions were upheld on appeal, as supported by sufficient evidence, including that: (1) the defendant, along with two codefendants, fired numerous shots into a crowd in an attempt to shoot several men with whom they had been feuding; (2) one of the codefendants later told a friend that the three committed the crimes; (3) one of the defendant's friends saw the defendant with a shotgun shortly after the shooting, the shotgun had red shells, and the defendant told the friend that the gun had been used in the shootings; and (4) forensic evidence later confirmed that red shotgun shells were found at the scene. Adkins v. State, 281 Ga. 301, 637 S.E.2d 714 (2006).

Sufficient evidence was presented to convict the defendant of two counts of aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21 because witness testimony indicated that the first victim and the first victim's young child, the second victim who was also the defendant's child, were scared and crying after a confrontation with the defendant and that gunshots were fired; thus, the evidence established that the victims were in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury as required by § 16-5-21. Cain v. State, 288 Ga. App. 535, 654 S.E.2d 456 (2007).

There was sufficient evidence to support a defendant's convictions for aggravated assault and possession-of-a-firearm based on the testimony of three separate witnesses, including the victim, that the defendant threateningly pointed a gun at the victim's head. Further, regarding the need to show the victim's reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury, the state presented evidence from the victim's mouth that the victim feared the gun and that the fear resulted in the victim urinating on the victim's person and in the victim lying to an officer at the front door to protect the victim's children. Hardy v. State, 293 Ga. App. 265, 666 S.E.2d 730 (2008).

Victim's testimony that the defendant kicked in the door of the victim's residence, entered, pointed a shotgun at the victim, and threatened to shoot the victim if the victim did not give the defendant money was sufficient in itself to support the defendant's conviction for aggravated assault in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a). Reed v. State, 293 Ga. App. 479, 668 S.E.2d 1 (2008).

Though the victim was approaching the defendant when the defendant fatally shot the victim at a distance of three feet, the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of aggravated assault and felony murder despite the defendant's claim of self-defense as the defendant decided to confront the victim and beat the victim up, retrieved a gun from a car, and lied to police about the victim's pulling a knife before the shooting. McNeil v. State, 284 Ga. 586, 669 S.E.2d 111 (2008).

Evidence was sufficient to convict a defendant of aggravated assault in connection with the robbery of a cell phone store at gunpoint as the employees of the store identified the defendant from a non-suggestive photographic array; the getaway car had been rented by the defendant's spouse; and the employee of another cell phone store that had been robbed 20 minutes earlier identified the defendant as the robber. Fuller v. State, 295 Ga. App. 439, 672 S.E.2d 438 (2009), cert. denied, No. S09C0749, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 220 (Ga. 2009).

Sufficient evidence was presented to convict a defendant of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon based on evidence that the defendant and a codefendant approached the victims' rental car and brandished guns; while pistol whipping the victims and robbing them of their property, the defendant's gun went off and fatally wounded the first victim; and a gun matching the caliber of bullet recovered from the first victim during the autopsy was found during the execution of a search warrant at a hotel where the defendant had visited a guest on three occasions. Watkins v. State, 285 Ga. 107, 674 S.E.2d 275 (2009).

Rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed voluntary manslaughter, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-2, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime (voluntary manslaughter), O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106, aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime (aggravated assault), O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106, because the defendant's explanation of the killing was inconsistent with and not explanatory of the other direct and circumstantial evidence, and, therefore, the jury was permitted to reject such explanation and convict on the remaining evidence; the defendant's son testified on direct that the defendant told the son that the defendant shot the victim once, that the victim ran, that the defendant pursued, and that although the victim begged for the victim's life, the defendant shot the victim again, and there also was forensic evidence indicating that the defendant fired three more rounds into the victim's body. Cantera v. State, 304 Ga. App. 289, 696 S.E.2d 354 (2010).

Defendant's claim that the testimony of an armed robbery victim was insufficient to authorize the jury to find that an aggravated assault victim was placed in apprehension of receiving an immediate bodily injury was not supported by the record because the record revealed that the actual victim of the aggravated assault testified that one of the robbers pointed a gun at the victim. Hester v. State, 304 Ga. App. 441, 696 S.E.2d 427 (2010).

Evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as a party to two counts of aggravated assault in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21 because even though the defendant did not actually use a weapon, there was evidence that an accomplice brandished a handgun and pointed the handgun at both the manager and the clerk of the video store, and the accomplice's use of a weapon could be attributed to the defendant; one who intentionally aids or abets the commission of a crime by another is a party to the crime and equally guilty with the principal, and reasonable apprehension of injury can be proved by circumstantial or indirect evidence as well as by direct or positive evidence since the presence of a gun would normally place a victim in reasonable apprehension of being injured violently. Rainly v. State, 307 Ga. App. 467, 705 S.E.2d 246 (2010).

Evidence supported the defendant's convictions for malice murder, felony murder, criminal attempt to commit armed robbery, armed robbery, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime because: (1) the defendant participated in the armed robbery of three people, including the shooting victim, who were sitting in a car on a neighborhood street; (2) during the encounter, the co-indictee fatally shot the victim in the head with a shot gun; (3) one of the two other people in the car testified that, after the shooting, the defendant, with the defendant's hand in the defendant's pocket simulating that the defendant had a gun, took money and drugs from the witness; (4) the co-indictee also took money from the other person; and (5) the defendant and the co-indictee then fled the scene. Gilyard v. State, 288 Ga. 800, 708 S.E.2d 329 (2011).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of aggravated assault, motor-vehicle hijacking, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21(a)(2),16-5-44.1(b), and16-11-106(b)(1), because the defendant waited in a getaway vehicle while an accomplice hijacked the victim's vehicle and possessed the gun that the accomplice used in the crime. Gordon v. State, 316 Ga. App. 42, 728 S.E.2d 720 (2012).

Sufficient evidence existed to support the defendant's convictions for aiding and abetting armed robbery, burglary, aggravated assault, and false imprisonment based on the evidence that the defendant was a party to the crimes, including evidence that the defendant drove the co-defendants to the house just before the crimes were committed; that the defendant was in the vehicle when plans to commit the crimes were discussed; that the defendant waited in the victim's driveway when the co-defendants entered the front door of the house, wearing masks and carrying guns; and that the defendant drove the perpetrators away from the scene after the crimes were committed - speeding, driving erratically, and not stopping when the police, with sirens and lights activated, began following the vehicle. Simon v. State, 320 Ga. App. 15, 739 S.E.2d 34 (2013).

Victim's testimony that the defendant approached the victim, thrust a gun about six inches from the victim's face, took the victim's cell phone and keys, and told the victim to "get out of here," while waving a gun, was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for armed robbery, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, aggravated assault, and theft by taking. Wright v. State, 319 Ga. App. 723, 738 S.E.2d 310 (2013).

Aggravated assault conviction was supported by evidence that the defendant struggled with the first victim after the first victim tried to take a gun from the defendant, the defendant called for help, and an accomplice who came to help the defendant shot the first victim. Falay v. State, 320 Ga. App. 781, 740 S.E.2d 738 (2013).

Evidence that the defendant was found in the laundry room of the home that was the subject of the home invasion; police found masks, gloves, money, a gun, and some of the victim's jewelry in or near the laundry room; and the defendant's DNA was found on one of masks recovered supported the defendant's convictions for armed robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. Rudison v. State, 322 Ga. App. 248, 744 S.E.2d 444 (2013).

Evidence that, after being ejected from a nightclub, the defendant told the bouncer that the defendant was going to the car and would be back, a statement which the bouncer viewed as threatening and meaning that the defendant was going to get a gun, authorized a finding that the bouncer was in reasonable apprehension of receiving a violent injury as shots were fired in the bouncer's direction and supported the defendant's conviction for aggravated assault. Jordan v. State, 322 Ga. App. 252, 744 S.E.2d 447 (2013).

Evidence including testimony as to the gang's criminal activities, corroborating the defendant's participation in the armed robberies; the defendant's admission to participating in two murders; and a gun the defendant used in the attempted armed robbery of the first victim was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for criminal street gang activity, criminal attempt to commit armed robbery, two counts of aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Morris v. State, 322 Ga. App. 682, 746 S.E.2d 162 (2013).

Evidence that the defendant approached a group with a gun, causing the children to scream, was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for aggravated assault upon the restaurant owner's wife and children. Veasey v. State, 322 Ga. App. 591, 745 S.E.2d 802 (2013).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of terroristic threats, six counts of aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony because a witness testified that a vehicle fitting the description of the defendant's car was driven by the shooter who shot at the house of the complainant's mother where the complainant was staying; multiple gunshot holes were found in the side of the home; the complainant testified that, earlier that morning, the defendant had threatened to come to the house and kill the complainant; and the complainant received text messages from the defendant later that morning apologizing for what had happened. Brown v. State, 325 Ga. App. 237, 750 S.E.2d 453 (2013).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of aggravated assault and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony because the victim testified that the defendant shot at the victim at least three times; and the victim's neighbor saw the victim on the ground, and the defendant was standing over the victim. Marshall v. State, 324 Ga. App. 348, 750 S.E.2d 418 (2013).

Evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty of aggravated assault and aggravated battery beyond a reasonable doubt because the trial court's final charge to the jury included instructions on the defense of justification; and the victim testified that, at the time in question, the victim did not have a gun, that the victim did not reach for any of the defendant's guns, and that the victim was not attacking the defendant and only charged the defendant after the defendant was aiming a gun at the victim. Price v. State, 325 Ga. App. 564, 754 S.E.2d 144 (2014).

Evidence was sufficient for the jury to find defendant guilty of aggravated assault and terroristic threats based on the trial court properly admitting the victim's testimony identifying defendant as the person who threatened to shoot the victim early in the morning, and the testimony of the victim's friend, who also identified defendant as the person who threatened to shoot the victim. Johnson v. State, 326 Ga. App. 220, 756 S.E.2d 303 (2014).

Victim's testimony that the victim and the defendant were fighting, the defendant left the room and later returned with gun that the defendant held to the victim's side, and the victim heard gunshot and turned to face the defendant, who told the victim that the defendant had been meaning to do that and ran, supported the defendant's convictions for aggravated assault, aggravated battery, and possession of firearm during the commission of a felony. Jones v. State, 326 Ga. App. 151, 756 S.E.2d 267 (2014).

Evidence that the defendant invited the victim to physically fight the defendant after a verbal dispute arose over a dice bet, and that the victim was unarmed while the defendant had concealed a firearm in a pocket, was sufficient to defeat the defendant's justification defense and support the convictions for aggravated assault and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felon. Robinson v. State, 326 Ga. App. 59, 755 S.E.2d 865 (2014).

Evidence was sufficient to support a finding of guilt on six counts of aggravated assault and one count of possession of a handgun by an underage person because the evidence included direct evidence in the form of eyewitness testimony identifying the juvenile as shooting and discarding the gun. In the Interest of T. D. J., 325 Ga. App. 786, 755 S.E.2d 29 (2014).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's convictions as a party to the crimes of armed robbery, aggravated assault against the manager and cashier, and possession of a firearm during the commission of the armed robbery because the law allowed defendant to be charged with and convicted of the same offenses as co-defendant since the evidence showed that defendant drove co-defendant to the fast food restaurant that was robbed and waited as the getaway driver. Broyard v. State, 325 Ga. App. 794, 755 S.E.2d 36 (2014).

Victims' testimony that the victims' heard the sound of a gun being cocked and turned around to see the defendant, a juvenile, holding a gun while chasing the victims with a group of other young men, causing the victims to be so afraid the victims ran into the expressway, was sufficient to place the victims in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury and to support the defendant's adjudication for delinquent acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted aggravated assault. In the Interest of S. W., 337 Ga. App. 110, 786 S.E.2d 499 (2016).

Co-defendant's testimony constituted direct evidence that the defendant intentionally aided and abetted the codefendants in committing the crimes of armed robbery and aggravated assault and intentionally advised, encouraged, and counseled them to commit the crimes, and there was sufficient corroboration of the co-defendant's testimony, including a recorded telephone call between the defendant and a second co-defendant, the defendant's own testimony at trial, and the defendant's statements to law enforcement. Stallings v. State, 343 Ga. App. 135, 806 S.E.2d 613 (2017).

No fatal variance existed between the indictment and the proof at trial as to the defendant's hijacking a motor vehicle and two counts of aggravated assault convictions because the evidence showed that the defendant struck the victim with a handgun and, shortly thereafter, two men fled in the minivan, while a Hispanic male and the man that struck the victim, the defendant, fled in a red car, thus, there was no fatal variance between the evidence and the indictment. Scott v. State, 342 Ga. App. 442, 803 S.E.2d 600 (2017).

Video showing the defendant bursting into the store and holding a gun on the clerk while the defendant stole cash and lottery tickets was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for armed robbery, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during a felony. Beamon v. State, 348 Ga. App. 732, 824 S.E.2d 624 (2019).

Evidence that the victim was first shot in the arm and attempted to retreat as the defendant continued to fire was sufficient for a jury to find the defendant guilty of aggravated assault. Goodson v. State, 305 Ga. 246, 824 S.E.2d 371 (2019).

Evidence, including testimony as to the number of shots and ballistics, authorized the jury to conclude that, in the first incident, the defendant shot in the direction of all four alleged victims and that two different guns were used in the assault, one of the guns by the defendant and, thus, the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction. Green v. State, 304 Ga. 385, 818 S.E.2d 535 (2018).

Defendant's conviction for felony murder was supported by evidence that the defendant agreed to sell methamphetamine and possessed a handgun, which the defendant gave to the defendant's cohort on the way to the drug sale; the two then robbed the two victims and shot at both victims, killing one; the two left the scene together, telephoned a senior gang member, and traveled to a gang safe house in Atlanta together. Boyd v. State, 306 Ga. 204, 830 S.E.2d 160 (2019).

Aggravated assault with gun upon police officer.

- Because an officer, knowing a bank robbery and carjacking had just occurred, saw defendant with a white bag running away from a car matching the stolen car's description, and the fleeing individual pointed a gun at the officer after being ordered to stop, and a bystander corroborated the officer's testimony about the pointing of the gun, there was probable cause to believe the defendant had committed the felonies of aggravated assault and aggravated assault upon a peace officer under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, and detaining the defendant was a lawful warrantless seizure such that none of the evidence obtained from the seizure was tainted. United States v. Epps, 613 F.3d 1093 (11th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, U.S. , 131 S. Ct. 1526, 179 L. Ed. 2d 344 (2011).

Aggravated assault committed during armed robbery with gun.

- Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for aggravated assault, under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21(a)(1) and16-5-21(a)(2), because: (1) the perpetrator of a crime entered just before closing time a fast-food restaurant with a gun and directed the employees into a room, a cooler, and a freezer; (2) the perpetrator took money from the restaurant, shot one of the employees, and left the scene in the employee's car; (3) one of the employees telephoned relatives with a cell phone and told them what was happening; (4) the relatives called the police, came to the restaurant, and saw the perpetrator drive away; (5) money, a gun, and discarded clothing was recovered from the car or the area where the perpetrator fled on foot; (6) a police officer, who was pursuing the perpetrator, was wounded in an altercation with the perpetrator when the officer's gun discharged; (7) when the defendant later surrendered to the police, DNA from the officer's blood was found on the defendant's chest; and (8) the employees, the relatives, and the officer identified the defendant, a former employee of the restaurant who was fired days before the crime, as the perpetrator. Donald v. State, 312 Ga. App. 222, 718 S.E.2d 81 (2011).

Evidence negated accident defense.

- Sufficient evidence supported convictions of aggravated assault, tampering with evidence, and felony misuse of a firearm while hunting, and negated the defense of accident where the victim who was shot by defendant while hunting waved to signal defendant before the gun was fired and where defendant was hunting while on medication that could have caused mental and physical impairment; the jury also could have considered defendant's actions after the shooting in removing the victim's orange vest, hiding two guns, failing to aid the victim, and failing to alert paramedics of the victim's location. Wilson v. State, 279 Ga. App. 136, 630 S.E.2d 640 (2006).

Steering vehicle sufficient for aggravated assault.

- In view of the circumstances of the chase, in which the codefendant leaned the codefendant's upper body out the window of the moving vehicle while shooting at the trooper, the jury could have concluded that the defendant assisted the codefendant by steering the vehicle and the jury was free to reject as unreasonable the hypothesis that the defendant was a mere passenger who did not assist the codefendant. Best v. State, Ga. App. , 846 S.E.2d 157 (2020).

Conviction as party to crime in assault with gun.

- In the defendant's aggravated assault and false imprisonment trial arising out of the defendant's and the defendant's brother's beating of a marijuana dealer with a handgun, whether the defendant knew that the defendant's brother was going to steal the marijuana was not relevant; regardless of whether the defendant knew that the defendant's brother was going to steal the marijuana, the defendant actively participated in the false imprisonment and beating of the victim and was responsible as a party. Gonzalez v. State, 350 Ga. App. 297, 829 S.E.2d 385 (2019).

Evidence held sufficient.

- No fatal variance existed between the indictment alleging the defendant committed aggravated assault in either of two different ways and the defendant's conviction for aggravated assault, as the wording of the indictment allowed the state to seek a conviction for either showing that the defendant assaulted another person with intent to murder or with a deadly weapon; the state was not required to prove both methods of assault, and, thus, the trial court's instruction to the jury only as to aggravated assault by use of a deadly weapon did not cause a fatal variance between the indictment and the proof. Lopez v. State, 260 Ga. App. 713, 580 S.E.2d 668 (2003).

Because the passenger's testimony demonstrated that the passenger had a reasonable apprehension of a violent injury, the evidence was sufficient to find defendant guilty of aggravated assault where defendant fired several shots at the car in which the passenger was riding. Richardson v. State, 261 Ga. App. 55, 581 S.E.2d 694 (2003).

Evidence was sufficient to support all but one of defendant's convictions for burglary, kidnapping, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime because the testimony of the three shooting victims was entirely consistent in all material respects, and any conflicts in the witnesses' testimony raised a credibility issue for jury resolution. Squires v. State, 265 Ga. App. 673, 595 S.E.2d 547 (2004).

Victim's testimony and in-court identification was sufficient evidence to convict defendant of hijacking the victim's motor vehicle at a gas station and of aggravated assault for shooting the victim three times; thus, a photo lineup was not unduly suggestive. Weeks v. State, 268 Ga. App. 886, 602 S.E.2d 882 (2004).

Evidence that defendants intentionally fired bullets into a house occupied by three people in an attempt to kill one of them was sufficient to support their conviction of aggravated assault against another occupant, whom they wounded, under the doctrine of transferred intent. It was immaterial that defendants were unaware that the assault victim was in the home. Culler v. State, 277 Ga. 717, 594 S.E.2d 631 (2004).

After the defendants were accused of firing into a house, killing one occupant and injuring another; one defendant admitted firing into the home, thinking defendant had killed a man; ballistics reports identified shell casings found at the scene as having been fired from at least two different guns; and DNA testing identified a cap recovered from the scene as having been worn by another defendant, their convictions for felony murder and aggravated assault were supported by sufficient evidence. Culler v. State, 277 Ga. 717, 594 S.E.2d 631 (2004).

When the defendant's victim identified the defendant from a photo lineup and at trial as the person who forced the victim to open the vaults in the fast-food restaurant where the victim worked, then duct-taped the victim's limbs and repeatedly struck the victim as the victim lay face down on the floor, the evidence was sufficient beyond a reasonable doubt to allow the jury to convict the defendant of kidnapping with bodily injury, armed robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, and possession of a firearm during the commission of certain crimes. Banks v. State, 269 Ga. App. 653, 605 S.E.2d 47 (2004).

Evidence was sufficient to show that defendant was guilty of two counts of aggravated assault, one count of aggravated battery, and one count of possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, as the evidence showed that defendant shot the victim in the abdomen and the arm with a gun and that defendant intended to cause serious physical harm and disfigurement to the victim. King v. State, 269 Ga. App. 658, 605 S.E.2d 63 (2004).

Evidence that the defendant fatally shot the victim during a scuffle in a robbery attempt and told the police that the defendant was shot by a robber was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for felony murder, aggravated assault, making a false statement to law enforcement officers, and giving a false name to law enforcement officers. Sampson v. State, 279 Ga. 8, 608 S.E.2d 621 (2005).

Evidence supported the defendant's aggravated assault conviction as the defendant twice pointed a gun at a victim's neck, ordered the victim to kneel, demanded the victim's wallet and keys, and left with a coin bag and the victim's keys; the victim was scared and covered the victim's head with the victim's forearms so that the defendant would not shoot the victim in the head. Kirk v. State, 271 Ga. App. 640, 610 S.E.2d 604 (2005).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for aggravated assault because: (1) the victim heard an unidentified voice scream defendant's name, tell defendant "don't do it," and tell defendant that defendant was going to kill the victim, as a gun was cocked and fired at the victim; and (2) the victim unequivocally identified defendant as the victim's assailant. Sharif v. State, 272 Ga. App. 660, 613 S.E.2d 176 (2005).

Evidence was sufficient to support a jury's verdict convicting defendant of aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(c), and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106, because, through the testimony of someone whom defendant threatened with a gun after the defendant shot a police officer, the evidence showed that the person saw defendant fire a gun at the officer and recognized the gun later recovered as the weapon the defendant used. Milton v. State, 272 Ga. App. 908, 614 S.E.2d 140 (2005).

Evidence was sufficient to support a juvenile court's finding that a minor had committed aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21 because it showed that the minor blocked the victim's flight, assisted a friend in pushing the victim into the bedroom, and committed sexual battery, all while the friend remained armed with the gun that the friend had pointed at the victim's head; since defendant was concerned in the commission of the crime, defendant could be convicted of it under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20. In the Interest of A.J., 273 Ga. App. 51, 614 S.E.2d 159 (2005).

Because defendant shot a victim with a rifle as the victim attempted to flee and the victim at first thought that defendant had a BB gun, but realized otherwise when defendant shot at the victim's cousin, the evidence supported defendant's conviction for aggravated assault based on: (1) defendant's attempt to commit a violent injury to the victim with a deadly weapon; or (2) defendant's shooting at the victim with a deadly weapon, thereby putting the victim in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury. Harris v. State, 273 Ga. App. 90, 614 S.E.2d 189 (2005).

Evidence supported defendant's conviction for armed robbery, kidnapping, and aggravated assault as, notwithstanding the absence of an in-court identification of defendant and the state's failure to present fingerprint evidence, a victim's testimony concerning the victim's on-the-scene identification supported the finding that defendant perpetrated the crimes; there was also sufficient evidence that the cash seized from defendant's love interest's house had been put there by defendant. Oliver v. State, 273 Ga. App. 754, 615 S.E.2d 846 (2005).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm in the commission of a felony in a case because defendant, who had engaged in previous altercations with the victim, got out of defendant's car after seeing the victim on the street, ran up to the victim, shot the victim, returned to defendant's car, ran back to the victim and shot the victim again, and then got in defendant's car and drove off, as all of the elements of those offenses were established. Hayes v. State, 279 Ga. 642, 619 S.E.2d 628 (2005).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's aggravated assault, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon convictions where the jury was entitled to give greater weight to the victim's positive contemporaneous identification of the defendant as the shooter and to conclude that the victim's subsequent uncertainty resulted from fear of retaliation by the defendant rather than from any real confusion about who fired the shot; the jury was also entitled to give little weight to a negative gunshot residue test result on defendant's hands as a sergeant regularly ordered gunshot residue tests on the suspects. Haggins v. State, 277 Ga. App. 742, 627 S.E.2d 448 (2006).

Because: (1) the jury was authorized to infer that defendant intended to commit a violent injury upon the victim in view of the evidence showing that the defendant demanded to know the victim's location, and then walked directly up to the victim and shot the victim; and (2) this same evidence was sufficient to show that defendant intended to commit an act that placed the victim in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury, defendant's two aggravated assault with a deadly weapon convictions were supported by sufficient evidence. Smith v. State, 279 Ga. App. 211, 630 S.E.2d 833 (2006).

In defendant's convictions for armed robbery, kidnapping, and aggravated assault in connection with robbery of a fast food restaurant, sufficient evidence existed to support defendant's convictions based on a restaurant employee identifying defendant as one of two perpetrators who confronted that employee and manager at gunpoint and threatened to shoot if the victims did not comply with defendant's demand for money; also, evidence showed that defendant forced the manager out of the manager's car at gunpoint, ordered the manager back across the parking lot and into the restaurant, and stole over $300 from the restaurant's safe as well as a cellular phone before fleeing. Holsey v. State, 291 Ga. App. 216, 661 S.E.2d 621 (2008).

