State v. Quigley
Annotate this Case
State v. Quigley (2004-165); 179 Vt. 567; 892 A.2d 211
2005 VT 128
[Filed 15-Dec-2005]
ENTRY ORDER
2005 VT 128
SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2004-165
MARCH TERM, 2005
State of Vermont } APPEALED FROM:
}
} District Court of Vermont,
v. } Unit No. 2, Chittenden Circuit
}
Jay D. Quigley }
} DOCKET NO. 6072-9-02 Cncr
Trial Judge: James R. Crucitti
In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:
¶ 1. The State appeals the Chittenden District Court's decision
suppressing evidence obtained from defendant's locked bedroom during the
execution of a warrant to search the apartment where he lived with two
other full-time students. The State contends that investigating officers
reasonably believed that defendant, Jay Quigley, lived in a "communal"
living situation, such that a single warrant generally describing the
entire apartment justified their search of his locked bedroom. After
reviewing the district court's findings, and the record on which they are
based, we conclude that the State's position is unsupported. Therefore, we
affirm.
¶ 2. On the morning of September 26, 2002, Chris Linquist summoned
emergency personnel after finding one of his roommates unconscious and
foaming from the mouth in the living room of their apartment. Police
officers Eric Bergstresser and James Goslin from the South Burlington
Police Department arrived at the scene along with medical personnel who
transported the individual to the hospital, where he was pronounced dead.
Accounts from individuals who had been with the deceased during the
previous evening led the officers to believe that alcohol and oxycontin may
have contributed to the untimely death. Linquist gave the police officers
verbal consent to search the apartment.
¶ 3. Officers Bergstresser and Goslin, and Detective Andrew
Chaulk, who arrived on the scene shortly after the initial responders,
conducted a preliminary search of the apartment pursuant to Linquist's
verbal consent. The investigating officers found marijuana and three pipes
used for smoking marijuana in the deceased's bedroom. Officers also found
marijuana in the living room of the apartment. According to Officer
Bergstresser's deposition testimony, the investigating officers noticed a
third bedroom, Quigley's, during their initial search of the apartment, but
they were unable to enter the room at that time because the door was
locked. At this point, the investigating officers decided to halt their
search and apply for a search warrant because, as Detective Chaulk
indicated in his deposition testimony, they felt that they were "starting
to go into other people's private areas" and that Linquist's verbal consent
to search the whole apartment "probably wouldn't stand up." Detective
Chaulk left the apartment to apply for a search warrant while Officer
Goslin stayed behind to secure the scene.
¶ 4. While the officers were applying for a search warrant,
Quigley returned to the apartment and attempted to remove some of his
belongings from his bedroom. Officer Goslin limited the number of items
Quigley took from his room and examined these items before Quigley left the
apartment. After Quigley departed, Detective Chaulk returned with a
warrant to search the apartment for "[a]ny information that may assist in
the untimely death investigation." The investigating officers proceeded to
search Quigley's bedroom in execution of the warrant. Because Quigley's
bedroom door was locked, the investigating officers had to use a pen to
unlock the door and enter the room. Once inside Quigley's bedroom, the
investigating officers found cocaine in a container in the closet.
¶ 5. Quigley was charged with felony possession of cocaine in
violation of 18 V.S.A. § 4231(a)(3). Prior to trial, Quigley moved to
suppress all evidence the investigating officers seized during their search
of his bedroom. Judge Crucitti, who granted the search warrant at issue in
this case, presided over Quigley's motion. Quigley argued that the
affidavit in support of the application for the search warrant failed to
establish probable cause that evidence of a crime would be found in his
locked bedroom. Though the supporting affidavit specifically named
Linquist and the deceased, it did not indicate the existence of a third
bedroom, or that Quigley also resided in the apartment, even though the
investigating officers were aware of these details. The district court
found that the affidavit failed to link Quigley or his bedroom to any
criminal activity. Moreover, the court found that the affidavit created
the impression that only two individuals occupied the apartment, the
deceased and Linquist.
