Stevens v. Stearns

Stevens v. Stearns (2002-077); 175 Vt. 428; 833 A.2d 835

2003 VT 74

[Filed 01-Aug-2003]


       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                 2003 VT 74

                                No. 2002-077

  Peggy Stevens and Doreen Jarvis	         Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
       v.	                                 Windsor Superior Court


  Theodore R. Stearns, et al.	                 November Term, 2002

  Stephen B. Martin, J.

  Franz P. Frechette of Frechette Law Office, PLLC, Brattleboro, and
    Gary H. Schall, Tunbridge, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

  William H. Sorrell, Attorney General, Montpelier, and Mark J. Patane,
    Assistant Attorney General, Waterbury, for Defendants-Appellees.


  PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse (FN1) and Johnson, JJ., and Carroll,
            Supr. J., Specially Assigned

        
       ¶  1.  AMESTOY, C.J.  This case stems from defendants' unannounced
  inspection of plaintiffs' property, conducted pursuant to the terms of a
  probation order that had allegedly expired.  Plaintiffs initially sought
  relief against defendants in federal court and then filed the instant
  action, raising various tort and constitutional claims.  The trial court
  granted summary judgment for defendants, finding them entitled to immunity
  after giving preclusive effect to the federal court's determination that
  defendants had performed discretionary acts in an "objectively reasonable"
  manner.  Plaintiffs argue that issue preclusion is inappropriate here
  because the standard for establishing qualified immunity in cases involving
  alleged violations of Chapter I, Article Eleven of the Vermont Constitution
  should be more stringent than those cases involving qualified immunity for
  alleged Fourth Amendment violations brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  We
  affirm. 

       ¶  2.  After ninety-two animals were seized from her property,
  plaintiff Peggy Stevens was charged with multiple counts of animal cruelty. 
  She was convicted of one count and sentenced on April 18, 1996 to three to
  six months, suspended, with a stipulated year's probation.  Stevens'
  probation order required that she allow unannounced inspections of her
  property, and it contained the parties' stipulation that probation would
  last one year.  The order also stated that Stevens would remain on
  probation "until further order of the Court."  Stevens did not sign the
  order until August 6, 1996.

       ¶  3.  On July 11, 1997, Probation Officer Theodore Stearns conducted
  an unannounced inspection of Stevens' property.  Defendants Susan Skaskiw,
  Linda Noiseux, and Pat Audsley, humane society volunteers, accompanied
  Officer Stearns and acted under his authority.  Over Stevens' objections,
  defendants inspected her home and the surrounding premises, including the
  room in which plaintiff Doreen Jarvis was living.  Officer Stearns noted
  several probation violations, which the State declined to prosecute.  On
  July 28, 1997, the district court ostensibly discharged Stevens from
  probation.  
   
       ¶  4.  In April 1998, Stevens and Jarvis filed suit in state court
  against defendants Stearns, Skaskiw, Noiseux, Audsley, William Eck, Jr.,
  the Department of Corrections, and the State, seeking damages under 42
  U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment of the United
  States Constitution, and asserting state law claims for invasion of
  privacy, negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress, breach
  of contract, and gross misconduct.  The case was subsequently removed to
  federal court. 

       ¶  5.  In June 1999, the federal district court dismissed plaintiffs'
  state law claims without prejudice and granted defendants' motion for
  summary judgment.  The court found the individual defendants entitled to
  qualified immunity after applying the objective good faith test enunciated
  in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).  According to the court,
  the undisputed record, viewed objectively, suggested that defendants acted
  reasonably in conducting their search.  The court pointed to the absence of
  a specific termination date on Stevens' probation order, the confusing
  statement that probation lasted "until further order of the Court," and
  Stevens' delayed execution of the probation agreement.  These facts, the
  court concluded, could reasonably lead one to believe that a gap existed
  between Stevens' sentencing and the commencement of her probation.  Thus, a
  reasonable probation officer could conclude that Stevens was still on
  probation at the time of the search.
   