Eyewitnesses testified that the defendant ordered a man to shoot the victim, who was wounded but escaped; later, eyewitnesses saw the defendant and an armed cohort encounter the unarmed victim, who was fatally shot. This evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for aggravated assault and murder. Wilcox v. State, 284 Ga. 414, 667 S.E.2d 603 (2008).

Juvenile court properly denied a juvenile's motion for a new trial with regard to the juvenile's delinquency adjudication finding the juvenile guilty for aggravated assault, criminal property damage, cruelty to children, and reckless conduct arising from the shooting of a BB gun at a passing car. The juvenile was the only Caucasian identified in the group of youth; the juvenile admitted to hiding the BB gun; the juvenile did not dispute that the juvenile encouraged another youth to shoot the gun; and the judge was the final arbiter of the credibility and witness issues and had the province to reject the testimony of the juvenile and a parent that the juvenile did not shoot the gun. In the Interest of A.A., 293 Ga. App. 827, 668 S.E.2d 323 (2008).

Testimony by two victims that the defendant grabbed a purse from one of them and pointed a gun at both of them, and testimony from an eyewitness that the defendant fled from the police, was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for armed robbery and aggravated assault. Wallace v. State, 295 Ga. App. 452, 671 S.E.2d 911 (2009).

Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's convictions of murder, felony murder, and aggravated assault; the evidence revealed that the victim and the defendant got into a physical fight at a bar, and that the victim then left the bar and went to an apartment. The defendant then went home, retrieved a handgun, went to the apartment, knocked on the door, and when one of the people inside opened the door, the defendant shot the victim in the chest, killing the victim. Rector v. State, 285 Ga. 714, 681 S.E.2d 157, cert. denied, 558 U.S. 1081, 130 S. Ct. 807, 175 L. Ed. 2d 567 (2009).

Evidence authorized the jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a weapon during the commission of a felony because contrary to the defendant's arguments, the evidence showed that the person who was sitting in the back seat of the victim's car was not sitting directly behind the victim, but instead, that person was in the rear seat on the passenger's side of the car; the forensics testing showed that the murderer was located to the left of the victim, not the right, and there was blood spatter on the seat behind the victim from which the jury could have inferred that no one was sitting there at the time of the shooting. Julius v. State, 286 Ga. 413, 687 S.E.2d 828 (2010).

Jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of two counts of aggravated assault because the victim's testimony that the defendant pointed a gun at the victim and that a shot was subsequently fired wounding the victim was sufficient circumstantial evidence that the defendant committed a violent injury to the victim; the victim's testimony that the victim was afraid of being shot when the defendant pointed the gun at the victim sufficed to convict the defendant of aggravated assault by placing the victim in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury. Wright v. State, 302 Ga. App. 101, 690 S.E.2d 220 (2010).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for the aggravated assault of people because there was evidence that the defendant stabbed and shot at the same person, and there was evidence that the defendant and the defendant's accomplice pointed a gun at the people in the house, and an officer testified to their names; the defendant did not show the requisite harm arising out of a claim that the allegations and proof fail to correspond. Ward v. State, 304 Ga. App. 517, 696 S.E.2d 471 (2010).

Although under Georgia law, a defendant could not be convicted solely upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8), the evidence corroborated some particulars of the accomplice's testimony implicating the codefendants in the charged crimes since all three of the victims from the three separate gas stations provided descriptions of their assailants that generally matched the codefendants and the accomplice, and all three victims also testified that their assailants brandished a handgun and a shotgun, which were indeed the weapons that were found at the scene where the stolen SUV crashed and where the accomplice was arrested. Accordingly, the evidence corroborating the accomplice's testimony was sufficient to authorize the jury's determination that the codefendants were guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as parties to armed robbery, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41, hijacking a motor vehicle, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-44.1, aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, theft by taking, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-2, theft by receiving, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-7, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106. Daniels v. State, 306 Ga. App. 577, 703 S.E.2d 41 (2010).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for aggravated assault, under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), because the defendant knocked the victim face-down into a table, pointed a gun at the kneeling and bloodied victim, and threatened to kill the victim and the victim's children with the gun. The defendant later told the victim that the victim was going to commit suicide that night and forced the victim to swallow several unidentified pills. Reynolds v. State, 311 Ga. App. 119, 714 S.E.2d 621 (2011).

Evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of malice murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime because the three men who were with the victim when the victim was shot identified the defendant as the person who fired shots at them; there was testimony that the defendant was the boyfriend of a woman who was the former girlfriend of one of the three men with the murder victim and that the defendant and the former boyfriend had exchanged heated words earlier the day the victim was killed as well as the afternoon of the day before the shooting. Glass v. State, 289 Ga. 706, 715 S.E.2d 85 (2011).

Evidence supported the defendant's convictions of felony murder during the commission of aggravated assault, aggravated assault, possession of marijuana, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime when: (1) after smoking marijuana, the defendant attacked the victim, pulled a gun from defendant's pocket, and shot the victim four times; (2) the victim told the police that the defendant did it; (3) the victim died; (4) a knife was found near the victim, the defendant had a stab wound, and the defendant claimed self-defense; and (5) witnesses one and two saw the defendant pull the gun but did not see the victim with a knife. Hill v. State, 291 Ga. 160, 728 S.E.2d 225 (2012).

Evidence supported the defendant's convictions for felony murder, aggravated battery, kidnapping with bodily injury, aggravated assault, and burglary, after the state presented independent corroboration in support of an accomplice's testimony connecting the defendant to the crimes; the defendant's statements to police, the defendant's actions before and after the crimes, and the defendant's girlfriend's testimony stating that the defendant asked the girlfriend to lie about the defendant's whereabouts corroborated the defendant's guilt. Brown v. State, 291 Ga. 750, 733 S.E.2d 300 (2012).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of burglary, aggravated assault, possession of a firearm during the commission of the aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon because a house-sitter returned to a residence to discover an intruder inside; the intruder flashed a gun and told the house-sitter that the intruder would shoot the house-sitter; the house-sitter identified the defendant, whom the house-sitter had known for over 20 years, as the intruder; and a back window of the home had been shattered. Davis v. State, 325 Ga. App. 572, 754 S.E.2d 151 (2014).

Because the victim testified that the defendant held the victim at gunpoint with a rifle, that the victim thought the defendant was going to kill the victim, and that the victim was afraid for the victim's life, the testimony of the victim, standing alone, was sufficient to sustain the defendant's conviction for aggravated assault. Lambert v. State, 325 Ga. App. 603, 754 S.E.2d 392 (2014).

In an action for aggravated battery, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and possession of a firearm during a felony, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to determine that the defendant was the shooter, including testimony from the victims identifying the defendant and any inconsistency between that testimony and the victims' pretrial identifications was for the jury. Smith v. State, 354 Ga. App. 782, 841 S.E.2d 444 (2020).

Evidence that the defendant approached the victim with a handgun, pointed the gun at the victim while demanding money, and ultimately shot the victim was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for armed robbery, criminal attempt to commit armed robbery, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. Cooke v. State, Ga. App. , S.E.2d (Sept. 15, 2020).

Aggravated assault with gun while buying marijuana.

- Evidence supported the defendant's convictions for felony murder predicated on armed robbery, armed robbery, and aggravated assault because the evidence showed that the defendant and the codefendant, after discussing the idea of stealing marijuana and whatever cash the victim had on the victim, arranged to meet with the victim to buy marijuana from the victim. When the victim got into the back seat of the defendant's vehicle and pulled out a bag of marijuana, the codefendant drew a gun and shot the victim, fatally wounding the victim. Herbert v. State, 288 Ga. 843, 708 S.E.2d 260 (2011).

Running from gunfire sufficient for reasonable apprehension of assault.

- Evidence was sufficient to prove three counts of aggravated assault against the defendant because testimony that the victims ran from gunfire was sufficient evidence that the defendant and the codefendant placed the victims in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury, and other evidence showed that all of the victims were positioned in or very near the line of fire; one of the victims testified that the victim was sitting on the ground, could have been shot, and would have been if the victim had stood up, and a jury could find that the victim experienced a reasonable apprehension of receiving a violent injury even though the victim affirmatively testified that the victim was not afraid. Howard v. State, 288 Ga. 741, 707 S.E.2d 80 (2011).

Aiding and abetting in possession of firearm during aggravated assault.

- Based on the evidence that the defendant drove and deliberately followed the victims and pulled in behind the victims' vehicle, intentionally encouraged the shooter by telling the shooter "you better not let these guys get away, go ahead and handle your business, do what you got to do," and fled with the shooter after the shooting, the jury was authorized to conclude that the defendant was a party to the crimes of aggravated assault and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. Talifero v. State, 319 Ga. App. 65, 734 S.E.2d 61 (2012).

Evidence sufficient under doctrine of transferred intent.

- Evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find that the defendant was a party to the crime of aggravated assault under the doctrine of transferred intent as the defendant participated in the gun fight that wounded the unintended victim. Jones v. State, 292 Ga. 656, 740 S.E.2d 590 (2013).

Evidence sufficient for aggravated assault of bus driver.

- Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for a directed verdict after a jury found the defendant guilty of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon against a bus driver, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), because the bus driver testified that the driver did not feel free to drive away since the driver felt the driver's life was in danger; the driver testified that the driver chose not to drive away for fear that the defendant would shoot. Cannon v. State, 310 Ga. App. 262, 712 S.E.2d 645 (2011).

Identification of defendant sufficient.

- Victim's testimony at trial sufficiently identified the defendant as the assailant who fired shots at the victim, and the evidence was sufficient to support convictions for aggravated assault, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, since the victim knew the defendant from previous encounter and although it was dark, the victim was able to see the defendant's face during incident because area was illuminated by streetlight. Johnson v. State, 279 Ga. App. 153, 630 S.E.2d 661 (2006).

Evidence insufficient for conviction.

- Because no eyewitnesses saw a third defendant participate in an armed robbery, a kidnapping, an aggravated assault, or possess a firearm during the commission of the crimes, and because the third defendant was not implicated by the other defendants, did not confess to the crimes, and did not flee the jurisdiction, the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for the third defendant. Johnson v. State, 277 Ga. App. 499, 627 S.E.2d 116 (2006).

Evidence was insufficient to support the defendant's conviction for aggravated assault in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) because there was no affirmative evidence that a restaurant employee saw the defendant with a gun or heard the defendant's threats to shoot; from an officer's description of the scene, the officer did not personally observe the employee climb out of the drive-through window, and thus, the evidence that the employee climbed out of the window rested mainly on the veracity and competence of persons other than the testifying officer, making the testimony hearsay under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-1(a) (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-8-801). Santiago v. State, 314 Ga. App. 623, 724 S.E.2d 793 (2012).

Evidence was insufficient to convict the defendant of aggravated assault and possession of a weapon during the commission of the crime; the defendant was out of the officer's view when the defendant fired the gun, no other officer or witness saw the defendant fire the gun, no witness saw where the defendant aimed the gun when the defendant fired the gun, and no forensic or other evidence was introduced which suggested that the defendant fired the gun in the officer's direction. Touchstone v. State, 319 Ga. App. 477, 735 S.E.2d 805 (2012).

Evidence was insufficient to convict the defendant of aggravated assault as a party because there was no evidence in the record to show that the defendant knew that the grandfather was likely to respond to the defendant's initial cries for help by firing a shot, or that the defendant's cries intentionally encouraged the grandfather to discharge the single shot actually fired; and, although the defendant's exclamation after the single shot was fired could be interpreted as an expression of encouragement or incitement, it was made after the grandfather's already completed act of firing a revolver near the officers, which was the act that formed the basis of the indictment against both the defendant and the grandfather. Hoglen v. State, 336 Ga. App. 471, 784 S.E.2d 832 (2016).

Testimony as to ultimate issue excluded in assault with gun case.

- In a prosecution for aggravated assault, under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-6, the issue of whether the defendant shot the victim with the intention of assaulting the victim was an issue of ultimate fact to be decided by the jury. Therefore, the state's objection to defense counsel's question to the defendant, "Did you intend to assault the victim?" was properly sustained. Gordon v. State, 294 Ga. App. 908, 670 S.E.2d 533 (2008).

Use of a gun to strike victim.

- Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to argue for involuntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of murder, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-5-3(a), because the jury would have had to believe that the use of a loaded gun to strike the victim was not use as a deadly weapon (or the crime would be assault with a deadly weapon under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21), and the theory of the defense was that the defendant was not present. Wells v. State, 295 Ga. 161, 758 S.E.2d 598 (2014).

Assault against person other than intended victim.

- Since a rational trier of fact could have found that the defendant shot at the bouncer intending to commit a violent injury against the bouncer and that the bullet struck a bystander instead, the evidence authorized the defendant's conviction for aggravated assault against the bystander. Jordan v. State, 322 Ga. App. 252, 744 S.E.2d 447 (2013).

Sentencing.

- Defendant was entitled to resentencing with regard to the defendant's convictions on one count of aggravated assault and one count of armed robbery arising from the robbery of a restaurant because the two counts were based upon the same conduct, namely pointing a handgun at the restaurant's manager in order to commit a robbery. Fagan v. State, 283 Ga. App. 784, 643 S.E.2d 268 (2007).

Defendant's sentences of 20 years in confinement for the aggravated assault on the deceased victim, followed by 20 years for the aggravated assault on the second victim (with five years in confinement and the remainder on probation), followed by an additional 15 years of probation for the charge of participation in criminal street gang activity and another five years' probation for the possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, to run consecutively to the other sentences, were within the statutory range for those crimes, and did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Taylor v. State, 331 Ga. App. 577, 771 S.E.2d 224 (2015).

Assault With Automobile

Trial counsel not ineffective as lenient sentence imposed.

- Trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel due to a failure to investigate defendant's mental health history as: (1) defendant did not claim that defendant was insane at the time of the crimes, was incompetent to stand trial, or was otherwise suffering from delusional compulsion; (2) there was no evidence that defendant was guilty, but mentally ill; and (3) felony murder carried a mandatory life sentence, firearm possession required a consecutive five-year sentence, and the trial court was lenient in sentencing defendant to half of the time allowed by law for an aggravated assault, so there was no harm in the failure to introduce more detail about defendant's mental health history at sentencing. Harris v. State, 279 Ga. 304, 612 S.E.2d 789 (2005).

Reckless driving as lesser included offense of aggravated assault.

- Defendant was entitled to a new trial on the charge of aggravated assault upon a police officer in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21 because the trial court should have given the defendant's requested charge on reckless driving in violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-390(a) as a lesser included offense since there was evidence that the defendant did not intend to injure a police officer but that the defendant's decision to drive off suddenly with the officer in close proximity to the defendant's truck was nonetheless an act of criminal negligence, which would have supported a conviction for reckless driving. Young v. State, 294 Ga. App. 227, 669 S.E.2d 407 (2008).

Charge on reckless driving not required.

- Because Count 4, alleging aggravated assault by placing another in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury with an object which, when used offensively against a person, was likely to and actually did result in serious bodily injury, only required the state to prove that the defendant had the general intent to drive the van, the offense of reckless driving would not show a less culpable mental state than that which was required to establish the commission of the crime of aggravated assault as charged, and the trial court did not err by refusing to give the requested charge of reckless driving as a lesser included offense of aggravated assault as alleged in Count 4. Patterson v. State, 332 Ga. App. 221, 770 S.E.2d 62 (2015), aff'd, 299 Ga. 491, 789 S.E.2d 175 (2016).

Automobile is not per se deadly weapon, but may become one depending upon the manner and means of the vehicle's use. Blalock v. State, 165 Ga. App. 269, 299 S.E.2d 753 (1983); Cline v. State, 199 Ga. App. 532, 405 S.E.2d 524 (1991); Reynolds v. State, 234 Ga. App. 884, 508 S.E.2d 674 (1998).

Although an automobile is not per se a deadly or offensive weapon, it may become one depending on the manner and means of the vehicle's use. The question of whether an automobile, or other instrumentality, has been used so as to constitute a deadly or offensive weapon is properly for the jury's determination. Butler v. State, 196 Ga. App. 706, 396 S.E.2d 916 (1990); Reynolds v. State, 234 Ga. App. 884, 508 S.E.2d 674 (1998).

Aggravated assault convictions were affirmed after the defendant accelerated toward officers standing in front of the defendant at a roadblock, forcing the officer's to jump out of the way, and causing one to fall. Williams v. State, 270 Ga. App. 371, 606 S.E.2d 594 (2004).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for aggravated assault, as a rational trier of fact was authorized to conclude that defendant meant to harm the police officer who stopped defendant's vehicle when defendant fled in the vehicle and the officer had to step out of the way to avoid being struck; although an automobile was not a deadly weapon per se, defendant used it as such and defendant's increasing level of hostility during the stop, coupled with defendant's attempt to run over the officer while fleeing, supported defendant's conviction for aggravated assault. Young v. State, 273 Ga. App. 151, 614 S.E.2d 257 (2005).

Automobile can be a deadly weapon.

- Evidence that defendant hit patrol cars while making a U-turn and appeared to be in full control of the vehicle just prior to the impact was sufficient for the jury to find that defendant attempted to commit a violent injury to another's person and interfered with government property. Black v. State, 222 Ga. App. 80, 473 S.E.2d 186 (1996).

Sufficient evidence existed to convict defendant of aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), since defendant used a vehicle as a deadly or offensive weapon, because when the officer pulled defendant over, defendant turned the vehicle around and accelerated at the officer, forcing the officer to jump behind a patrol car to avoid being hit. Thomas v. State, 255 Ga. App. 777, 567 S.E.2d 72 (2002).

Evidence that defendant, a shoplifting suspect, drove off in defendant's vehicle with a police officer hanging only halfway inside defendant's vehicle as the officer attempted to grab defendant's keys, and that defendant continued to drive even though the officer was hanging half-in and half-out of the vehicle was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for aggravated assault of a police officer as the evidence showed that defendant used the vehicle as a deadly weapon and that defendant had the general intent required to sustain an aggravated assault conviction. Frayall v. State, 259 Ga. App. 286, 576 S.E.2d 654 (2003).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for aggravated assault on a peace officer as it showed defendant had the general intent to commit the crime against the police officer who had executed a traffic stop on defendant, by using defendant's automobile to commit an offensive act and make it likely the officer would sustain serious bodily injury as defendant was aware that the officer had both hands on defendant when defendant put the car in drive and sped off with the officer hanging on to defendant. Riels v. State, 259 Ga. App. 420, 577 S.E.2d 88 (2003).

Evidence that defendant forced a love interest to remain in the love interest's car against the love interest's will, that the defendant chased the love interest with the love interest's car when the love interest tried to escape, that the defendant hit the love interest with the car, and that the love interest suffered a broken ankle was sufficient to sustain defendant's convictions for false imprisonment and aggravated assault. Scott v. State, 268 Ga. App. 889, 602 S.E.2d 893 (2004).

Convictions against defendant for aggravated assault and simple assault did not require reversal because the police failed to preserve defendant's car after defendant had engaged in an aggressive car chase, which resulted in the assault charges based on defendant having used the car as a weapon, as there was no showing that the police acted in bad faith in failing to preserve the evidence and no evidence that suggested that the possible exculpatory value of the car was apparent before the car's destruction. Ransby v. State, 273 Ga. App. 594, 615 S.E.2d 651 (2005).

Withdrawal of plea to charge of aggravated assault on police officer was properly denied because the defendant agreed during the plea colloquy with the state's version of the facts that the defendant drove toward the officer-victim and rammed a stolen vehicle that the defendant was driving into the officer's car while the officer was in it and admitted to the court that the defendant was in fact guilty of the crime as charged. Sheffield v. State, 270 Ga. App. 576, 607 S.E.2d 205 (2004).

Officer stepped backward to avoid being struck by car.

- Evidence supported the defendant's conviction for aggravated assault, under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21(a)(2) and, because, when a police officer who was directing traffic approached the vehicle which the defendant was driving, the defendant pulled the vehicle out of the traffic, sped directly toward the officer, and then sped away. Furthermore, the officer specifically testified that the officer believed the vehicle would hit the officer and that the officer stepped backward to avoid being struck. Myers v. State, 311 Ga. App. 668, 716 S.E.2d 772 (2011).

Officer's statement on what the defendant saw was admissible.

- In the defendant's trial for aggravated assault on a peace officer, which required knowledge of the victim's identity as a police officer, the officer's statement regarding the defendant's attempt to run the officer down in a parking lot, "I know he saw me," was not improper speculation but was based on the officer's perception of events. Favors v. State, 296 Ga. 842, 770 S.E.2d 851 (2015).

Pinning victim to house with automobile.

- Defendant's conviction for aggravated assault with an object under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(b)(2) with regard to pinning the victim to a house with a vehicle was affirmed because the defendant was not entitled to jury instructions on the lesser included crimes of reckless conduct and reckless driving since the base crime of simple assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a)(2) did not require a specific intent to cause the victim to be apprehensive of receiving a violent injury. Patterson v. State, 299 Ga. 491, 789 S.E.2d 175 (2016).

Evidence of intent sufficient.

- Evidence of criminal intent was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of aggravated assault of a peace officer, notwithstanding that defendant might have had a seizure during the police chase, where: (1) defendant exhibited continued hostility of the officers during the chase; (2) defendant eluded rolling backups; (3) defendant maneuvered through stationary roadblocks; and (4) defendant maintained control of defendant's vehicle at high speeds during the chase. Dupree v. State, 267 Ga. App. 561, 600 S.E.2d 654 (2004).

Defendant's proceeding pro se after three detailed trial court warnings was not abuse of discretion; the defendant's conviction of two counts of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) aggravated assault and one count of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-70(c) cruelty to children (using defendant's car as a deadly weapon to run into the defendant's spouse's car with the spouse and child inside) was supported by sufficient evidence. Bush v. State, 268 Ga. App. 200, 601 S.E.2d 511 (2004).

Adjudications as to two counts of aggravated assault and two counts of failing to stop at or return to an accident scene were supported by sufficient evidence detailing the juvenile's act of striking two individuals with a car, and then leaving the scene of said accident; moreover, decisions as to the credibility of witnesses were in the province of the juvenile court, which apparently determined that the state disproved the juvenile's defense. In the Interest of J.L., 281 Ga. App. 105, 635 S.E.2d 393 (2006).

Trial court did not err by denying the defendant's motion for a directed verdict on an aggravated assault charge based on evidence that a deputy stood visibly in the roadway with the deputy's arms raised and yelling for defendant to stop the defendant's vehicle at a roadblock, defendant drove the vehicle at 40 miles per hour directly at the deputy who had to quickly jump out of the roadway to avoid being struck by the defendant's vehicle, and the deputy testified that the deputy feared being struck by the defendant's vehicle and receiving serious injuries; the jury was authorized to determine that the defendant had the requisite criminal intent to commit aggravated assault against the deputy, who was placed in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury. Taul v. State, 290 Ga. App. 288, 659 S.E.2d 646 (2008).

There was sufficient evidence to support a defendant's conviction for aggravated assault based on the defendant, after panicking from striking a vehicle in a nightclub parking lot, drove a vehicle with headlights on toward a sheriff's deputy providing security at the nightclub, accelerated towards the officer, and drove within two or three car lengths of the officer without stopping, at which point the officer ran out of the vehicle's path, which evidence authorized a jury to find that the defendant had the requisite intent to commit injury. Further, there was sufficient evidence to authorize a jury finding that the defendant intended to act in a manner that placed the officer in reasonable apprehension of an immediate violent injury based on the officer jumping to safety to avoid being struck by the vehicle. Adams v. State, 293 Ga. App. 377, 667 S.E.2d 186 (2008).

Evidence supported convictions of aggravated assault when the evidence showed that the defendant chased the victims in the defendant's car for about 15 miles, rear-ended their vehicle when the car attempted to make a turn, and ran the defendant's vehicle into their driver's side with enough force to push their vehicle up onto a curb; moreover, one victim testified that during the vehicle chase, it was apparent that the defendant and another person were trying to box the victim in with their vehicles and that the victim was very scared. The jury was not required to believe defendant's testimony that the incident was an accident. Windham v. State, 294 Ga. App. 72, 668 S.E.2d 526 (2008).

