In re Lambert

In re Lambert (2002-001); 173 Vt. 604; 795 A.2d 1236

[Filed 21-Mar-2002]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                      SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2002-001

                             JANUARY TERM, 2002


In re Felicia Lambert	              }	     APPEALED FROM:
                                      }
                                      }
                                      }	     Chittenden Superior Court
                                      }	
                                      }
                                      }	     DOCKET NO. S1429-01CnC

                                             Trial Judge: David Jenkins  

             In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:


       Petitioner Felicia Lambert appeals from a superior court order denying
  a habeas corpus  petition seeking to prevent her extradition to
  Massachusetts.  She contends: (1) the documents  accompanying the
  extradition request did not comply with statutory requirements; and (2) her 
  detention was in violation of federal law.  We affirm. 

       On April 5, 2001, following a jury trial in the Chittenden District
  Court, petitioner was  convicted of certain misdemeanor charges.  She was
  released on bail pending sentencing.  Several  days later, she was arrested
  on fugitive-from-justice charges, arraigned and released on conditions.  
  On May 10, the Acting Governor of Massachusetts filed a request for
  extradition with the Governor  of Vermont, stating that petitioner had
  violated the terms of her probation stemming from a felony  larceny
  conviction in Massachusetts.  The Governor of Vermont issued a warrant of
  extradition on  May 30.  Petitioner was arrested on the warrant on June 22,
  and held without bail.  

       On July 20, petitioner was sentenced on the Vermont misdemeanor
  convictions and began  serving her sentence.  On November 30, the district
  court granted a motion to stay execution of the  sentence pending appeal. 
  Petitioner  remained incarcerated, however, on the Governor's warrant.  
  One week later, on December 7, petitioner filed a petition for habeas
  corpus, claiming that the  Massachusetts documents supporting the
  extradition request were deficient under 13 V.S.A. § 4943,  and further
  asserting that her continued incarceration violated due process.

       Under 13 V.S.A. chapter 159, Vermont's codification of the Uniform
  Criminal Extradition  Act, a demand for extradition must be accompanied by
  one or more types of authenticated  documents, including "a copy of a
  judgment of conviction or of a sentence imposed in execution 

 

  thereof."  Id. § 4943(a). (FN1)  The extradition request in this case was
  accompanied by a number of  supporting documents, including one entitled
  "Record of Criminal Case," a certified computer print-out from the
  Massachusetts District Court. (FN2) Under the subheading "Offense and
  Judgment  Information," the document identifies petitioner's offense as
  larceny over $250, indicates a judgment  date of April 10, 1989, a sentence
  of two years and six months, with eighteen months to serve,  and a 
  probation starting date of April 10, 1989 and ending date of April 11,
  1994.  The document also  states that a restitution fine of $22,103 was
  imposed, and notes that an arrest warrant on default was  issued on
  November 27, 1990.
 
       In her habeas petition, petitioner claimed that the Record of Criminal
  Case failed to satisfy §  4943(a)'s requirement of a "judgment of
  conviction."  She relied principally on In re Sousie, 147 Vt.  330, 331,
  516 A.2d 142, 143-44 (1986), in which this Court held that a Massachusetts
  request for  extradition accompanied by a document entitled "warrant"
  failed to satisfy the statutory requirement.  The warrant was essentially a
  mittimus, or transportation order, that was signed by a court clerk and 
  that also indicated the petitioner had been convicted of a crime and the
  length of the sentence  imposed.  Id. at 331, 516 A.2d  at 143.  Sousie
  relied, in turn, on a Florida Court of Appeals decision  holding that
  extradition required at a minimum "'the document representing the official
  court action  of conviction.'"  Id. (quoting Britton v. State, 447 So. 2d 458, 459 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)).  The  trial court here distinguished
  Sousie on this basis, observing that the "Record of Criminal Case" had 
  been signed by a "clerk-magistrate" who is authorized under Massachusetts
  law to perform certain  judicial duties, and represented a "formal and
  regular document generated by the Massachusetts trial  courts in the course
  of 'official court action.'"  Accordingly, it found that the document
  satisfied the  requirements of § 4943.

       Petitioner on appeal renews her claim that the Massachusetts Record of
  Criminal Case was  insufficient to support the extradition warrant. We are
  persuaded, however, that the trial court's  ruling was essentially sound.
  Our conclusion is informed by certain fundamental principles  underlying
  the concept of interstate extradition.   Originating in the Extradition
  Clause of Article IV, 

 

  § 2, cl. 2, of the United States Constitution, (FN3) the United States
  Supreme Court has explained  that the framers' purpose was "to preclude any
  state from becoming a sanctuary for fugitives from  justice of another
  state and thus 'balkanize' the administration of justice among the several
  states. It  articulated, in mandatory language, the concepts of comity and
  full faith and credit."  Michigan v.  Doran, 439 U.S. 282, 287-88 (1978). 
  Interstate extradition was thus "intended to be a summary and  mandatory
  executive proceeding."  Id. at 288; see also In re Everett, 139 Vt. 317,
  319, 427 A.2d 349, 350 (1981) (citing Doran, 439 U.S. at 288).