¶ 6. The district court concluded that probable cause premised on
a single warrant generally describing the entire apartment could not
logically extend to Quigley's locked bedroom because the other tenants did
not have access to that room. The court concluded that Quigley had a
reasonable expectation of privacy based on the fact that the door to his
bedroom was locked. The court drew this conclusion after considering
inquest testimony presented as part of the motion, which indicated that
Quigley routinely locked his bedroom door and was seldom in the apartment.
The court further concluded that the presence of marijuana in the living
room of the apartment did not justify the investigating officers' search of
Quigley's locked bedroom because nothing in the affidavit linked him to
criminal activity and, furthermore, it was unreasonable to assume that the
individuals mentioned in the affidavit, the deceased and Linquist, could
have concealed evidence of a crime in an area of the apartment to which
they did not have access. Thus, the district court granted Quigley's
motion to suppress the cocaine.
¶ 7. In reviewing the magistrate's finding of probable cause, the
"key inquiry" is whether the affidavit provides information sufficient to
justify the search. State v. Cooper, 163 Vt. 44, 51, 652 A.2d 995, 999
(1994). We must consider whether the facts in the affidavit create an
objectively reasonable inference that the place to be searched will reveal
evidence of the crime that has been committed. State v. Melchior, 172 Vt.
248, 251, 775 A.2d 901, 904 (2001). The affidavit must be viewed in a
practical manner, and we will not subject it to "hypertechnical scrutiny."
State v. Towne, 158 Vt. 607, 615, 615 A.2d 484, 489 (1992). Therefore, we
give deference to the magistrate's determination of probable cause, and
consider only the facts available to the magistrate at the time the warrant
was issued. State v. Potter, 148 Vt. 53, 60, 529 A.2d 163, 167 (1987).
¶ 8. As an initial matter, the State complains that the district
court erroneously considered inquest testimony regarding information that
was not known to the investigating officers at the time they requested or
executed the warrant; specifically, testimony indicating that Quigley was
seldom at the apartment and routinely locked his door. We agree with the
State's argument as a matter of law, for the constitutionality of the
investigating officers' conduct must be assessed "in light of the
information available to them at the time they acted." Maryland v.
Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 85 (1987). It was incorrect for the court to
consider testimony regarding Quigley's habits, unless such testimony
indicated that this information was known to the officers at the time they
acted.
¶ 9. Notwithstanding this error, we must affirm the district court's
ultimate conclusion under the applicable standard of review solely on the
basis of evidence that was properly before the court, without any reference
to or reliance on information not known to the investigating officers when
they applied for the warrant. See Larkin v. City of Burlington, 172 Vt.
566, 568, 772 A.2d 553, 556 (2001) (mem.) ("[W]e will not reverse the trial
court's underlying decision if the record before us reveals any legal
grounds that would justify the result."). This case comes to us on appeal
from the court's grant of a motion to suppress. We review the district
court's conclusions of law on the issue of suppression de novo. State v.
Rheaume, 2004 VT 35, ¶ 8, 176 Vt. 413, 853 A.2d 1259. Therefore, in
assessing the legal soundness of the court's conclusion, we consider the
investigating officers' deposition testimony, which indicates that prior to
obtaining a search warrant, the officers were aware that there was a third
bedroom, that Quigley occupied this bedroom, (FN1) that Quigley's bedroom
was locked, and that they had consent to search every place in the
apartment except Quigley's locked bedroom. Based on this testimony alone,
we affirm the trial court's conclusion that there was no probable cause to
conduct a search of Quigley's bedroom, and that the "community living
exception" does not apply.
¶ 10. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
Chapter One, Article Eleven of the Vermont Constitution (FN2) protect
individuals, their homes, and their possessions from unreasonable and
warrantless government intrusion. The home is, in most instances, a place
where an individual expects privacy, and, more importantly, a place where
society recognizes that this expectation is reasonable. See Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (explaining that
constitutional protection exists where "a person [has] exhibited an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy . . . that society is prepared to
recognize as 'reasonable.' "); State v. Morris, 165 Vt. 111, 115, 680 A.2d 90, 94 (1996) ("In determining whether persons have a privacy interest in
any given area or activity, we examine both private subjective expectations
and general social norms."). Without question, Quigley's locked bedroom
manifests the core privacy interest encompassed by the federal and state
constitutions.