       ¶  6.  On reconsideration, plaintiffs challenged the court's finding
  that the probation order was ambiguous regarding its commencement date. 
  Plaintiffs presented new evidence suggesting that defendants Stearns and
  Eck subjectively believed that Stevens' probation began April 18, 1996. 
  The court rejected this argument, finding defendants' subjective beliefs
  irrelevant to the qualified immunity inquiry.  The court explained that,
  even if defendants had assumed that Stevens' probation began April 18,
  1996, the following facts remained: (1) there was a substantial lapse
  between Stevens' sentencing and the date she assented to her conditions of
  probation and (2) Vermont law does not define when probation is deemed to
  start under these circumstances.  Thus, viewed objectively, and in the
  absence of state law to the contrary, a reasonable probation officer could
  conclude that by signing the probation order on August 6, 1996, Stevens had
  agreed to submit to probation until August 6, 1997.

       ¶  7.  The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
  affirmed this decision in June 2000.  The appeals court agreed that, in
  light of the ambiguity in the probation order regarding its effective date,
  and in the absence of any clear guidance under Vermont law, it was
  objectively reasonable for an officer in Stearns' position to believe that
  the probation order was still in effect on July 11, 1997.  Plaintiffs
  appealed, and the United States Supreme Court subsequently denied
  certiorari.  See Stevens v. Stearns, 213 F.3d 626 (2d Cir.) (Table), cert.
  denied, 531 U.S. 1055 (2000).  

       ¶  8.  In February 2000, plaintiffs filed suit in state court against
  the same defendants, asserting claims for invasion of privacy, trespass,
  intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, and conversion,
  as well as claims for damages directly under the Vermont Constitution.  The
  trial court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment, finding the
  individual defendants entitled to qualified immunity and the State entitled
  to sovereign immunity after giving preclusive effect to the federal court's
  findings.  The court granted plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration and
  re-affirmed its order.  This appeal followed. 
   
       ¶  9.  Plaintiffs now argue that: (1) Chapter I, Article Eleven of the
  Vermont Constitution supports a direct claim for damages; (2) issue
  preclusion is inapplicable; (3) defendants are not entitled to qualified
  immunity; (4) the State subjected Stevens to additional probation time
  without due process of law; and (5) the State is not entitled to sovereign
  immunity.  Plaintiffs have not adequately raised or sufficiently briefed
  claims (4) and (5), and we therefore decline to address them.  See State v.
  Taylor, 145 Vt. 437, 439, 491 A.2d 1034, 1035 (1985) (Court will not
  consider issues not adequately raised or briefed except in rare
  circumstances). 

       ¶  10.  We review a grant of summary judgment using the same standard
  as the trial court.  Richart v. Jackson, 171 Vt. 94, 97, 758 A.2d 319, 321
  (2000).  Summary judgment is appropriate when, taking all allegations made
  by the nonmoving party as true, there are no genuine issues of material
  fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Id.;
  V.R.C.P. 56(c).  A party is entitled to summary judgment if he presents at
  least one legally sufficient defense that would bar a plaintiff's claims. 
  Smith v. Day, 148 Vt. 595, 597, 538 A.2d 157, 158 (1987). 

       ¶  11.  We first address plaintiffs' claim regarding the applicability
  of collateral estoppel because we find resolution of this issue
  dispositive.  Plaintiffs assert that collateral estoppel should not apply
  because their state law claims raise a different issue than that decided by
  the federal court.  Specifically, plaintiffs argue that the legal standard
  for evaluating qualified immunity in cases involving alleged violations of
  Article Eleven should be more stringent than the standard used by the
  federal court to evaluate plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment claims.  We find
  plaintiffs' arguments unavailing.  As discussed below, the objective good
  faith test employed by the federal court is the appropriate standard for
  evaluating qualified immunity here.  Given this, and plaintiffs' reliance
  on the same claims and facts as those presented in federal court, we
  conclude that collateral estoppel was appropriately invoked.  Defendants
  are therefore entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law. 
   
