2020 Georgia Code
Title 16 - Crimes and Offenses
Chapter 5 - Crimes Against the Person
Article 2 - Assault and Battery
§ 16-5-20. Simple Assault

1. A person commits the offense of simple assault when he or she either:
   1. Attempts to commit a violent injury to the person of another; or
   2. Commits an act which places another in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury.
2. Except as provided in subsections (c) through (h) of this Code section, a person who commits the offense of simple assault shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
3. Any person who commits the offense of simple assault in a public transit vehicle or station shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished for a misdemeanor of a high and aggravated nature. For purposes of this Code section, "public transit vehicle" means a bus, van, or rail car used for the transportation of passengers within a system which receives a subsidy from tax revenues or is operated under a franchise contract with a county or municipality of this state.
4. If the offense of simple assault is committed between past or present spouses, persons who are parents of the same child, parents and children, stepparents and stepchildren, foster parents and foster children, or other persons excluding siblings living or formerly living in the same household, the defendant shall be punished for a misdemeanor of a high and aggravated nature. In no event shall this subsection be applicable to corporal punishment administered by a parent or guardian to a child or administered by a person acting in loco parentis.
5. Any person who commits the offense of simple assault against a person who is 65 years of age or older shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished for a misdemeanor of a high and aggravated nature.
6. Any person who commits the offense of simple assault against an employee of a public school system of this state while such employee is engaged in official duties or on school property shall, upon conviction of such offense, be punished for a misdemeanor of a high and aggravated nature. For purposes of this Code section, "school property" shall include public school buses and stops for public school buses as designated by local school boards of education.
7. Any person who commits the offense of simple assault against a female who is pregnant at the time of the offense shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished for a misdemeanor of a high and aggravated nature.
8. Nothing in this Code section shall be construed to permit the prosecution of:
   1. Any person for conduct relating to an abortion for which the consent of the pregnant woman, or person authorized by law to act on her behalf, has been obtained or for which such consent is implied by law;
   2. Any person for any medical treatment of the pregnant woman or her unborn child; or
   3. Any woman with respect to her unborn child.

      For the purposes of this subsection, the term "unborn child" means a member of the species homo sapiens at any stage of development who is carried in the womb.

(Laws 1833, Cobb's 1851 Digest, p. 787; Code 1863, §§ 4256, 4257; Code 1868, §§ 4291, 4292; Code 1873, §§ 4357, 4358; Code 1882, §§ 4357, 4358; Penal Code 1895, §§ 95, 96; Penal Code 1910, §§ 95, 96; Code 1933, §§ 26-1401, 26-1402; Code 1933, § 26-1301, enacted by Ga. L. 1968, p. 1249, § 1; Ga. L. 1991, p. 971, §§ 1, 2; Ga. L. 1999, p. 381, § 2; Ga. L. 1999, p. 562, § 2; Ga. L. 2004, p. 621, § 1; Ga. L. 2005, p. 60, § 16/HB 95; Ga. L. 2006, p. 643, § 1/SB 77.)

- Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1999, "subsections (c), (d), and (e)" was substituted for "subsections (c) and (d)" in subsection (b), and subsection (d) as enacted by Ga. L. 1999, p. 562, § 2, was redesignated as subsection (e).

- Ga. L. 1999, p. 381, § 1, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: "This Act shall be known and may be cited as the 'Crimes Against Family Members Act of 1999'."

Ga. L. 1999, p. 381, § 7, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: "Nothing herein shall be construed to validate a relationship between people of the same sex as a 'marriage' under the laws of this State."

Ga. L. 1999, p. 562, § 1, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: "This Act shall be known and may be cited as the 'Crimes Against Elderly Act of 1999'."

Ga. L. 2004, p. 621, § 9(b), not codified by the General Assembly, provides that the amendment by that Act shall apply to offenses committed on or after July 1, 2004.

Ga. L. 2006, p. 643, § 5, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that the amendment by that Act shall apply to all offenses committed on or after July 1, 2006.

- For survey article on criminal law and procedure, see 34 Mercer L. Rev. 89 (1982). For article, "Misdemeanor Sentencing in Georgia," see 7 Ga. St. B. J. 8 (2001). For article on 2006 amendment of this Code section, see 23 Georgia. St. U. L. Rev. 37 (2006). For note on 1999 amendments to Code sections in this article, see 16 Georgia. St. U. L. Rev. 72 (1999).

ANALYSIS

• General Consideration
• Application
• Not Excessive Force
• Jury Instruction

General Consideration

Concurrent jurisdiction with federal labor legislation.

- Even under situations involving the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq., the state has retained concurrent jurisdiction to enforce O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20 as it directly relates to the prevention of, or incitement to, immediate violence or to the prevention of the threat of immediate violence or violent injury. State v. Klinakis, 206 Ga. App. 318, 425 S.E.2d 665 (1992).

- Offense of simple assault is complete if there is such a demonstration of violence, coupled with an apparent ability to inflict injury so as to cause the person against whom it is directed reasonably to fear the injury unless the person retreats to secure that person's safety. Hise v. State, 127 Ga. App. 511, 194 S.E.2d 274 (1972); Hudson v. State, 135 Ga. App. 739, 218 S.E.2d 905 (1975).

Simple assault does not require physical contact with victim. Tuggle v. State, 145 Ga. App. 603, 244 S.E.2d 131 (1978).

Any attempt to do any unlawful act of violence injurious to another was included in former Code 1933, § 26-1401 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20). Williams v. State, 15 Ga. App. 306, 82 S.E. 938 (1914).

Assault is inchoate violence, with present means of carrying the violence into effect. The intention to do bodily harm is the essence of assault. Mullen v. State, 51 Ga. App. 385, 180 S.E. 521 (1935).

- State may present a surviving aggravated assault victim for view by the jurors, where, even though the victim does not testify, the victim's presence establishes that the victim is a "person" for purposes of proving the elements of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a). Perry v. State, 276 Ga. 836, 585 S.E.2d 614, rev'd, 276 Ga. 839, 584 S.E.2d 253 (2003).

- When there was no evidence that defendant performed any act constituting a substantial step toward the commission of a battery, defendant could not be convicted of assault, as the evidence could not satisfy the element of "commits an act." In the Interest of C.S., 251 Ga. App. 411, 554 S.E.2d 558 (2001).

- Charge of aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21 based upon the "intent to commit injury" provisions of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a)(1) requires a criminal intent that is fatally inconsistent with the negligence required by a charge of reckless conduct under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-60(b). Reddick v. State, 264 Ga. App. 487, 591 S.E.2d 392 (2003), overruled on other grounds by State v. Springer, 297 Ga. 376, 774 S.E.2d 106 (2015).

Aggravated assault convictions were affirmed because the defendant accelerated toward officers standing in front of a roadblock, forcing them to jump out of the way, and causing one to fall. Williams v. State, 270 Ga. App. 371, 606 S.E.2d 594 (2004).

Intention to commit unlawful act must exist. Woodruff v. Woodruff, 22 Ga. 237 (1857); Dorsey v. State, 108 Ga. 477, 34 S.E. 135 (1899).

Intent is question for jury. Thomas v. State, 99 Ga. 38, 26 S.E. 748 (1896); Robinson v. State, 118 Ga. 750, 45 S.E. 620 (1903).

- There does not have to be an actual present ability to commit the injury. There need only be an apparent ability to commit violent injury upon the person assailed. Thomas v. State, 99 Ga. 38, 26 S.E. 748 (1896).

Mere preparation unaccompanied by physical effort to commit violent injury upon another person is not assault. Fennell v. State, 164 Ga. 59, 137 S.E. 762 (1927); Mullen v. State, 51 Ga. App. 385, 180 S.E. 521 (1935).

Contact proceeding from rudeness is as offensive and harmful as that from anger or lust, and in law constitutes an assault and battery. Brown v. State, 57 Ga. App. 864, 197 S.E. 82 (1938).

- While a mere threat or menace to commit a violent injury upon the person of another is not sufficient to constitute an assault, yet where the threat or menace is accompanied by an apparent attempt to commit such an injury, and its consummation is prevented, either by the act of the person upon whom the assault is threatened or by the interposition of a third person, the violence has commenced, and the assault is complete. Harrison v. State, 60 Ga. App. 610, 4 S.E.2d 602 (1939).

There need not be an actual present ability to commit a violent injury upon the person assailed but, if there be such a demonstration of violence, coupled with an apparent ability to inflict the injury, so as to cause the person against whom it was directed reasonably to fear the injury unless the person retreats to secure that person's safety, and under such circumstances, the person is compelled to retreat to avoid an impending danger, the assault is complete though the assailant may never have been within actual striking distance of the person assaulted. Harrison v. State, 60 Ga. App. 610, 4 S.E.2d 602 (1939).

- It is lawful to convict for simple assault even though the proof shows that a battery was committed because by definition an assault is nothing more than an attempted battery. Scott v. State, 141 Ga. App. 848, 234 S.E.2d 685 (1977).

Assault is necessarily included in every battery. Terry v. State, 166 Ga. App. 632, 305 S.E.2d 170 (1983); Anderson v. State, 170 Ga. App. 634, 317 S.E.2d 877 (1984).

- Offense of simple assault is complete if there is a demonstration of violence, coupled with apparent present ability to inflict injury so as to cause person against whom it is directed reasonably to fear that the person will receive an immediate violent injury unless the person retreats to secure that person's safety. Johnson v. State, 158 Ga. App. 432, 280 S.E.2d 856 (1981).