Aggravated assault by means of a deadly weapon (O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2)) is not a specific intent crime; the state is only required to prove a general intent to injure. Therefore, evidence that the defendant threatened to kill the victim and tried to hit the victim with the defendant's car was sufficient to prove that the defendant had the requisite intent to commit aggravated assault. Barnes v. State, 296 Ga. App. 493, 675 S.E.2d 233 (2009).

Defendant fled from police in a car, disregarded their orders to stop, and almost ran over one of the officers. Evidence that an officer reasonably feared receiving a violent injury when the defendant backed the car toward the officer, and that the defendant acted in reckless disregard for human life, was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction of aggravated assault by intent to murder. The defendant's defense, that the defendant was resisting an unlawful arrest, was meritless. Mackey v. State, 296 Ga. App. 675, 675 S.E.2d 567 (2009).

Evidence was sufficient to enable the trial court to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant possessed the intent necessary to commit aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a), and felony murder, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-1(c), because the defendant used a vehicle as an offensive weapon while the defendant was extremely drunk, and the evidence was sufficient to prove both forms of simply assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a)(1)-(2) by the defendant against all six of the victims; the defendant engaged in an extended high-speed car chase with a driver, deliberately rammed the other driver's truck, and attempted to smash into the other driver head-on after the truck stalled, and within minutes after the driver escaped, the defendant came upon the other five victims by swerving sharply into oncoming traffic and slamming into a vehicle. Guyse v. State, 286 Ga. 574, 690 S.E.2d 406 (2010).

Evidence was sufficient to enable the jury to determine that the defendant was guilty of aggravated assault beyond a reasonable doubt because the jury was authorized to infer from the defendant's conduct that the defendant had an intent to injure a driver or anybody who was in the defendant's way while the defendant attempted to elude police; the defendant crashed into the driver's car while the defendant led police on a high-speed chase in a stolen car. Johnson v. State, 289 Ga. 650, 715 S.E.2d 99 (2011).

Trial court erred in revoking probation pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 42-8-34.1 on the ground that the probationer committed an aggravated assault in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21 because there was insufficient evidence that the probationer committed an aggravated assault offense in violation of the terms of probation; there was no evidence supporting an aggravated assault based on an alleged victim's apprehension of injury because even assuming that the probationer's collision with another vehicle while evading an officer was the basis for the aggravated assault charge, there was no evidence as to the occupant's apprehension of receiving an injury or as to his or her conduct showing the injury. Klicka v. State, 315 Ga. App. 635, 727 S.E.2d 248 (2012).

Deliberately driving stolen van toward deputies.

- Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's conviction because the defendant drove the stolen white van directly toward the deputies when they attempted to detain him, only missing them when they dove out of the way. Miller v. State, 351 Ga. App. 757, 833 S.E.2d 142 (2019).

Assault With Hands, Fists, or Other Body Parts

Fists are not, per se, deadly weapons. Thomas v. State, 237 Ga. 690, 229 S.E.2d 458 (1976); Boling v. State, 244 Ga. 825, 262 S.E.2d 123 (1979); Meminger v. State, 160 Ga. App. 509, 287 S.E.2d 296 (1981), rev'd on other grounds, 249 Ga. 561, 292 S.E.2d 681 (1982).

While fists per se are not a deadly weapon within the meaning O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, they may be found to be a deadly weapon by the jury depending on the manner and means of their use, the wounds inflicted, etc. Quarles v. State, 130 Ga. App. 756, 204 S.E.2d 467 (1974); Guevara v. State, 151 Ga. App. 444, 260 S.E.2d 491 (1979); Boling v. State, 244 Ga. 825, 262 S.E.2d 123 (1979); Harper v. State, 152 Ga. App. 689, 263 S.E.2d 547 (1979); Wright v. State, 211 Ga. App. 431, 440 S.E.2d 27 (1994).

Striking with closed fist.

- Evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed aggravated assault and that such felony proximately caused the victim's death based on the testimony of two witnesses that showed that the defendant, without provocation, swung and hit the victim on the side of the head with a closed fist, and the medical examiner testified that the victim's cause of death was blunt force trauma to the head. Redding v. State, Ga. , 844 S.E.2d 725 (2020).

Hands as deadly weapons.

- Evidence that defendant beat the victim about the head and face with defendant's hands was sufficient to authorize the jury's verdict that defendant was guilty of aggravated assault. Scott v. State, 243 Ga. App. 383, 532 S.E.2d 141 (2000).

While hands are not considered deadly weapons per se within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), the fact finder may find them to be so depending on the circumstances surrounding their use, including the extent of the victim's injuries. Mallon v. State, 253 Ga. App. 51, 557 S.E.2d 409 (2001), overruled on other grounds, Rowland v. State, 349 Ga. App. 650, 825 S.E.2d 231 (2019).

Evidence that the defendant beat the victim about the head with the defendant's hands so hard that the victim's ears rang and was bleeding from both sides of the head was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for aggravated assault. Ferguson v. State, 322 Ga. App. 565, 745 S.E.2d 784 (2013).

Strangulation with hands.

- Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's conviction for aggravated assault as the evidence showed that the defendant jumped on top of the victim and choked the victim with the defendant's hands until a police officer pulled the defendant off, at which time the victim was gasping for breath and the pressure around the throat left red marks; thus, the jury was authorized to find that the defendant used the defendant's hands as a deadly weapon or object likely to result in serious bodily injury. Goodrum v. State, 335 Ga. App. 831, 783 S.E.2d 354 (2016).

Evidence was sufficient to prove aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a); an officer testified that the defendant had the victim in a chokehold and was leaning back to apply pressure to the victim's neck, that the victim was helpless, and that the defendant refused to let the victim go when ordered by the officer and had to be physically separated. Maxwell v. State, 348 Ga. App. 870, 825 S.E.2d 420 (2019).

There was sufficient evidence to support the defendant's conviction for aggravated assault as the victim testified that the defendant put the defendant's hands around the victim's neck, that the victim could not breathe, and that the pressure caused the victim to pass out, as well as to clench the victim's teeth so tightly that it broke one of the teeth on the victim's denture plate. Both the victim's son and the responding officer corroborated the victim's testimony, and the jury was able to view the photographs of the victim's neck. Sutton v. State, 354 Ga. App. 399, 841 S.E.2d 2 (2020).

Defense of property not sole defense.

- Trial court did not err in failing sua sponte to instruct the jury on the defense of property defense as the defendant's sole defense as the defendant claimed that the defendant did not cause the victim's injuries, defense counsel attempted to establish that the victim's recollection of the events was impaired by the victim's fading in and out of consciousness and by the victim's consumption of alcohol, and the jury was adequately instructed on witness credibility, the burden of proof, reasonable doubt, and the presumption of innocence. Strickland v. State, 267 Ga. App. 610, 600 S.E.2d 693 (2004).

Fists may constitute weapon likely to produce death. See Haygood v. State, 154 Ga. App. 633, 269 S.E.2d 480 (1980).

Whether fists are deadly weapons is question for jury. See Arnett v. State, 245 Ga. 470, 265 S.E.2d 771 (1980).

With regard to a defendant's conviction for aggravated assault and other related crimes, sufficient evidence existed to support the conviction since the evidence authorized the jury to find that the defendant beat the victim with the defendant's fists until the victim was rendered unconscious, fracturing bones in the victim's face. Ferrell v. State, 283 Ga. App. 471, 641 S.E.2d 658 (2007).

As the Georgia Court of Appeals has held, the use of hands to choke a victim can satisfy the deadly weapon or dangerous object element of aggravated assault and whether the use of hands rises to that level is a question for the jury. Goodrum v. State, 335 Ga. App. 831, 783 S.E.2d 354 (2016).

Fists and feet may be deadly weapons.

- Although fists and feet are not considered deadly weapons within the meaning of former Code 1933, § 26-1302, they may be found to be deadly weapons by the jury depending on the manner and means of their use. Kirby v. State, 145 Ga. App. 813, 245 S.E.2d 43 (1978); Dixon v. State, 268 Ga. 81, 485 S.E.2d 480 (1997); Braswell v. State, 245 Ga. App. 602, 538 S.E.2d 492 (2000) (see O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21).

Jury could find that a defendant's hands and feet, depending upon their use, wounds inflicted, and other surrounding circumstances, were deadly weapons or objects likely to result in serious bodily injury when used offensively against a person for purposes of aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2). Haugland v. State, 253 Ga. App. 423, 560 S.E.2d 50 (2002).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) as defendant repeatedly stomped defendant's work boots on the victim's chest and face, driving the victim's head into the floor. Kemp v. State, 257 Ga. App. 340, 571 S.E.2d 412 (2002).

While an indictment against defendant failed to state that defendant's hands were used as deadly weapons, this omission did not render the charge flawed, where the allegations set forth that defendant's hand were used as offensive objects, resulting in serious bodily injury to defendant's child. State v. English, 276 Ga. 343, 578 S.E.2d 413 (2003).

Sufficient evidence supported convictions of aggravated assault, criminal trespass, and obstruction of a9-1-1 call as the defendant became irate after a demand for a refund was denied by a store, a store manager told the defendant to leave, but the defendant refused, when the manager picked up the phone to call9-1-1, the defendant grabbed the phone and slammed it on the counter, the defendant pushed the bag of brass plates the defendant was trying to return in the manager's face, cutting the manager, and punched the manager in the face. Hooker v. State, 278 Ga. App. 382, 629 S.E.2d 74 (2006).

Delinquency finding for acts constituting party to the crimes of aggravated assault and battery was supported by sufficient evidence showing that the appellant was one of a group of youths who punched, kicked, and struck one victim with a shotgun, and participated in the attack; the appellant also knocked another victim to the ground and hit that victim during the fracas. In the Interest of E.R., 279 Ga. App. 423, 631 S.E.2d 458 (2006).

Two defendants were properly convicted of felony murder with aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), as the predicate felony since the evidence established that the defendants killed the victim by repeatedly striking the victim's face and head, and the jury was authorized to conclude that the defendants' hands and feet were used as deadly weapons. Dasher v. State, 285 Ga. 308, 676 S.E.2d 181 (2009).

Victim's testimony that the defendant pushed the victim off a porch railing then came down the stairs and kicked the victim in the mouth, after which the victim was paralyzed from the chest down, was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2). Morales v. State, 305 Ga. App. 569, 699 S.E.2d 864 (2010).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of aggravated assault because although hands and feet were not considered per se deadly weapons within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), the jury could find them to be so depending on the circumstances surrounding their use, including the extent of the victim's injuries. Lewis v. State, 317 Ga. App. 218, 735 S.E.2d 1 (2012).

Hands, fists, and shoe-clad feet are not necessarily or per se deadly weapons, but may or may not be deadly weapons depending upon the circumstances of the case. Chafin v. State, 154 Ga. App. 122, 267 S.E.2d 625 (1980).

Although hands, feet and a telephone receiver are not deadly weapons per se, the jury could find them to be deadly depending upon their use, wounds inflicted, and other surrounding circumstances. Wheeler v. State, 232 Ga. App. 749, 503 S.E.2d 628 (1998).

Whether defendant's hands were used as a deadly weapon within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21 was a jury question. Richards v. State, 222 Ga. App. 853, 476 S.E.2d 598 (1996).

Assault with shoe clad feet.

- Evidence supported a conviction of aggravated assault when the indictment alleged that the defendant kicked and stomped the victim with shoe clad feet, a means likely to cause serious bodily injury when used offensively against a person. Whether the defendant's shoe-clad feet constituted objects likely to result in serious injury was a question of fact for the jury, and given that the defendant stomped on and kicked the victim, rendering the victim bruised and unconscious, the jury was authorized to convict the defendant of aggravated assault. Windham v. State, 294 Ga. App. 72, 668 S.E.2d 526 (2008).

It is jury question as to whether or not shoe or boot constitutes deadly weapon, under all the circumstances surrounding the shoe or boot, its size, weight and construction, and the manner in which it was used. Williams v. State, 127 Ga. App. 386, 193 S.E.2d 633 (1972).

Use of brass knuckles.

- In a late-evening robbery of a pizzeria, the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendants of one count of aggravated assault when the second defendant struck one of the employees with brass knuckles because the jury was authorized to find that brass knuckles qualified, at a minimum, as an object, device, or instrumentality that was likely to cause serious bodily injury; and the first defendant was a party to the second defendant's use of the brass knuckles against the employee. Hughes v. State, 345 Ga. App. 107, 812 S.E.2d 363 (2018).

Actual serious injuries not required.

- Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of violating of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), as the indictment alleged that the aggravated assault was committed with objects likely to cause serious bodily injury (a broom handle and defendant's feet and hands), not that serious bodily injury in fact occurred. Massey v. State, 278 Ga. App. 303, 628 S.E.2d 706 (2006).

Photographs of victim's injuries.

- In a prosecution for a violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), as the indictment alleged that the aggravated assault was committed with objects likely to cause serious bodily injury (a broom handle and the defendant's feet and hands), photos depicting the condition of the victim, one of which depicted the defendant's foot print on the victim's face, were relevant to establish the nature and extent of the injury. Massey v. State, 278 Ga. App. 303, 628 S.E.2d 706 (2006).

Denial of motion for acquittal proper.

- Defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal on an aggravated assault of a peace officer charge was properly denied as the evidence supported the conviction since an officer testified that the defendant knocked the officer to the ground, attempted to remove the officer's firearm from its holster, told the officer that defendant "was going to take care of (the officer)," indicated that the defendant wanted the defendant's drugs back, grabbed the drugs, and ran away; a videotape of the incident was also admitted at trial. Bolden v. State, 281 Ga. App. 258, 636 S.E.2d 29 (2006).

Jury instructions.

- Since defendant's aggravated assault conviction merged as a matter of law into defendant's malice murder conviction, any complaint by defendant about the jury instruction on aggravated assault was rendered moot. Mason v. State, 279 Ga. 636, 619 S.E.2d 621 (2005).

Biting victim with risk of transmitting HIV virus.

- When defendant was tried for aggravated assault with intent to murder after biting a police officer, the jury could rationally find the risk of transmitting the HIV virus through a human bite rendered defendant's bite, if not defendant's spittle, a "deadly" weapon beyond a reasonable doubt. Scroggins v. State, 198 Ga. App. 29, 401 S.E.2d 13 (1990), cert. denied, 198 Ga. App. 898, 401 S.E.2d 13 (1991).

Hands likely to cause serious bodily injury sufficient for indictment.

- Trial court erred in quashing an aggravated assault count against defendant because the indictment was sufficient where it alleged that defendant assaulted defendant's spouse with defendant's hands, which, when used offensively were likely to cause serious bodily injury; further, the indictment did not need to additionally charge in the language of simple assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20 in order to withstand demurrer. State v. Tate, 262 Ga. App. 311, 585 S.E.2d 224 (2003).

Sixth Amendment violation was harmless error.

- Although the admission of a victim's statements to a deputy violated defendant's Sixth Amendment rights, the error was harmless as to defendant's aggravated assault and battery convictions in light of the photographs of the victim's injuries and the defendant's admission that the defendant grabbed the victim around the neck and that the defendant might have hit the victim in the face. Miller v. State, 273 Ga. App. 761, 615 S.E.2d 843 (2005).

Choking victim and slamming her around room.

- Evidence supported defendant's rape, aggravated sodomy, aggravated assault, criminal trespass, misdemeanor obstruction of a law enforcement officer, felony obstruction of a law enforcement officer, and possession of marijuana conviction because: (1) a victim testified that defendant choked the victim, slammed the victim around a room, and raped and sodomized the victim, then drank a beer, took some BC powder packets, and cell phone, and left; (2) defendant fled from the police, kicked two officers, and had marijuana, BC packets, and a cell phone; (3) defendant's DNA matched the DNA on the beer can; (4) a nurse testified that the victim's bruise was consistent with strangulation; and (5) a doctor testified that the victim's injuries were consistent with rape and sodomy. Lewis v. State, 271 Ga. App. 744, 611 S.E.2d 80 (2005).

No merger with family violence battery.

- Aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21 with fists only and family violence battery under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-23.1(f) with fists and a bottle upon the defendant's then live-in love interest were not required to be merged under O.C.G.A. § 16-1-7(a) because there were two separate incidents separated by the love interest's visit to a store and because the aggravated assault did not require the use of a bottle. Collins v. State, 277 Ga. App. 381, 626 S.E.2d 513 (2006).

Evidence sufficient to show beating.

- Evidence that the defendant beat the victim about the head and face with the defendant's hands was sufficient to authorize the jury's verdict that the defendant was guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt, of aggravated assault, particularly in light of the victim's concussion and fractured face bone caused by the defendant's punches. Sims v. State, 296 Ga. App. 461, 675 S.E.2d 241 (2009).

Evidence was insufficient to sustain a juvenile court's finding that a child committed aggravated battery in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24(a) because there was no showing that the child's ongoing memory and cognitive problems were caused by the beating and not by a preexisting brain tumor and brain surgeries; however, the evidence was sufficient to show an aggravated assault. In the Interest of Q. S., 310 Ga. App. 70, 712 S.E.2d 99 (2011).

Evidence that the defendant struck the male victim in the back of the head with a pistol and participated in further beating the male victim during a fight involving the defendant and at least eight others, and that the male victim sustained serious bodily injury when the male victim lost a tooth sometime during the fight was sufficient to support the aggravated assault conviction as to the male victim. Bledson v. State, 337 Ga. App. 444, 787 S.E.2d 809 (2016).

Evidence sufficient for assault on infant.

- Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated assault, given the defendant's own admissions to the police that the defendant had shaken the defendant's love interest's infant; the jury was entitled to reject the defendant's version of events and credit the testimony of the state's multiple medical experts, as each of the experts testified that the child's severe injuries were inconsistent with the defendant's explanation for the injuries. Sullivan v. State, 277 Ga. App. 738, 627 S.E.2d 437 (2006).

Sufficient circumstantial evidence supported the defendant's conviction of aggravated assault in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21 upon the eight-month-old victim, as a jury could have concluded that the other children, ages four and five, could not have injured the victim; medical testimony indicated that such shaken baby injuries could not have been caused by the other children, and the defendant was the only adult with the child at the time the injuries were allegedly sustained. Mahan v. State, 282 Ga. App. 201, 638 S.E.2d 366 (2006).

Evidence that the baby had been in the defendant's care for more than two hours when the baby died; that in the medical examiner's opinion, the baby would have died within minutes or hours of suffering a brain injury; and that the autopsy uncovered extensive internal injuries to the baby was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for cruelty to children, aggravated assault, and aggravated battery. Graham v. State, 320 Ga. App. 714, 740 S.E.2d 649 (2013).

Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's convictions for aggravated battery, aggravated assault, and cruelty to children with regard to the skull fracture and other head injuries incurred by the defendant's infant son because the expert testimony and medical evidence established that the child's injuries were not accidental but caused by a blow to the head and severe trauma. Oliver v. State, 324 Ga. App. 53, 748 S.E.2d 510 (2013).

Assault With Other Objects

Knife with two blades each three and one-fourth inches in length was deadly weapon. Powell v. State, 140 Ga. App. 36, 230 S.E.2d 90 (1976).

Knives.

- Sufficient evidence existed to support defendant's conviction for burglary, aggravated assault, and two counts of cruelty to children in the second degree based on the evidence adduced at trial that the defendant broke into the adult victim's apartment through a rear window and attacked the victim, stabbed the adult victim in the neck, dragged the victim down the hall, and stabbed the victim's hand, and although the defendant put a cloth over the victim's face at some point, the adult victim saw that the person stabbing the victim in the neck was the defendant, the victim's ex-boyfriend, and the victim positively and consistently identified the defendant as the perpetrator. White v. State, 319 Ga. App. 530, 737 S.E.2d 324 (2013).

Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's convictions for aggravated assault with a knife and theft by shoplifting based on the testimony of the loss prevention officer, who witnessed the defendant take the watch, and the testimony of both the loss prevention officer and the store manager, who indicated that the defendant had a knife. Broom v. State, 331 Ga. App. 564, 769 S.E.2d 400 (2015), cert. denied, No. S15C1173, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 520 (Ga. 2015).

Defensive use of knife.

- O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21 does not differentiate between offensive and defensive threats of immediate bodily harm, and a knife may constitute a "deadly weapon" even though the victim was out of striking range and the defendant maintained a defensive posture. Davis v. State, 184 Ga. App. 230, 361 S.E.2d 229 (1987).

Box cutter.

- Evidence did not support finding that defendant had committed aggravated assault because the state did not show that a box cutter was a deadly weapon; the state showed only that the defendant hit the victim with the blunt side of a box cutter, inflicting minor injuries, but there was no evidence that the blade was ever exposed or that defendant threatened the victim with an exposed blade. Ware v. State, 289 Ga. App. 860, 658 S.E.2d 441 (2008).

Razor blades.

- Since the evidence showed the first defendant threatened to cut the victim and hit the victim with a razor blade in the defendant's hand, there was no error in the denial of the defendant's motion for a directed verdict on the aggravated assault charge. Griffin v. State, 292 Ga. 321, 737 S.E.2d 682 (2013).

Scissors.

- Evidence that the defendant approached the first victim while holding scissors and threatened the victim supported a conviction for aggravated assault. Bradley v. State, 322 Ga. App. 541, 745 S.E.2d 763 (2013).

Chain.

- Evidence supported defendant's conviction of aggravated assault on a peace officer in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) where the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the state, showed that defendant, after being sprayed with pepper spray during a confrontation with a police officer, grabbed a long chain and swung it over defendant's head while moving toward the officer; defendant's testimony that defendant had been backing away with the chain raised an issue of credibility for the jury to resolve. Chancey v. State, 258 Ga. App. 319, 574 S.E.2d 383 (2002).

Ceramic vase is not per se an offensive or deadly weapon. Banks v. State, 169 Ga. App. 571, 314 S.E.2d 235 (1984).

Table as tool for assault.

- Based on the victim's testimony that the victim was concerned that the victim would be injured by the table the defendant threw at the victim, a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant used the table offensively in a manner that was likely to cause serious bodily injury, supporting the defendant's conviction for aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2). Hendrix v. State, 328 Ga. App. 819, 762 S.E.2d 820 (2014).

Pencil.

- Sufficient evidence supported the finding that the defendant, a juvenile, had committed an act that would have constituted aggravated assault in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2); circumstantial evidence, including cuts on the victim's face, discovery of the pencil in the vicinity of the assault, and the investigating officer's testimony, corroborated the victim's belief that the defendant wielded a broken pencil during the attack. In the Interest of M.V.H., 281 Ga. App. 486, 636 S.E.2d 168 (2006).

Pen.

- Evidence sufficed to sustain the jury's determination that the defendant was guilty of aggravated assault in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) for stabbing a store manager with a pen because the defendant stabbed the manager with the pen with such force that it bent the pen and broke the manager's skin, causing bleeding; the jury viewed the weapon and received testimony and photographic evidence about the nature and extent of the victim's actual injuries and the manner in which the defendant used the pen to stab the manager. Griggs v. State, 303 Ga. App. 442, 693 S.E.2d 615 (2010).

Metal cane employed to beat victim's head sufficiently showed the use of an instrumentality in a way that was likely to cause serious injury, so as to prove aggravated assault. Coney v. State, 209 Ga. App. 9, 432 S.E.2d 812 (1993).

Metal objects.

- Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's conviction of aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) after the defendant's companions used metal knuckles, a metal pipe, and a gun to beat the victim; the defendant was a party to the offense under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(a), as the victim, whose testimony was sufficient to establish a fact under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8), testified that, during the incident, the defendant summoned the companions to help beat the victim, and the defendant and the companions repeatedly warned the victim not to testify in court in the defendant's criminal case. Souder v. State, 281 Ga. App. 339, 636 S.E.2d 68 (2006), cert. denied, No. S07C0113, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 97 (Ga. 2007); overruled on other grounds by Willis v. State, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 685 (Ga. 2018).

