State v. Beauregard

State v. Beauregard (2002-208); 175 Vt. 472; 820 A.2d 183

2003 VT 3

[Filed 2-Jan-2003]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                                  2003 VT 3

                      SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2002-208

                             NOVEMBER TERM, 2002

  State of Vermont	               }	APPEALED FROM:
                                       }
                                       }
       v.	                       }	District Court of Vermont,
                                       }	Unit No. 1, Windsor Circuit
  David A. Beauregard	               }
                                       }	DOCKET NO. 1158-8-01 Wrcr

                                                Trial Judge:  Paul F. Hudson

             In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       ¶  1.  Defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle while
  under the influence of intoxicating liquor (DUI), second offense, 23 V.S.A.
  § 1201(a)(2).  He entered a conditional plea of guilty, reserving the right
  to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress evidence based on his
  contention that the initial traffic stop was illegal.  On appeal, defendant
  argues that the stop was a violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United
  States Constitution and that Vermont's defective equipment statute is
  unconstitutionally vague as applied in the context of noisy mufflers.  We
  affirm.

       ¶  2.  The trial court's decision was based upon testimony from
  Trooper Vincent DiMauro that on the evening of July 20, 2001, he was on
  duty, sitting stationary in his cruiser at a highway exit in Hartland,
  Vermont.  The time was around dusk, and his windows were open.  The
  Trooper's attention was drawn to an older Jeep Wagoneer approaching without
  its headlights on.  The Trooper described the sound of the exhaust as "a
  loud raspy noise versus a low mellow sound from a modified exhaust system." 
  The trial court found that Trooper DiMauro was an "experienced listener" on
  the basis of testimony that the trooper had once owned an older model Jeep
  and had experience working on automobile exhaust systems.  The trooper
  thought that the sound was consistent with a perforated muffler.  He stated
  that he stopped the Jeep, which was driven by Beauregard, because he
  thought that the car was being operated in violation of 23 V.S.A. § 1244,
  which requires that drivers illuminate headlights when necessary to provide
  adequate visibility, and in violation of 23 V.S.A. § 1221, which prohibits
  the operation of a motor vehicle that is not in good mechanical condition
  on a highway.  Beauregard was subsequently arrested and processed for DUI. 
  Defendant moved to suppress the evidence from the stop on the grounds that
  he did not violate 23 V.S.A. § 1244 because the stop occurred within thirty
  minutes of sunset and light was adequate to meet the statutory
  requirements, and that he did not violate 23 V.S.A. § 1221 because there
  are no standards for noise emissions from motor vehicles and noise was not
  a reasonable basis for believing that Beauregard's vehicle had defective
  equipment.  

       ¶  3.  The lower court denied the motion to suppress.  The court
  agreed with defendant that there was no headlight violation, but it held
  that the trooper could conduct a motor vehicle stop on the basis of a noisy
  exhaust system.  This appeal followed. 
   
       ¶  4.  The issue on appeal is whether a noisy exhaust system can
  provide a reasonable basis for a motor vehicle stop given that there is no
  specific statute regulating noise emissions.  Since this is a question of
  law, we review it de novo.  See State v. Longe, 170 Vt. 35, 36, 743 A.2d 569, 570 (1999) (questions of law reviewed de novo). 

       ¶  5.  Section 1221 of Title 23 requires that "[a] motor vehicle,
  operated on any highway, shall be in good mechanical condition and shall be
  properly equipped."  Under Vermont law, in order to be "properly equipped,"
  a car must have a muffler.  23 V.S.A. § 4(37).  Thus to comply with the
  statute, cars driven in Vermont must have a muffler that is functioning "in
  good mechanical condition."  It is true that the statute is silent as to
  the degree of noise that might establish that a muffler is not in
  compliance with the statute, but defendant was not stopped for a noise
  violation; he was stopped because the trooper suspected defective
  equipment.  Therefore, the only question before us is whether the trooper
  had the ability to detect a problem with the muffler on the basis of the
  sounds he heard when the Jeep passed by his patrol car. 