There must be substantial step toward committing battery before there can be assault since assault is attempted battery. Bissell v. State, 153 Ga. App. 564, 266 S.E.2d 238 (1980).

- Indictment charged defendant with aggravated assault by committing two acts, however, the state need prove only one of the two acts constituting the crime of aggravated assault to sustain the conviction. Brown v. State, 242 Ga. App. 347, 529 S.E.2d 650 (2000), overruled on other grounds, Ellis v. State, 292 Ga. 276, 736 S.E.2d 412 (2013).

In every assault there must be intent to injure. The test is, was there a present purpose of doing bodily injury? Riddle v. State, 145 Ga. App. 328, 243 S.E.2d 607 (1978), overruled on other grounds, Adsitt v. State, 248 Ga. 237, 282 S.E.2d 305 (1981).

State of mind of either a perpetrator or a victim, including whether a victim has been placed under reasonable apprehension of injury or fear from an event, when in issue, may be proved by indirect or circumstantial evidence. Williams v. State, 208 Ga. App. 12, 430 S.E.2d 157 (1993).

When the language of the indictment did not track the exact language of the assault statute, but did allege that the defendant "maliciously" struck the victim, it properly alleged the necessary element of intent since, given the circumstances of the case whereby the victim did not see the defendant strike the victim, it would have been difficult to conclude that the victim was placed in reasonable apprehension of being injured violently. Gamble v. State, 235 Ga. App. 777, 510 S.E.2d 69 (1998).

- To constitute an assault no actual injury need be shown, it being only necessary to show an intention to commit an injury, coupled with an apparent ability to do so. Reeves v. State, 128 Ga. App. 750, 197 S.E.2d 843 (1973).

There need not be actual present ability to commit violent injury upon person assailed; but, if there be such a demonstration of violence, coupled with an apparent ability to inflict the injury, so as to cause the person against whom it is directed reasonably to fear the injury unless the person retreats to secure that person's safety, and under such circumstances the person is compelled to retreat to avoid an impending danger, the assault is complete though the assailant may never have been within actual striking distance of the person assailed. Reeves v. State, 128 Ga. App. 750, 197 S.E.2d 843 (1973).

- Proof that victim has been placed in apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury need not necessarily be solely by reason of victim's testimony of victim's mental state but may be inferred from conduct of victim such as when the victim retreats to secure safety. Hurt v. State, 158 Ga. App. 722, 282 S.E.2d 192 (1981).

- Simple assault is defined as an act which places another in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a)(2), an assault becomes aggravated when it is committed with a deadly weapon, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2); thus, if the victim is in reasonable apprehension of an immediate violent injury from a weapon, an aggravated assault has occurred. Because reasonable apprehension of injury is not the same as simple fear, the testimony that the victim was not afraid of the defendant does not preclude conviction. Lunsford v. State, 260 Ga. App. 818, 581 S.E.2d 638 (2003).

Mere threat to commit violent injury upon person of another is not sufficient to constitute an assault. Hudson v. State, 135 Ga. App. 739, 218 S.E.2d 905 (1975); Johnson v. State, 158 Ga. App. 432, 280 S.E.2d 856 (1981).

- In every criminal case of aggravated assault, trial judge must include statement as to elements of simple assault within the judge's definition of aggravated assault. Harper v. State, 157 Ga. App. 480, 278 S.E.2d 28 (1981).

"Assault" in aggravated assault is not equivalent to simple assault in O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20. Zachery v. State, 158 Ga. App. 448, 280 S.E.2d 860 (1981).

- Because an indictment, which included charging language that the defendant "unlawfully, and with malice aforethought, caused the death of the victim by striking," placed the defendant on notice of a possible conviction of an assault upon the victim with the intent to murder or commit a violent injury, the defendant could be convicted of aggravated assault as a lesser included crime of malice murder; the only difference was that the malice murder indictment alleged that the defendant actually accomplished the murder, in addition to having intended to accomplish the murder. Reagan v. State, 281 Ga. App. 708, 637 S.E.2d 113 (2006).

- Trial court does not necessarily err in failing to charge upon the definition of simple assault in charging on aggravated assault as a charge on simple assault need not be given in order to complete the definition of aggravated assault. Willis v. State, 167 Ga. App. 626, 307 S.E.2d 133 (1983).

There is no merit in defendant's contention that a charge on simple assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20 must be given in order to complete the definition of aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21 as the latter does not need the former to make it complete. Spaulding v. State, 185 Ga. App. 812, 366 S.E.2d 174, cert. denied, 185 Ga. App. 911, 366 S.E.2d 174 (1988).

- Simple assault under former Code 1933, § 26-1301 (see O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20) and pointing a gun or pistol at another under former Code 1933, § 26-2908 (see O.C.G.A. § 16-11-102) are both misdemeanors and are included in the greater crime of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. Morrison v. State, 147 Ga. App. 410, 249 S.E.2d 131 (1978).

Simple assault is not a lesser included offense of terroristic threats. McQueen v. State, 184 Ga. App. 630, 362 S.E.2d 436 (1987).

Defendant failed to show error in refusal to merge offenses because the defendant failed to show that aggravated assault was established by the same facts used to prove simple battery; evidence that the defendant entered a store wearing a mask, that the defendant opened the cash drawer, that the defendant tried to wrangle a key to the drawer from the employee's hand, that the defendant demanded money, that the defendant banged on the register, and that the defendant appeared to have had a gun supported the aggravated assault conviction, but none of this evidence was needed to prove simple battery, which was established by evidence of the defendant's bruising blows to the employee's arm. Lawson v. State, 275 Ga. App. 334, 620 S.E.2d 600 (2005).

- Under Ga. L. 1968, pp. 1249, 1280 et seq. (see O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20), numerous offenses formerly specifically set out are grouped as assaults or batteries. Wells v. State, 125 Ga. App. 579, 188 S.E.2d 407 (1972).

- When the circumstances clearly disclose a situation in which the jury could determine that the alleged victim, with a pistol pointed at the victim, was in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury, the evidence clearly supports the verdict of guilty of simple assault. Hise v. State, 127 Ga. App. 511, 194 S.E.2d 274 (1972).

Since the defendant's conviction for aggravated assault was based on placing the victim in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a)(2), the guilty verdict did not preclude the element of criminal negligence in reckless conduct and, therefore, was not mutually exclusive with a verdict of guilt as to serious injury by vehicle predicated on reckless driving. Dryden v. State, 316 Ga. App. 70, 728 S.E.2d 245 (2012).

- Convictions for theft, aggravated assault, and making a terroristic threat was supported by evidence because the defendant admitted to taking gas cans, raised a machete to scare or strike the sibling, the sibling was frightened and ran, and the defendant then threatened the siblings that if either called the sheriff the defendant would return and kill them. Turner v. State, 273 Ga. App. 535, 615 S.E.2d 603 (2005).

Convictions against the defendant for aggravated assault and simple assault did not require reversal because the police failed to preserve the defendant's car after the defendant had engaged in an aggressive car chase, which resulted in the assault charges based on the defendant having used his car as a weapon, as there was no showing that the police acted in bad faith in failing to preserve the evidence and no evidence that suggested that the possible exculpatory value of the car was apparent before its destruction. Ransby v. State, 273 Ga. App. 594, 615 S.E.2d 651 (2005).

Despite the recantation by a juvenile's parent at trial, because sufficient evidence that the juvenile placed the parent in reasonable apprehension of being struck with a hammer, which was in line with the allegations in the parent's complaint filed immediately following the incident, the juvenile court's adjudication against the juvenile for aggravated assault was upheld on appeal. In the Interest of C.B., 288 Ga. App. 752, 655 S.E.2d 342 (2007).

- When the defendant pled guilty to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, defendant's application for leave to file a second or successive motion to vacate, set aside, or correct the defendant's federal sentence was denied as the defendant had three prior violent felony convictions under the elements clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924, because the defendant had two separate Georgia convictions for felony obstruction of a law enforcement officer and a Georgia conviction for aggravated assault, which constituted violent felonies for purposes of the ACCA. In re White, F.3d (11th Cir. June 15, 2016).