Evidence that the defendant threw a punch at the victim, who punched the defendant back and walked away; and that the defendant followed the victim and aggressively swung a metal rod at the victim, who felt threatened enough to go into a residence, was sufficient to adjudicate the defendant delinquent of committing acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted felony aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21. The trial court was authorized to find that it was the victim, not the defendant, who acted in self defense. In the Interest of J. W. B., 296 Ga. App. 131, 673 S.E.2d 630 (2009).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of aggravated assault because a police officer met with the victim, who identified the defendant as the assailant and told the officer that the defendant had struck the victim with something like a tire iron; the officer found a metal bar that was approximately 18-20 inches long with a 90 degree bend at the end, and at night could have easily been mistaken for a tire iron; the metal bar had a tip on it that was consistent with the shape of the wound on the victim's head; and a rational jury could have found that the state disproved the defendant's self-defense claim as all of the testimony presented at trial pointed to the defendant as the initial aggressor who attacked the unarmed victim. Tremblay v. State, 329 Ga. App. 139, 764 S.E.2d 163 (2014).

Pry bar.

- Testimony indicating that the defendant struck the victim in the head and on the arm with a pry bar, breaking the victim's arm and pulling the flesh away from the victim's head, was sufficient to convict the defendant of aggravated battery under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24 and aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21. Mattis v. State, 282 Ga. App. 49, 637 S.E.2d 787 (2006).

Iron.

- Testimony that defendant struck the victim with a hot iron along with photographs of the wounds were sufficient to support finding that defendant used the iron as an offensive weapon. Hill v. State, 230 Ga. App. 395, 496 S.E.2d 526 (1998).

Use of a dog can be considered a deadly weapon. Perkins v. State, 197 Ga. App. 577, 398 S.E.2d 702 (1990).

Use of a dog.

- Officer's testimony that the defendant yelled to the defendant's dog "sic him boy, bite him" before the dog attacked the officer was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for aggravated assault on a peace officer. Braziel v. State, 320 Ga. App. 6, 739 S.E.2d 13 (2013).

Lit cigarette constituted an offensive weapon likely to cause serious injury when, after defendant doused the victim, a store clerk, with gasoline, the defendant profanely insisted that the victim give the defendant "the money" or the defendant would burn the victim with the cigarette. Johnson v. State, 246 Ga. App. 109, 539 S.E.2d 605 (2000).

Bludgeon device used as offensive weapon.

- When the testimonies of the victim, a doctor, and other witnesses were a sufficient indication under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-6) of the severity of the blow to show that a bludgeon device was used as an offensive weapon, there was sufficient competent evidence to find defendant guilty of armed robbery and aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21(a) and16-8-41(a). Garrett v. State, 263 Ga. App. 310, 587 S.E.2d 794 (2003).

Assault with a baseball bat.

- Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for aggravated assault and attempted robbery; the description of the crimes as they occurred by a witness to a9-1-1 operator, the9-1-1 tape transcript of that call, the observations of the police officers who responded to the call of the witness that an African-American person was beating a Hispanic person with a baseball bat while trying to take money out of the Hispanic person's pockets, and the testimony of the witness at trial was sufficient to overcome evidence that the witness gave a false name to police, that the witness was unable to identify defendant at trial, and that the victim did not testify at trial. Williams v. State, 275 Ga. App. 491, 621 S.E.2d 512 (2005).

Testimony of the state's witnesses that the defendant struck the victims with a baseball bat, coupled with testimony and photographs depicting the defendants' injuries, amply supported the defendant's conviction of two counts of aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2). Gray v. State, 291 Ga. App. 573, 662 S.E.2d 339 (2008).

Wooden plank.

- Trial court properly denied a defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal following the defendant's conviction for aggravated assault of a romantic friend as the evidence sufficiently established that the defendant's friend sustained serious bodily injury as a result of being attacked with a wooden plank with which the defendant struck the friend on the back and head with repeatedly. The testimony and photographs admitted at trial reflected that, as a result of the defendant repeatedly striking the victim with the wooden plank, the victim was bruised on multiple parts of the body and experienced soreness, saw "stars," and fell to the ground. Reynolds v. State, 294 Ga. App. 213, 668 S.E.2d 846 (2008).

Tree limb.

- There was sufficient evidence to support a defendant juvenile's conviction of aggravated assault as the defendant juvenile hit a victim with a "big old broken tree limb," bruising the victim's back; whether the tree limb was a deadly weapon under the aggravated assault statute, capable of causing serious bodily injury, was an issue for the factfinder. In the Interest of T.W., 280 Ga. App. 693, 634 S.E.2d 854 (2006).

Convictions against the defendant for malice murder, burglary, armed robbery, and aggravated assault were supported by evidence that the defendant entered the victim's home, hit the victim multiple times about the head and face with a tree limb with a metal piece on the limb, and wrote a check in defendant's name from the victim's checkbook; evidence included witness testimony from the bank where defendant cashed the check, defendant's confession to police, and physical evidence. Bell v. State, 284 Ga. 790, 671 S.E.2d 815 (2009).

Stick and brick.

- Evidence that the defendant intentionally struck the victim with a stick and that either the defendant or one of the other parties to the assault intentionally struck the victim with their fists and a concrete block supported an aggravated assault conviction; further, although the victim was the only person who testified about having been hit with a concrete block, and was not sure which of the attackers struck that blow, this testimony was sufficient to establish that the victim was hit with a concrete block because it made no difference whether an accomplice, and not the defendant, assaulted the victim in the manner alleged in the indictment. Oliver v. State, 278 Ga. App. 425, 629 S.E.2d 63 (2006).

Brick.

- Defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the defendant's aggravated assault conviction failed because the admission of the victim's statement to police that the defendant threw a brick at the victim's vehicle as the victim was driving down the street was not erroneous since the statement was admitted without objection, and an off-duty officer observed glass on the victim and the victim's sister observed glass and speckles of blood on the victim immediately after the incident. Jones v. State, 321 Ga. App. 900, 743 S.E.2d 557 (2013).

Machete.

- There was sufficient evidence to conclude that the defendant, charged with aggravated assault with a deadly weapon resulting in serious bodily injury, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), and aggravated battery by maliciously causing bodily harm and serious disfigurement in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24(a), was the person who attacked the victim with a machete; the victim and two other persons identified the defendant, and a witness testified that the defendant told the witness that the defendant had hit a person with a machete after someone threw an object at the defendant's car. Emberson v. State, 271 Ga. App. 773, 611 S.E.2d 83 (2005).

Convictions for theft, aggravated assault, and making a terroristic threat was supported by evidence because the defendant admitted to taking gas cans, raised a machete to scare or strike the defendant's sibling, the sibling was frightened and ran, and the defendant then threatened the siblings that if either called the sheriff the defendant would return and kill them. Turner v. State, 273 Ga. App. 535, 615 S.E.2d 603 (2005).

Meat cleaver.

- Evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for aggravated assault in a case where the defendant, an occasional houseguest, became angry at a relative, retrieved a meat cleaver, and attacked the relative, who grabbed a pool cue to in self-defense; the defendant's conduct amounted to a reasonable imminent threat of the use of deadly force and the relative, under the circumstances, was entitled to use force in defense of habitation pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-3-23. Robison v. State, 277 Ga. App. 133, 625 S.E.2d 533 (2006).

Assault with brick.

- Evidence that, after an officer stopped defendant's car and asked defendant to exit the vehicle, defendant attempted to flee, and, in the ensuing struggle, struck the officer with a brick was sufficient to support defendant's aggravated assault conviction, as any alleged inconsistencies in the victim's testimony were for the jury to resolve, rather than an appellate court. Monroe v. State, 273 Ga. App. 14, 614 S.E.2d 172 (2005).

Pipe.

- Evidence that the defendant struck the victim with a pipe was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction of aggravated assault. Bilow v. State, 279 Ga. App. 509, 631 S.E.2d 743 (2006).

Metal pipe.

- While, at trial, the victim of the defendant's assault disavowed an initial, pre-trial statement to police and medical personnel that the defendant hit the victim with a metal pipe, the jury was authorized to believe the victim's pre-trial statement rather than the victim's in-court disavowal, and sufficient evidence supported the defendant's conviction of aggravated assault, Leonard v. State, 279 Ga. App. 192, 630 S.E.2d 804 (2006).

Possession of destructive device offense did not merge with aggravated assault.

- Defendant's aggravated assault convictions and the defendant's possession of a destructive device convictions did not merge because the possession offense required that the weapon function in a certain way and have certain dimensions, and the assault offense required that the victim was conscious of the risk of immediately receiving a violent injury by use of an offensive weapon. Because each offense required proof of a fact not required for the other, there was no merger under the required evidence test. Mason v. State, 312 Ga. App. 723, 719 S.E.2d 581 (2011).

Evidence that the defendant approached the victim from behind and struck the victim after the victim received cash in payment for delivering pizza and that the defendant attempted to use an automotive water pump to hit the victim was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for aggravated assault and criminal attempt to commit armed robbery. Simmons v. State, 342 Ga. App. 853, 805 S.E.2d 615 (2017).

Lamp.

- When the defendant was accused of felony murder and aggravated assault by throwing a lamp at the victims, because the indictment alleged that the lamp was an object that when used offensively against a person was likely to and actually did result in serious bodily injury, an allegation that the lamp was a deadly weapon was not required. Furthermore, the indictment was not too vague as the defendant clearly was apprised that the defendant would have to defend against the allegation that the defendant struck one victim on and about the head with the lamp, and the defendant admitted to a law enforcement officer that the defendant had thrown the lamp at the other victim. Hester v. State, 283 Ga. 367, 659 S.E.2d 600 (2008).

Ten-pound wooden chair.

- Juvenile's adjudication for aggravated assault on a peace officer was supported by evidence that, after disrupting a classroom and being escorted to the principal's office, the juvenile picked up a 10-pound wooden chair and threw the chair at the school resource officer, who testified the officer was apprehensive of injury and had to make an evasive move to avoid the chair. In the Interest of I. H., 350 Ga. App. 394, 829 S.E.2d 437 (2019).

Glass bowl.

- Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) because defendant hurled a glass bowl at a motel manager, which caused injuries when the manager raised a hand in front of the manager's face for protection. Watson v. State, 301 Ga. App. 824, 689 S.E.2d 104 (2009).

Beer bottle.

- Victim was struck from behind with a beer bottle; the victim's head was cut, requiring stitches. The circumstantial evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of aggravated assault because: (1) the victim saw defendant standing close behind the victim after the blow was struck, and defendant began fighting with the victim; (2) similar transaction evidence showed the defendant's history of making unprovoked attacks on unsuspecting victims; and (3) a bartender's testimony that someone else committed the crime was internally inconsistent and uncorroborated. Maiorano v. State, 294 Ga. App. 726, 669 S.E.2d 678 (2008).

Defendant's act of throwing a beer bottle at a deputy sheriff at close range and with such force that the bottle shattered on impact was sufficient to allow a jury to conclude that the defendant used a bottle offensively against the officer in a manner likely to have resulted in serious bodily injury within the meaning of the aggravated assault statute, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2). Reese v. State, 303 Ga. App. 871, 695 S.E.2d 326 (2010).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of aggravated assault and a violation of the Georgia Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-15-1 et seq., because various gang members including the defendant's brother and their associate were on the dance floor flashing gang hand signs and dancing roughly, purposefully bumping into other club patrons, and an altercation ensued; the defendant's brother struck the victim in the back of the victim's head with a beer bottle; the defendant's associate and several others struck the victim and punched the victim in the head; when the victim walked toward the exit door, the defendant hit the victim across the face with a bottle; and the victim was taken by ambulance to a hospital. Dowdell v. State, 325 Ga. App. 593, 754 S.E.2d 383 (2014).

Unknown object.

- Defendant was properly convicted of aggravated assault for repeatedly cutting a person's arm. Even though the victim could not identify what kind of weapon inflicted the wound, a treating nurse testified the wound was inflicted by a sharp instrument, like a box cutter, and the victim's testimony established all the other elements of the offense. Freeman v. State, 297 Ga. App. 496, 678 S.E.2d 97 (2009).

Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's conviction for aggravated assault based on the defendant's admission that the defendant hit the victim on the head as well as the testimony of the forensic pathologist, which established that the victim sustained two head injuries as a result of blunt force trauma; that the state was unable to definitively identify the object or instrument that caused the head injuries did not render the evidence insufficient to prove aggravated assault. King v. State, 304 Ga. 349, 818 S.E.2d 612 (2018).

Screwdriver.

- Evidence showed aggravated assault because the defendant had a long screwdriver in the defendant's hand, the defendant took a swing at the victim when the victim caught up to the defendant, the victim assumed a fighting stance until the victim noticed the screwdriver and immediately retreated, and the victim did not thereafter try to personally apprehend the defendant but opted to call the police and only trailed the defendant while keeping a safe distance; the jury was not required to view the evidence as the defendant urged. Davis v. State, 308 Ga. App. 7, 706 S.E.2d 710 (2011).

Assault with Intent to Murder

Definition of assault with intent to murder is assault without justification and without any circumstances of mitigation made by one person upon another, with a weapon in its nature likely to produce death, with the specific intent at the time unlawfully to take the life of the person assaulted. Killian v. State, 19 Ga. App. 750, 92 S.E. 227 (1917).

Elements of assault with intent to murder.

- To constitute the offense of assault with intent to murder, there must be an assault by one person upon another, with a weapon likely to produce death in the manner used, the assault must be actuated by malice, either express or implied, and made by a person making the assault with the specific intent to kill the person assaulted. Reddick v. State, 11 Ga. App. 150, 74 S.E. 901 (1912); Griffin v. State, 50 Ga. App. 213, 177 S.E. 511 (1934); Anderson v. State, 51 Ga. App. 98, 179 S.E. 654 (1935); Dennis v. State, 51 Ga. App. 538, 180 S.E. 909 (1935).

On the trial of one indicted for the offense of assault with intent to murder by the use of a deadly weapon, the burden is on the state to show: (1) the assault; (2) the deadly character of the weapon; (3) the intent to take life; and (4) the commission of the assault under such circumstances that, had death ensued, the party making the assault would have been guilty of the offense of murder. Jackson v. State, 56 Ga. App. 374, 192 S.E. 633 (1937).

There must be overt act. Jackson v. State, 103 Ga. 417, 30 S.E. 251 (1898).

Proof of assault with intent to murder requires proof of all elements of murder except victim's death. Jackson v. State, 51 Ga. 402 (1874); Caudle v. State, 7 Ga. App. 848, 68 S.E. 343 (1910); Baker v. State, 88 Ga. App. 894, 78 S.E.2d 357 (1953).

Evidence must show specific intent to kill person assaulted.

- Specific intent to kill is an essential ingredient of the offense of assault with intent to commit murder. Neese v. State, 40 Ga. App. 503, 150 S.E. 451 (1929).

One cannot legally be convicted of an assault with intent to murder unless the evidence shows that the assault was committed with the specific intent to kill the person assaulted. Gresham v. State, 46 Ga. App. 54, 166 S.E. 443 (1932).

To constitute the offense of assault with intent to murder there must be a specific intent to kill, which is not necessarily or conclusively shown by the use of a weapon likely to produce death. Titshaw v. State, 51 Ga. App. 60, 179 S.E. 641 (1935); Jackson v. State, 99 Ga. App. 740, 109 S.E.2d 886 (1959).

Specific intent to kill will not be presumed.

- When death ensues from the use of a deadly weapon, a specific intent to kill will be presumed; but when death does not ensue, such an intent will not be presumed. In a charge of assault with intent to murder, proof of the specific intent to kill is a necessary ingredient of the crime. Hawks v. State, 51 Ga. App. 317, 180 S.E. 363 (1935).

Single shot assaulting two individuals.

- Firing of a single shotgun blast at a car containing two persons in the front seat of the car authorized defendant's conviction for the offense of aggravated assault as to both individuals. Cavender v. State, 208 Ga. App. 61, 429 S.E.2d 711 (1993).

Indictment must allege intent to kill.

- In an indictment for assault with intent to murder, the intent to kill cannot be implied or inferred by the state, but must be specifically alleged; and the jury may or may not infer such intention from the facts proved. Minge v. State, 45 Ga. App. 197, 164 S.E. 68 (1932) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 97).

Indictment sufficient.

- Indictment which alleged that defendant assaulted another person "with a handgun, a deadly weapon" was sufficient to inform defendant of the charge defendant had to defend, and the trial court properly overruled defendant's special demurrer alleging that the indictment was deficient because it did not specify whether defendant committed the assault by shooting the victim, pointing the gun at the victim, or beating the victim with the gun. Arthur v. State, 275 Ga. 790, 573 S.E.2d 44 (2002).

Allegation that act was committed "with malice aforethought" is not equivalent to allegation of "intent to kill," which must be specifically alleged in an indictment for assault with intent to murder. Minge v. State, 45 Ga. App. 197, 164 S.E. 68 (1932).

Intent to kill may be gathered from circumstances and is jury question.

- Existence of intent to murder is matter of fact to be ascertained by the jury from all the evidence before the jury, and not a matter for legal inference or presumption. Minge v. State, 45 Ga. App. 197, 164 S.E. 68 (1932).

Intention of the defendant is a question for determination by the jury under the facts and circumstances surrounding the occurrence. Vickery v. State, 48 Ga. App. 851, 174 S.E. 155 (1934).

While the intent to kill is not conclusively shown by the use of a weapon likely to produce death, such intent may be gathered from circumstances and is a matter for the determination of the jury. Griffin v. State, 50 Ga. App. 213, 177 S.E. 511 (1934); Dennis v. State, 51 Ga. App. 538, 180 S.E. 909 (1935); Jackson v. State, 56 Ga. App. 374, 192 S.E. 633 (1937).

In prosecution for assault with intent to murder, the court, in passing upon the intent, may take into consideration all the facts and circumstances of the case at the time of the attack, and also the nature of the wound inflicted. Breland v. State, 80 Ga. App. 575, 56 S.E.2d 921 (1949).

Proving intent.

- Intent to kill may be established by proving, to satisfaction of jury, reckless disregard of human life. Minge v. State, 45 Ga. App. 197, 164 S.E. 68 (1932).

Intent to kill may be inferred.

- While to authorize a conviction for assault with intent to murder a deliberate intent to kill must be shown at the time of the assault, such intent may be inferred by the jury from the nature of the instrument used in making the assault, the manner of its use, and the nature of the wounds inflicted. Reece v. State, 60 Ga. App. 195, 3 S.E.2d 229 (1939); Tanner v. State, 86 Ga. App. 767, 72 S.E.2d 549 (1952).

Jury may consider brutality and duration of assault as circumstances from which intent to kill may be inferred. Reece v. State, 60 Ga. App. 195, 3 S.E.2d 229 (1939).

Evidence sufficient to show intent.

- When the defendant was tried for aggravated assault with intent to murder after biting a police officer, the jury's finding of "intent to murder" was supported by evidence that the defendant sucked up excess sputum before biting the officer - this being evidence of a deliberate, thinking act rather than purely spontaneous - and that the defendant laughed when the officer asked the defendant if the defendant had AIDS. Scroggins v. State, 198 Ga. App. 29, 401 S.E.2d 13 (1990), cert. denied, 198 Ga. App. 898, 401 S.E.2d 13 (1991).

Evidence was sufficient to adjudicate a juvenile a delinquent for aggravated assault with intent to murder when: (1) the juvenile was willingly present when the victim was beaten and stabbed; (2) the juvenile was part of a group carrying bricks, sticks, and bats on a mission of revenge; and (3) the juvenile fled the crime scene and gave police false information moments after the incident, because, under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20, whether the juvenile actually stabbed the victim was not controlling, as the juvenile was an accomplice of those who did, and it could be inferred from the juvenile's conduct before and after the crime that the juvenile shared the perpetrators' criminal intent. In the Interest of N.L.G., 267 Ga. App. 428, 600 S.E.2d 401 (2004).

Jury was authorized to find that the defendant intended to murder a kidnapping victim since the defendant strangled the victim after the defendant's spouse told the defendant to get rid of the victim, the defendant's conduct caused the victim to lose consciousness and created such pressure in the victim's neck that both eyes hemorrhaged, and the defendant then threw the victim into the back of the defendant's car trunk and drove away. Moody v. State, 279 Ga. App. 440, 631 S.E.2d 485 (2006).

Evidence supported a defendant's conviction for malice murder and assault as: (1) the defendant told a first witness that the defendant had killed a man; (2) the defendant had tried to sell the victim's car; (3) the defendant admitted to police that the defendant had the key to the victim's car; and (4) the defendant told a fellow prisoner that the defendant and an accomplice strangled the victim, beat the victim, stabbed the victim, cut the victim's throat, and tore out the victim's fingernails. Richard v. State, 281 Ga. 401, 637 S.E.2d 406 (2006).

Reasonable jury was entitled to find that the defendant acted with the intent to kill the victim, as required to find the defendant guilty of aggravated assault with the intent to murder, based on the fact that the defendant lured the victim down a secluded path while arguing with the victim and repeatedly kicked and struck the victim with tree limbs so that the victim could barely walk. Gipson v. State, 332 Ga. App. 309, 772 S.E.2d 402 (2015).

Aggravated assault merged into felony murder.

- Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for aggravated assault based on the non-fatal beating of the victim where: (1) the victim had been beaten, but had died from strangulation; (2) the victim's clothing was found in defendant's apartment complex's trash bin; and (3) the victim's DNA was present in blood on defendant's bedspread. Thus, the aggravated assault conviction merged into the felony murder conviction; however, a Separate aggravated assault conviction based on the non-fatal beating of the victim did not merge. Scott v. State, 276 Ga. 195, 576 S.E.2d 860 (2003).

Erroneous charge to jury that assault with intent to murder linked to possibility of murder conviction.

- Charge to jury that if it finds that defendant would have been guilty of murder if victim of assault had died (which the victim did not) that defendant would now be guilty of assault with intent to murder is erroneous, but it is not always reversible error to give such charge. Bradford v. State, 69 Ga. App. 856, 26 S.E.2d 848 (1943).

Failure to charge jury on law of assault with intent to murder when victim died of wounds.

- When in trial for murder, whether or not the evidence demanded a finding that the deceased died of a wound inflicted by defendant, it showed conclusively and without dispute that the deceased died as a result of a wound or wounds inflicted by one or more of the persons jointly indicted, the court did not err in failing to charge the jury on the law of assault with intent to murder. Fudge v. State, 190 Ga. 340, 9 S.E.2d 259 (1940).

Evidence sufficient for aggravated assault conviction.

- Evidence that the defendant shot the victim with a gun in a dispute over money the victim allegedly owed to the defendant was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for aggravated assault as it showed the defendant used a deadly weapon to inflict serious bodily injury on the victim. Render v. State, 257 Ga. App. 477, 571 S.E.2d 493 (2002).

Maximum sentence properly imposed.

- When the defendant was convicted of aggravated assault, burglary, theft by taking, and carrying a concealed weapon, the trial court properly imposed a 111-year sentence of imprisonment, which was within the statutory limits and which was the maximum possible. The presumption of vindictiveness was absent when a trial court imposed a greater penalty after trial than the court would have after a guilty plea; furthermore, the trial court explained that the court imposed the sentence because the defendant's actions were life-threatening, because the jury convicted the defendant of entering the dwelling with intent to commit murder, because the defendant's actions against one victim, the defendant's parent, had escalated from the defendant's previous misdemeanor crimes against the parent, and because the defendant displayed no remorse. Townes v. State, 298 Ga. App. 185, 679 S.E.2d 772 (2009).

Defendant properly sentenced for attempted murder rather than aggravated assault.

- Defendant's appeal from the defendant's conviction of attempted murder, in which the defendant argued that the law was ambiguous about whether the defendant's attempt to kill the defendant's wife was punishable as attempted murder or only as aggravated assault, was res judicata and barred the defendant's petition for habeas corpus; contrary to the defendant's argument, there was no change in the law because McNair v. State, 293 Ga. 282 (2013) applying the rule of lenity when there was ambiguity between two felony punishments, was dictated by the Supreme Court's own precedents. Rollf v. Carter, 298 Ga. 557, 784 S.E.2d 341 (2016).

Assault with Intent to Rob

Offender may be convicted of assault with intent to murder and assault with intent to rob where the evidence supports an intent to murder and an intent to rob. Under the provisions of the state Constitution they are not the same offenses, although they include the same occasion, time, and place. Martin v. State, 77 Ga. App. 297, 48 S.E.2d 485 (1948).

Assault with intent to rob person of money may be committed though person assaulted may not have money in their pocket, or on person, at the time and place the crime is attempted. Alexander v. State, 66 Ga. App. 708, 19 S.E.2d 353 (1942).

No fatal variance.