       ¶  6.  The trial court credited testimony from Trooper DiMauro that
  the trooper had experience with older model Jeeps, which provided him with
  some knowledge of the way they sounded when  running in good condition. 
  Trooper DiMauro testified that unlike the sounds that a Jeep normally
  makes, the sound he heard was loud, raspy, and consistent with a serious
  failing in the exhaust system.  We agree with the trial court that the
  trooper's aural observations provided a reasonable basis for believing that
  defendant's vehicle was not in good mechanical condition, and that this was
  an adequate basis for the stop.  "A reasonable and articulable suspicion of
  wrongdoing is necessary for a police officer to stop a motor vehicle that
  is being operated on the highway."  State v. Welch, 162 Vt. 635, 636, 650 A.2d 516, 517, (1994) (mem.); see also State v. Emilio, 144 Vt. 477, 481,
  479 A.2d 169, 171 (1984) (holding that a police officer's "suspicion" that
  a car did not belong in a particular area in the early morning does not
  meet the requirement that a stop cannot be made without an " 'articulable
  and reasonable' suspicion of some criminal wrongdoing") (quoting Delaware
  v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979)).  There is nothing vague about the
  requirement of section 1221 that mufflers must be "in good mechanical
  condition."  When a sound emitted by a vehicle is entirely consistent with
  a prohibited defect, and a trooper has experience that enables him to make
  such a determination on the basis of sound, we find that a trooper has an
  adequate legal basis for stopping a vehicle.  The level of suspicion
  required for a traffic stop under the Fourth Amendment is "considerably
  less than proof of wrongdoing by preponderance of the evidence."  United
  States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989).  The test for the validity of a
  vehicle stop is " 'whether, based upon the whole picture, [the police] . .
  . could reasonably surmise that the particular vehicle they stopped was
  engaged in criminal activity.' "  State v. Kettlewell, 149 Vt. 331, 335,
  544 A.2d 591, 594 (1987), quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411,
  421-22 (1981).  We find that the trooper in this case had a reasonable
  basis for believing that the muffler on defendant's Jeep was not in working
  order.  

       ¶  7.  Defendant makes further arguments challenging the legality of
  the underlying statute.  First, he challenges the application of §1221 to
  noisy mufflers.  He observes that while the State has established noise
  limits for snow mobiles, 23 V.S.A. §3205, motorboats, 23 V.S.A. § 3309, and
  all-terrain vehicles, 23 V.S.A. §3505, the legislature did not establish
  noise emission standards for motor vehicles.  Defendant correctly notes
  that according to the principles of statutory construction, "[i]t is 
  inappropriate to read into a statute something which is not there
  unless it is necessary in order to make the statute effective."  State v.
  O'Neill, 165 Vt. 270, 275, 682 A.2d 943, 946 (1996).  By permitting a stop
  in this case, however, we are not establishing a noise limit for motor
  vehicles, but upholding the statutory requirement that a vehicle's exhaust
  system be maintained in good mechanical condition.  

       ¶  8.  Second, defendant contends that Vermont's defective equipment
  statute is void for vagueness as applied in this case.  He cites the void
  for vagueness doctrine, which establishes that penal statutes must define a
  criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can
  understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not
  encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.  See City of Chicago v.
  Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56 (1999).  Defendant argues that the enforcement of
  23 V.S.A. §1221 on the basis of noise will lead to arbitrary and
  discriminatory enforcement actions.  We are unpersuaded that the void for
  vagueness doctrine is implicated by the facts in this case.  As we noted
  above, Vermont's motor vehicle law is explicit in terms of what is
  prohibited: it is a violation of §1221 to drive a vehicle on a highway
  without a muffler that is in good mechanical condition.  The statute does
  not prohibit innocent conduct, nor does it confer "vast discretion" on the
  police to determine what action constitutes a violation.  See Morales, 527 U.S.  at 60-61.  For a motor vehicle stop to be valid, "the legal
  justification must be objectively grounded."  United States v. Miller, 146 F.3d 274, 279 (5th Cir. 1998), citing Wren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806,
  812-14 (1996).  We believe that the State has demonstrated that the trooper
  in this case acted with an objectively grounded suspicion that defendant's
  muffler was not in good working condition, and the stop was justified. 

       Affirmed. 


                                       BY THE COURT:



                                       _______________________________________
                                       Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Chief Justice

                                       _______________________________________
                                       John A. Dooley, Associate Justice

                                       _______________________________________
                                       James L. Morse, Associate Justice

                                       _______________________________________
                                       Denise R. Johnson, Associate Justice

                                       _______________________________________
                                       Marilyn S. Skoglund, Associate Justice