¶ 11. Individual privacy interests yield to probable cause,
however, when " 'a person of reasonable caution would conclude that a crime
has been committed and that evidence of the crime will be found in the
place to be searched.' " Melchior, 172 Vt. at 251, 775 A.2d at 904
(quoting State v. Defranceaux, 170 Vt. 561, 562, 743 A.2d 1074, 1075 (1999)
(mem.)). Absent exceptional circumstances, the federal and state
constitutions instruct executive officers to conduct searches pursuant to a
warrant issued by an impartial magistrate. See Morris, 165 Vt. at 115, 680 A.2d at 93 (noting that the Warrant Clause of the Vermont Constitution is
the "foremost line of protection" for individual privacy). A search
warrant shall not issue "except one 'particularly describing the place to
be searched.' " Garrison, 480 U.S. at 84 (quoting U.S. Const. amend. IV).
Particularity does not translate to absolute precision. State v. Stewart,
129 Vt. 175, 178, 274 A.2d 500, 502 (1971) (finding warrant description
adequate where identity of place to be searched could be ascertained "with
reasonable effort"). But when a warrant application affidavit fails to
demonstrate to the issuing magistrate that the object of the search will be
found in the particular place to be searched, probable cause does not
exist, and the scope of the investigating officers' lawful search is
thereby limited. Garrison, 480 U.S. at 84.
¶ 12. The investigating officers' deposition testimony supports the
inference that their awareness of Quigley's locked bedroom motivated their
decision to get a search warrant, especially in light of the verbal consent
the officers obtained from Linquist to search every other area of the
apartment. Detective Chaulk's testimony indicates that he believed
Linquist's verbal consent "probably wouldn't stand up" to search any place
other than his bedroom, and that the investigating officers discontinued
their initial search of the apartment because they felt that they were
"starting to go into other people's private areas." Recognizing that
Quigley had a privacy interest in his locked bedroom, the officers were
correct to stop their initial search and apply for a warrant. Cf.
Garrison, 480 U.S. at 86 (noting that where officers are aware of possible
overbreadth of warrant they are "obligated to limit their search"
accordingly). But the officers failed in their warrant application
affidavit to establish probable cause to search Quigley's locked bedroom,
because they did not show the issuing magistrate that the other tenants had
access to it. In fact, the officers altogether failed to mention Quigley
or his bedroom in the affidavit.
¶ 13. Excluding Quigley's own testimony, the evidence indicates
that the door to Quigley's bedroom was locked when the police first arrived
at the apartment, and that the investigating officers were aware of this
fact. Where the facts show "some minimal communications between the
officers," we may consider their collective knowledge of the salient facts
prior to applying for the warrant. State v. Phillips, 140 Vt. 210, 216,
436 A.2d 746, 749-50 (1981) (recognizing that collective knowledge of
probable cause to arrest a suspect may be imputed to the arresting officer
where the facts support an inference of communication with other officers
who could share that information). Although Detective Chaulk, the officer
who applied for the warrant, claims that he was not aware of the locked
bedroom door until he and the other investigating officers executed the
search warrant, his own warrant application affidavit indicates that he
participated in the initial search of the apartment and conversed with
other officers in the apartment, including Officer Bergstresser. Moreover,
at various times while Detective Chaulk was getting the warrant he was in
telephone contact with Officer Goslin, who was securing the scene. Officer
Bergstresser testified that when he and the other investigating officers
became aware of the third bedroom during their initial search of the
apartment, they did not enter the room during that time because it was
locked. Furthermore, Quigley could not have initially locked his bedroom
door in response to the officers' presence because he was not in the
apartment when the investigating officers first arrived and discovered the
locked third bedroom. The record thus leads to the logical conclusion that
Quigley's bedroom was locked when the officers first arrived on the scene,
and that the investigating officers were aware Quigley's bedroom was locked
before they applied for a warrant to search the apartment.
¶ 14. The State argues that the investigating officers could have
reasonably believed that the search warrant sufficiently described the
place to be searched and, therefore, justified their search of Quigley's
bedroom. But when one tenant consistently denies all other tenants access
to a part of the premises, probable cause based on a general description of
the premises will not extend to the separately secured area. 2 W. LaFave,
Search & Seizure § 4.5(b), at 586-87 (4th ed. 2004). The investigating
officers knew that Quigley's bedroom was locked when they first arrived in
the apartment, and it had been locked again when they executed the warrant.