Cited in Johnson v. State, 122 Ga. App. 542, 178 S.E.2d 42 (1970); Smith v. State, 127 Ga. App. 468, 193 S.E.2d 921 (1972); Bentley v. State, 131 Ga. App. 425, 205 S.E.2d 904 (1974); Harvey v. State, 233 Ga. 41, 209 S.E.2d 587 (1974); Hale v. State, 135 Ga. App. 625, 218 S.E.2d 643 (1975); Harper v. State, 135 Ga. App. 924, 219 S.E.2d 636 (1975); Ray v. State, 235 Ga. 467, 219 S.E.2d 761 (1975); Smith v. State, 140 Ga. App. 395, 231 S.E.2d 143 (1976); Williams v. State, 141 Ga. App. 201, 233 S.E.2d 48 (1977); Leach v. State, 143 Ga. App. 598, 239 S.E.2d 177 (1977); Pass v. State, 144 Ga. App. 253, 240 S.E.2d 777 (1977); Oliver v. State, 146 Ga. App. 551, 246 S.E.2d 734 (1978); Peterkin v. State, 147 Ga. App. 437, 249 S.E.2d 152 (1978); Ruff v. State, 150 Ga. App. 238, 257 S.E.2d 203 (1979); Jarrad v. State, 152 Ga. App. 553, 263 S.E.2d 444 (1979); Sutton v. State, 245 Ga. 192, 264 S.E.2d 184 (1980); Henderson v. State, 153 Ga. App. 801, 266 S.E.2d 522 (1980); Hayslip v. State, 154 Ga. App. 835, 270 S.E.2d 61 (1980); Webb v. State, 156 Ga. App. 623, 275 S.E.2d 707 (1980); C.L.T. v. State, 157 Ga. App. 180, 276 S.E.2d 862 (1981); Delano v. State, 158 Ga. App. 296, 279 S.E.2d 743 (1981); Craft v. State, 158 Ga. App. 745, 282 S.E.2d 203 (1981); Jackson v. State, 248 Ga. 480, 284 S.E.2d 267 (1981); Jefferson v. State, 159 Ga. App. 740, 285 S.E.2d 213 (1981); Goodman v. Davis, 249 Ga. 11, 287 S.E.2d 26 (1982); Williams v. State, 249 Ga. 6, 287 S.E.2d 31 (1982); Merrell v. State, 162 Ga. App. 886, 293 S.E.2d 474 (1982); Capitol T.V. Serv., Inc. v. Derrick, 163 Ga. App. 65, 293 S.E.2d 724 (1982); Joiner v. State, 163 Ga. App. 521, 295 S.E.2d 219 (1982); Chastain v. State, 163 Ga. App. 678, 296 S.E.2d 69 (1982); Talley v. State, 164 Ga. App. 150, 296 S.E.2d 173 (1982); Petouvis v. State, 165 Ga. App. 409, 301 S.E.2d 483 (1983); McWilliams v. State, 172 Ga. App. 55, 322 S.E.2d 87 (1984); Lester v. State, 173 Ga. App. 300, 325 S.E.2d 912 (1985); Hamby v. State, 173 Ga. App. 750, 328 S.E.2d 224 (1985); Swint v. State, 173 Ga. App. 762, 328 S.E.2d 373 (1985); Hambrick v. State, 174 Ga. App. 444, 330 S.E.2d 383 (1985); Green v. State, 175 Ga. App. 92, 332 S.E.2d 385 (1985); Cook v. State, 255 Ga. 565, 340 S.E.2d 843 (1986); King v. State, 178 Ga. App. 343, 343 S.E.2d 401 (1986); Robinson v. State, 182 Ga. App. 423, 356 S.E.2d 55 (1987); Rhodes v. State, 257 Ga. 371, 359 S.E.2d 670 (1987); Binns v. State, 258 Ga. 23, 364 S.E.2d 871 (1988); Munoz v. State, 190 Ga. App. 806, 380 S.E.2d 88 (1989); Freeman v. State, 194 Ga. App. 905, 392 S.E.2d 330 (1990); State v. Seignious, 197 Ga. App. 766, 399 S.E.2d 559 (1990); Knox v. State, 261 Ga. 272, 404 S.E.2d 269 (1991); Gaston v. State, 209 Ga. App. 477, 433 S.E.2d 306 (1993); Smiley v. State, 263 Ga. 716, 438 S.E.2d 75 (1994); Powell v. State, 228 Ga. App. 56, 491 S.E.2d 135 (1997); Reeves v. State, 233 Ga. App. 802, 505 S.E.2d 540 (1998); Fletcher v. Screven County, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1377 (S.D. Ga. 2000); Huguley v. State, 242 Ga. App. 645, 529 S.E.2d 915 (2000); Lowery v. State, 242 Ga. App. 375, 530 S.E.2d 22 (2000); Brinson v. State, 272 Ga. 345, 529 S.E.2d 129 (2000); Tucker v. State, 245 Ga. App. 551, 538 S.E.2d 458 (2000); Robertson v. State, 245 Ga. App. 649, 538 S.E.2d 755 (2000); Brown v. State, 246 Ga. App. 60, 539 S.E.2d 545 (2000); Maynor v. State, 257 Ga. App. 151, 570 S.E.2d 428 (2002); Heard v. State, 257 Ga. App. 315, 573 S.E.2d 82 (2002); Damare v. State, 257 Ga. App. 508, 571 S.E.2d 507 (2002); Jackson v. State, 257 Ga. App. 817, 572 S.E.2d 360 (2002); Williams v. State, 270 Ga. App. 371, 606 S.E.2d 594 (2004); Taylor v. State, 271 Ga. App. 701, 610 S.E.2d 668 (2005); Harris v. State, 273 Ga. App. 90, 614 S.E.2d 189 (2005); Kelley v. State, 279 Ga. App. 187, 630 S.E.2d 783 (2006); Ivey v. State, 284 Ga. App. 232, 644 S.E.2d 169 (2007); May v. State, 287 Ga. App. 407, 651 S.E.2d 510 (2007); Brown v. State, 288 Ga. App. 812, 655 S.E.2d 692 (2007); Boyd v. State, 289 Ga. App. 342, 656 S.E.2d 864 (2008); Taul v. State, 290 Ga. App. 288, 659 S.E.2d 646 (2008); Louis v. State, 290 Ga. App. 106, 658 S.E.2d 897 (2008); Quiroz v. State, 291 Ga. App. 423, 662 S.E.2d 235 (2008); Branton v. State, 292 Ga. App. 104, 663 S.E.2d 414 (2008); Lewis v. State, 292 Ga. App. 257, 663 S.E.2d 721 (2008); Armstrong v. State, 292 Ga. App. 145, 664 S.E.2d 242 (2008); Carlos v. State, 292 Ga. App. 419, 664 S.E.2d 808 (2008); Hardy v. State, 293 Ga. App. 265, 666 S.E.2d 730 (2008); Adams v. State, 293 Ga. App. 377, 667 S.E.2d 186 (2008); Gordon v. State, 294 Ga. App. 908, 670 S.E.2d 533 (2008); Bradshaw v. State, 284 Ga. 675, 671 S.E.2d 485 (2008); Hollis v. State, 295 Ga. App. 529, 672 S.E.2d 487 (2009); Hudson v. State, 296 Ga. App. 692, 675 S.E.2d 578 (2009); In the Interest of J. W. B., 296 Ga. App. 131, 673 S.E.2d 630 (2009); Williams v. State, 288 Ga. 7, 700 S.E.2d 564 (2010); Rainly v. State, 307 Ga. App. 467, 705 S.E.2d 246 (2010); Myers v. State, 311 Ga. App. 668, 716 S.E.2d 772 (2011); Gross v. State, 312 Ga. App. 362, 718 S.E.2d 581 (2011); Hall v. State, 313 Ga. App. 66, 720 S.E.2d 181 (2011); Ellis v. State, 316 Ga. App. 352, 729 S.E.2d 492 (2012); Williams v. State, 316 Ga. App. 821, 730 S.E.2d 541 (2012); Sullivan v. Kemp, 293 Ga. 770, 749 S.E.2d 721 (2013); State v. Owens, 296 Ga. 205, 766 S.E.2d 66 (2014); Goodrum v. State, 335 Ga. App. 831, 783 S.E.2d 354 (2016); In the Interest of L. J., 337 Ga. App. 653, 788 S.E.2d 531 (2016); Harper v. State, 337 Ga. App. 57, 785 S.E.2d 691 (2016); Williams v. State, 347 Ga. App. 171, 818 S.E.2d 88 (2018); Parks v. State, 304 Ga. 313, 818 S.E.2d 502 (2018); Jackson v. State, 305 Ga. 614, 825 S.E.2d 188 (2019); Martin v. State, 349 Ga. App. 656, 825 S.E.2d 227 (2019); Gonzalez v. State, 352 Ga. App. 83, 833 S.E.2d 727 (2019); Dodson v. State, 353 Ga. App. 412, 838 S.E.2d 87 (2020).

Application

Person aiding and abetting assault is equally guilty.

- When two people confederate with the mutual intent of committing an assault on another, and in pursuance of this purpose one commits the actual assault, while the other stands by in a position to assist, if necessary, and thus aids and abets in the commission of the crime, the latter is guilty equally with the one committing the actual assault, even though that person does not inflict a blow. Knight v. State, 52 Ga. App. 199, 182 S.E. 684 (1935).

- Defendant's conviction for aggravated assault was affirmed since there was not a fatal variance between the evidence and the indictment, which alleged that the defendant unlawfully made an assault with intent to rob, with a knife, by holding the knife in a threatening manner while demanding money; the defendant was a conspirator in an armed robbery and the demands for money could be attributed to the defendant as the defendant entered the apartment without permission and held the knife at the defendant's side with the blade exposed as the defendant's partner demanded money, and the victims were afraid that the defendant "would do something." Brown v. State, 281 Ga. App. 523, 636 S.E.2d 709 (2006), cert. denied, No. S07C0168, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 99 (Ga. 2007).

- Since the state contended the defendant threw a lighted lamp at the prosecutrix, testimony relative to the fire in the room, the fire's height, the things burned by the fire, and the place where the things were burned at the time when the prosecutrix came back to her house a few minutes after she had fled and when the officers had arrived was admissible in assault prosecution as showing subsequent circumstances that grew out of and were the natural consequences of throwing the lighted lamp. Harrison v. State, 60 Ga. App. 610, 4 S.E.2d 602 (1939).