       ¶  12.  The doctrine of collateral estoppel or issue preclusion "bars
  the subsequent re-litigation of an issue which was actually litigated and
  decided in a prior case between the parties resulting in a final judgment
  on the merits, where that issue was necessary to the resolution of the
  action."  Berlin Convalescent Ctr., Inc. v. Stoneman, 159 Vt. 53, 56, 615 A.2d 141, 144 (1992) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  It
  is designed to "protect the courts and the parties against the burden of
  relitigation, encourage reliance on judicial decisions, prevent vexatious
  litigation and decrease the chances of inconsistent adjudication."  Id. at
  57, 615 A.2d  at 144.  Issue preclusion applies to issues of fact as well as
  law.  Mellin v. Flood Brook Union Sch. Dist., 173 Vt. 202, 209, 790 A.2d 408, 416 (2001). 

       ¶  13.  Issue preclusion is appropriate when the following elements
  are met:  (1) preclusion is asserted against one who was a party or in
  privity with a party in the earlier action; (2) the issue was resolved by a
  final judgment on the merits; (3) the issue is the same as that raised in
  the later action; (4) there was a full and fair opportunity to litigate the
  issue in the earlier action; and (5) applying preclusion in the later
  action is fair.  Berlin Convalescent Ctr., Inc., 159 Vt. at 56-57, 615 A.2d 
  at 144.  In deciding whether issue preclusion is appropriate, "we balance
  our 'desire not to deprive a litigant of an adequate day in court' against
  a 'desire to prevent repetitious litigation of what is essentially the same
  dispute.'"  Id. at 60, 615 A.2d  at 145-46 (quoting Restatement (Second) of
  Judgments § 27 cmt. c. (1982)). 
   
       ¶  14.  In evaluating defendants' immunity from plaintiffs' 42 U.S.C.
  § 1983 claims, the federal courts applied the objective good faith standard
  enunciated in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).  Under this
  standard, "government officials performing discretionary functions
  generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their
  conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
  rights of which a reasonable person would have known."  Id.  In other
  words, liability generally turns on the "objective legal reasonableness" of
  an official's action, assessed in light of clearly established legal rules
  and the information possessed by the defendants.  Anderson v. Creighton,
  483 U.S. 635, 639, 641 (1987).  An official's subjective beliefs are
  irrelevant.  Id. at 641.

       ¶  15.  We apply the same standard to evaluate defendants' immunity
  from plaintiffs' state law claims.  Under state law, "lower-level
  government actors are immune from tort liability when they perform
  discretionary acts in good faith during the course of their employment and
  within the scope of their authority."  Hudson v. Town of East Montpelier,
  161 Vt. 168, 171, 638 A.2d 561, 563 (1993).  We use the Harlow standard to
  evaluate whether an official acted in good faith.  Sabia v. Neville, 165
  Vt. 515, 521, 687 A.2d 469, 473 (1996).  Thus, "[g]ood faith exists where
  an official's acts did not violate clearly established rights of which the
  official reasonably should have known."  Murray v. White, 155 Vt. 621, 630,
  587 A.2d 975, 980 (1991) (internal footnote omitted).  The good faith
  inquiry "does not ask whether plaintiff's rights were violated, but rather
  whether the official reasonably should have known that what she was doing
  violated plaintiff's rights."  Id.  An official's subjective intent is
  irrelevant.  See Levinsky v. Diamond, 151 Vt. 178, 198-99, 559 A.2d 1073,
  1087 (1989) (rejecting subjective inquiry into whether official acted in
  good faith), overruled on other grounds, Muzzy v. State, 155 Vt. 279, 280,
  n.*, 583 A.2d 82, 83, n.* (1990).  
   
