Wood v. Eddy

Wood ex rel. Eddy v. Eddy (2002-230); 175 Vt. 608; 833 A.2d 1243

2003 VT 67

[Filed 23-Jul-2003]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                                 2003 VT 67

                      SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2002-230

                              APRIL TERM, 2003


  Tonya Wood o/b/o Megan Eddy	       }	APPEALED FROM:
                                       }
                                       }
       v.	                       }	Chittenden Family Court
                                       }	
  Richard Eddy	                       }
                                       }	DOCKET NO. 270-5-02 Cnfa

                                                Trial Judge:  Brian L. Burgess

             In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       ¶  1.  Mother Tonya Wood appeals on behalf of her daughter from an
  order of the Chittenden Family Court denying mother's motion for relief
  from abuse against father Richard Eddy. The court ruled that the definition
  of abuse under 15 V.S.A. § 1101(1)(C) rather than § 1101(1)(A) applied to
  children, and that father's conduct towards his daughter does not qualify
  as abuse under this subsection.  We affirm.  

       ¶  2.  Mother and father divorced in 1997, assigning mother sole
  custody of their son and daughter and granting father bimonthly parental
  visitation rights.  On May 5, 2002, mother filed an emergency motion for
  relief from abuse against father under 15 V.S.A. § 1103 on behalf of her
  thirteen-year-old daughter.  On May 16, 2002 mother filed a motion to
  modify the parental rights and responsibility order contained in their
  divorce, and the Chittenden Family Court held a final hearing on her motion
  for relief from abuse.  At this hearing, daughter appeared as the only
  witness, providing the court with the following testimony.    

       ¶  3.  On May 5, 2002 the Eddy children visited their father, who
  had planned a movie outing for that day.  A dispute erupted between father
  and daughter over when they should leave for the theater.  When father told
  his daughter to finish getting ready quickly, daughter replied that the
  more he hurried her, the more slowly she would come.  Father subsequently
  attempted to leave without her, pushing daughter into a chair as she
  followed him towards the door. 

       ¶  4.  Father then drove both children to the theater, asking his
  daughter to roll down her window.  When she refused and pushed her leg
  against the window crank, father reached over and punched her leg.  Upon
  arrival, daughter demanded her ticket, claiming that she wanted to sit by
  herself.  Father grew angry and took both children home, yelling at her as
  he drove.     
        
       ¶  5.  At the house, daughter refused to go to her room as her
  father ordered, claiming that she wanted to leave the premises and call
  911.  Father called his daughter's grandmother, who offered to drive her
  back to the mother's home.  She rejected this proposal and again attempted
  to leave the house.  Father picked up daughter by the arms and threw her
  onto a chair, pushing her arms against her face and causing her gum to
  bleed.  A short while later daughter snuck out the door to a nearby gas
  station, where she called 911.  Aside from her bleeding gum, the police
  found her free from injury. 

       ¶  6.  Daughter testified that her father had been angry with her on
  that day, and that he had hit her on previous occasions when she gave him
  an "attitude."  Because these altercations caused daughter physical pain,
  mother filed a motion under 15 V.S.A. § 1103, which grants quick and
  temporary relief from the abuse of family or household members.  At the
  hearing, she argued that father's behavior satisfied the definition of
  abuse in 15 V.S.A. § 1101(1)(A): "attempting to cause or causing physical
  harm."  This section defines the terms relevant to requests for temporary
  relief from the abuse of family or household members.  Although 15 V.S.A. §
  1101(1)(C) specifically provides a different and more narrow definition of
  abuse to children, mother claimed that she could prove abuse under either
  subsection and asked the court to temporarily suspend father's visits with
  daughter.    

       ¶  7.  Father agreed that he would temporarily refrain from
  visitation with daughter at her request, but contested the allegation that
  he had committed child abuse.  The trial court agreed with father and
  rejected mother's interpretation of 15 V.S.A. § 1101(1), concluding that
  the Legislature intended only 15 V.S.A. § 1101(1)(C) rather than §
  1101(1)(A) to apply to child abuse determinations.  The court held that the
  narrower standard in § 1101(1)(C) reflects not only the need for abuse
  prevention, but also the desire to preserve parental discretion in
  disciplinary decisions, a factor not relevant to domestic abuse between
  adults.  Applying § 1101(1)(C), the trial court concluded that father's
  physical acts did not constitute child abuse as a matter of law. 

       ¶  8.  Mother appealed, arguing that (1) the trial court incorrectly
  concluded that she lacked standing, as a matter of law, to file for relief
  under 15 V.S.A. § 1101(1)(A) on behalf of her daughter, and (2) that she
  had made out a prima facie case against father under this subsection's
  definition of abuse.
        