- Because simple assault is a misdemeanor, an unintentional homicide proximately resulting from that unlawful act would amount to involuntary manslaughter and not murder. Norrell v. State, 116 Ga. App. 479, 157 S.E.2d 784 (1967).

- When the defendant refused to leave, the complainant had a right to eject defendant from complainant's property, but with force not disproportionate to that required to eject the defendant. Whether or not force in excess of that necessary was used, giving defendant the right to defend self against an unwarranted assault but not to an extent within itself to constitute an assault and battery on the complainant, or whether the defendant was arbitrarily refusing to leave and was committing an unwarranted battery, were all questions for the jury under the proper instructions of the court. Slaughter v. State, 64 Ga. App. 423, 13 S.E.2d 391 (1941).

- In a suit under a life insurance policy, an exclusionary provision which eliminates coverage and liability if loss resulted from the insured's attempt to commit an assault, and where from the undisputed evidence all the apparent circumstances, reasonably viewed, are such as to lead a person reasonably to apprehend a violent injury from the unlawful act of another, there is an assault within the meaning of the exclusionary provision. Quaker City Life Ins. Co. v. Sutson, 102 Ga. App. 53, 115 S.E.2d 699 (1960).

- Since the state's evidence showed no assault other than the assault with intent to rob with a shotgun, the simple assault lost its identity and was merged into the greater crime of assault with intent to rob. Alexander v. State, 66 Ga. App. 708, 19 S.E.2d 353 (1942).

Whether pointing or swinging pistol is assault should be left to jury. Kerbo v. State, 230 Ga. 241, 196 S.E.2d 424 (1973).

- Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion by denying the defendant's motion for a new trial because sufficient evidence supported the defendant's convictions for arson and aggravated assault based on the testimony of the witnesses who testified that the witnesses could see the defendant starting the fire through the kitchen windows and witnessed the defendant shoot a shotgun in the direction of a neighbor and four law enforcement officers who were at the scene as well as the defendant's admission that the defendant set the fire. Jackson v. State, 347 Ga. App. 199, 818 S.E.2d 268 (2018).

In resisting unlawful arrest, one is justified in using force as reasonably necessary to prevent arrest, i.e., force proportionate to the force being used in the unlawful detention. Brooks v. State, 144 Ga. App. 97, 240 S.E.2d 593 (1977).

Arrestee is justified in assaulting arresting officer only when officer has assaulted the arrestee first. Brooks v. State, 144 Ga. App. 97, 240 S.E.2d 593 (1977).

Communication of terroristic threat is not punishable under the simple assault statute. Lanthrip v. State, 235 Ga. 10, 218 S.E.2d 771 (1975).

- Plaintiff's alleged threat to "kick" a child's "ass" if the child did not get out of the plaintiff's yard did not constitute a simple assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a) because the plaintiff made the allegedly threatening statement from inside an open window and had no present ability to injure the child, who was outside and on a bicycle, with the ability to leave the area at will; furthermore, plaintiff's alleged threat to "kick" the child's parent's "ass," where the parent also happened to be the complaining officer who caused the plaintiff's arrest, without more, did not constitute a simple assault, since the parent was also outside the house and in no apparent danger from plaintiff. Payne v. Dekalb County, 414 F. Supp. 2d 1158 (N.D. Ga. 2004).

One may be guilty of simple assault without violating terroristic threats. Lanthrip v. State, 235 Ga. 10, 218 S.E.2d 771 (1975).

No assault when the defendant told the officers the defendant was going into back room to get gun to prevent the officers from arresting the defendant's mother. Hudson v. State, 135 Ga. App. 739, 218 S.E.2d 905 (1975).

- Defendant's conduct did constitute simple assault where there was ample evidence upon which jury could reasonably have found that defendant placed victim "in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury." McGee v. State, 165 Ga. App. 423, 299 S.E.2d 573 (1983).

Evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for aggravated assault, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), where the defendant fired shots towards the victim, who was "having a good time" with a group of other people in the apartment parking lot; the victim's reasonable apprehensive of receiving a violent injury was sufficient to satisfy the intent element under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a)(2). Thompson v. State, 277 Ga. App. 323, 626 S.E.2d 825 (2006).

Under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a)(2), the evidence established that the victim reasonably apprehended immediate violent injury where, during an exchange between the defendant and the defendant's spouse, the victim, who had accompanied the spouse, asked the defendant to lower the defendant's voice, the defendant came after the victim, and, as the victim backed away, the defendant slammed the door shut, yelling "Stay out of it," walked to the defendant's car, drove around the parking lot, and returned. Wroge v. State, 278 Ga. App. 753, 629 S.E.2d 596 (2006).

Juvenile court's adjudication entered against a juvenile on charges of aggravated assault and terroristic threats was upheld on appeal given sufficient evidence that: (1) the state adequately showed venue; and (2) the victim's testimony described the juvenile's act of pointing a gun, threatening to use the gun, and that such caused fear that something could happen as a result of defendant's acts. In the Interest of J.A.L., 284 Ga. App. 220, 644 S.E.2d 162 (2007).

There was sufficient evidence to convict the defendant of aggravated assault when after the victim flicked a cigarette that landed on the defendant's car seat, the defendant said "I'll shoot you," and pointed a gun at the victim; although the defendant claimed that the defendant and the victim were just joking around, the evidence presented was sufficient to support a finding that the defendant's act placed the victim in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a)(2). Moore v. State, 286 Ga. App. 313, 649 S.E.2d 337 (2007).

Evidence was sufficient to uphold the defendant's conviction for aggravated assault because all of the victims were together in a group, and one of the victim's testified that guns were pointed at everybody; the defendant's act of firing the weapon into the group made each individual a separate victim, and testimony that the victims were crying and screaming when the defendant fired was sufficient for the jury to conclude that the group too had a reasonable apprehension of receiving a violent injury, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a)(2). Gaither v. State, 312 Ga. App. 53, 717 S.E.2d 654 (2011), cert. denied, No. S12C0337, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 216 (Ga. 2012).

Trial court erred in ruling that there was insufficient evidence that the children felt threatened by the firearm because, while there was no direct evidence that the children were injured or were in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury, there was evidence that the defendant's sister and the sister's boyfriend were terrified of being harmed and the jury could have inferred that the children were aware of the totality of the defendant's actions and also terrified. State v. Wilkerson, 348 Ga. App. 190, 820 S.E.2d 60 (2018).

- Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's conviction for aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer because the defendant drove the stolen white van directly toward the deputies when they attempted to detain him, only missing them when they dove out of the way. Miller v. State, 351 Ga. App. 757, 833 S.E.2d 142 (2019).

- When the defendant, while cursing and screaming at the defendant's parent, stood near the parent, holding a pot of boiling water and staring at the parent, the defendant's acts constituted aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2). They constituted both a substantial step toward committing a battery and a demonstration of violence against the parent, and showed a present ability to inflict injury that placed the parent in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury under § 16-5-20(a)(2). In the Interest of T.Y.B., 288 Ga. App. 610, 654 S.E.2d 688 (2007).

- Defendant's convictions for family violence battery and simple battery were supported by evidence from the victim that the defendant had slapped the victim and choked the victim, an officer's observation of red marks around the victim's neck, and evidence of the defendant's two prior guilty pleas to batteries against the defendant's spouse. Evidence of the victim's fear of retrieving the victim's children from the house and the defendant's threats to spread the victim's brains on the wall supported the simple assault conviction. Cuzzort v. State, 307 Ga. App. 52, 703 S.E.2d 713 (2010).

- Evidence was insufficient to convict defendant of aggravated assault on facts arising out of an automobile crash that occurred as defendant was fleeing police, because criminal negligence was an insufficient degree of culpability to support a conviction of violating O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a)(1) and because there was no evidence that a police officer attempting to join the chase ever experienced an immediate apprehension of danger before the accident as required by O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a)(2) since the officer never saw the suspect's car. Montford v. State, 254 Ga. App. 524, 564 S.E.2d 216 (2002).

- Defendant's convictions for voluntary manslaughter, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-2(a), and simple assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a), were supported by evidence that the defendant and others chased down a robber in an unsavory part of town and the defendant stabbed the robber with a knife while the robbery victim shot the robber; under O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8, the testimony of the defendant's accomplices about the defendant's participation in the crimes was adequately corroborated by each other's testimony and another eye witness. Woods v. State, 342 Ga. App. 301, 802 S.E.2d 822 (2017).

Not Excessive Force

Officers had probable cause for simple assault arrest and did not use excessive force.

- County police officers were properly granted summary judgment in surviving spouse's civil rights action, arising from the fatal shooting of the decedent when the decedent broke into the decedent's own house as officers did not use excessive force by using tasers on two occasions because the decedent refused to put the knife down or heed the officers' instructions, and the officers had probable cause to arrest the decedent for simple assault or obstruction of officers, and it was reasonable to believe that the decedent posed a danger. Smith v. LePage, 834 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir. 2016).

- When a decedent was tased once in the prong mode during an arrest, and all subsequent tasings were in the dry stun mode, a deputy and an officer were entitled to qualified immunity as to an excessive force claim because the illegality of their behavior was not clearly established at the time since their conduct did not rise to the level of "obvious clarity," because, inter alia, the decedent committed assault and battery on a police officer, the decedent's acts were contemporaneous with repeated threats to kill the deputy, and the decedent resisted during the entire time that they tried to handcuff the decedent. Hoyt v. Cooks, 672 F.3d 972 (11th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, U.S. , 133 S. Ct. 138, 184 L. Ed. 2d 29 (2012).