       ¶  16.  Plaintiffs' arguments on appeal rest entirely on their
  assertion that we should recognize a claim for damages directly under
  Chapter I, Article Eleven of the Vermont Constitution, analogous to the
  United States Supreme Court's recognition of a private damages action
  against federal officials for alleged Fourth Amendment violations.  See
  Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 395-97 (1971).  Plaintiffs assert that, if we were to recognize such a
  cause of action, we would need to apply a more stringent qualified immunity
  test than that applied by the federal court because Article Eleven provides
  broader protection than the Fourth Amendment.  Thus, plaintiffs argue,
  issue preclusion would be inappropriate.  

       ¶  17.  Plaintiffs assert that applying the objective good faith
  standard to evaluate defendants' qualified immunity from their Article
  Eleven claim would: "(1) erode the well established greater protections
  afforded under Article 11 to the comparatively lower level of the Fourth
  Amendment; (2) thereby derogating the central role of the Vermont Judiciary
  in Article 11 jurisprudence; and (3) would produce the paradoxical result
  of the same constitutional provision affording greater protection to the
  criminal defendant than it would the civil plaintiff."  In light of these
  concerns, plaintiffs suggest that we replace the objective good faith test
  with a "substantial certainty" test that would ask whether a reasonably
  prudent law enforcement officer would be substantially certain that a
  warrantless search was lawful, in light of the information possessed at the
  time of the search.  Alternatively, plaintiffs propose that we impose a
  "heightened" standard of reasonableness when applying the objective good
  faith test to Article Eleven claims.
   
       ¶  18.  We have not yet addressed whether Chapter I, Article Eleven
  of the Vermont Constitution supports a direct claim for money damages.  To
  evaluate whether such a claim is appropriate, we ask whether Article Eleven
  is "self-executing," and if so, whether money damages are available as a
  remedy.  Shields v. Gerhart, 163 Vt. 219, 222, 658 A.2d 924, 927 (1995).  A
  constitutional provision is self-executing if it "supplies a sufficient
  rule by means of which the right given may be enjoyed and protected."  Id.
  at 224, 658 A.2d  at 928 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
  In making this determination, we examine whether the constitutional
  provision describes the right in detail, including the means for its
  enjoyment and protection; whether it contains a directive to the
  legislature for further action; whether the legislative history indicates
  the provision's intended operation; and whether a conclusion that a
  provision is or is not self-executing would be consistent with the scheme
  of rights established in the constitution as a whole.  Id.

       ¶  19.  Once we determine that a constitutional provision is
  self-executing, we must also examine whether a claim for money damages is
  appropriate.  See Shields, 163 Vt. at 227-28, 658 A.2d  at 930.  When the
  legislature has not fashioned an adequate remedial scheme, "it may be
  appropriate to imply a monetary damages remedy to enforce constitutional
  rights."  Id. at 234, 658 A.2d  at 934.  However, where the legislature has
  provided a remedy, "although it may not be as effective for the plaintiff
  as money damages, we will ordinarily defer to the statutory remedy and
  refuse to supplement it."  Id. at 234-35, 658 A.2d  at 934.  ¶  20.  We need
  not decide here whether Shields supports a private claim for money damages
  under Article Eleven because we reject plaintiffs' premise that the
  standard for evaluating an official's qualified immunity depends on the
  constitutional right asserted.  The establishment of a Bivens-like claim
  does not resolve the standard of immunity available to governmental
  officials.  See  Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 486 (1978).  "Bivens
  established that compensable injury to a constitutionally protected
  interest could be vindicated by a suit for damages invoking the general
  federal-question jurisdiction of the federal courts, but [it] reserved the
  question whether the agents involved were immune from liability."  Id.
  (internal quotation marks and footnote omitted).
   
       ¶  21.  The United States Supreme Court's subsequent determination
  that federal executive officials exercising discretion are entitled to
  qualified immunity in "suit[s] for damages arising from unconstitutional
  action," id. at 507 (emphasis added), did not suggest that the standard for
  qualified immunity be adjusted according to the constitutional right
  allegedly violated.  Indeed, it would have been illogical for the Court to
  have done so, since the purpose of qualified immunity is "the need to
  protect officials who are required to exercise their discretion and the
  related public interest in encouraging the vigorous exercise of official
  authority."  Id. at 506.  Thus, even where a state court has concluded that
  an individual is entitled to recover money damages for injuries resulting
  from the violation of a state constitutional right to be free from
  unreasonable searches, the test for qualified immunity is the same; it
  remains the same "under any action arising from the state constitution." 
  Moresi v. State Through Dep't of Wildlife & Fisheries, 567 So. 2d 1081,
  1093 (La. 1990). 