With this knowledge, the investigating officers were on notice that Quigley
sought to exclude his co-tenants from his room. At the very least, their
failure to fully develop the knowledge they had, given their access to the
apartment and to Quigley prior to the execution of the warrant, does not
excuse them from their obligation to disclose salient facts to the issuing
magistrate in the warrant affidavit. We are persuaded by Judge Crucitti's
observation that the affidavit created the impression that the search would
implicate only two specific privacy interests: the deceased's, and that of
Linquist, who had already consented to the search. Therefore, Judge
Crucitti's decision stands because the information known to the
investigating officers at the time they acted, and the reasonable
conclusions that could be drawn therefrom, confirms that Quigley had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his locked bedroom, and refutes the
State's assertion that probable cause extended beyond his locked door.
¶ 15. We do not agree with the State that it was reasonable for
the investigating officers to assume they could search Quigley's bedroom
pursuant to the community living exception. As formulated in other
jurisdictions, the community living exception permits officers to execute a
warrant that merely describes the place to be searched by its outward
appearance, without regard to the separate privacy interests officers may
encounter therein. This exception applies only where the officers could
not have known or anticipated that they would encounter separate privacy
interests inside the premises prior to executing the warrant. See United
States v. Santore, 290 F.2d 51, 67 (2d Cir. 1960) (establishing "community
living exception" to warrant particularity requirement where officers could
not discern the dual occupancy nature of the house to be searched until
after they had executed the warrant and gone inside); see also United
States v. Kyles, 40 F.3d 519, 524 (2d Cir. 1994) (allowing admission of
evidence seized from a locked bedroom where officers had no reason to
believe it was a separate residence prior to the search); State v.
Anderson, 935 P.2d 1007, 1017-20 (Haw. 1997) (same).
¶ 16. Though this exception has been accepted by some federal
courts interpreting the Fourth Amendment, and by other state courts, we
have not previously recognized it as part of our Article Eleven
jurisprudence. In several instances, we have held that Article Eleven
provides broader protection than the Fourth Amendment, and have rejected
certain judicially-crafted exceptions to the warrant requirement. See
State v. Schofner 174 Vt. 430, 435 n.1, 800 A.2d 1072, 1077 n.1 (2002)
(mem.) (Johnson, J., dissenting) (collecting cases). Quigley has not,
however, specifically argued that Article Eleven should provide broader
protection here, and so we reserve full consideration of this issue for
another day. Nonetheless, we find the State's argument unavailing.
¶ 17. The State cannot reasonably argue that the officers who
executed the warrant were unaware of the locked third bedroom prior to
executing the warrant. All of the officers who executed the warrant,
including the affiant, Detective Chaulk, participated in the initial search
of the apartment, which occurred prior to the warrant being issued. Unlike
the cases cited by the State, the investigating officers in this case were
on notice of the privacy interests they might encounter because they were
able to gain access to the premises under investigation prior to applying
for or executing the search warrant. Here, the investigating officers were
familiar with the layout of the apartment, and they knew how many tenants
lived there and how many bedrooms existed. Specifically, Officer
Bergstresser's testimony that Quigley's bedroom was locked when the
officers first arrived in the apartment severely undercuts the State's
position on this issue. Moreover, Detective Chaulk stated that Linquist
"would be able to give consent to search his bedroom but as far as any
place else, it probably wouldn't stand up" and that they limited their
initial search "because . . . [they were] starting to go into other
people's private areas." The investigating officers' own statements reveal
their awareness that Quigley had a separate privacy interest in his locked
bedroom that would be affected by their search. Under these circumstances,
the community living exception, even if accepted, does not apply.
¶ 18. The State also argues that because "the residents had so
blatantly left narcotics in the common area," it is logical to draw an
inference that drugs were concealed in other areas of the apartment,
including Quigley's locked bedroom. The State's argument has three prongs:
(1) the other tenants, including the deceased, had access to the bedroom,
and thus could have concealed additional drugs inside prior to the arrival
of the police; (2) the drugs in the common area belonged to all the
residents; and (3) Quigley's "obvious knowledge" of drugs in the common
room leads to the inference that drugs would be found in his room as well.