       ¶  9.  Plaintiff's first argument that the trial court incorrectly
  denied her standing to sue under 15 V.S.A. § 1101(1)(A) conflates two
  separate legal issues: whether she has standing to sue for her daughter,
  and which of the statute's differing definitions of abuse applies to her
  claim.  On the former issue, § 1103(a) explicitly confers standing to the
  mother, providing that "[a]ny family or household member may seek relief
  from abuse by another family or household member on behalf of him or
  herself or his or her children by filing a complaint under this chapter." 
  Where the meaning of a statute is this plain on its face, the Court will
  enforce the statute according to its terms.  Conn v. Middlebury Union High
  Sch. Dist. #3, 162 Vt. 498, 503, 648 A.2d 1385, 1388 (1994).  Because the
  statute does not, however, explicitly state whether § 1101(1)(A) and §
  1101(1)(C) or § 1101(1)(C) alone defines child abuse for purposes of §
  1103, resolving this latter issue requires a more extensive examination of
  the Legislature's intent.  In re Margaret Susan P., 169 Vt. 252, 262, 733 A.2d 38, 46 (1999) (explaining that we look to the intent of the
  Legislature when statutory meaning is unclear).  

    ¶  10.  15 V.S.A. § 1101(1)(A) broadly defines "abuse" between
    family or household members as the act of "attempting to cause or
    causing physical harm."  By contrast, § 1101(1)(C) applies only to
    "abuse to children" and adopts the narrower definition of abuse
    provided in 33 V.S.A. § 4912: 

    (2) An "abused or neglected child" means a child whose physical
    health, psychological growth and development or welfare is harmed
    or is at substantial risk of harm by the acts or omissions of his
    or her parent or other person responsible for the child's welfare.
    . . .

    (3) "Harm" can occur by: 
            (A) Physical injury or emotional maltreatment; . . . 
    . . . .

    (6) "Physical injury" means death, or permanent or temporary
    disfigurement or impairment of any bodily organ or function by
    other than accidental means.  

  The broad definition of abuse under § 1101(1)(A) encompasses any claim that
  one could bring using the more specific requirements of § 1101(1)(C).  If
  the Legislature had intended both definitions to apply to child abuse in a
  relief from abuse proceeding, they would have had no reason to include §
  1101(1)(C) in the statute.  Because we will not construe a statute to
  render a significant part of it pure surplusage, Cantin v. Young, 170 Vt.
  563, 564, 742 A.2d 1246, 1247 (1999) (mem.), we must conclude that §
  1101(1)(C) alone provides the definition of abuse relevant to relief from
  abuse hearings involving children.

       ¶  11.  Mother argues against this result, claiming that due to
  children's vulnerability, the statutory scheme should make abuse of a minor
  as easy if not easier to substantiate than abuse between adults.  Society
  undoubtedly regards the protection of children as one of its most important
  responsibilities.  Varnum v. Varnum, 155 Vt. 376, 384, 586 A.2d 1107, 1111
  (1990).  Although the Legislature also considers abuse prevention a
  priority, it had to weigh this interest against two additional factors
  relevant to allegations of abuse of minors in formulating § 1101(1)(C).  
   
       ¶  12.  First, to follow the dictates of the United States Supreme
  Court, the Legislature needed to preserve some degree of natural parents'
  "fundamental liberty interest" in custody and management of their children. 
  Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1983).  Second, the Legislature
  acknowledged the impracticality of substituting the judgment of a court for
  that of a parent who observes his children on a regular basis and better
  knows their particular disciplinary needs.  Accordingly, a court must
  employ some level of deference when evaluating child-rearing preferences to
  maximize child welfare.  Lane v. Schenck, 158 Vt. 489, 495, 614 A.2d 786,
  789 (1992).  The balancing of these two factors against the responsibility
  of abuse prevention yielded the larger degree of physical harm required to
  prove child abuse under § 1101(1)(C), as compared with domestic abuse
  between adults as defined by § 1101(1)(A). 

       ¶  13.  As the trial court correctly explained, this Court has
  previously interpreted 33 V.S.A. § 4912's requirement of "harm" and
  "physical injury" as satisfied where the trial court found that a parent
  (1) inflicted physical punishment out of anger rather than a corrective
  purpose, State v. Martin, 170 Vt. 614, 616, 751 A.2d 769, 771 (2000)
  (mem.); or (2) physically punished a child in an excessive, unreasonable,
  or cruel manner, Gerety v. Gerety, 131 Vt. 396, 400, 306 A.2d 693, 694
  (1973).  After hearing daughter's testimony,  the trial court ruled that 
  neither of these circumstances had transpired in the present case. 
  Although the court believed that father had caused daughter some physical
  discomfort, it found that father did not use corporal discipline to a cruel
  degree, and did not engage in a pattern of malicious as opposed to
  corrective behavior.  We will not set aside the family court's findings if
  supported by the evidence, nor its conclusions if supported by the
  findings.  Begins v. Begins, 168 Vt. 298, 301, 721 A.2d 469, 471 (1998). 
  The record in this case does not support the allegation that the trial
  court abused its discretion in dismissing the motion for relief from abuse. 

       Affirmed.


                                       BY THE COURT:



                                       _______________________________________
                                       Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Chief Justice

                                       _______________________________________
                                       John A. Dooley, Associate Justice

                                       _______________________________________
                                       Denise R. Johnson, Associate Justice

                                       _______________________________________
                                       Marilyn S. Skoglund, Associate Justice

                                       _______________________________________
                                       Frederic W. Allen, Chief Justice (Ret.)
                                       Specially Assigned