- Evidence of the defendant's prior drug use and history of crimes committed against family members fueled by drug usage were properly admitted as relevant to the crimes charged, despite incidentally placing the defendant's character in issue; thus, convictions for both aggravated assault and simple assault were upheld on appeal. Jones v. State, 283 Ga. App. 812, 642 S.E.2d 887 (2007).

- Because the defendant was aware the victim was the judicial officer responsible for defendant's arrest, had a face-to-face encounter with the victim within 48 hours after the arrest, and because the defendant had made a profane threat of physical violence against the victim, defendant was guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt, of simple assault despite defendant's argument that the threat against the victim was justified because the victim first said the victim would put defendant back in jail. Wells v. State, 204 Ga. App. 91, 418 S.E.2d 438 (1992).

In an altercation where the victim was shot by defendant's codefendant, even though defendant did not hit the victim, there was evidence of defendant's threats against the victim and other actions sufficient to convict the defendant of simple assault; because defendant was acquitted of aggravated assault, however, defendant could not be ordered to pay restitution to the victim for gunshot wounds inflicted by the codefendant. Rider v. State, 210 Ga. App. 716, 437 S.E.2d 493 (1993).

Defendant's aggressive driving, the defendant's act of following the victim, the defendant's estranged spouse, in the defendant's vehicle after the victim left the hospital, yelling at the victim, impeding the victim's movement, forcing the victim into oncoming lanes of traffic, and, on several occasions, bumping the victim's car, constituted at least simple assault in that it placed the victim in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a)(2). Johnson v. State, 260 Ga. App. 413, 579 S.E.2d 809 (2003).

Evidence supported guilt since the defendant tried to steal DVD players from a store, tried to hit an employee, and resisted arrest. Williams v. State, 261 Ga. App. 176, 582 S.E.2d 141 (2003).

Reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence was sufficient to support the verdicts against the defendant for false imprisonment, aggravated battery, and simple assault in regard to acts of domestic violence against the victim, the defendant's spouse, as the evidence showed that the defendant dragged the spouse down a hallway by the spouse's hair and held the spouse in a bedroom against the spouse's will, that the defendant broke the spouse's nose and arm, and that the defendant beat the spouse with a car-washing brush. Mize v. State, 262 Ga. App. 486, 585 S.E.2d 913 (2003).

Factfinder was allowed to find the defendant's hands to have been deadly weapons depending on the circumstances surrounding their use, including the extent of the victim's injuries; the jury was authorized to find the defendant guilty of aggravated assault where the defendant punched the victim in the face, shattering the victim's nose, and causing an injury so severe that the victim was required to undergo surgery. Lewis v. State, 263 Ga. App. 98, 587 S.E.2d 245 (2003), overruled on other grounds by Washington v. State, 310 Ga. App. 775, 714 S.E.2d 364 (2011).

Where the record revealed that the defendant and the defendant's love interest went to a party together, that the defendant became enraged when the defendant's love interest and another left the party without telling the defendant, and that upon returning home, the defendant strangled the defendant's love interest, whom the defendant had a history of abusing, and the defendant assaulted the other person, there was sufficient evidence to support the defendant's convictions for malice murder in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-1 and simple assault in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20. Rickman v. State, 277 Ga. 277, 587 S.E.2d 596 (2003).

Testimony about how sound traveled from the kitchen to the den and the victim's comments concerning how the defendant could keep tabs on where the victim was constituted sufficient evidence to authorize the jury to conclude that the defendant knew where the victim was in the small kitchen and intentionally fired the defendant's gun at the victim through the upstairs flooring just above the site the victim was occupying in the kitchen, intending to inflict violent injury upon the victim and, thus, to establish that the defendant committed a simple assault. Chase v. State, 277 Ga. 636, 592 S.E.2d 656 (2004).

Evidence was sufficient to show that the defendant committed an assault against the victims where the evidence showed that after one of the victims separated defendant and the defendant's sibling who were involved in a minor altercation, the defendant left and came back with a gun, which the defendant fired into the truck in which the victims were sitting; accordingly, the evidence showed the defendant intended to commit violence to the person of another. Bishop v. State, 266 Ga. App. 129, 596 S.E.2d 674 (2004).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's convictions on one count of simple assault and two counts of battery, which arose from a fight with a romantic friend, as it was within the jury's province to consider defendant's self-defense theory and reject that defense; the jury heard witnesses and observed testimony and was more capable of determining the reasonableness of the hypothesis produced by the evidence or lack of evidence than the appellate court. Thompson v. State, 291 Ga. App. 355, 662 S.E.2d 135 (2008).

Defendant's acts sufficient to cause the victim to retreat and to generate a reasonable fear that the defendant intended to inflict injury upon the victim, authorized the jury to conclude that the defendant committed assault. Holbrook v. State, 168 Ga. App. 380, 308 S.E.2d 869 (1983).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of simple assault after demonstrating violence through verbal threats and damage to property, coupled with an apparent ability to inflict injury, causing victims to reasonably fear injury unless they retreated to secure their safety. Lewis v. State, 253 Ga. App. 578, 560 S.E.2d 73 (2002).

Criminal negligence cannot substitute for criminal intent in cases of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon based on either O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a)(1) or (a)(2). Dunagan v. State, 269 Ga. 590, 502 S.E.2d 726 (1998), overruling Osborne v. State, 228 Ga. App. 758, 492 S.E.2d 732 (1007) and Jordan v. State, 214 Ga. App. 598, 448 S.E.2d 917 (1994).

Criminal negligence cannot substitute for criminal intent in proving the commission of an aggravated assault. Cadle v. State, 271 Ga. App. 595, 610 S.E.2d 574 (2005).

- Appellant's convictions for felony murder, aggravated assault, and knife-possession offenses were reversed because the Georgia Supreme Court could not say that the trial court's erroneous admission of the voluminous evidence that the appellant had previously committed multiple serious violent acts did not contribute to the guilty verdicts that the jury returned. Strong v. State, Ga. , 845 S.E.2d 653 (2020).

- See Wells v. State, 178 Ga. App. 82, 342 S.E.2d 21 (1986); Larkin v. State, 191 Ga. App. 269, 381 S.E.2d 421 (1989); King v. State, 213 Ga. App. 268, 444 S.E.2d 381 (1994); Richards v. State, 222 Ga. App. 853, 476 S.E.2d 598 (1996); Veal v. State, 242 Ga. App. 873, 531 S.E.2d 422 (2000).

Evidence that defendant shot the victim in the face with a handgun was sufficient to show defendant committed "violent injury to the person of another." Johnson v. State, 225 Ga. App. 863, 485 S.E.2d 551 (1997).

Rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty of simple assault beyond a reasonable doubt where defendant's parents/victims both testified that the parents were afraid of the defendant and the defendant had the capability of carrying out threats. Paul v. State, 231 Ga. App. 528, 499 S.E.2d 914 (1998).

When the evidence established more than the defendant's mere presence at the scene of the crimes, the evidence was sufficient to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of felony murder and simple assault; although the defendant was not indicted for conspiracy, the evidence also supported a conspiracy charge. Belsar v. State, 276 Ga. 261, 577 S.E.2d 569 (2003).

Aggravated assault convictions were upheld on appeal, based on the defendant's act of deliberately firing a gun in the direction of another; moreover, the fact that one of the defendant's cohorts also fired a weapon in the direction of the shooting victims was sufficient for defendant to be guilty as a party to said criminal acts. Thompson v. State, 281 Ga. App. 627, 636 S.E.2d 779 (2006).

Evidence supported a defendant's conviction for the simple assault of the defendant's older child. The child and a sibling testified to the defendant's violent behavior on the night in question, and their testimony was corroborated by statements they and the defendant's live-in companion made to a detective and by property damage observed by the detective; furthermore, the older child testified that the child was afraid that night that the defendant might hit the child, that the defendant had previously pushed the child when angry, and that the defendant had a history of abusing persons of the opposite sex. Bearden v. State, 291 Ga. App. 805, 662 S.E.2d 736 (2008).

There was sufficient evidence to support a defendant's convictions for false imprisonment, simple assault, and criminal trespass with regard to actions the defendant took toward the victim, who was a prior romantic friend, as the evidence established that the defendant went to the victim's home uninvited and entered the home; as the victim exited the bathroom, the defendant was standing in the hallway in front of the victim; alarmed, the victim attempted to flee into an adjacent room at which time the victim and the defendant struggled as the defendant attempted to prevent the victim from passing the defendant; once in the adjacent room, the defendant took the telephone from the victim as the victim tried to call9-1-1; and the victim ultimately pushed out the screen and successfully exited the residence through an open window despite the defendant's attempt to pull the victim back inside. Port v. State, 295 Ga. App. 109, 671 S.E.2d 200 (2008).

Based on a child's testimony that the defendant hit the child with the defendant's car after attempting to hit the child's parent, as well as the corroborating testimony of three other witnesses, the jury was authorized to conclude that the defendant assaulted the child with the car. Barnes v. State, 296 Ga. App. 493, 675 S.E.2d 233 (2009).