We have already rejected the first prong of the State's argument by
declining to apply the community living exception to the facts of this
case. To reiterate, the investigating officers made no showing that the
other tenants had access to Quigley's locked bedroom.
¶ 19. As to the second argument, the trial court correctly rejected
this assumption, noting that the evidence found in the deceased's bedroom
explained the presence of marijuana in the common area-the only illegal
drug actually found there. Specifically, Detective Chaulk's affidavit
states that the initial search of the apartment, undertaken pursuant to
Linquist's consent, revealed a plastic baggie with a green leafy substance
under the deceased's bed, three glass pipes for smoking marijuana in the
deceased's closet, and a large cloth banner hanging on the deceased's wall
depicting a multitude of marijuana leaves. Moreover, the marijuana in the
living room was scattered about a coffee table near the couch where the
deceased was found. In the absence of additional information drawing a
nexus between the drugs in the living room and the apartment's third
resident, or even any mention of a third resident's existence, this set of
facts supports the inference that the marijuana in the common area belonged
exclusively to the deceased. State v.Weiss provides no support for the
State's assertion that a person's proximity to criminal activity is
probable cause to search that person's residence; the facts in Weiss show
more than proximity to criminal activity. 155 Vt. 558, 562-63, 587 A.2d 73, 75-76 (1991). There, officers applied for a warrant to search the home
of one of the defendants after arresting the defendants in a nearby forest
where marijuana plants were being grown. At the time of the arrest, the
defendants were in possession of instrumentalities of marijuana
cultivation. We held that the defendant's possession of household items
used in the commission of a crime and found at the scene of a crime
established a sufficient nexus linking his nearby residence to the
criminal enterprise because such items were often concealed at the home.
Id. at 563, 587 A.2d at 75-76. By contrast, the officers in this case did
not allege that Quigley himself was found in possession of contraband or
instrumentalities of crime such that there was probable cause to suggest
that he had concealed additional instrumentalities of crime in his locked
bedroom.
¶ 20. The State relies on State v. Hall, 168 Vt. 327, 332, 719 A.2d 435, 439 (1998), to support its third argument, contending that Quigley's
"obvious knowledge" of the presence of drugs in the common room supports
the inference that drugs would be found in his room. But Hall does not
stand for the proposition that a person's knowledge of criminal activity
necessarily supports an inference of the person's involvement in criminal
activity. In Hall, the defendant argued that a search warrant for his home
based on the presence of a marijuana plant in his back yard lacked a nexus
between the planting site and the nearby home sufficient to create an
inference that evidence of marijuana production and cultivation would be
found in the home. In rejecting that argument, we noted that the plant was
obviously cultivated, having been staked and tied with fishing line, and
that the plant was in a mowed area of the back yard close to the house.
Id. We stated, therefore, that the evidence indicated "not only knowledge
of the illegal plant's existence," but also that the plant's carefully
cultivated appearance suggested participation by the homeowner in that
cultivation. Id. The probable cause determination also relied on a tip
from an informant, indicating that the defendant had drug paraphernalia in
his home. Id.
¶ 21. Having not previously established a rule that a person's
knowledge of criminal activity is necessarily probable cause to suspect
that person of the criminal activity, we decline to do so in this case. In
the context of a shared student apartment, it is not unusual for persons
thrown together by a tight housing market to knowingly tolerate casual drug
use on the part of their roommates, even though they themselves may not use
drugs. Thus, probable cause to overcome Quigley's individual privacy
interest in his locked bedroom cannot be based solely on the allegation
that he had knowledge that marijuana had been used in the living room of
the apartment he shared with two other students.
Affirmed.
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Concurring
¶ 22. DOOLEY, J., concurring. Although I agree that the community
living exception does not apply on the facts of this case, I find the much
closer question to be whether the discovery of marijuana in the common area
supplied probable cause for a search of each of the bedrooms. On this
point, the fact that defendant's bedroom was locked is not decisive.