       ¶  22.  Under both the Fourth Amendment and Article Eleven, plaintiffs
  enjoy the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.  See,
  e.g., State v. Berard, 154 Vt. 306, 309, 576 A.2d 118, 120 (1990); State v.
  Lockwood, 160 Vt. 547, 559, 632 A.2d 655, 663 (1993).  The federal court
  assessed defendants' actions in light of this "clearly established" right. 
  We are asked to conduct the same analysis here. 

       ¶  23.  Given our conclusion that the objective reasonableness test is
  appropriate, we find plaintiffs' attempt to distinguish between
  "warrantless search" cases and probation cases immaterial.  Here,
  defendants possessed a probation order specifically authorizing searches of
  Stevens' premises.  Thus this case does not turn on whether defendants had
  "reasonable grounds" to conduct a probation search as in Lockwood, 160 Vt.
  at 558, 632 A.2d  at 662, or had reason to believe that a warrantless search
  was appropriate.  The relevant question in both cases is whether, in light
  of plaintiffs' clearly established right to be free from unreasonable
  searches and seizures and in light of the information possessed by
  defendants, it was nonetheless objectively reasonable for defendants to
  believe that their conduct was lawful.  We agree with the trial court that,
  given the federal court's finding that it was objectively reasonable for
  defendants to believe that Stevens' probation order was still in effect,
  "the search did not violate the plaintiffs' clearly-established rights
  under either constitution."
   
       ¶  24.  Given the similarity of the qualified immunity analysis
  applied by both courts, we turn next to the similarity of the facts. 
  Plaintiffs do not dispute that their complaint in this case, in all
  material respects, presents the same factual allegations and claims as
  their complaint in the prior federal action.  Nor do they dispute that,
  based on these facts, the Second Circuit concluded that it was "objectively
  reasonable" for defendants to believe that the probation order remained in
  effect on July 11, 1997.  Instead, plaintiffs argue that the facts relied
  on by the federal court are "not material" here.  Specifically, they
  maintain that a factual dispute exists because the evidence "objectively"
  demonstrates that defendants believed Stevens' probation began April 18,
  1996.  This, they argue, is "information possessed by the searching
  officials at the time of the search," and therefore, the federal court had
  no basis to find an "ambiguity" regarding the dates of Stevens' probation. 

       ¶  25.  Plaintiffs raise a legal, rather than a factual, argument. 
  The federal court considered this same argument and rejected it, finding
  defendants' subjective beliefs irrelevant.  Plaintiffs' assertion that the
  federal court misinterpreted the evidence or misapplied the federal
  objective good faith standard has no bearing on the similarity of the facts
  presented in plaintiffs' federal action and those presented here. 
   
       ¶  26.  We conclude that the federal court's determination that
  defendants acted in an objectively reasonable way is entitled to preclusive
  effect.  This issue was litigated and decided in a prior case between the
  parties that resulted in a final judgment on the merits.  The federal
  court's determination of this issue was necessary to the resolution of the
  action; it formed the basis of the court's decision to grant summary
  judgment to defendants on qualified immunity grounds.  Plaintiffs have
  received a full and fair opportunity to contest this issue and they are not
  entitled to relitigate it here.  We therefore find defendants entitled to
  qualified immunity as a matter of law and conclude that the trial court
  properly granted defendants' motion for summary judgment.

       Affirmed.


                                       FOR THE COURT:


                                       _______________________________________
                                       Chief Justice


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                                  Footnotes


FN1.  Justice Morse sat for oral argument but did not participate in this
  decision.