- Defendant's conviction for aggravated assault was affirmed since there was not a fatal variance between the evidence and the indictment, which alleged that the defendant unlawfully made an assault with intent to rob, with a knife, by holding the knife in a threatening manner while demanding money; the defendant was a conspirator in an armed robbery and the demands for money could be attributed to the defendant as the defendant entered the apartment without permission and held the knife at the defendant's side with the blade exposed as the defendant's partner demanded money, and the victims were afraid that the defendant "would do something." Brown v. State, 281 Ga. App. 523, 636 S.E.2d 709 (2006), cert. denied, No. S07C0168, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 99 (Ga. 2007).

No merger of related offenses.

- As separate facts were used to prove each crime, the trial court did not err by refusing to merge the offenses of armed robbery, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of the felonies. Blocker v. State, 265 Ga. App. 846, 595 S.E.2d 654 (2004).

There was sufficient evidence to uphold a defendant's convictions for malice murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime in connection with the fatal shootings of two men, and the wounding of four other men, as the jury was authorized to accept an accomplice's version of events, including that robbery was the initial motive and that the defendant fired the shots that killed and wounded the victims. The fact that conflicts in the evidence were resolved adversely to the defendant did not render the evidence insufficient and there was ample evidence that the defendant acted with implied malice, therefore, there was no error in determining that the killings were malice murders rather than felony murders. Jackson v. State, 282 Ga. 668, 653 S.E.2d 28 (2007).

Defendant was properly denied merger of a charge of criminal attempt to commit armed robbery and aggravated assault of a store victim as the offense of attempted armed robbery under, inter alia, O.C.G.A. § 16-4-1 was complete when the defendant pointed the gun at the victim and aggravated assault occurred when the victim was struck in the face with the gun. Stubbs v. State, 293 Ga. App. 692, 667 S.E.2d 905 (2008).

Trial court did not err in sentencing defendant for aggravated assault of a victim, one with a deadly weapon and the other with intent to rob, because under the case law test, the two crimes did not merge since aggravated assault with intent to rob requires proof of a fact (the intent to rob) that aggravated assault with a deadly weapon does not, and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon requires proof of a fact (the use of a deadly weapon) that aggravated assault with intent to rob does not. Thomas v. State, 292 Ga. 429, 738 S.E.2d 571 (2013).

Trial court did not err in sentencing the defendant for both aggravated assault with intent to rob and felony murder because the aggravated assault with intent to rob charge required the state to prove that the defendant had the intent to rob, which the state did not need to prove for the felony murder conviction based on aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, and the felony murder count required the state to prove that the defendant caused the death of the victim and used a deadly weapon, neither of which the state had to prove for the conviction of aggravated assault with intent to rob. Thomas v. State, 292 Ga. 429, 738 S.E.2d 571 (2013).

Because the crime of aggravated assault by shooting the victim with a gun was the underlying felony for the defendant's felony murder conviction, it should have merged for sentencing purposes; however, the conviction for aggravated assault with intent to rob, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(1), did not merge into the felony murder conviction because the felony murder charge required proof that the defendant caused the victim's death and used a deadly weapon, O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-1(c) and16-5-21(a)(2). Norris v. State, 302 Ga. 802, 809 S.E.2d 752 (2018).

Merger required.

- Because all of the facts used to prove the offense of aggravated assault with intent to rob were used up in proving the armed robbery, merger was required. Mercer v. State, 289 Ga. App. 606, 658 S.E.2d 173 (2008).

Because the assault element of a defendant's aggravated assault with intent to rob conviction under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a) was contained within the "use of an offensive weapon" element of armed robbery under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41, and both crimes shared the "intent to rob" element, the defendant's aggravated assault conviction merged into the armed robbery conviction. Lucky v. State, 286 Ga. 478, 689 S.E.2d 825 (2010).

Defendant's aggravated assault conviction should have merged into defendant's armed robbery conviction for sentencing purposes because the defendant's use of the defendant's handgun against the victim was the same conduct in both offenses, designed to immobilize the victim while the victim was robbed. The aggravated assault was established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the commission of the armed robbery. Herrera v. State, 306 Ga. App. 432, 702 S.E.2d 731 (2010).

Defendants' robbery and aggravated assault convictions, under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21 and16-8-40, merged because, while aggravated assault did not require taking property from another, aggravated assault was proved by the same or less than all facts required to show robbery, as the assault forming the basis of the aggravated assault with intent to rob, which was pointing a pistol at the victim, was "contained within" the element of robbery requiring the defendants to have used force, intimidation, threat or coercion, or placed the victim in fear of immediate serious bodily injury. Washington v. State, 310 Ga. App. 775, 714 S.E.2d 364 (2011).

Because the victim was still being pistol whipped while the men asked the victim what the victim had and took the victim's wallet and cell phone, the robbery by use of a handgun was completed at the same place and approximately the same time as the aggravated assault with a handgun; thus, the timing of the offenses of armed robbery and aggravated assault with intent to rob did not preclude their merger. Curtis v. State, 330 Ga. App. 839, 769 S.E.2d 580 (2015).

Because the "assault" element of aggravated assault with intent to rob is contained within the "use of an offensive weapon" element of armed robbery and both crimes share the "intent to rob" element, there is no element of aggravated assault with intent to rob that is not contained in armed robbery, and the offenses merge. Curtis v. State, 330 Ga. App. 839, 769 S.E.2d 580 (2015).

Defendant's testimony sufficient to authorize conviction.

- Where defendant testified that codefendant conceived of the robbery without defendant's knowledge or participation and that only the codefendant was armed, defendant did acknowledge pretending to have a gun and giving orders to the store occupants, defendant's own testimony was sufficient to authorize a conviction for armed robbery and aggravated assault, and insufficient to support a defense of coercion. House v. State, 203 Ga. App. 55, 416 S.E.2d 108, cert. denied, 203 Ga. App. 906, 416 S.E.2d 108 (1992).

Different jury decisions supported.

- Defendant's conviction was based on direct evidence, corroborated by circumstantial evidence; the jury's decision on the gun charge did not alter the fact that the aggravated assault charge was well-supported by the record. Murray v. State, 256 Ga. App. 736, 569 S.E.2d 636 (2002).

Evidence sufficient for conviction of robbery and assault.

- Evidence was sufficient to support defendants' convictions for aggravated assault with intent to rob and aggravated battery. Autry v. State, 230 Ga. App. 773, 498 S.E.2d 304 (1998).

Ample evidence supported defendant's convictions of two counts of armed robbery in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a), and one count of aggravated assault in violation O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(1), (a)(2), where defendant was identified by defendant's companions in statements to the police, and also by two victims at trial, as the person who drove with the three companions to a store and, while pointing a gun at the various victims, robbed one person of money and lottery tickets, demanded and obtained money from a second person and shot that person, demanded money from the second person's spouse, and then fled with the three companions. Bates v. State, 259 Ga. App. 232, 576 S.E.2d 619 (2003).

Defendant was properly found guilty of aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, aggravated assault with intent to rob under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106 where the footprints observed along the path between the crime scene and the area where defendant was apprehended matched the size and soles of defendant's shoes and defendant was identified as the robber based on defendant's clothing, shoes and "build." Mack v. State, 263 Ga. App. 186, 587 S.E.2d 132 (2003).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for armed robbery, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of the felonies because the only evidence of coercion came from defendant personally. To disprove the coercion defense, the victim testified that defendant did not appear nervous, that the robbery occurred very quickly, with no "fumbling" or "bumbling" on defendant's part, and that defendant commented that the defendant was robbing the victim because the defendant needed a place to stay. Blocker v. State, 265 Ga. App. 846, 595 S.E.2d 654 (2004).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for aggravated assault as defendant approached a fast food manager in a parking lot, demanded money at gunpoint, and shot the victim in a struggle; the victim and the victim's spouse identified defendant as the assailant. Clark v. State, 271 Ga. App. 534, 610 S.E.2d 165 (2005).

Evidence supported defendant's conviction for aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20 as: (1) defendant and codefendant tried to convince a victim to participate in a fake armed robbery; (2) defendant told the victim that they would take the bullets out of the gun if it would make the victim feel better; (3) defendant watched over the victim while codefendant retrieved the gun; (4) defendant informed the victim that the victim would not get hurt if the victim cooperated with codefendant; and (5) defendant left in the car with codefendant. Broome v. State, 273 Ga. App. 273, 614 S.E.2d 807 (2005).

Because the person who stole the victim's vehicle had a distinctive hairstyle, and the defendant, who had the same hairstyle, was apprehended while in possession of the vehicle soon after the crime was committed, there was sufficient evidence to support a conviction for armed robbery in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41, aggravated assault with intent to rob in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, and possessing a firearm during commission of a felony in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106. Hall v. State, 277 Ga. App. 413, 626 S.E.2d 611 (2006).

Acceptance of the juveniles' admissions to an aggravated assault with intent to rob under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21 was proper because the defendants' argument that, while they threatened to take the victim's vehicle, they failed to take any steps to consummate the taking of the vehicle was rejected because, clearly, the defendants were parties to the assault, and there merely had to be an intent to rob, as a substantial step toward a robbery was unnecessary. In the Interest of T.K.L., 277 Ga. App. 461, 627 S.E.2d 98 (2006).

Sufficient evidence supported convictions of felony murder, armed robbery, aggravated assault, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and possession of a firearm in the commission of a felony where, upon pulling into an apartment complex to turn around and ask for directions, the victims were approached by defendant and another man, where defendant pulled out a gun and told the victims to "give it up," where, when one of the victims hesitated, defendant shot him, where defendant then stole that victim's money and jewelry, where, later, the gunshot victim died, where the second victim described defendant, who was wearing a specific jersey at the time of the crimes, and where two witnesses who knew defendant testified that defendant robbed and shot the victim while wearing that jersey. Davis v. State, 280 Ga. 442, 629 S.E.2d 238 (2006).

Convictions for kidnapping and aggravated assault were supported by sufficient evidence, including testimony from the victim that, when the victim stopped the victim's car at a stop sign, the defendant jumped in the car, held a knife to the victim's throat and demanded money, that, as the victim drove, the defendant held the knife on the victim and continued to demand money, that, when the victim spotted a police station, the victim sped into its parking lot, at which point, the defendant fled on foot. Adcock v. State, 279 Ga. App. 473, 631 S.E.2d 494 (2006).

Convictions for armed robbery, aggravated assault, fleeing to elude a police officer, and reckless driving were all upheld on appeal, given the sufficiency of the identification evidence supplied by the victim, an investigating officer, and the arresting officer, as well as observations made by the latter in apprehending the defendant; moreover, the defendant's failure to object to the admission of a photographic lineup and show-up as impermissibly suggestive precluded appellate review of the same. Newton v. State, 280 Ga. App. 709, 634 S.E.2d 839 (2006).

Jury was entitled to find the defendant guilty of aggravated assault, charged in the indictment "with the intent to rob," based on the corroboration of the defendant's admission to going on a "lick," which meant to go find someone to rob, and that the defendant knew what a passenger was going to do when that passenger reached out of the car window in an attempt to snatch the elderly victim's purse, resulting in the victim being struck by the car and falling to the ground; hence, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's amended motion for a new trial. Jackson v. State, 281 Ga. App. 506, 636 S.E.2d 694 (2006).

Given the defendant's confession, the victim's identification of the defendant as the person who robbed the victim, testimony by the victim and others that the robber had a gun, and testimony that the defendant was not at the nightclub where the defendant claimed to be, the jury was authorized to find the defendant guilty of armed robbery and aggravated assault in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-8-41(a) and16-5-21(a). Burns v. State, 288 Ga. App. 507, 654 S.E.2d 405 (2007).

There was sufficient evidence to support a defendant's convictions of armed robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, false imprisonment, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony when the state showed that the defendant intentionally aided and abetted a home invasion in which the home was burglarized and the homeowner's teenage child was detained and robbed by use of a handgun. Even in the absence of evidence sufficient to show that the defendant directly committed the charged offenses, there was sufficient evidence that the defendant was a party to the offenses in that the defendant and a person armed with a gun loaded a truck with property stolen from the home during the two-hour home invasion, the defendant was present speaking with the armed person during the home invasion, and the defendant confirmed that the child was home alone. Whitley v. State, 293 Ga. App. 605, 667 S.E.2d 447 (2008).

Testimony that the defendant's passenger pointed a gun at the victim's head, while attempting to gain control of the victim's vehicle sufficed to prove both counts of aggravated assault. Moreover, the jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of two counts of aggravated assault based on the defendant's involvement as a party to the crimes or as a coconspirator. Johnson v. State, 299 Ga. App. 706, 683 S.E.2d 659 (2009).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for directed verdict of acquittal on the defendant's aggravated assault with intent to rob convictions because the jury was authorized to conclude that the defendant fired a gun at the victims to further a robbery, and the indictment did not charge the defendant with a specific intent to rob the victims but only with a general intent to rob; the defendant approached the victims, pointed a gun toward the head of one of the victims, and demanded money, and after robbing that victim, the defendant fled and fired several shots at the porch where the victims had been standing and at the victims once the victims began chasing the defendant. Johnson v. State, 304 Ga. App. 371, 696 S.E.2d 396 (2010).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for directed verdict of acquittal because there was ample evidence of the defendant's guilt of aggravated assault in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(1) based on the defendant's act of firing two shots in the victim's direction, wounding the victim in the chest and leg. Nyane v. State, 306 Ga. App. 591, 703 S.E.2d 53 (2010), cert. denied, No. S11C0420, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 538 (Ga. 2011).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for armed robbery and aggravated assault when, in addition to accomplice testimony implicating the defendant, the descriptions of the defendant's clothing at the time of offenses offered by the accomplice and one of the victims were the same, and the driver of the vehicle in which the defendant left the area testified that, on the day of the robbery, the driver drove the defendant and the accomplice to an area near the location of the offenses, left the car, and upon the driver's return, the defendant and the accomplice were gone, another passenger told the driver to meet the defendant and the accomplice at a gas station across from the scene of the offenses, and the defendant and the accomplice returned to the car at the gas station with a box full of change. Love v. State, 318 Ga. App. 387, 734 S.E.2d 95 (2012).

Evidence that the defendant kicked in a door and entered an occupied apartment with others, the defendant provided the guns used, the defendant placed a gun to one victim's head, a victim's wallet and key were taken, and marijuana, digital scales, and a device used to grind marijuana were found at the defendant's house was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for four counts of aggravated assault, three counts of false imprisonment, and one count each of armed robbery, burglary, possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, and possession of a firearm during commission of a felony. Thompson v. State, 320 Ga. App. 150, 739 S.E.2d 434 (2013).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for robbery and aggravated assault because the defendant was advised that the mattresses that the defendant was loading into the defendant's truck belonged to the victim; and when the victim attempted to remove the mattresses from the defendant's truck, the defendant attacked the victim, punching the victim in the face, pushing the victim to the ground, and punching the victim in the chest. Aldridge v. State, 325 Ga. App. 774, 755 S.E.2d 19 (2014).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of armed robbery, two counts of aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony because the credibility of the victim's identification of the defendant was a matter to be determined by the jury; and, even though the defendant was covered from head to toe in clothing with only the defendant's eyes visible, the victim was able to identify the defendant, who spoke during the robbery as the defendant was a regular customer and the victim watched the defendant grow up. Wiggins v. State, 334 Ga. App. 54, 778 S.E.2d 60 (2015).

Evidence that the defendant utilized a firearm, a deadly weapon, to hold the victim in place while the defendant and others effectuated a robbery of the victim's apartment supported the convictions for aggravated assault and aggravated assault with intent to rob. Taylor v. State, 344 Ga. App. 122, 809 S.E.2d 76 (2017).

In a late-evening robbery of a pizzeria, the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendants of two counts of aggravated assault when the first defendant pointed a firearm at two store employees as a jury could thus infer that the defendants' acts placed both employees in reasonable apprehension of receiving a violent injury because the first employee testified that the act of pointing the gun at the first employee, along with the verbal threats made by the assailants, caused the first employee to fear that the first employee would be injured or killed; the second employee noted that the first defendant asked about no one wanting to die; and the second defendant aided and abetted the first defendant in committing the offenses. Hughes v. State, 345 Ga. App. 107, 812 S.E.2d 363 (2018).

Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's convictions for armed robbery, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during commission of a felony, based on evidence that three taxi drivers were robbed and the telephone number used to call the taxis was registered to the defendant's mother, who allowed the defendant to use the phone, and an accomplice identified the defendant as the person with a gun. Gay v. State, 351 Ga. App. 811, 833 S.E.2d 305 (2019), cert. denied, No. S20C0264, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 317 (Ga. 2020).

Which defendant held weapon immaterial.

- Because the victim's testimony was legally sufficient under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8) to establish that the defendants assaulted the victim with intent to rob, the issue of which defendant actually held the weapon was immaterial; therefore, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(a), the evidence was sufficient to find both defendants guilty of aggravated assault with intent to rob and of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21(a)(1) and16-11-106. Clark v. State, 311 Ga. App. 58, 714 S.E.2d 736 (2011).

Assault with Intent to Rape

Elements of crime of assault with intent to rape are: (1) an assault; (2) an intent to have carnal knowledge of the female; and (3) a purpose to carry into effect this intent with force and against the consent of the female. Dorsey v. State, 108 Ga. 477, 34 S.E. 135 (1899); McCullough v. State, 11 Ga. App. 612, 76 S.E. 393 (1912); Fitchett v. State, 52 Ga. App. 87, 182 S.E. 412 (1935); Pickett v. State, 53 Ga. App. 478, 186 S.E. 206 (1936); Scott v. State, 63 Ga. App. 353, 11 S.E.2d 64 (1940); Moody v. State, 91 Ga. App. 138, 85 S.E.2d 61 (1954).

Crime of aggravated assault with intent to rape is complete when there is substantial step toward battery of the victim, i.e., an assault coupled with an intent to rape. Bissell v. State, 153 Ga. App. 564, 266 S.E.2d 238 (1980).

Substantial step requirement relates to assault, the first element of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, and not to the second element, the intent to rape. Bissell v. State, 153 Ga. App. 564, 266 S.E.2d 238 (1980); Young v. State, 181 Ga. App. 587, 353 S.E.2d 82 (1987).

Substantial step toward committing battery.

- Since assault is an attempted battery, there must be a substantial step toward committing a battery before there can be an assault. Bissell v. State, 153 Ga. App. 564, 266 S.E.2d 238 (1980).

If there is substantial step toward rape, crime would become attempted rape. Bissell v. State, 153 Ga. App. 564, 266 S.E.2d 238 (1980).

Evidence sufficient to supply "substantial step" requirement.

- When the evidence authorized a finding that the defendant tricked the victim into a building, ostensibly to use a telephone, then seized the victim, stated an intention of kissing the victim, and attempted to get the victim to lie on a bed and the ensuing struggle was interrupted by a third party and the victim was then able to escape, the evidence supplied the "substantial step" requirement as it relates to the offense of assault with intent to rape. Lester v. State, 173 Ga. App. 300, 325 S.E.2d 912 (1985).

When a defendant was charged with assault with intent to commit rape but did not actually have carnal knowledge of the victim as defined by § 16-6-1, there was evidence, although circumstantial insofar as intent is concerned, sufficient to establish that the defendant assaulted the victim with intent to commit rape. Butler v. State, 194 Ga. App. 895, 392 S.E.2d 324 (1990); Whitehill v. State, 247 Ga. App. 267, 543 S.E.2d 470 (2000).

Convictions of criminal attempt to commit kidnapping, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-40(a), and aggravated assault with intent to rape, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(1), were supported by sufficient evidence since the victim positively identified the defendant as the attacker when the defendant was captured and again at trial, and since a store owner also identified the defendant at trial and testified that the store owner maintained sight of the defendant from when the store owner saw the defendant attacking the victim until the defendant's capture; additionally, since the defendant made no attempt to take the victim's purse or keys, and the evidence showed that the defendant had pornographic photos of someone who looked similar to the victim, the jury was authorized to find that the defendant had the requisite intent to detain, abduct, and rape the victim as charged. Mobley v. State, 279 Ga. App. 476, 631 S.E.2d 491 (2006).

Solicitation alone will not constitute offense of assault with intent to rape. Tiller v. State, 101 Ga. 782, 29 S.E. 424 (1897).

Battery is not essential. Owens v. State, 9 Ga. App. 441, 71 S.E. 680 (1911).

Intent not abrogated by defendant's statement that defendant lacked time for offense.

- Defendant's statement to the victim that defendant did not have time to actually attempt to rape the victim did not abrogate defendant's intent. Young v. State, 181 Ga. App. 587, 353 S.E.2d 82 (1987).

Distinguishing assault with intent to rape and assault with intent to kill.

- Assault with intent to rape involves attempted sexual intercourse with the victim while assault with intent to murder involves striking the victim in the head with the admitted intent of killing the victim. Both of these offenses require proof of distinct essential elements, each of which separately or together will sustain a conviction, and both are aimed at prohibiting specific conduct, and, accordingly, are not offenses established by the same conduct. Guthrie v. State, 147 Ga. App. 351, 248 S.E.2d 714 (1978).

Female under 14 years of age.

- It is not necessary to show that attempt was forcible and against female's will where one is charged with assault with intent to rape upon a female under the age of 14 years. Vickery v. State, 48 Ga. App. 851, 174 S.E. 155 (1934).

In an assault with an intent to rape upon a female under the age of 14 years it is only necessary to show an intent to have carnal knowledge of the female, and that some overt act was done towards the accomplishment of that purpose. Vickery v. State, 48 Ga. App. 851, 174 S.E. 155 (1934).

When female is under age 14, law conclusively presumes that engaging in intercourse is against her will, she being unable to consent. Moody v. State, 91 Ga. App. 138, 85 S.E.2d 61 (1954).

Evidence sufficient for finding defendant guilty of assault with intent to rape.

- When appellant crawled under the door of the ladies' room stall in which victim was changing her clothes, pulled his pants down to his knees, grabbed her by the throat and pulled at her clothes, all the while warning her not to make any noise, this was sufficient to authorize rational triers of fact to find appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of assault with intent to rape. Middlebrooks v. State, 156 Ga. App. 319, 274 S.E.2d 643 (1980).

When the jury could find that the victim consented to intercourse after being assaulted by the defendant, the evidence was sufficient to authorize a finding of assault with the intent to commit rape. Terry v. State, 166 Ga. App. 632, 305 S.E.2d 170 (1983).

Evidence that the defendant held women at gunpoint and attempted to remove or did remove some of their underclothes was sufficient to support convictions for assault with intent to rape. Hardy v. State, 240 Ga. App. 115, 522 S.E.2d 704 (1999).

Evidence that the defendant entered the victim's home, crawled onto the victim's back as the victim slept in bed, pressed a knife to the victim's neck, and then began fondling the victim's genital area was sufficient to authorize the jury to find intent to rape. Brown v. State, 242 Ga. App. 858, 531 S.E.2d 409 (2000).

Evidence showing that defendant threatened and struck the victim, combined with the evidence showing that defendant unsuccessfully tried to rape the victim, was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for aggravated assault with intent to rape. Jackson v. State, 257 Ga. App. 817, 572 S.E.2d 360 (2002).

Evidence that defendant touched the inside of the first victim's breasts, that the victim feared the victim was going to be raped, and that the defendant fled and turned to the second victim only after being foiled in the defendant's first attempt was sufficient for the jury to have concluded that the defendant was guilty of aggravated assault with intent to rape two people. De'Mon v. State, 262 Ga. App. 10, 584 S.E.2d 639 (2003).

Evidence provided by the victim that defendant was the person who threatened the victim with a knife and then raped the victim was sufficient to support both the rape and aggravated assault with intent to rape convictions. Wilson v. State, 267 Ga. App. 491, 600 S.E.2d 440 (2004).

Denial of a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-9-1, was proper because the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction of aggravated assault with intent to rape, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21; defendant came to the home of the victim, who was a former love interest, and the victim claimed that the defendant physically and sexually assaulted the victim, causing multiple serious injuries and bruises. Goodall v. State, 277 Ga. App. 600, 627 S.E.2d 183 (2006).

Defendant's convictions of rape, aggravated sodomy, false imprisonment, and two counts of aggravated assault were supported by sufficient evidence in the form of the victim's injuries, and the victim's testimony that, among other things, after the victim refused the defendant's request for sex, the defendant threw the victim on the bed, hit the victim in the back and on the arms with hedge clippers, ordered the victim to remove the victim's clothes, dragged the victim by the hair back into the house after the victim had escaped through a window, grabbed the victim, twisted the victim's arm, and said, "I'm trying - bitch, I'm going to kill you," hit the victim in the arm and leg with the hedge clippers, punched the victim on the lips and on the forehead, threw the victim on the bed and raped the victim and made the victim perform oral sex on the defendant. Tarver v. State, 280 Ga. App. 89, 633 S.E.2d 415 (2006).

Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's conviction of aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21; the victim's testimony that the defendant pinned the victim down while touching the victim underneath the victim's clothes against the victim's will and that the defendant was really rough was sufficient to convict. Clark v. State, 282 Ga. App. 248, 638 S.E.2d 397 (2006).

Defendant ripped off a 15-year-old child's shorts, tried to force the victim's legs open, and when the victim resisted, beat the victim, rammed the victim's head to the floor, and choked the victim; police found the victim on the floor, bloody, naked, and sobbing, and the defendant clad only in underwear. This evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of aggravated assault with intent to rape. Murray v. State, 293 Ga. App. 516, 667 S.E.2d 382 (2008).

Because the victim, a resident, and a police officer all testified that defendant was attempting to have sex with the victim against the victim's will, the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated assault with intent to rape in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(1). Cubia v. State, 298 Ga. App. 746, 681 S.E.2d 195 (2009).

Because the jury was authorized to infer that the defendant had the requisite intent to rape the victim as charged, the jury was also authorized to find that he was guilty of aggravated assault with intent to rape in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(1); the state presented evidence that the defendant removed the victim's underwear while on top of her in her bed and then licked her genital and anal areas, and the evidence also showed that defendant only stopped sexually assaulting the victim after she pleaded with him and offered him money. Mattox v. State, 305 Ga. App. 600, 699 S.E.2d 887 (2010).

Evidence presented at trial was sufficient to authorize a rational jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of rape, aggravated sodomy, aggravated assault with intent to rape, and simple battery because the victim's testimony, standing alone, could sustain the convictions; the jury was entitled to take into account similar transaction evidence for the purpose of showing the defendant's intent, bent of mind, and course of conduct, and while the defendant testified to a different version of what transpired, it was the exclusive role of the jury to determine witness credibility and to choose what evidence to believe and what to reject. Alvarez v. State, 309 Ga. App. 462, 710 S.E.2d 583 (2011).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for a directed verdict on a charge of aggravated assault with intent to rape. The evidence that the defendant disrobed the victim, forced her onto a bed, and attempted to have intercourse with her before she pushed him off supported the conviction. Rawls v. State, 315 Ga. App. 891, 730 S.E.2d 1 (2012).

Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's convictions for aggravated assault with the intent to rape, aggravated sexual battery, and burglary based on the testimony of the victim that at approximately 4:00 A.M. the victim was in bed asleep when a man got into the victim's bed and began choking the victim, that it was not consensual, and that the perpetrator indicated watching the victim for some time and inserted two fingers into the victim's vagina. Davis v. State, 326 Ga. App. 778, 757 S.E.2d 443 (2014).

Admissibility of proof of similar offenses in rape cases.

- It is well settled in rape cases that proof of similar offenses committed by the accused in the same locality, about the same time, and where similar methods were employed by the accused in commission of such offenses, is admissible in defendant's trial for the purpose of identifying the defendant as the guilty party and to show motive, plan, scheme, bent of mind and course of conduct. The separate crimes must, of course, be logically related to the offense being tried and must tend to establish an element of the state's case. Burnett v. State, 137 Ga. App. 183, 223 S.E.2d 232 (1976).

Trial court properly admitted the similar acts evidence of other women who were also attacked by the defendant and who all identified defendant as their attacker. The evidence was highly probative of defendant's intent to rape, a necessary element of the charged offense. Henderson v. State, 204 Ga. App. 884, 420 S.E.2d 813 (1992).

Pushing rape victim into furniture.

- Nurse was properly allowed to testify as to a rape victim's statement to the nurse that her assailant had blindfolded her and pushed her into furniture because the victim's statement to the nurse was given to explain the nature and origin of some of her injuries. This evidence was sufficient to allow the jury to find that the rape victim had been pushed into furniture as she was pushed and dragged through her home while blindfolded, supporting the defendant's aggravated assault convictions. Bryant v. State, 304 Ga. App. 456, 696 S.E.2d 439 (2010).

Conviction of aggravated assault is legal conviction upon indictment for rape. Jones v. Smith, 228 Ga. 648, 187 S.E.2d 298 (1972).

On indictment for rape, defendant can be convicted of assault with intent to rape, although the indictment does not contain an allegation of an assault. Long v. State, 84 Ga. App. 638, 66 S.E.2d 837 (1951).

Failure to charge on assault with intent to rape not error.

- Conviction of assault with intent to rape may be had on an indictment for rape since the act was attempted but not completed. The jury should be instructed that the defendant may be found guilty of the lesser offense necessarily involved in the graver offense, if under any view of the evidence submitted a conviction of the lesser offense would be authorized. If all of the evidence, however, shows that the defendant, if guilty at all, was guilty of the completed major offense, it is not error to fail to charge as to the lesser offense. Rider v. State, 196 Ga. 767, 27 S.E.2d 667 (1943).

Guilty verdict on rape charge and not guilty verdict on aggravated assault charge are inconsistent. Martin v. State, 157 Ga. App. 304, 277 S.E.2d 300, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 833, 102 S. Ct. 133, 70 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1981).

Conviction for rape and aggravated assault.

- Evidence consisting mostly of testimony from the victim, that the victim was awakened by defendant when the defendant broke into the victim's home, placed the defendant's hand around the victim's neck, and forced the victim to shut up or die, as the defendant threw the victim onto a couch and engaged in sexual intercourse with the victim without the victim's consent, was sufficient to uphold defendant's rape conviction, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-6-1, aggravated assault conviction, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, and burglary conviction, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1. Lowe v. State, 259 Ga. App. 674, 578 S.E.2d 284 (2003).

Despite the victim's recantation of the events that occurred leading up to the rape, kidnapping and aggravated assault committed by defendant, the evidence presented of the victim's statements and the testimony of the other state witnesses and medical personnel as to the extent of the victim's injuries, was sufficient to support the convictions. Hambrick v. State, 278 Ga. App. 768, 629 S.E.2d 442 (2006).

Defendant's conviction for aggravated assault with intent to rape did not merge into the defendant's rape conviction as the defendant's fondling the victim while threatening to kill the victim were separate and distinct acts of force and intimidation beyond that necessary to accomplish the rape. Williams v. State, 295 Ga. App. 9, 670 S.E.2d 828 (2008).

Because the requirement under the rape statute, O.C.G.A. § 16-6-1, that defendant have forcible carnal knowledge of the victim against the victim's will was not a fact required under the aggravated assault statute, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, the aggravated assault with intent to rape charge merged with the rape charge; therefore, the trial court erred in sentencing defendant separately for aggravated assault. Johnson v. State, 298 Ga. App. 639, 680 S.E.2d 675 (2009).

Merger of attempted rape and aggravated assault.

- Defendant's conviction for aggravated assault with intent to rape under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(1) merged into the defendant's conviction for attempted rape under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-4-1 (criminal attempt) and16-6-1 (rape) because the same evidence supported both convictions and, therefore, the aggravated assault conviction was vacated. Smith v. State, 313 Ga. App. 170, 721 S.E.2d 165 (2011).

No merger of rape and aggravated assault.

- Aggravated assault and rape convictions did not merge because the assault was complete before the rape and involved a separate and distinct act of force outside that needed to accomplish the rape. Andrews v. State, 328 Ga. App. 344, 764 S.E.2d 553 (2014).

Conviction upheld on appeal.

- Aggravated assault with intent to rape conviction was upheld on appeal, given the overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt, as the jury charges on intent and unanimity were proper; the victim's identification testimony was sufficient; the sentencing judge's comments did not show bias; and trial counsel was not ineffective. Williams v. State, 290 Ga. App. 829, 661 S.E.2d 563 (2008).

Sentence not void.

- Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for an out-of-time appeal to vacate a void sentence because the defendant's sentence of 40 years imprisonment for aggravated assault with intent to rape in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(1) and kidnapping in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-40(a) fell within the statutory range and was not void; the offenses of aggravated assault and kidnapping both carry maximum sentences of 20 years, O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21(b) and16-5-40(b)(1). Shelton v. State, 307 Ga. App. 599, 705 S.E.2d 699 (2011), overruled on other grounds by Collier v. State, 834 S.E.2d 769, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 708 (Ga. 2019).

Jury Instructions

Charge including element not alleged in indictment.

- Even though a jury charge included reference to the intent to rob, which element was not contained in the indictment, defendant was not denied a fair trial since the jury was given a copy of the indictment, and there was no reasonable possibility that the jury did not believe defendant committed aggravated assault in the manner alleged in the indictment. Green v. State, 221 Ga. App. 694, 472 S.E.2d 457 (1996).

Charging the jury on two alternative methods of committing aggravated assault, while the indictment charged only that aggravated assault was committed because the assault was with "intent to rob," was not reversible error because there was no reasonable possibility that the jury would have convicted defendant of committing the crime in a way not alleged in the indictment. Harwell v. State, 231 Ga. App. 154, 497 S.E.2d 672 (1998).

When the indictment charged the defendant with having committed an aggravated assault on the victim by assaulting the victim with intent to rape, even though the trial court charged the jury that aggravated assault also may be committed by the use of a deadly weapon, there was no error because the court additionally instructed that there was no basis to find the defendant guilty on this theory since the indictment charged the defendant with commission of an aggravated assault with intent to rape. Gordon v. State, 244 Ga. App. 265, 535 S.E.2d 289 (2000).

Although the court read the charge as set forth in the indictment, because the court did not instruct the jury to limit its consideration of aggravated assault to only the method set forth in the indictment, and not to consider aggravated assault as having occurred in another manner charged, the conviction of the defendants was defective. Chapman v. State, 273 Ga. 865, 548 S.E.2d 278 (2001).

There was no need to instruct the jury on the use of hands as deadly weapons as the defendant alleged, given that that method of aggravated assault was not alleged nor pursued by the state. Boyd v. State, 289 Ga. App. 342, 656 S.E.2d 864 (2008), cert. denied, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 498 (Ga. 2008).

Instruction on reckless conduct charge not warranted.

- Defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel for the failure to request an instruction on reckless conduct as defendant testified at trial and trial counsel testified at the new trial hearing that the defense strategy was to portray the stabbing of the former love interest as an accident; thus, the incident was either an accident or an aggravated assault and a charge on reckless conduct was unwarranted. Alston v. State, 277 Ga. App. 117, 625 S.E.2d 475 (2005).

After threatening to kill the victim, because the defendant's actions in continuing to drive away, as the victim was caught on the outside of the car screaming, supported the crime of either aggravated or simple assault, and not simple negligence, the trial court did not err in rejecting a reckless conduct instruction. Martin v. State, 283 Ga. App. 652, 642 S.E.2d 340 (2007).

Because the evidence in the defendant's felony murder trial, with aggravated assault as the underlying felony, showed without dispute that, although the defendant might not have intended to kill the victim, the defendant intentionally gunned the engine and then drove at the victim, who was acting aggressively and was armed with a knife, the trial judge did not err in denying the defendant's request for a reckless conduct instruction, but properly instructed the jury on the issue of justification. Berry v. State, 282 Ga. 376, 651 S.E.2d 1 (2007).

Defendant admitted firing a gun to frighten the victims, but asserted the affirmative defense of justification. The defendant was not entitled to a jury charge on reckless conduct as a lesser included offense of the charged offense of aggravated assault as the evidence established either the commission of an aggravated assault, or no offense at all. Hudson v. State, 296 Ga. App. 692, 675 S.E.2d 578 (2009).

Defendant was not entitled to a jury charge on the misdemeanors of reckless conduct, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-60(b), as a lesser included offense of the felony counts of aggravated assault because, although the defendant relied upon evidence that the defendant was intoxicated, the defendant cited no evidence that the defendant's intoxicated state was involuntary or that the intoxication resulted in any permanent brain function alteration. Dailey v. State, 313 Ga. App. 809, 723 S.E.2d 43 (2012), cert. denied, No. S12C0969, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 551 (Ga. 2012).

Because the defendant drove the van and struck and injured the victim, the state charged the defendant with aggravated assault by placing another in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury, and because the offense of reckless conduct would not show a less culpable mental state than that which was required to establish the commission of aggravated assault as charged, a charge on reckless conduct was not warranted. Patterson v. State, 332 Ga. App. 221, 770 S.E.2d 62 (2015), aff'd, 299 Ga. 491, 789 S.E.2d 175 (2016).

Jury's consideration limited to facts alleged in indictment.

- Trial court's recharge to the jury that an aggravated assault could be committed in a way not set forth in the indictment, without giving a remedial instruction limiting the jury's consideration to the facts alleged in the indictment, was reversible error. Elrod v. State, 238 Ga. App. 80, 517 S.E.2d 805 (1999).

Because the indictment charged defendant with aggravated assault by using a deadly weapon, the trial court's inclusion in the instruction of the definition of simple assault was superfluous and potentially misleading; however, the charge as a whole was not erroneous because, at the beginning, the court read the indictment to the jurors verbatim. Salahuddin v. State, 241 Ga. App. 168, 525 S.E.2d 422 (1999).

Because actual injury is not an essential element of aggravated assault under Georgia law, the trial court's failure to explicitly charge the jury that it had to find that defendant shot the victims was not a federal due process violation. Salahuddin v. State, 241 Ga. App. 168, 525 S.E.2d 422 (1999).

Because the indictment did not charge the defendant with using a deadly weapon, but with using objects, specifically, hands and feet, which when used offensively are likely to and actually do result in serious bodily injury, it was not necessary for the court to define the term "deadly weapon." Johnson v. State, 245 Ga. App. 761, 538 S.E.2d 850 (2000).

Trial court erred in its charge on aggravated assault because even though defendant was indicted for aggravated assault by use of a handgun, the court instructed the jury that intent to murder, rape or rob are alternative methods by which a person commits aggravated assault. Boone v. State, 250 Ga. App. 133, 549 S.E.2d 713 (2001).

When the defendant was indicted for two counts of aggravated assault, the assault of one victim by shooting that person with a pistol and the assault of another victim by striking that person on the head with a pistol, the court properly instructed that a person commits the offense of aggravated assault when he or she assaults another person with intent to murder or with any instrument that, when used offensively, is likely to result in serious bodily injury. Scott v. State, 274 Ga. 153, 549 S.E.2d 338 (2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 929, 122 S. Ct. 1301, 152 L. Ed. 2d 212 (2002).

When the defendant was charged with aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, the trial court's jury instruction that aggravated assault could occur both by an assault with intent to murder or by an assault with a deadly weapon was error because the instruction deviated from the indictment, which had not alleged assault with intent to murder. Doomes v. State, 261 Ga. App. 442, 583 S.E.2d 151 (2003).

Upon a charge in an indictment alleging that the defendant committed an aggravated assault by holding a razor blade against the victim's neck, and the only weapon shown to be used by the defendant was a razor blade, the question as to whether the razor blade constituted a deadly weapon or an instrument likely to inflict serious bodily harm had nothing to do with the manner in which the crime was committed; hence, a charge and recharge given to the jury could not reasonably be deemed to have presented the jury with an alternative basis for finding the defendant guilty of a crime not charged in the indictment. Dudley v. State, 283 Ga. App. 86, 640 S.E.2d 677 (2006).

Because the trial court's additional instructions confined the aggravated assault charge to O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), which was alleged in the indictment, the jury was not misled; the trial court did not err in failing to give a charge concerning whether hands and feet were deadly weapons per se since it would not have been adjusted to the facts and circumstances of the case. Stevens v. State, 293 Ga. App. 845, 668 S.E.2d 467 (2008).

Trial court's jury charge on aggravated assault was not erroneous because the trial court properly tailored the court's charge to the allegation in the indictment by charging the jury with just the relevant portion of the simple assault statute, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a)(1); the trial court did as the court was required and delivered a charge tailored to the indictment. Daniels v. State, 310 Ga. App. 562, 714 S.E.2d 91 (2011).

While the evidence presented could have supported a conviction on an unalleged manner of committing aggravated assault (with intent to rob), the jury was instructed that the state was required to prove every material allegation of the indictment and every essential element of the crimes charged beyond a reasonable doubt; the indictment alleged aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and the trial court read the indictment to the jury at the beginning of the trial and sent it out with the jury during jury deliberations; thus, a jury of average intelligence would not have been confused by the charge and the charge properly set forth the basis on which the jury was authorized to convict the defendant on the aggravated assault count. King v. State, 336 Ga. App. 531, 784 S.E.2d 875 (2016), overruled on other grounds by Quiller v. State, 338 Ga. App. 206, 789 S.E.2d 391 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016).

Reference to both paragraphs of O.C.G.A.

§ 16-5-21(a). - Trial court's reference to both paragraphs of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a) in its recharge on aggravated assault did not violate defendant's due process rights because its initial charge limited the jury's consideration to the method of committing the offense alleged in the indictment. Martin v. State, 268 Ga. 682, 492 S.E.2d 225 (1997).

Even though the trial court recited both O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(1) and (a)(2) in its charge to the jury, the court properly limited the elements of the crime to those charged in the indictment by reading the indictment verbatim and also instructing the jury that the state had the burden of proving every material allegation of the indictment. Johnson v. State, 245 Ga. App. 761, 538 S.E.2d 850 (2000).

In the defendant's trial for aggravated assault by shooting the victim, the trial court did not err in charging the jury on the complete definition of simple assault; there was no danger of the jury convicting the defendant of aggravated assault solely for placing the victim in apprehension of receiving a violent injury. Hollins v. State, 340 Ga. App. 190, 796 S.E.2d 901 (2017).

Knowledge as essential element.

- Knowledge is an essential element to the offense of the aggravated assault of a police officer, and the jury must be charged that knowledge is an essential element to the crime. Britt v. State, 184 Ga. App. 445, 361 S.E.2d 710 (1987); Hudson v. State, 189 Ga. App. 201, 375 S.E.2d 475 (1988).

The charge was inadequate, and the convictions of the indictment were vacated where the court defined the elements of the charges of aggravated assault and aggravated battery without any reference to the element of defendant's knowledge that the victim was a police officer. Chandler v. State, 204 Ga. App. 816, 421 S.E.2d 288 (1992).

Knowledge element adequately covered.

- Deficiency in conveying to the jury the requirement that the accused must have acted with knowledge that the victim was a police officer did not require reversal, since the knowledge element of the offense was adequately covered in an earlier portion of the charge. Cornwell v. State, 193 Ga. App. 561, 388 S.E.2d 353, cert. denied, 193 Ga. App. 909, 388 S.E.2d 353 (1989).

Defendant's contention that the trial court failed to properly instruct the jury on the definition of a deadly weapon and on the requisite knowledge that the victim of the aggravated assault was a police officer was rejected on appeal because the argument was waived, in that defendant neither made nor reserved any objection to any of the jury charges; nonetheless, the trial court's charge and recharge mirrored the aggravated assault statute, including the requirement of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(c) that the person "knowingly" commit the offense, and there could be no dispute that the gun defendant fired at the officer was a deadly weapon. Milton v. State, 272 Ga. App. 908, 614 S.E.2d 140 (2005).

"Mere presence" charge unwarranted.

- Defendant's aggravated assault with a deadly weapon conviction was upheld, and an amended motion for a new trial was properly denied, as the defendant was not entitled to a jury instruction on a claimed defense of "mere presence" as such was not a recognized defense, and the charge given to the jury covered all legal principles relevant to the determination of guilt; any confusion was cleared up by the court's further instruction that in order for the jury to convict defendant of aggravated assault under a party to a crime theory, it would have to find that the defendant directly committed or intentionally helped in the commission of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. Kelley v. State, 279 Ga. App. 187, 630 S.E.2d 783 (2006).

Evidence elicited at trial did not support a charge on mere presence because the defendant took an active role in the crime; the defendant drove the codefendants to the crime scene with the intent to rob, the defendant turned off the car's lights to assist in accosting the victims by surprise, the defendant drove defendant's comrades away from the crime, and the defendant tried to get rid of the stolen car. Huckabee v. State, 287 Ga. 728, 699 S.E.2d 531 (2010).

Parties to a crime charge.

- In a prosecution for aggravated assault, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's requested jury instruction on a "parties to a crime" issue, as the overall jury charge the trial court gave, which included the applicable portions of the pattern instruction on parties to a crime, and generally tracked the statutory language of O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20, as well as the entire pattern instruction on "mere presence," substantially covered the principles necessary. Morales v. State, 281 Ga. App. 18, 635 S.E.2d 325 (2006).

Defense of justification and character of defendant.

- Assertion of the defense of justification does not, in and of itself, have the effect of placing the defendant's character in issue. Moon v. State, 202 Ga. App. 500, 414 S.E.2d 721 (1992).

Defendant could not argue justification as a defense since defendant denied firing the weapon into the crowd; thus, defendant did not meet the elements of justification whereby the defendant admitted acting with the intent to inflict an injury, but claimed doing so while in reasonable fear of suffering immediate serious harm. Broussard v. State, 276 Ga. 216, 576 S.E.2d 883 (2003).

Failure to charge jury on justification and duty to retreat.

- Defendant's convictions for voluntary manslaughter, aggravated assault, and two related counts of possession of a firearm in the commission of a crime required reversal because the trial court erred by not charging the jury on the principle of no duty to retreat since the defense of justification was raised by the evidence, via defendant's testimony that the victim tried to stab the defendant, and the state placed the issue of retreat before the jury. As a result of defendant making out a prima facie case of justification, the trial court erred by concluding otherwise. Lewis v. State, 292 Ga. App. 257, 663 S.E.2d 721 (2008), cert. denied, No. S08C1869, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 885 (Ga. 2008).

Basing deadly weapon determination on victim's apprehensions not error.

- When the charge given the jury required an analysis of the concept of the "deadly weapon" be conducted in terms of the reasonable apprehensions of the victim rather than those of the hypothetical prudent person the court found no error in the charge. Moore v. State, 169 Ga. App. 24, 311 S.E.2d 226 (1983).

Victim's reasonable belief.

- Error in a jury instruction, its failing to state that the victim's belief that a shotgun was a deadly weapon had to be reasonable, was harmless error. Brown v. State, 211 Ga. App. 267, 438 S.E.2d 713 (1993).

Improper charge on eyewitness testimony.

- Eyewitness testimony identifying the defendant as the perpetrator of an assault was sufficient to support a conviction; a new trial was required, however, because the trial judge should not have instructed the jurors to take into account the certainty shown by the eyewitness in making the identification. Brown v. State, 277 Ga. App. 396, 626 S.E.2d 596 (2006).

Essential element of simple assault must be stated in jury instructions in defining aggravated assault. Smith v. State, 140 Ga. App. 395, 231 S.E.2d 143 (1976); Harper v. State, 157 Ga. App. 480, 278 S.E.2d 28 (1981), but see Quong v. State, 157 Ga. App. 532, 278 S.E.2d 122 (1981); McKibben v. State, 212 Ga. App. 370, 441 S.E.2d 895 (1994).

Term "assault" is legal word of art and the term's meaning must be explained to the jury by the judge. Smith v. State, 140 Ga. App. 395, 231 S.E.2d 143 (1976).

It is not necessary to define or explain "assault" in charging aggravated assault. Zachery v. State, 158 Ga. App. 448, 280 S.E.2d 860 (1981).

Meaning of "assault" in aggravated assault was not equivalent to definition of simple assault in former Code 1933, § 26-1301. Zachery v. State, 158 Ga. App. 448, 280 S.E.2d 860 (1981) (see O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20).

Defining "assault" in charge.

- When charging on essential elements of aggravated assault, "assault" should be defined by statutory elements of simple assault. Emmons v. State, 142 Ga. App. 553, 236 S.E.2d 536 (1977).

No definition of simple assault is necessary in charge on aggravated assault. Bundren v. State, 155 Ga. App. 265, 270 S.E.2d 807 (1980), rev'd on other grounds, 247 Ga. 180, 274 S.E.2d 455 (1981); Quong v. State, 157 Ga. App. 532, 278 S.E.2d 122 (1981), but see Harper v. State, 157 Ga. App. 480, 278 S.E.2d 28 (1981).

Charge on simple assault authorized.