Conviction of assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a)(2), was supported by sufficient evidence because the defendant shouted at the victim in an agitated and angry manner, while standing in close proximity to the victim and blocking the victim's movement, the defendant had the apparent present ability to inflict injury, and the victim testified that the victim feared that the defendant might harm the victim; eyewitnesses also testified that the eyewitnesses feared for the victim's safety. The victim's fear was also shown by the fact that the victim was trying to escape the defendant's immediate presence, but was prevented from doing so by the defendant's actions. Daniels v. State, 298 Ga. App. 736, 681 S.E.2d 642 (2009).

Trial court did not err in convicting the defendant of rape, O.C.G.A. § 16-6-1(a)(1), sexual battery, O.C.G.A. § 16-6-22.1(b), aggravated battery, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24(a), and assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a)(1), because the victim's testimony that the defendant raped, sodomized, punched, burned, and threatened to kill the victim was sufficient to authorize the defendant's convictions. Harris v. State, 308 Ga. App. 523, 707 S.E.2d 908 (2011).

- Evidence that, during an argument, the defendant grabbed the defendant's spouse by the arms and threw the spouse to the ground, and then grabbed the back of the spouse's head, pushed the spouse down into the floor, and twisted the spouse's arm behind the spouse's back was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for simple assault. Pettis v. State, 350 Ga. App. 421, 829 S.E.2d 613 (2019).

- Although the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that the father committed an assault against the mother when the father threatened the mother and pointed a gun at the mother outside their home, because that incident took place outside the presence of the children, as the uncontradicted record showed that the children were inside the house asleep, there was no evidence that any of the children saw or heard the exchange between their mother and father, and none of the testimony offered by the Department of Family and Children Services established an act of abuse on the part of the father sufficient to warrant a finding of dependency; thus, there was insufficient evidence for the juvenile court to find the father's children dependent. In the Interest of K. D., 344 Ga. App. 423, 810 S.E.2d 193 (2018).

- There was sufficient evidence that the defendant, a juvenile, committed acts that would constitute simple assault if done by an adult since while in a vice principal's office, the defendant took off the defendant's outer clothing and watch, made fists, squared the defendant's shoulders, and asked the vice principal, "Now what are you going to do?"; the vice principal testified that the vice principal felt threatened, and there was evidence of a present ability to inflict injury in that although the distance between the defendant and the vice principal was greater than an arm's length, they were standing in a confined office. In the Interest of D.B., 284 Ga. App. 445, 644 S.E.2d 305 (2007).

- Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction of aggravated assault, as: (1) the defendant previously threatened to kill the victim; (2) the defendant pointed a gun at the victim, warned the victim not to give information to the police about what they did, and said, "We own this area"; (3) the frightened victim told the defendant to leave; and (4) the defendant left after further words were exchanged. Husband v. State, 275 Ga. App. 246, 620 S.E.2d 479 (2005).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for aggravated assault and simple battery because the perpetrator of a robbery entered a business wearing a mask, opened the cash drawer, an employee closed the drawer shut and locked it, the perpetrator and the employee then fought over the key to the drawer, leaving bruises on the employee's arm, the employee testified that the perpetrator had a shirt wrapped around the perpetrator's hand and it appeared that the perpetrator held a gun, the defendant then fled from police, within 10 minutes of the robbery both the employee and a customer identified the defendant as the perpetrator, and later, the defendant admitted that a hat found at the scene of the robbery belonged to the defendant. Lawson v. State, 275 Ga. App. 334, 620 S.E.2d 600 (2005).

Trial court properly denied the defendant's motion for acquittal as a matter of law, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-9-1, as the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction on four counts of assault, in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-20 and16-5-21(a)(2), as the defendant and the perpetrator's codefendant committed two home invasions, whereupon the victims therein were fearful, some were harmed, and during the incidents, the defendant held a night stick and instructed the victims to cooperate with the perpetrator's codefendant, who brandished a handgun. Moyer v. State, 275 Ga. App. 366, 620 S.E.2d 837 (2005), overruled on other grounds, Vergara v. State, 283 Ga. 175, 657 S.E.2d 863 (2008).

Trial court properly denied the defendant's motion for a new trial on grounds that the state failed to prove that the defendant intentionally threatened two deputies the defendant forced off the road with a car, given evidence that prior to driving directly at the deputies, the car was being used offensively toward others by forcing those individuals off the road, and thereafter, in driving toward the two deputies at 90 miles per hour, a jury could infer that the defendant intended to threaten the deputies in hopes of forcing them from the road. Adams v. State, 280 Ga. App. 779, 634 S.E.2d 868 (2006).

Because the defendant failed to present any evidence that the state ever threatened the victim into testifying against the defendant, and the defendant failed to acknowledge that the victim's statement to police would have been tendered into evidence regardless of what version of events were recounted on the stand, the appeals court rejected the defendant's claim that the state's coercion of the victim warranted reversal of a simple assault conviction. Wheeler v. State, 281 Ga. App. 158, 635 S.E.2d 415 (2006).

Jury was entitled to find the defendant guilty of aggravated assault, charged in the indictment "with the intent to rob," based on the corroboration of the defendant's admission to going on a "lick," which meant to go find someone to rob, and that the defendant knew what a passenger was going to do when that passenger reached out of the car window in an attempt to snatch the elderly victim's purse, resulting in the victim being struck by the car and falling to the ground; hence, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's amended motion for a new trial. Jackson v. State, 281 Ga. App. 506, 636 S.E.2d 694 (2006).

Because the state showed that the victim had an apprehension, reasonable under the circumstances, of immediately receiving a violent injury, this testimony, if believed, together with a finding that the defendant intended to drive rapidly out of the car wash while dragging the victim, was sufficient to authorize the jury to find the defendant guilty of aggravated assault; further, an assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a)(2) did not require that a defendant act with criminal intent in regard to the victim, but did require that an intentional act be shown. Kirkland v. State, 282 Ga. App. 331, 638 S.E.2d 784 (2006).

Because sufficient evidence was presented showing that the defendant cut a correctional officer's face with either a razor blade or other sharp object, requiring more than 150 stitches and cosmetic surgery to repair, the defendant's convictions of aggravated assault and aggravated battery upon a correctional officer were upheld on appeal. White v. State, 289 Ga. App. 224, 656 S.E.2d 567 (2008).

Testimony of both an aggravated assault victim and another witness, which demonstrated that the defendant shot the victim in the leg, coupled with the defendant's flight after the incident, was sufficient to support the defendant's aggravated assault conviction. Jones v. State, 289 Ga. App. 219, 656 S.E.2d 556 (2008), cert. denied, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 381 (Ga. 2008).

With regard to a defendant's conviction for aggravated assault, there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction based on the victim's testimony that the defendant was the individual who approached the victim's car with a gun and ordered the victim out, causing the victim to be in fear. Kashamba v. State, 295 Ga. App. 540, 672 S.E.2d 512 (2009).

Evidence was sufficient to enable the trial court to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant possessed the intent necessary to commit aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a), and felony murder, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-1(c), because the defendant used a vehicle as an offensive weapon while the defendant was extremely drunk, and the evidence was sufficient to prove both forms of simply assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a)(1)-(2) by the defendant against all six of the victims; the defendant engaged in an extended high-speed car chase with a driver, deliberately rammed the other driver's truck, and attempted to smash into the other driver head-on after the truck stalled, and within minutes after the driver escaped, the defendant came upon the other five victims by swerving sharply into oncoming traffic and slamming into a vehicle. Guyse v. State, 286 Ga. 574, 690 S.E.2d 406 (2010).

Defendant's convictions for felony murder and aggravated assault on victims were supported by sufficient evidence despite the lack of evidence of the victims' mental state; assault included an attempt to commit a violent injury to the person of another, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a)(1), so when two gang members attempted to commit violent injuries on their pursuers by intentionally firing guns at the pursuers, the defendant could be guilty as a party to these aggravated assaults and felony murder. Hayes v. State, 298 Ga. 339, 781 S.E.2d 777 (2016).

- Police officers had probable cause to arrest defendant for simple assault in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a)(2) based on: (a) the statements of defendant's wife that he tried to force her to have sex against her will, became angry when she rebuffed him, and then threw against a wall the vacuum cleaner that she was using; and (b) evidence at the scene which bolstered the wife's story. The fact that defendant was ultimately acquitted of the simple assault did not invalidate the arrest. Lammerding v. State, 255 Ga. App. 606, 565 S.E.2d 908 (2002).

- Trial court did not err in declining to merge a defendant's convictions for assault and kidnapping with bodily injury because assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a)(2) was established by evidence that the victim was placed in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury when defendant told the victim the defendant had a gun, and kidnapping with bodily injury in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-40(a), on the other hand, was established by evidence that defendant abducted and held the victim against the victim's will in the victim's car, driving from one location to another, during which time the victim received bodily injuries. Walker v. State, 306 Ga. App. 16, 701 S.E.2d 523 (2010).

- Trial court did not err in failing to merge the defendant's convictions for simply assault and battery because the convictions were based upon different conduct as the first cut to the victim's forehead caused reasonable apprehension of immediate violent injury supporting the simple assault conviction, and the victim's remaining injuries caused by the knife wounds that followed supported a finding of visible bodily harm to support the battery conviction and each crime required proof of a fact that the other did not. Watts v. State, 321 Ga. App. 289, 739 S.E.2d 129 (2013).