¶ 23. I believe that the issue reduces to the application of State
v. Towne, 158 Vt. 607, 615 A.2d 484 (1992), to the situation where there
are multiple places to search. Towne overruled State v. Brown, 151 Vt.
533, 562 A.2d 1057 (1989), a case in which the police had obtained a search
warrant to search the defendant's house by relying primarily on evidence
that the defendant was growing marijuana on a neighbor's land. In
affirming the decision not to suppress the fruits of the search, we held in
Brown that the standard was "whether, taking the information [in the
affidavits] as true, marijuana or indicia of its use or sale would more
likely than not be found at defendant's residence." 151 Vt. at 535, 562 A.2d at 1058. In Towne, we abandoned the "more likely than not" standard
of Brown: "To the extent that Brown requires a rigid quantitative analysis
for determining probable cause, we agree that it is not the correct
standard and now overrule that portion of Brown." 158 Vt. at 613, 615 A.2d
at 487. Although we did not explicitly adopt any alternative test, we
upheld the search in Towne because there was a "reasonable probability"
that the murder weapon would be found in the location covered by the
warrant. Id. at 618, 615 A.2d at 490.
¶ 24. The circumstances in this case are such that there is a
reasonable probability that evidence of drug use or sale would be found in
the bedroom of the owner of the drugs found in plain view in the common
area. Although we know that there is evidence of marijuana use by the
deceased roommate, no evidence suggests the marijuana found in the common
area belonged to that roommate as opposed to the others. I note that we do
not usually divide up the spaces in a dwelling for purposes of probable
cause analysis. Thus, in State v. Melchior, 172 Vt. 248, 252, 775 A.2d 901, 905 (2001), evidence of marijuana growing in the backyard created
probable cause to search the entire house.
¶ 25. The issue is whether after contraband is discovered and it
remains uncertain which suspect in a group owns the discovered contraband,
a reasonable probability exists that further evidence regarding illegal
substances will be found in a search of all of the suspects. The United
States Supreme Court faced this issue in the arrest context in Maryland v.
Pringle. 540 U.S. 366 (2003). In Pringle, three men were present in an
automobile and, during a routine traffic stop, police found rolled-up cash
in the glove compartment the driver had opened to get his registration and,
thereafter, found cocaine in the armrest. Eventually, the front seat
passenger confessed to owning the cash and drugs, but he subsequently
attacked the confession as the fruit of an arrest unsupported by probable
cause. In language supportive of the State's position here, the Court
noted:
The probable-cause standard is incapable of precise
definition or quantification into percentages because it deals
with probabilities and depends on the totality of the
circumstances. We have stated, however, that [the] substance of
all the definitions of probable cause is a reasonable ground for
belief of guilt, and that the belief of guilt must be
particularized with respect to the person to be searched or
seized. . . .
. . . .
We think it an entirely reasonable inference from these facts
that any or all three of the occupants had knowledge of, and
exercised dominion and control over, the cocaine. Thus, a
reasonable officer could conclude that there was probable cause to
believe [defendant] committed the crime of possession of cocaine,
either solely or jointly.
Id. at 371-72 (citations and quotations omitted) (quoting Ybarra v.
Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979)). The Court, however, ultimately adopted
a rationale that helps little in answering the question before us:
[Defendant] and his two companions were in a relatively small
automobile . . . . [W]e think it was reasonable for the officer
to infer a common enterprise among the three men. The quantity of
drugs and cash in the car indicated the likelihood of drug
dealing, an enterprise to which a dealer would be unlikely to
admit an innocent person with the potential to furnish evidence
against him.
Id. at 373 (citations omitted).
¶ 26. After a long analysis of circumstances similar to those
present in this case, Professor Lafave argues for a rule on probable cause
that depends primarily on whether there is a risk that the privacy of an
innocent person will be invaded. See 2 W. LaFave, Search & Seizure §
3.2(e), at 78-84 (4th ed. 2004). Certainly, some of the few cases on point
support Professor LaFave's distinction. See United States v. Shamaeizadeh,
80 F.3d 1131, 1137 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that, where one resident of
house claims that some of other occupants are growing marijuana inside
house and house in question is divided into separate living units, no
probable cause exists for searching basement apartment); State v.