- Trial court was authorized to give an instruction on the lesser-included offense of simple assault because some evidence showed that the defendant attempted to violently injure a store manager by stabbing the manager with a pen with such force that defendant bent the pen; the fact that actual contact occurred did not diminish the fact that there was evidence of a simple assault. Griggs v. State, 303 Ga. App. 442, 693 S.E.2d 615 (2010).

Charge on simple assault need not be given to complete definition of aggravated assault. Sutton v. State, 245 Ga. 192, 264 S.E.2d 184 (1980); Petouvis v. State, 165 Ga. App. 409, 301 S.E.2d 483 (1983).

Trial court does not necessarily err in failing to charge upon the definition of simple assault in charging on aggravated assault as a charge on simple assault need not be given in order to complete the definition of aggravated assault. Willis v. State, 167 Ga. App. 626, 307 S.E.2d 133 (1983).

There is no merit in defendant's contention that a charge on simple assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20 must be given in order to complete the definition of aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, as the latter does not need the former to make it complete. Spaulding v. State, 185 Ga. App. 812, 366 S.E.2d 174, cert. denied, 185 Ga. App. 911, 366 S.E.2d 174 (1988).

Trial court's jury instructions in defendant's criminal trial on multiple charges arising out of a domestic dispute were proper, as: (1) there was no requirement that the jury be instructed on the element of assault (O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20) in order to be properly instructed on the crime of aggravated assault (O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21); (2) the methods of committing an aggravated battery, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24(a), were properly defined based on the methods asserted in the indictment; (3) there was no support for a requested charge on the lesser included offense of reckless conduct, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-5-60(b); and (4) there was no possibility of a lesser included conviction for false imprisonment (O.C.G.A. § 16-5-41), such that instruction only on the indicted offense of kidnapping (O.C.G.A. § 16-5-40) was proper. Brown v. State, 275 Ga. App. 99, 619 S.E.2d 789 (2005).

In a prosecution for aggravated assault in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), as the jury charge provided guidelines for determining guilt or innocence, the defendant waived any other error by failing to request, in writing, a charge on the lesser-included offense of battery. Massey v. State, 278 Ga. App. 303, 628 S.E.2d 706 (2006).

In a prosecution for aggravated assault, the trial court did not err in failing to give a charge on the lesser-included offense of simple battery, as the defendant failed to request the same in writing, at or before the close of the evidence, and an oral request to give such a charge was insufficient. Morales v. State, 281 Ga. App. 18, 635 S.E.2d 325 (2006).

In the defendant's prosecution for aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), the defendant was not entitled to a jury instruction on the lesser included offense of simple assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20 because the defendant's wife could have reasonably apprehended that the black microrecorder allegedly in the defendant's hand was a gun. Dixon v. State, 285 Ga. App. 694, 647 S.E.2d 370 (2007).

Trial court did not commit reversible error, much less "plain error" pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-8-58(b), by failing to inform the jury of the definition of simple assault because the defendant's defense was mistaken identity, and the undisputed evidence showed that the perpetrators intentionally fired the perpetrators' guns through a parking lot occupied by many pedestrians and in the direction of a vehicle; neither negligence nor reckless conduct was an issue and, thus, any error in the charge would not have affected the outcome of the case. Howard v. State, 288 Ga. 741, 707 S.E.2d 80 (2011).

During the defendant's trial for aggravated assault in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), the trial court did not err in failing to instruct the jury on simple assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a), as an essential element of aggravated assault because the record failed to indicate that the defendant submitted a written request to charge on simple assault, and the trial court's instruction was sufficient to define the offense charged and provided a proper guideline for the determination of the defendant's guilt or innocence. Williams v. State, 307 Ga. App. 577, 705 S.E.2d 332 (2011).

Trial counsel's performance was not deficient due to counsel's failure to request a jury charge on simple assault as a lesser included offense of the charged crime of aggravated assault because there was no evidence showing that the defendant committed merely simple assault; the evidence showed that the defendant's assault upon the victim was with a screwdriver within the purview of the aggravated assault statute, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2). Davis v. State, 308 Ga. App. 7, 706 S.E.2d 710 (2011).

Even in the absence of the production or verbal description of the weapon used, evidence as to the nature, kind, and location of the wounds inflicted by the assailant is sufficient to allow the jury to infer the character of the weapon. King v. State, 304 Ga. 349, 818 S.E.2d 612 (2018).

In the defendant's trial for aggravated assault after threatening the defendant's stepparent with two knives, the trial court did not err by refusing to charge on simple assault as a lesser included offense because, based upon the form of aggravated assault alleged, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), the defendant was either guilty of aggravated assault or was justified. Johnson v. State, 348 Ga. App. 540, 823 S.E.2d 853 (2019).

Failure to charge jury on simple assault when the defendant is charged with aggravated assault is not reversible error in the absence of a proper request. Glover v. State, 153 Ga. App. 74, 264 S.E.2d 554 (1980).

Defendant was accused of hitting the victim in the head with a beer bottle, cutting the victim's head and requiring stitches. The evidence allowed the jury to either find that the defendant had not committed an aggravated assault, or to find the defendant guilty as charged; the defendant was not entitled to an instruction on the lesser-included charge of simple assault as there was no evidence to support that charge. Maiorano v. State, 294 Ga. App. 726, 669 S.E.2d 678 (2008).

Because the defendant intentionally shot the victim, wounded the victim, chased the victim down, and intentionally shot the victim three more times as the victim begged for the victim's life, and as neither negligence nor reckless conduct was an issue, the trial court did not err by failing to instruct the jury on simple assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a) in connection with the jury's charge on aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21. Cantera v. State, 289 Ga. 583, 713 S.E.2d 826 (2011).

Appellate review of the trial court's decision not to give a charge on the lesser included offense of simple assault was waived because trial counsel admitted that counsel acquiesced and did not further object to the trial court's decision to not give the charge. Gunter v. State, 316 Ga. App. 485, 729 S.E.2d 597 (2012).

Jury charge on aggravated assault, omitting the definition of simple assault, was not erroneous because the only evidence presented was that the victim's injures were consistent with a severe beating and blunt force trauma that precipitated death. Holloman v. State, 293 Ga. 151, 744 S.E.2d 59 (2013).

In an aggravated assault case, the trial court properly charged the jury with the applicable assault definition by requiring that the defendant assault the victim with a deadly weapon, and that the act placed another in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury, but by stating that an actual injury to the victim need not be shown; a charge on simple assault was not required simply because the victim suffered no injury. Marshall v. State, 324 Ga. App. 348, 750 S.E.2d 418 (2013).

Even if the trial court gave an incomplete charge on aggravated assault by failing to charge the jury on simple assault, the omission did not constitute plain error as the omission probably did not affect the outcome at trial because the defendant admitted to intentionally firing a gun in the victims' direction, which was conduct that constituted aggravated assault. Bashir v. State, 350 Ga. App. 852, 830 S.E.2d 353 (2019).

Charging jury on aggravated assault.

- It is not error for a judge to charge on aggravated assault in the same language as former Code 1933, § 26-1302, even though that language contains means of committing the offense other than that for which a defendant is indicted, if it does not confuse the jury. Pitts v. State, 128 Ga. App. 827, 198 S.E.2d 377 (1973) (see O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21).

When, in charging the jury on aggravated assault, the trial court fails to include that portion of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21 which prohibits an individual from knowingly committing aggravated assault on a peace officer while the peace officer is engaged in or on account of the performance of the officer's official duties, but the trial court communicates that knowledge was an essential element of the offense, it is not reversible error. Glover v. State, 153 Ga. App. 74, 264 S.E.2d 554 (1980); Bright v. State, 238 Ga. App. 876, 520 S.E.2d 48 (1999).

Curative recharge on aggravated assault with intent to rape eliminated any possibility that the jury convicted the defendant of the crime in a manner not charged in the indictment. Cook v. State, 210 Ga. App. 323, 436 S.E.2d 61 (1993).

Requested charge of reckless conduct as a lesser included offense was properly denied where the evidence was that defendant was guilty of two offenses of aggravated assault, as averred, or was not guilty of any crime under this particular indictment for aggravated assault. Morris v. State, 228 Ga. App. 90, 491 S.E.2d 190 (1997).

Charge on aggravated assault given in conjunction with a charge on felony murder and in substantial conformity with pattern jury instructions was not reversible error. Robinson v. State, 268 Ga. 175, 486 S.E.2d 156 (1997).

Jury instruction on aggravated assault, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, which tracked the language of the statute in the statute's entirety, was not error, although it was a better practice to conform the jury charge to the evidence; however, there was no possibility that the jury was misled by reading the entire statute. Morris v. State, 280 Ga. 179, 626 S.E.2d 123 (2006).

Defendant's aggravated assault and cruelty to children convictions were upheld on appeal as: (1) the prosecutor's closing argument comments did not inject a personal opinion as to the veracity of the witnesses and the appeal to the jury was to make the community safer; (2) the trial court charged the jury fully on defendant's justification and self-defense claims, and thus, did not err in declining to instruct the jury on mistake of fact; and (3) the appeals court failed to see how jury charges on guilt by association, bare suspicion, or mere presence were appropriate. Navarro v. State, 279 Ga. App. 311, 630 S.E.2d 893 (2006).

Two charged methods of committing simple assault, as an element of aggravated assault, did not provide an improper basis for the jury to convict the defendant of aggravated assault, and the trial court did not charge a separate, unalleged method of committing aggravated assault, but simply defined both methods of committing simple assault, a lesser included offense; hence, because the jury's charge did not authorize a conviction in a manner other than that alleged in the indictment, the charge was not erroneous. Opio v. State, 283 Ga. App. 894, 642 S.E.2d 906 (2007).

Trial court properly instructed the jury on aggravated assault when the court charged that an assault was an attempt to commit a violent injury to the person of another or an act which placed another person in a reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury and that a person committed aggravated assault when the person assaulted another person with a deadly weapon or with any object, device, or instrument which, when used offensively against a person, was likely to or actually did result in serious bodily injury. Cail v. State, 287 Ga. App. 547, 652 S.E.2d 190 (2007), overruled on other grounds by State v. Lane, 838 S.E.2d 808, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 98 (Ga. 2020).

Trial court did not err by giving a charge on aggravated assault that permitted the jury to convict if the jury found that the defendant placed the intruder in reasonable fear of receiving a violent injury, even though the indictment specified that the defendant, while in the commission of an aggravated assault, caused the victim's death by shooting at the victim. Warren v. State, 283 Ga. 42, 656 S.E.2d 803 (2008).

Trial court erred by failing to provide the statutory definition of assault, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20, in a jury charge, which resulted in the final charge being fatally insufficient since the charge did not instruct on substantive points and issues involved in the case and allowed the jury to find defendant guilty of aggravated assault based merely on criminal negligence. As a result, defendant's conviction for aggravated assault was reversed and a retrial was ordered since there was sufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction. Coney v. State, 290 Ga. App. 364, 659 S.E.2d 768 (2008).

Since the defendant was charged with aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, the trial court did not mislead the jury by charging all of the aggravated assault statute, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, as the court read the indictment to the jury; charged the jury that the state had the burden to prove every allegation in the indictment, and that the jury could convict only if the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the offense alleged in the indictment; and the court sent the indictment out with the jury during the jury's deliberations. Turner v. State, 293 Ga. App. 869, 668 S.E.2d 268 (2008), overruled on other grounds, Worthen v. State, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 22 (Ga. 2019).

Trial court's jury charges on both simple assault and aggravated assault were proper in the defendant's criminal trial on charges of, inter alia, aggravated assault as the instructions that defined aggravated assault by using the simple assault definition and including the manner in which the assault had to be committed in order to be an aggravated assault did not improperly expand the indictment. Deleon v. State, 285 Ga. 306, 676 S.E.2d 184 (2009).

Trial court did not err in the court's jury instructions on aggravated assault because the instruction, which stated that the jury had to find that the assault was made with an object when used offensively against a person was likely to result in serious bodily injury, substantially covered the principle that the jury had to consider the manner and means of the object's use. Griggs v. State, 303 Ga. App. 442, 693 S.E.2d 615 (2010).

Trial court did not err in failing to define simple assault in the court's charge to the jury because although in the court's definition of felony murder based on aggravated assault, the trial court did not include a definition of simple assault in the court's charge to the jury on aggravated assault, the trial court did cover the fundamentals of simple assault. Johnson v. State, 289 Ga. 650, 715 S.E.2d 99 (2011).

Defendant could not show that the trial court erroneously charged the jury as to aggravated assault, under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), because the defendant helped induce the trial court into giving the aggravated assault jury charge about which the defendant complained and the charge as a whole was not erroneous in that the trial court's use of the language "actually does" was extraneous. Gross v. State, 312 Ga. App. 362, 718 S.E.2d 581 (2011).

Trial court did not plainly err in the court's jury instruction on aggravated assault when the trial court's instructions included the definition of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon in O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) and tracked the applicable definition of simple assault in O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a)(1). Scott v. State, 290 Ga. 883, 725 S.E.2d 305 (2012).

Counsel should have challenged the portion of the jury charge on aggravated assault regarding the use of a firearm as a deadly weapon, because the law required the State to prove that the firearm, which was alleged to have been used as a bludgeon or club, was a deadly weapon when the defendant used it to strike the victim on the lip. Byrd v. State, 325 Ga. App. 24, 752 S.E.2d 84 (2013).

In a felony murder case, because the indictment charged that the defendant caused the victims' death by assaulting them with intent to murder and with a deadly weapon, the defendant was on notice that the state could prove the defendant's guilt of the felony murders in either of the ways alleged in the indictment; thus, the trial court's decision - without objection by the state - to instruct the jury only on assault with a deadly weapon under the aggravated assault statute was authorized by the evidence and did not amount to error. Cash v. State, 297 Ga. 859, 778 S.E.2d 785 (2015), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 137, 196 L. Ed. 2d 106 (U.S. 2016).

Failure to give charges on simple assault and reckless conduct not error.

- Trial court did not err when the court refused to charge the jury on simple assault and reckless conduct as lesser included offenses of aggravated assault because the defendant failed to raise a question of fact as to whether the defendant assaulted the victim with a gun and there was no evidence suggesting that the gun went off accidentally. Johnson v. State, 320 Ga. App. 161, 739 S.E.2d 469 (2013).

Charge that tracked the assault language of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), under which the defendant was indicted, and addressed the specific instrument of the assault that was alleged in the indictment was proper. Braziel v. State, 320 Ga. App. 6, 739 S.E.2d 13 (2013).

Trial court's charge on aggravated assault was not erroneous because the court did not charge a separate, unalleged method of committing aggravated assault, but simply defined both methods of committing simple assault, a lesser included offense; the trial court's charge tracked the suggested pattern charge on aggravated assault. Clayton v. State, 319 Ga. App. 713, 738 S.E.2d 299 (2013).

Instructions on felony murder and aggravated assault moot in light of malice murder conviction.

- Any issue concerning the trial court's issuance of instructions to the jury on the offenses of felony murder and aggravated assault became moot when a defendant was convicted and sentenced on a charge of malice murder. Parker v. State, 282 Ga. 897, 655 S.E.2d 582 (2008).

Sequential charges on aggravated assault and reckless battery were proper since the jury's finding that defendant committed aggravated assault required a finding of an intentional infliction of injury, which precluded the element of criminal negligence in reckless conduct. Sheats v. State, 210 Ga. App. 622, 436 S.E.2d 796 (1993).

Issuance of sequential jury charge in trial for malice murder, felony murder, and aggravated assault.

- In a prosecution for malice murder, felony murder, and aggravated assault, although no error resulted from the trial court's issuance of a sequential jury charge, because the jury found in the defendant's favor on the defense of justification as to the malice murder count, the finding also applied to the felony murder charge. Thus, the trial court erred in finding the defendant guilty of both felony murder and the underlying felony of aggravated assault. Turner v. State, 283 Ga. 17, 655 S.E.2d 589 (2008).

Instruction on voluntary manslaughter not warranted.

- When evidence established either that the defendant intentionally shot and killed the victim or that a pistol discharged accidentally and no offenses occurred, this showed either the commission of felony murder and aggravated assault or commission of no offense, and the trial court did not err in refusing to give the lesser included offense charge on involuntary manslaughter based on reckless conduct. Lashley v. State, 283 Ga. 465, 660 S.E.2d 370 (2008).

Trial court did not err by refusing to charge the jury on voluntary manslaughter because the defendant's testimony that the defendant was not upset but fired a gun out of fear, in self-defense, and in defense of the defendant's parent showed that the defendant did not shoot a child in the heat of passion, and the other evidence was not to the contrary; rather, the testimony of the neighbors, who were the child's parents and the only other trial witnesses present during the shooting demonstrated, at most, that the defendant could have opened fire in response to the neighbors' heated or angry statements, which, as a matter of law, could not constitute "serious provocation" within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-2(a). Davidson v. State, 289 Ga. 194, 709 S.E.2d 814 (2011).

Three separate assaults did not merge.

- Defendant-B's punches to the victim's face upon defendant-A's demand for the victim's property amounted to an assault with attempt to rob, which justified one of defendant-B's convictions for aggravated assault, the formulation of a plan to rob someone at a convenience store with defendant-A and defendant-A's aggravated assault in pointing a gun at the victim constituted a second aggravated assault, and an armed robbery of the victim's property constituted the armed robbery; as each of the three crimes was proven by three different sets of facts, there was no error in the trial court's failure to have merged defendant-B's aggravated assault convictions in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, into the armed robbery conviction in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41. Johnson v. State, 279 Ga. App. 182, 630 S.E.2d 778 (2006).

Refusal to give a requested charge on the misdemeanor offense of reckless conduct, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-60, as a lesser included offense of aggravated assault was not error where defendant admitted firing a gun with the intent to scare the victim, although defendant testified that defendant did not intend to hit the victim, since using a deadly weapon to commit an act which places another in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury amounts to an aggravated assault, absent justification. The act testified to by defendant was either justified as an act of self-defense or constituted a felony. Riley v. State, 181 Ga. App. 667, 353 S.E.2d 598 (1987).

Because witnesses established that, during a dispute with the victim over drugs, defendant pointed a gun at the victim, struck the victim in the head, and shot the victim, there was no evidence that defendant was simply negligent in pointing or firing the gun and thus no evidence of reckless conduct; it was not error for the trial court to refuse to charge the jury on reckless conduct as a lesser included offense of aggravated assault. Anthony v. State, 276 Ga. App. 107, 622 S.E.2d 450 (2005).

Trial court did not err in refusing a request to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of reckless conduct, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-60, in a criminal trial on a charge of aggravated assault, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), as the essential elements of the assault charge were all shown by the evidence; the defendant's firing of a gun into a crowded parking lot, and in the direction of the victim, was not criminal negligence that would have supported a reckless conduct charge, but rather, was deemed intentional. Thompson v. State, 277 Ga. App. 323, 626 S.E.2d 825 (2006).

Variance from indictment.

- Jury instruction on aggravated assault did not vary from the indictment since the indictment charged that the defendant shot the victim with intent to rob the victim and the instruction stated that a person commits aggravated assault when the person assaults another person with the intent "to rob with a deadly weapon"; as the shooting of the victim was a material element as set forth in the indictment, the trial court properly charged an aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. Isaac v. State, 269 Ga. 875, 505 S.E.2d 480 (1998).

Trial court did not authorize a conviction in a manner not alleged in the indictment as the indictment alleged that a defendant assaulted an assault victim by striking the assault victim with a gun, and that the defendant assaulted a murder victim by shooting the murder victim with a gun; the jury instruction on the assault of the assault victim was proper as it did not charge a separate, unalleged method of committing aggravated assault, but simply defined both methods of committing simple assault, a lesser included offense. Johnson v. State, 281 Ga. 229, 637 S.E.2d 393 (2006).

Charge in exact language of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21 shows no error. Zilinmon v. State, 234 Ga. 535, 216 S.E.2d 830 (1975), overruled by Drinkard v. Walker, 281 Ga. 211, 636 S.E.2d 530 (2006).

In the absence of a request for a further charge, a charge in the language of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21 is correct. Griffin v. State, 168 Ga. App. 696, 310 S.E.2d 278 (1983).

Charging O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(1) and (a)(2) in their entirety does not succumb to the argument that there was a problem because of an incomplete definition of "deadly weapon" in jury instructions. Spaulding v. State, 185 Ga. App. 812, 366 S.E.2d 174, cert. denied, 185 Ga. App. 911, 366 S.E.2d 174 (1988).

It is not usually reversible error that an entire Code section or subsection is charged even though a part of the charge may be inapplicable under the facts in evidence. Diaz v. State, 194 Ga. App. 577, 391 S.E.2d 140 (1990).

Trial court erred in the court's charge of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21 in its entirety given the indictment's specific language; however, this error did not warrant reversal of defendant's conviction. Hunley v. State, 227 Ga. App. 234, 488 S.E.2d 716 (1997).

O.C.G.A.

§ 16-5-21(a)(1) need not be charged where such possibilities not raised by evidence. - Where no evidence introduced at trial indicated that defendant assaulted victim with intent to murder, rape, or rob, trial court's definition of aggravated assault omitting any reference to specific intent possibilities of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21 was permissible. Harper v. State, 157 Ga. App. 480, 278 S.E.2d 28 (1981).

Charge to jury on both paragraphs of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a) was warranted by an indictment charging that defendant made an assault upon the victim with a deadly weapon, by pointing the weapon at the victim, threatening to kill the victim, and firing at the victim's car, thereby placing the victim in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury. Cannon v. State, 223 Ga. App. 248, 477 S.E.2d 381 (1996).

Charging jury as to deadly weapon.

- When in a prosecution for aggravated assault, the jury was charged that a deadly weapon is any weapon which when used in the manner in which the jury finds it to have been used is capable of causing death or great bodily injury, and told that it was the jury's duty to determine whether the "night stick" was a deadly weapon or not, the court did not err in not instructing that a night stick was not a deadly weapon per se. Howard v. State, 151 Ga. App. 759, 261 S.E.2d 483 (1979).

When the court instructed that "the mere fact" that the defendant did not initiate the confrontation "does not necessarily show" that defendant was not guilty of assault "with a knife, a deadly weapon," but this language was immediately preceded by the correct and clear instruction that "whether or not a weapon is a deadly weapon is an issue to be determined by you . . . based on the character of the weapon and the nature of the wounds inflicted . . .," in the context of the instruction as a whole, and of the undisputed facts in evidence, the language could not have been understood by reasonable jurors as a usurpation of their prerogative to determine whether the knife with which appellant stabbed the victim was or was not a deadly weapon. Doss v. State, 166 Ga. App. 361, 304 S.E.2d 484 (1983).

Court did not err in charging jury that it must first determine if the knife used by the defendant was a deadly weapon "likely to cause great bodily injury" instead of "likely to produce death or great bodily injury". Johnson v. State, 185 Ga. App. 167, 363 S.E.2d 773 (1987).

Trial courts inclusion of the phrase "weapon or any object, device or instrument," in its charges rather than limiting the charge to the knife specifically referred to in the indictment did not mislead the jury because the court charged the jury properly with respect to the manner in which aggravated assault was allegedly committed by the defendant, i.e., with a deadly weapon. Oseni v. Hambrick, 207 Ga. App. 166, 427 S.E.2d 559 (1993).

In aggravated assault prosecution, because the trial court did not err in instructing the jury on the issue of whether a weapon could be considered deadly when used in an intentional and threatening manner, defendant's conviction on this charge was upheld on appeal; hence, the trial court did not err in instructions by taking the deadliness issue from the jury. Chappell v. State, 290 Ga. App. 691, 659 S.E.2d 919 (2008).

"Levels of certainty."

- In a prosecution on four counts of aggravated assault and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, given that the state did not rely upon eyewitness identification alone, but presented other evidence linking the defendant to the crimes charged, the trial court did not err in giving the "level of certainty" portion of an identity charge to the jury, which the defendant requested, Creamer v. State, 282 Ga. App. 411, 638 S.E.2d 832 (2006).

Charging presumption of intent to kill.

- It was not error to charge that the law presumes the intent to kill when a person uses a deadly weapon or instrumentality in the manner in which such weapon or instrumentality is ordinarily employed to produce death. Hardy v. State, 242 Ga. 702, 251 S.E.2d 289 (1978).

Use of "the law presumes" in deadly weapon charge.