- Trial court erred in denying the defendant juvenile's motion to reconsider, vacate, or modify a delinquency adjudication for the offense of simple assault because the evidence was insufficient to support the finding of delinquency since, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a)(2), the crime of simple assault required proof that the defendant's actions placed the defendant's grandmother in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury, but the only evidence of that fact was hearsay; a police officer, who was the only witness, testified that the grandmother told the officer that the grandmother was afraid of the defendant, and that the defendant was perhaps going to hit the grandmother, but the officer admitted that there were no allegations that the defendant attempted to hit the grandmother, nor did the officer witness any of the alleged events. In the Interest of J. L. K., 302 Ga. App. 844, 691 S.E.2d 892 (2010).

Evidence was insufficient to support a juvenile's adjudication of delinquency for aggravated assault because the state failed to prove that the juvenile placed the victim in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury when the juvenile placed the juvenile's hands in the victim's pockets to see what the victim was carrying. The evidence did not show that the juvenile assaulted the victim by attempting to commit a violent injury to the person of the victim, and there was no evidence that the juvenile demonstrated violence through physical acts or gestures. In the Interest of D.M., 308 Ga. App. 589, 708 S.E.2d 550 (2011).

- Evidence did not support the adjudication of delinquency for simple assault because the officer testified that the defendant juvenile turned toward the officer while the officer's hand was on the defendant's back and that the defendant remained in the same location during the entire encounter; no reasonable fact finder could interpret the officer's use of the word "charge" to mean violently rushing toward the officer; and the officer's testimony did not show that the defendant's turning toward the officer caused the officer to apprehend immediately receiving a violent injury as the officer's testimony was that the officer apprehended that the officer might receive physical or bodily injury. In the Interest of T. P., Ga. App. , S.E.2d (Aug. 21, 2020).

- Defendant's sentence to 10 years for false imprisonment, 12 months for sexual battery, and 12 months for simple battery, to run concurrently, provided that upon service of four years in custody, the defendant could serve the remaining six years on probation, was not void as the sentence fell within the allowable sentencing ranges of no less than one nor more than 10 years for false imprisonment, and up to 12 months each for sexual battery and simple battery. Rehberger v. State, 267 Ga. App. 778, 600 S.E.2d 635 (2004).

- Any error in the admission of a witness's statements under the necessity exception to the hearsay rule was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt for assault and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, including the exact match of the defendant's blood sample to the blood found at the scene, the location and timing of the defendant's capture, and the fact that the defendant had a recent gunshot wound. Porter v. State, 275 Ga. App. 513, 621 S.E.2d 523 (2005).

Jury Instruction

Charge on simple assault not required.

- When, according to the evidence, either the defendant committed a battery or an aggravated assault or did nothing at all, a charge on simple assault is not required. Sheffield v. State, 124 Ga. App. 295, 183 S.E.2d 525 (1971).

Trial court is not required to charge the jury on simple assault where a battery is actually committed. Arnett v. State, 245 Ga. 470, 265 S.E.2d 771 (1980); Sanders v. State, 251 Ga. 70, 303 S.E.2d 13 (1983).

When there is no question of simple assault, the failure to charge simple assault in explanation of the elements of aggravated assault is harmless error because it is highly probable the error does not contribute to the judgment. Wilkie v. State, 153 Ga. App. 609, 266 S.E.2d 289 (1980).

If defendant committed a simple assault with a deadly weapon, the offense is aggravated assault, and a charge on simple assault was not warranted. Stobbart v. State, 272 Ga. 608, 533 S.E.2d 379 (2000).

Trial court's jury instructions in the defendant's criminal trial on multiple charges arising out of a domestic dispute were proper, as: (1) there was no requirement that the jury be instructed on the element of assault (O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20) in order to be properly instructed on the crime of aggravated assault (O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21); (2) the methods of committing an aggravated battery, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24(a), were properly defined based on the methods asserted in the indictment; (3) there was no support for a requested charge on the lesser included offense of reckless conduct, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-5-60(b); and (4) there was no possibility of a lesser included conviction for false imprisonment (O.C.G.A. § 16-5-41), such that instruction only on the indicted offense of kidnapping (O.C.G.A. § 16-5-40) was proper. Brown v. State, 275 Ga. App. 99, 619 S.E.2d 789 (2005).

In a prosecution for aggravated assault, the trial court did not err in failing to give a charge on the lesser-included offense of simple battery, as the defendant failed to request the same in writing, at or before the close of the evidence, and an oral request to give such a charge was insufficient. Morales v. State, 281 Ga. App. 18, 635 S.E.2d 325 (2006).

In the defendant's prosecution for aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), the defendant was not entitled to a jury instruction on the lesser included offense of simple assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20 because the defendant's spouse could have reasonably apprehended that the black microrecorder allegedly in the defendant's hand was a gun. Dixon v. State, 285 Ga. App. 694, 647 S.E.2d 370 (2007).

Defendant was accused of hitting the victim in the head with a beer bottle, cutting the victim's head and requiring stitches. The evidence allowed the jury to either find that the defendant had not committed an aggravated assault, or to find the defendant guilty as charged; the defendant was not entitled to an instruction on the lesser included-charge of simple assault as there was no evidence to support that charge. Maiorano v. State, 294 Ga. App. 726, 669 S.E.2d 678 (2008).

Because the evidence showed that defendant committed an assault with intent and a deadly weapon, the crime constituted an aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2); therefore, a charge on the lesser-included offenses of simple assault or reckless conduct under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-20(a)(2) and16-5-60(b) was not warranted. Paul v. State, 296 Ga. App. 6, 673 S.E.2d 551 (2009).

During the defendant's trial for aggravated assault in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), the trial court did not err in failing to instruct the jury on simple assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a), as an essential element of aggravated assault because the record failed to indicate that the defendant submitted a written request to charge on simple assault, and the trial court's instruction was sufficient to define the offense charged and provided a proper guideline for the determination of the defendant's guilt or innocence. Williams v. State, 307 Ga. App. 577, 705 S.E.2d 332 (2011).

Trial counsel's performance was not deficient due to counsel's failure to request a jury charge on simple assault as a lesser included offense of the charged crime of aggravated assault because there was no evidence showing that the defendant committed merely simple assault; the evidence showed that the defendant's assault upon the victim was with a screwdriver within the purview of the aggravated assault statute, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2). Davis v. State, 308 Ga. App. 7, 706 S.E.2d 710 (2011).

Because defendant intentionally shot the victim, wounded the victim, chased the victim down, and intentionally shot the victim three more times as the victim begged for the victim's life, and as neither negligence nor reckless conduct was an issue, the trial court did not err by failing to instruct the jury on simple assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a) in connection with the court's charge on aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21. Cantera v. State, 289 Ga. 583, 713 S.E.2d 826 (2011).

Trial court did not plainly err in the court's jury instruction on aggravated assault when the trial court's instructions included the definition of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon in O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) and tracked the applicable definition of simple assault in O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a)(1). Scott v. State, 290 Ga. 883, 725 S.E.2d 305 (2012).

In an aggravated assault case, the trial court properly charged the jury with the applicable assault definition by requiring that the defendant assault the victim with a deadly weapon, and that the act placed another in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury, but by stating that an actual injury to the victim need not be shown; a charge on simple assault was not required simply because the victim suffered no injury. Marshall v. State, 324 Ga. App. 348, 750 S.E.2d 418 (2013).

Trial court did not err by refusing to charge simple assault as a lesser included offense of aggravated assault, alleging aggravated assault by placing another in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury with an object which, when used offensively against a person, was likely to and actually did result in serious bodily injury, as the defendant was either guilty of aggravated assault or not guilty at all because it was undisputed that the defendant hit the victim and pinned the victim against a mobile home while driving the van toward the victim from only about 20 feet away and that the defendant's action resulted in serious bodily injury to the victim. Patterson v. State, 332 Ga. App. 221, 770 S.E.2d 62 (2015), aff'd, 299 Ga. 491, 789 S.E.2d 175 (2016).

In the defendant's trial for aggravated assault by shooting the victim, the trial court did not err in charging the jury on the complete definition of simple assault; there was no danger of the jury convicting the defendant of aggravated assault solely for placing the victim in apprehension of receiving a violent injury. Hollins v. State, 340 Ga. App. 190, 796 S.E.2d 901 (2017).

In the defendant's trial for aggravated assault after threatening the defendant's stepfather with two knives, the trial court did not err by refusing to charge on simple assault as a lesser included offense because, based upon the form of aggravated assault alleged, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), the defendant was either guilty of aggravated assault or was justified. Johnson v. State, 348 Ga. App. 540, 823 S.E.2d 853 (2019).

- With regard to defendant's conviction for aggravated battery of a taxi driver, defendant was not entitled to a jury instruction on the lesser included offense of battery based on defendant's argument that the jury could have found under the facts of the case that the gun was not used as a deadly weapon as the evidence showed without conflict that defendant's physical assault upon the taxi driver with the handgun caused the taxi driver to bleed from the head and the entire right side of the face, and the taxi driver testified that, during the attack, the taxi driver was very afraid of being killed. Thus, the pistol in the case, if used in the manner testified to by the taxi driver, was per se a deadly weapon, and the offense was either aggravated assault or no offense at all. Ortiz v. State, 292 Ga. App. 378, 665 S.E.2d 333 (2008), cert. denied, No. S08C1851, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 928 (Ga. 2008).