Robinette, 270 N.W.2d 573, 577-78 (S.D. 1978). Robinette is probably
closest to the facts before us. In that case, marijuana plants were found
growing in the common yard of two buildings that contained a total of four
apartments, and there was no evidence that occupants of a particular
apartment were more likely than others to be the growers. The South Dakota
Supreme Court suppressed the evidence found in a search of one of the
apartments, concluding that "[s]uspicions do not amount to probable cause
for the issuance of a search warrant." 270 N.W.2d at 578.
¶ 27. But there are also decisions pointing in the opposite
direction. For example, the South Dakota Supreme Court, without
distinguishing Robinette, held in State v. Smith, 344 N.W.2d 505, 508-09
(S.D. 1984), that police could search for the perpetrator of a robbery in
both apartments of a duplex based on tracks in the snow from the robbery
site to the duplex's front door, but with no evidence as to which apartment
the perpetrator entered. The Court reasoned:
We do not mean to say, of course, that one search warrant may
be used in all cases to justify the search of all living units in
a multiple-residence structure, for in most situations probable
cause would not exist for such a blanket authorization and thus
the warrant would not pass constitutional muster. When considered
in the light of the totality of the circumstances, however, we do
not view the warrant in the instant case as being beyond the pale
of particularity. There were only two living units within the
structure located at 407 Dorothy Street. There apparently was no
separate entry dedicated to each apartment. The probable cause to
believe that the fruits of the break-in were in the structure was
overwhelming. The possible intrusion upon the privacy of the
occupants of both units was thus reasonable within any fair
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. In a word, we must draw a
distinction between the warrant in the instant case and one that
would purport to authorize a search of all units in a large
apartment complex based upon tracks leading to the front door of
the complex. That distinction made, the ghost of seriatim
kick-ins is laid.
Id. (citations omitted); see also State v. Thomas, 421 S.E.2d 227, 236-37
(W. Va. 1992) ("Because there should be no 'numerically precise'
probability, it is possible to have probable cause based on the same facts
to search more than one person"). Not surprisingly, both Robinette, 270 N.W.2d at 580, and Smith, 344 N.W.2d at 509-12, have dissents. Cf. R.
Gould & S. Stern, Catastrophic Threats and the Fourth Amendment, 77 S. Cal.
L. Rev. 777, 805 (2004) ("In cases of search of multiple persons, there may
be sharply divergent views and probable dissent because courts recognize
that these are very difficult cases, no matter the outcome.").
¶ 28. For two main reasons, I conclude that on the current
unsettled state of the law the search of defendant's bedroom cannot be
justified by the presence of drugs in the common area. First, I agree with
Professor LaFave that we should be more hesitant to find probable cause in
searches of multiple places, controlled by different persons, where a
serious risk of invading the privacy of an innocent person exists. Second,
in this case, the presence of drugs in the bedroom of the deceased roommate
explains the presence of drugs in the common area. While the common area
drugs could have been the property of one of the two other roommates, it is
entirely possible that neither of these roommates were involved in the drug
use and both were innocent. Thus, the probability of drugs being present
in their bedrooms is lower than the probability that evidence would be
found in one of the apartments in Smith, where one of the two apartments
was almost certain to contain the stolen property or evidence of the crime.
¶ 29. For this reason, I concur in the result reached by the
majority.
BY THE COURT:
_______________________________________
Paul L. Reiber, Chief Justice
_______________________________________
John A. Dooley, Associate Justice
_______________________________________
Denise R. Johnson, Associate Justice
_______________________________________
Marilyn S. Skoglund, Associate Justice
_______________________________________
Frederic W. Allen, Chief Justice (Ret.),
Specially Assigned
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Footnotes
FN1. Initially, Quigley gave the investigating officers a pseudonym.
FN2. Chapter One, Article Eleven of the Vermont Constitution provides:
"That the people have a right to hold themselves, their houses, papers, and
possessions, free from search or seizure; and therefore warrants, without .
. . sufficient foundation . . . to search suspected places . . . not
particularly described, are contrary to that right, and ought not to be
granted."
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