- Use of the phrase "the law presumes" in the deadly weapon charge is improper; the proper charge authorizes the jury to "infer the intent to kill" from the intentional and unjustified use of a deadly weapon. The words "the law presumes" cannot, however, be considered in a vacuum, but must be viewed in the context of the overall charge. Wilson v. Jones, 251 Ga. 23, 302 S.E.2d 546 (1983).

Use of "or actually did" in jury charge.

- Defendant asserts that the trial court erred by charging the jury that the jury could find defendant guilty of aggravated assault if the flashlight was "likely to or actually [did] result in serious bodily injury." Defendant objected to the inclusion of "or actually did" because this phrase was not included in the indictment. However, a charge on a code section in the statute's entirety is not error if a part thereof is applicable and it does not appear that the inapplicable part misled the jury or erroneously affected the verdict; thus, since the charge was taken from O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, and, immediately after giving the charge, the court correctly instructed the jury to determine whether the flashlight was "likely to cause serious bodily injury," using evidence of actual injury as part of this inquiry. Gibson v. State, 283 Ga. 377, 659 S.E.2d 372 (2008).

Use of "actually does" in instruction.

- Trial court properly charged the jury on only that part of the aggravated assault statute relating to the allegations of the indictment, and the court's use of the language "actually does" was extraneous. Further, the trial court was also within the court's province to instruct the jury as to the state's burden of proof. Jackson v. State, 288 Ga. App. 432, 654 S.E.2d 232 (2007).

Cautionary instruction on potential danger of weapon as exhibit held proper.

- An instruction given by the trial court cautioning the jury as to the potential danger presented by the weapon allegedly used in the assault that is an exhibit which still contains a round of ammunition is wholly proper and is not error even though the weapon appears to be inoperable. Drayton v. State, 167 Ga. App. 477, 306 S.E.2d 731 (1983).

Court should not authorize jury to convict for lesser crime of simple assault in every case of aggravated assault. Smith v. State, 140 Ga. App. 395, 231 S.E.2d 143 (1976).

When there is uncontradicted evidence that the victim died, it is not necessary to charge on the lesser included crimes of aggravated assault and aggravated battery. Sanders v. State, 251 Ga. 70, 303 S.E.2d 13 (1983).

Failure to give jury charge on accident as harmful error.

- When the defendant's testimony is sufficient to raise a jury question as to whether a physical encounter is an accident or an aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, it is harmful error for the court to fail to give any charge to the jury on accident. Dotson v. State, 144 Ga. App. 113, 240 S.E.2d 238 (1977).

Charge on simple battery, lesser included offense of aggravated assault.

- Since the jury was authorized to decide defendant's fists and hands were not used as deadly weapons as required for aggravated assault, there was no error in charging on simple battery, which was a lesser included offense of aggravated assault. Guevara v. State, 151 Ga. App. 444, 260 S.E.2d 491 (1979).

Because the defendant's conduct put the officer-victim in reasonable apprehension of immediately sustaining a violent injury, which satisfied the elements required to prove simple assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a)(2), the trial court properly charged the jury on simple assault as a lesser-included offense of aggravated assault upon a police officer. Bostic v. State, 289 Ga. App. 195, 656 S.E.2d 546 (2008).

Trial court did not err in failing to give an instruction on the lesser-included offense of simple battery because the defendant failed to request such an instruction. Griggs v. State, 303 Ga. App. 442, 693 S.E.2d 615 (2010).

Defendant failed to demonstrate that the defendant's trial counsel erred by failing to request a jury charge on simple battery as a lesser included offense of the charged crime of aggravated assault because there was no evidence that the defendant made physical contact with the victim or caused physical harm to the victim; since the state's evidence establishes all of the elements of an offense, and there is no evidence raising the lesser offense, there is no error in failing to give a charge on the lesser offense. Davis v. State, 308 Ga. App. 7, 706 S.E.2d 710 (2011).

Even though defendant was not charged as anything other than a direct perpetrator in a prosecution for aggravated assault, an instruction that defendant could be convicted under a theory of indirect concern was proper since defendant had notice of the testimony of a defense witness authorizing the jury to find that defendant was an aider and abettor. Upshaw v. State, 221 Ga. App. 655, 472 S.E.2d 484 (1996).

Charge on simple battery not required.

- Court's refusal to give the requested instruction on simple battery was proper because the evidence did not authorize an instruction on this lesser offense since there was no conflict in the evidence concerning defendant's act and its result and the state proved aggravated assault with a deadly weapon beyond a reasonable doubt. Doss v. State, 166 Ga. App. 361, 304 S.E.2d 484 (1983).

With regard to defendant's conviction for aggravated battery of a taxi driver, defendant was not entitled to a jury instruction on the lesser included offense of battery based on defendant's argument that the jury could have found under the facts of the case that the gun was not used as a deadly weapon as the evidence showed without conflict that defendant's physical assault upon the taxi driver with the handgun caused the taxi driver to bleed from the head and the entire right side of the face, and the taxi driver testified that, during the attack, the taxi driver was very afraid of being killed. Thus, the pistol in the case, if used in the manner testified to by the taxi driver, was per se a deadly weapon, and the offense was either aggravated assault or no offense at all. Ortiz v. State, 292 Ga. App. 378, 665 S.E.2d 333 (2008), cert. denied, No. S08C1851, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 928 (Ga. 2008).

Charge on maliciously in aggravated battery trial.

- Trial court did not err in charging the jury on the meaning of "maliciously" in the context of the elements of aggravated battery because the court charged the jury quite extensively on the element of intent as that element related to the crimes charged, and the court properly advised the jury of the state's requisite burden of proof; therefore, the additional charge on the definition of maliciously did not, in the context of the charge as a whole, prejudice the defendant. Mubarak v. State, 305 Ga. App. 419, 699 S.E.2d 788 (2010).

Charge on alternative method of committing aggravated assault.

- Defendant's objection to the charge for including an alternative method of committing aggravated assault, when the defendant and the defendant's co-defendant were specifically charged with pointing a gun at the victim, was without merit because the trial court merely tracked the suggested pattern charge on aggravated assault, and the indictment was sent out with the jury. Ford-Calhoun v. State, 327 Ga. App. 835, 761 S.E.2d 388 (2014).

Lesser included offense of pointing gun at another.

- Trial court properly refused a requested charge on the lesser included offense of pointing a gun at another, given the victim's testimony and defendant's own statement that defendant drew the firearm in response to the violence of a confrontation between defendant and the victim. Watson v. State, 199 Ga. App. 825, 406 S.E.2d 509 (1991).

With regard to a defendant's conviction for the felony murder of the defendant's wife, with aggravated assault as the underlying felony, the trial court erred by refusing the defendant's requested charge on involuntary manslaughter with pointing a pistol at another as the predicate misdemeanor, which entitled the defendant to a new trial based on the defendant testifying that the shooting occurred inadvertently when, in the course of horseplay with the pistol, the defendant pulled the trigger while pointing the pistol at the victim's head, not knowing there was a round in the chamber. Manzano v. State, 282 Ga. 557, 651 S.E.2d 661 (2007).

Defendant was not entitled to a jury charge on the misdemeanors of pointing a gun at another, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-102, as a lesser included offense of the felony counts of aggravated assault because the victims were placed in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury when defendant pointed a gun at the victims; the only testimony was that the weapon was pointed as a threat and perceived as such, and therefore, an assault. Dailey v. State, 313 Ga. App. 809, 723 S.E.2d 43 (2012), cert. denied, No. S12C0969, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 551 (Ga. 2012).

No merger with armed robbery.

- Because: (1) evidence presented against the second of two defendants, jointly charged, that the victim was beaten over the head with a pistol showed a completed aggravated assault prior to the armed robbery; and (2) possession of a firearm during the commission of an aggravated assault did not merge with armed robbery, as there was an expressed legislative intent to impose double punishment for conduct which violated both O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106 and other felony statutes, the offenses did not merge. Bunkley v. State, 278 Ga. App. 450, 629 S.E.2d 112 (2006).

Merger of assault with deadly weapon and assault with intent to rob.

- Under O.C.G.A. § 16-1-7(a), a trial court erred in convicting and sentencing the defendant for both aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and aggravated assault with the intent to rob, as those two offenses merged since the same facts were used to prove both offenses. Adcock v. State, 279 Ga. App. 473, 631 S.E.2d 494 (2006).

Declining defendant's requested instruction held not error.

- Trial court did not err in refusing defendant's requested instruction that, in order to convict, the state must show affirmatively an intention to aid and abet or an active involvement in the two crimes charged since the charge given covered fully (even to overflowing) each and every applicable principle of law concerning the crimes of armed robbery and aggravated assault and the law of principals as well as intent and participation only under coercion. August v. State, 180 Ga. App. 510, 349 S.E.2d 532 (1986).

In a prosecution for felony involuntary manslaughter, the trial court did not err in refusing the defendant's requested jury charge on unlawful-act involuntary manslaughter, because the jury considered the defendant's theories of self-defense and accident and rejected them, and evidence in opposition to these defenses showed that the defendant struck the victim with the barrel of the gun, which went off, killing the victim, and the evidence presumed that the defendant committed an aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2). Gore v. State, 272 Ga. App. 156, 611 S.E.2d 764 (2005).

There was sufficient evidence to convict a defendant of felony murder under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-1 based upon the actions of participating in the attack by hitting the victim with the bat even though the defendant did not actually shoot the victim; thus, instructions tracking O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) aggravated assault could properly be based on another perpetrator's use of a gun but the victim's acts of self-defense were not provocation that justified an O.C.G.A. § 16-5-3(a) involuntary manslaughter instruction. Ros v. State, 279 Ga. 604, 619 S.E.2d 644 (2005).

In a trial for voluntary manslaughter, aggravated assault, and battery, it was not error to refuse to charge on the lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-3(a). Such a charge required an unlawful act that was not a felony, and the only such act supported by the evidence was the striking of the victim with a gun, which constituted the felony of aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21. Moon v. State, 291 Ga. App. 499, 662 S.E.2d 283 (2008).

Trial court did not err by failing to give the defendant's requested charge on the lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-3, because the defendant's admitted act of purposefully putting a gun to the fearful victim's head and pulling the trigger constituted the felony offense of aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, not reckless conduct, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-60(b); the defendant's testimony that the victim began crying when the victim saw the gun provided evidence that the victim perceived the gun to be a loaded weapon that could be used to inflict a violent injury, which was a reasonable perception, and the jury's verdict of guilty on the felony murder charge established the existence of all the elements of the underlying felony offense of aggravated assault. Jones v. State, 289 Ga. 145, 710 S.E.2d 127 (2011).

Charge on intent not "closely connected" to charge on aggravated assault.

- Court of appeals would not consider the argument when the defendant contended the trial court failed to properly charge the jury on the intent necessary to commit aggravated assault, not arguing that the court's charge on intent was incorrect, but contending that the charge on intent was not "closely connected" with the charge on aggravated assault and thus, the jury could not properly understand the charge on intent, since the court charged the jury fully and correctly on intent, and there was nothing in the transcript to support the defendant's contention that the jury could not, or did not, understand the charge on intent as applied to aggravated assault. Cade v. State, 180 Ga. App. 314, 348 S.E.2d 769 (1986).

Charge on intent was sufficient where a reasonable juror would only have understood it to mean that if the victim was reasonably apprehensive of receiving bodily injury, the crime of aggravated assault has been committed regardless of whether defendant intended to injure the victim or whether the gun was loaded or could be fired. Head v. State, 233 Ga. App. 655, 504 S.E.2d 499 (1998).

Trial court did not sua sponte err in failing to charge jury on identity as: (1) there was Georgia law requiring a trial judge to warn the jury against the possible dangers of mistaken identification of an accused as the person committing a crime; and (2) such was not required after the jury had already been charged as to the presumption of innocence, reasonable doubt, burden of proof, credibility of witnesses, and impeachment of witnesses. Lee v. State, 281 Ga. 776, 642 S.E.2d 835 (2007).

Self-defense instruction based on statutory language upheld.

- When the defendant contended the trial court erred by failing to give the defendant's requested charge on self-defense, since the court charged the jury on self-defense in the language of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21 and16-3-23, which is the law in Georgia, and those code provisions cover the same principles requested by the defendant, it was not error to deny the defendant's request to charge. Cade v. State, 180 Ga. App. 314, 348 S.E.2d 769 (1986).

Trial court did not err by refusing to charge the jury on the affirmative defense of self defense because defendant never admitted to the crimes alleged and, in fact, denied even being present during the assault of the victim; therefore, there was no evidence to support the giving of the requested charge. Ransom v. State, 318 Ga. App. 764, 734 S.E.2d 761 (2012).

Accident and self-defense.

- Defenses of accident and self-defense are inconsistent, and a defendant generally is not entitled to a charge on both. Regardless of the reason why defendant drew a weapon, when the discharge of the weapon inside the victim's truck was the result of either an intentional or an unintentional act by defendant, there was no error in the trial court's refusal to give requested charges on both accident and self defense. Watson v. State, 199 Ga. App. 825, 406 S.E.2d 509 (1991).

Failure to give jury charge on accident was error.

- Defendant's convictions for voluntary manslaughter, aggravated assault, and possession of a knife during the commission of a felony were reversed because the trial court erred in failing to charge the jury on the defense of accident as requested when that defense was raised by the evidence, and the Court of Appeals could not find that it was highly probable that the failure to give the requested charge did not contribute to the verdict; at least slight evidence supported the theory that the defendant armed oneself with a knife in order to fend off the victim's attack with a pipe wrench and that although the defendant was prepared to intentionally stab the victim in self-defense, the defendant did not do so, but the victim lunged at the defendant and impaled oneself on the knife. Hill v. State, 300 Ga. App. 210, 684 S.E.2d 356 (2009).

Jury charge on defense of habitation.

- In a prosecution for aggravated assault, while the trial court charged the jury regarding the details of the defense of justification, because the evidence did not authorize the charge of defense of habitation, the instruction was properly denied; moreover, no evidence was presented to suggest that the victim used coercion or threats to gain entry into the defendant's residence. Brimidge v. State, 287 Ga. App. 23, 651 S.E.2d 344 (2007).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for new trial on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel because there was no evidence to support an instruction on defense of habitation pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-3-23 and, thus, trial counsel did not perform deficiently in failing to request such an instruction; there was no evidence that the victim was attempting to unlawfully enter or attack the defendant's vehicle at the time the defendant stabbed the victim, and under the facts, there could be no reasonable belief that stabbing the victim was necessary to prevent or terminate the other's unlawful entry into or attack upon a motor vehicle. Philpot v. State, 311 Ga. App. 486, 716 S.E.2d 551 (2011).

Failure to charge on defenses error even if defendant refused to admit criminal conduct.

- In the defendant's aggravated assault trial, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), based on the defendant's aiming a BB rifle at two victims, the trial court erred in denying the defendant's requested jury instructions on the defense of self and habitation on the basis that the defendant did not admit pointing the gun at the victims; if slight evidence supported the defenses, the charges should have been given. Defendant was not required to admit the elements of the crime in order to argue the defendant's theory of defense. McClure v. State, 306 Ga. 856, 834 S.E.2d 96 (2019).

Flight charge was not expression of court's opinion.

- When in a trial for aggravated assault defendant complained that part of the court's charge on intent was an improper comment on the evidence because the court charged in terms of inferences allowed to be made by the jury, if it so chose, from the evidence of flight, it was held that the flight charge, either standing alone or taken in the context of the whole charge, could not have been taken by the jury as an expression or intimation of the court's opinion. Alexander v. State, 180 Ga. App. 640, 350 S.E.2d 284 (1986).

Charge excluding "when used offensively" from definition.

- Trial court did not err in failing to use the phrase "when used offensively" in the court's definition of the crime when defendant was indicted specifically for using a hand gun and was not charged with the alternative method of committing the crime. Green v. State, 209 Ga. App. 274, 433 S.E.2d 383 (1993); Diaz v. State, 255 Ga. App. 288, 564 S.E.2d 872 (2002).

O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) defined aggravated assault as an assault with a deadly weapon or with any object which, when used offensively, was likely to result in serious bodily injury. The phrase "when used offensively" described an alternative method of committing aggravated assault, i.e., by use of an object other than one considered a deadly weapon; therefore, a trial judge did not err in omitting to charge this alternative language in a case in which the defendant was charged with using a deadly weapon. Finley v. State, 286 Ga. 47, 685 S.E.2d 258 (2009).

Recharge as to applicable definition.

- When the trial court's original charge to the jury with respect to the statutory definition of aggravated assault included the language of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(1), but at the state's suggestion, the trial court recalled the jury for the purpose of giving clarifying instructions to the effect that only O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) applied, and the record clearly showed that the trial court's recharge informed the jury to disregard only the previously given inapplicable definition of aggravated assault contained in O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(1), there was no error. Rashada v. State, 180 Ga. App. 773, 350 S.E.2d 323 (1986); Cail v. State, 194 Ga. App. 584, 391 S.E.2d 444 (1990).

Offensive weapon.

- Defendant failed to preserve for appellate review the defendant's contention that the trial court erred in using the "offensive weapon" definition of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a) as armed robbery was not one of the charged offenses because the defendant did not object to the charge and expressly declined the trial court's offer to recharge the jury. The charge did not constitute plain error because the definition of "offensive weapon" applicable to armed robbery mirrored very closely the definition of aggravated assault set forth in O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), and an "offensive weapon" under the armed robbery statute necessarily would fall within the category of weapons described in § 16-5-21(a)(2), and therefore the defendant could not show that the instruction affected the outcome of the proceedings. Jackson v. State, 316 Ga. App. 588, 730 S.E.2d 69 (2012).

Recharge not error.

- Because the jury in the defendant's criminal matter requested clarification for purposes of their deliberations, whereupon the trial court recharged them on the offense of aggravated assault, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, such was not error under O.C.G.A. § 5-5-24(c) or under the holding in Dukes, as the initial charge and the recharge were not based on the entire aggravated assault statute but instead, were only based on that part of the O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21 that related to the allegations in the indictment. Johnson v. State, 279 Ga. App. 669, 632 S.E.2d 688 (2006).

Charge which created an unconstitutional burden-shifting presumption as to intent was harmless error, since the defendant's defense was alibi and misidentification, and in the alternative, insanity, and such defenses did not put into issue criminal intent. Williams v. State, 180 Ga. App. 893, 350 S.E.2d 768 (1986).

Charge as to justification not misleading or confusing.

- In a trial for aggravated assault, jury charge as to justification was not misleading or confusing; charge made it clear that state bore burden of proving both elements of aggravated assault under the indictment and that defendant's use of force was not justified beyond a reasonable doubt. White v. State, 291 Ga. App. 249, 661 S.E.2d 865 (2008).

In an aggravated assault case in which the defense was justification under O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21(a), trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to request a charge defining aggravated battery under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24(a) as a forcible felony for which the use of force was justified. Also, there was no showing that the outcome of the trial would have been different if such a charge had been given. Lewis v. State, 302 Ga. App. 506, 691 S.E.2d 336 (2010).

Curative instructions prevented prejudice and obviated mistrial.

- In the prosecution of the defendant for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and resisting arrest, because the trial court's curative instructions to the jury obviated the need for a mistrial with respect to statements from a potential juror and cured any prejudice which might have resulted from the prosecutor's closing argument, convictions of those crimes were upheld on appeal. Mitchell v. State, 284 Ga. App. 209, 644 S.E.2d 147 (2007).

Harmless error.

- When the defendant was tried for aggravated assault with intent to murder after biting a police officer, the trial court's error in charging the jury that, in order to convict of the offense, the jury must find the use of a deadly weapon and intent to murder, caused the defendant no harm; it simply placed an extra burden of proof upon the state and therefore enured to the defendant's benefit. Scroggins v. State, 198 Ga. App. 29, 401 S.E.2d 13 (1990), cert. denied, 198 Ga. App. 898, 401 S.E.2d 13 (1991).

Charge did not omit nexus between violence and gang activity.

- With regard to defendant's convictions for aggravated assault and gang-related crimes, the trial court did not commit plain error with regard to its jury instructions because the trial court correctly stated the law by using the statutory language in the Georgia Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-15-4(a), in its charge to the jury, so the charge did not omit a nexus between the violence, and it was not possible for the jury to convict defendant without finding that nexus. Skinner v. State, 318 Ga. App. 217, 733 S.E.2d 506 (2012).

Guilty verdict for aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a) was not necessarily inconsistent because an O.C.G.A. § 16-11-102 pointing a gun count (for which petitioner inmate was found not guilty) included the element of acting without justification, an element not involved in the aggravated assault charge; counsel was not ineffective for not requesting an instruction on the specific method of committing the aggravated assault charged. Leroy Banks v. Georgia, 517 Fed. Appx. 709 (11th Cir. 2013)(Unpublished).

Charge on criminal negligence warranted.

- Court erred by denying the defendant's petition for habeas relief from an aggravated assault conviction because appellate counsel's failure to raise the issue that the trial court erred by failing to charge the jury on negligence was not subjectively a strategic decision but was based upon counsel's lack of familiarity with the relevant law and was deficient. Sullivan v. Kemp, 293 Ga. 770, 749 S.E.2d 721 (2013).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 6 Am. Jur. 2d, Assault and Battery, §§ 30, 31, 32, 33, 60.

C.J.S.

- 6A C.J.S., Assault and Battery, § 87 et seq.

ALR.

- Recovery for physical consequences of fright resulting in a physical injury, 11 A.L.R. 1119; 40 A.L.R. 983; 76 A.L.R. 681; 98 A.L.R. 402.

Cane as a deadly weapon, 30 A.L.R. 815.

Assault with intent to ravish or rape consenting female under age of consent, 81 A.L.R. 599.

Effect of failure or refusal of court, in robbery prosecution, to instruct on assault and battery, 58 A.L.R.2d 808.

Civil liability of one instigating or inciting an assault or assault and battery notwithstanding primary or active participant therein has been absolved of liability, 72 A.L.R.2d 1229.

Intent to do physical harm as essential element of crime of assault with deadly or dangerous weapon, 92 A.L.R.2d 635.

What constitutes attempted murder, 54 A.L.R.3d 612.

Assault and battery: sexual nature of physical contact as aggravating offense, 63 A.L.R.3d 225.

What constitutes penetration in prosecution for rape or statutory rape, 76 A.L.R.3d 163.

Antagonistic defenses as ground for separate trials of codefendants in criminal case, 82 A.L.R.3d 245.

Automobile as dangerous or deadly weapon within meaning of assault or battery statute, 89 A.L.R.3d 1026.

Pocket or clasp knife as deadly or dangerous weapon for purposes of statute aggravating offenses such as assault, robbery, or homicide, 100 A.L.R.3d 287.

Walking cane as deadly or dangerous weapon for purpose of statutes aggravating offenses such as assault and robbery, 8 A.L.R.4th 842.

Parts of the human body, other than feet, as deadly or dangerous weapons for purposes of statutes aggravating offenses such as assault and robbery, 8 A.L.R.4th 1268.

Criminal responsibility of husband for rape, or assault to commit rape, on wife, 24 A.L.R.4th 105.

Fact that gun was unloaded as affecting criminal responsibility, 68 A.L.R.4th 507.

Criminal assault or battery statutes making attack on elderly person a special or aggravated offense, 73 A.L.R.4th 1123.

Admissibility of expert opinion stating whether a particular knife was, or could have been, the weapon used in a crime, 83 A.L.R.4th 660.

Sufficiency of bodily injury to support charge of aggravated assault, 5 A.L.R.5th 243.

Stationary object or attached fixture as deadly or dangerous weapon for purposes of statute aggravating offenses such as assault, robbery, or homicide, 8 A.L.R.5th 775.

Transmission or risk of transmission of human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) or acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) as basis for prosecution or sentencing in criminal or military discipline case, 13 A.L.R.5th 628.

Kicking as aggravated assault, or assault with dangerous or deadly weapon, 19 A.L.R.5th 823.

Attempt to commit assault as criminal offense, 93 A.L.R.5th 683.

Dog as deadly or dangerous weapon for purposes of statutes aggravating offenses such as assault and robbery, 124 A.L.R.5th 657.

Cigarette lighter as deadly or dangerous weapon, 22 A.L.R.6th 533.

Parts of human body, other than feet, as deadly or dangerous weapons or instrumentalities for purposes of statutes aggravating offenses such as assault and robbery, 67 A.L.R.6th 103.

When is federal officer assaulted "while engaged in, or on account of, performance of official duties" for purposes of offense of assaulting, resisting, or impeding federal officer under 18 USCS § 111, 36 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 475.