- After threatening to kill the victim, because the defendant's actions in continuing to drive away, as the victim was caught on the outside of the car screaming, supported the crime of either aggravated or simple assault, and not simple negligence, the trial court did not err in rejecting a reckless conduct instruction. Martin v. State, 283 Ga. App. 652, 642 S.E.2d 340 (2007).

- With regard to the defendant's convictions for criminal trespass, simple assault, and battery, the trial court did not err in failing to give jury charges on the affirmative defense of justification because the evidence was insufficient to support such a defense as the defendant admitted that in the time it took the defendant to rip an air conditioning unit from the window and break in, the allegedly pursuing assailants had stopped chasing the defendant and had gone home. Miller v. State, 335 Ga. App. 58, 778 S.E.2d 424 (2015).

- Two charged methods of committing simple assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a)(1) and (a)(2), as an element of aggravated assault, did not provide an improper basis for the jury to convict the defendant of aggravated assault as the trial court did not charge a separate, unalleged method of committing aggravated assault, but simply defined both methods of committing simple assault, a lesser included offense; because the jury's charge did not authorize a conviction in a manner other than that alleged in the indictment, the charge was not erroneous and the defendant's conviction for aggravated assault with intent to rape was affirmed. McGuire v. State, 266 Ga. App. 673, 598 S.E.2d 55 (2004).

Because the defendant's conduct put the officer-victim in reasonable apprehension of immediately sustaining a violent injury, which satisfied the elements required to prove simple assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a)(2), the trial court properly charged the jury on simple assault as a lesser-included offense of aggravated assault upon a police officer. Bostic v. State, 289 Ga. App. 195, 656 S.E.2d 546 (2008).

Trial court was authorized to give an instruction on the lesser-included offense of simple assault because some evidence showed that the defendant attempted to violently injure a store manager by stabbing the manager with a pen with such force that the defendant bent the pen; the fact that actual contact occurred did not diminish the fact that there was evidence of a simple assault. Griggs v. State, 303 Ga. App. 442, 693 S.E.2d 615 (2010).

Trial court's jury charge on aggravated assault was not erroneous because the trial court properly tailored the court's charge to the allegation in the indictment by charging the jury with just the relevant portion of the simple assault statute, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a)(1); the trial court did as the court was required and delivered a charge tailored to the indictment. Daniels v. State, 310 Ga. App. 562, 714 S.E.2d 91 (2011).

- When the accused was convicted of assaulting a female under the age of fourteen years with the intent to rape her, and in the defendant's statement to the jury the defendant denied committing any assault or assault and battery upon the female, while the evidence of the female, if true, proved the felonious assault as alleged in the indictment, failure of the court to charge the jury on the law of assault, or assault and battery, was not error. Finney v. State, 51 Ga. App. 545, 181 S.E. 144 (1935).

Two city police officers who shot at prosecutor's car 12 times, finally causing the prosecutor to run the car off a bridge some 12 miles outside the city limits, after which they arrested the prosecutor, where they had no warrant for the prosecutor's arrest and no crime had been committed by the prosecutor in their presence, were guilty of shooting at another, and failure of the court to charge on simple assault in the absence of a timely and appropriate written request was not error. Hart v. State, 55 Ga. App. 85, 189 S.E. 547 (1936).

When the theory that the defendant could have been found guilty of a simple assault rather than assault with intent to rob and that the judge should have charged thereon was sustained only by the defendant's statement to the jury, without a proper request the judge did not commit reversible error in failing to charge on the law of assault. Alexander v. State, 66 Ga. App. 708, 19 S.E.2d 353 (1942).

Trial court erred in quashing an aggravated assault count against defendant because, in part, the indictment did not need to additionally charge the language of simple assault in order to withstand demurrer. State v. Tate, 262 Ga. App. 311, 585 S.E.2d 224 (2003).

Although the trial court erred by instructing the jury on assault, the instruction did not likely affect the outcome of the proceedings nor did it seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings as the jury was provided with the indictment and the trial court correctly instructed the jury on the language of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a)(2) for assault as charged in the accusation. Driskell v. State, 333 Ga. App. 886, 777 S.E.2d 717 (2015), cert. denied, No. S16C0191, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 115 (Ga. 2016).

- Appellate review of the trial court's decision not to give a charge on the lesser included offense of simple assault was waived because trial counsel admitted that counsel acquiesced and did not further object to the trial court's decision to not give the charge. Gunter v. State, 316 Ga. App. 485, 729 S.E.2d 597 (2012).

- In the trial of one accused of murder, it is reversible error for the court in charging the jury to assume or intimate that the accused had "assaulted" the deceased when the evidence and the defendant's statement did not demand a finding that an assault had been made. Tyner v. State, 70 Ga. App. 56, 27 S.E.2d 351 (1943).

With regard to a defendant's conviction for the felony murder of the defendant's spouse, with aggravated assault as the underlying felony, the trial court erred by refusing the defendant's requested charge on involuntary manslaughter with pointing a pistol at another as the predicate misdemeanor, which entitled the defendant to a new trial based on the defendant testifying that the shooting occurred inadvertently when, in the course of horseplay with the pistol, the defendant pulled the trigger while pointing the pistol at the victim's head, not knowing there was a round in the chamber. Manzano v. State, 282 Ga. 557, 651 S.E.2d 661 (2007).

Trial court erred by failing to provide the statutory definition of assault, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20, in a jury charge, which resulted in the final charge being fatally insufficient since the charge did not instruct on substantive points and issues involved in the case and allowed the jury to find defendant guilty of aggravated assault based merely on criminal negligence. As a result, defendant's conviction for aggravated assault was reversed and a retrial was ordered since there was sufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction. Coney v. State, 290 Ga. App. 364, 659 S.E.2d 768 (2008).

- When an indictment for aggravated assault alleged the aggravating aspect of simple assault, this was sufficient to put the defendant on notice that the defendant could be convicted for aggravated assault if the defendant committed a simple assault in either manner contained in the simple assault statute; accordingly, the trial court did not err by charging the jury that the jury could convict the defendant for aggravated assault in a manner not alleged in the indictment. Simpson v. State, 277 Ga. 356, 589 S.E.2d 90 (2003).

Two charged methods of committing simple assault, as an element of aggravated assault, did not provide an improper basis for the jury to convict the defendant of aggravated assault, and the trial court did not charge a separate, unalleged method of committing aggravated assault, but simply defined both methods of committing simple assault, a lesser included offense; hence, because the jury's charge did not authorize a conviction in a manner other than that alleged in the indictment, the charge was not erroneous. Opio v. State, 283 Ga. App. 894, 642 S.E.2d 906 (2007).

Trial court did not refuse to charge on simple assault because the trial court gave verbatim the charge that the defendant complained was not given. Gaither v. State, 312 Ga. App. 53, 717 S.E.2d 654 (2011), cert. denied, No. S12C0337, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 216 (Ga. 2012).

- Requested charges on involuntary manslaughter, pointing a firearm at another, and simple assault, were properly refused, where defendant's testimony (that defendant fired shots with the intention of frightening a group) established as a matter of law the offense of aggravated assault, and the testimony that members of the group were frightened and dropped to the ground was inconsistent with the requested charges. Hawkins v. State, 260 Ga. 138, 390 S.E.2d 836 (1990).

Defendant's conviction for aggravated assault with an object under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(b)(2) with regard to pinning the victim to a house with a vehicle was affirmed because the defendant was not entitled to jury instructions on the lesser included crimes of reckless conduct and reckless driving since the base crime of simple assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a)(2) did not require a specific intent to cause the victim to be apprehensive of receiving a violent injury. Patterson v. State, 299 Ga. 491, 789 S.E.2d 175 (2016).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Authority of Georgia Crime Information Center to maintain records of crimes.

- Georgia Crime Information Center is authorized to maintain records of reported crime and, in some instances, to record information identifying persons charged with the commission of crime; however, the center is not authorized to maintain records identifying persons charged with disorderly conduct except when the charge is directly connected with or directly related to certain statutory offenses including simple assault. 1976 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 76-33.

For an update of crimes and offenses for which the Georgia Crime Information Center is authorized to collect and file identifying data, see 1991 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 91-35.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 6 Am. Jur. 2d, Assault and Battery, §§ 1 et seq., 3, 4.

- 6A C.J.S., Assault, § 79 et seq.

- Recovery for physical consequences of fright resulting in a physical injury, 11 A.L.R. 1119; 40 A.L.R. 983; 76 A.L.R. 681; 98 A.L.R. 402.

Liability of tort-feasor for consequences of act induced by fear aroused by tort, 35 A.L.R. 1447.

Indecent proposal to woman as assault, 12 A.L.R.2d 971.

Truant or attendance officer's liability for assault and battery or false imprisonment, 62 A.L.R.2d 1328.

Civil liability of one instigating or inciting an assault or assault and battery notwithstanding primary or active participant therein has been absolved of liability, 72 A.L.R.2d 1229.

Attempt to commit assault as criminal offense, 79 A.L.R.2d 597.

Unintentional killing of or injury to third person during attempted self-defense, 55 A.L.R.3d 620.

Antagonistic defenses as ground for separate trials of codefendants in criminal case, 82 A.L.R.3d 245.

Criminal responsibility for physical measures undertaken in connection with treatment of mentally disordered patient, 99 A.L.R.3d 854.

Attempt to commit assault as criminal offense, 93 A.L.R.5th 683.