       The Constitutional provision has been implemented through federal
  statute, see 18 U.S.C. §  3182, as well as through individual state
  extradition acts, most of which - like our own - are  modeled on the
  Uniform Criminal Extradition Act.  See 11 Uniform Laws Annotated 97 (1995);
  see   Lovejoy v. State, 148 Vt. 239, 243-45, 531 A.2d 921, 924-25 (1987);
  see generally L. Abramson,   Extradition in America: Of Uniform Acts and
  Governmental Discretion, 33 Baylor L. Rev. 793, 794  (1981) (discussing
  history of interstate extradition).  In applying these provisions, however,
  the high  court has counseled that "the courts of an asylum state are bound
  by Art. IV, § 2," and that once the  governor of the asylum state has
  granted extradition, a court considering release on habeas corpus  can do
  no more than determine whether certain facial prerequisites have been
  satisfied, including  "whether the extradition documents on their face are
  in order."  Doran, 439 U.S.  at 288-89.  In an  early decision addressing
  the sufficiency of an affidavit to support extradition,  the Supreme Court 
  cautioned against unduly technical judicial interpretations of these
  procedural requirements.  

    When it appears, as it does here, that the affidavit in question
    was regarded  by the executive authority of the respective States
    concerned as a   sufficient basis, in law, for their acting -- the
    one in making a requisition,  the other in issuing a warrant for
    the arrest of the alleged fugitive -- the  judiciary should not
    interfere, on habeas corpus, and discharge the accused,  upon
    technical grounds, and unless it be clear that what was done was
    in  plain contravention of law.    

  Compton v. Alabama, 214 U.S. 1, 8 (1909).

       In a seminal California case, Justice Traynor similarly counseled that
  courts evaluating the  sufficiency of the demanding state's extradition
  papers were not to "exalt form over substance."  In re  Cooper, 349 P.2d 956, 959 (Cal. 1960). Consistent with this approach, constitutional and
  statutory  provisions applicable to extradition have been liberally
  construed in favor of the demanding state.  See Biddinger v. Commissioner,
  245 U.S. 128, 132-33 (1917) (extradition laws "have not been  construed
  narrowly and technically by the courts as if they were penal laws, but
  liberally to effect  their important purpose"). 

 

       Viewed in light of these principles, the document submitted by the
  Massachusetts authorities   must be deemed sufficient for extradition
  purposes. Unlike our own Rules of Criminal Procedure,  which specifically
  reference a "judgment of conviction," define its contents, and specify that
  it "shall  be signed by the judge," V.R.Cr.P. 32(b), the Massachusetts
  Rules of Criminal Procedure provide,  with respect to criminal judgments,
  merely that the verdict or finding "shall be rendered, in open  court, and
  shall be entered on the court's docket."  Mass. R. Cr. P. 28(a). 
  Massachusetts does not,  therefore, appear to require a judgment of
  conviction signed by a judicial officer, but merely a docket  entry based
  upon the verdict.  Nevertheless, the computer-generated entries itemized in
  the "Record  of Criminal Case" submitted by the Massachusetts authorities
  contain all of the essential information  that one would normally seek in a
  judgment of conviction, and more: it sets forth the judgment of  guilt and
  date of conviction; the nature of the offense; the sentence imposed,
  including the  imposition of probation with beginning and ending dates, and
  the imposition of a restitution fine,  including the amount paid and
  balance due; and other later docket entries.  Thus, for purposes of 
  establishing the bona fides of Massachusett's extradition request, the
  document was tantamount to a  judgment of conviction.  

       Confronted with similar circumstances, we note that other courts have
  uniformly recognized  judgment-of-conviction "equivalents."   In State v.
  Luster, 596 So. 2d 454, 455-56 (Fla. 1992), for  example, the Florida
  Supreme Court concluded that an "abstract of judgment" certified by the
  clerk  of the California court in which the petitioner had been convicted
  satisfied Florida's statutory  requirement of a "judgment of conviction"
  for extradition purposes.  The Florida court noted that  "California treats
  the clerk's abstract of judgment as though it were an equivalent of
  Florida's written  order of judgment," and reasoned that failure to accord
  it equal status "would be a clear violation of   the spirit and letter of
  the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the Supremacy Clause, and the Extradition 
  Clause of the federal Constitution."  Id. at 456.  It is interesting to
  note that in so holding, the Florida  Supreme Court reversed a lower court
  ruling which had relied on Britton v. State, 447 So. 2d 458  (Fla. Dist.
  Ct. App. 1984), the principal authority cited in Sousie.  See Lawrence v.
  Luster, 575 So. 2d 220, 221 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).  Indeed, the
  dissenting justice on the lower court, whose  views ultimately prevailed,
  had argued that Britton was "incorrectly decided," and that its "attempt at 
  technical exactitude defeats the summary nature of extradition
  proceedings."  Id. at 222 (Ferguson, J.,  dissenting).

       Other cases are in accord with the Florida decision.  See, e.g.,
  Smedley v. Holt, 541 P.2d 17,  19-20 (Alaska 1975)  (since California did
  not require signed judgment of conviction but merely oral  pronouncement
  carried into clerk's minutes, Alaska would honor extradition request
  despite absence  of signed judgment of conviction); Butcher v. Caldwell,
  677 P.2d 342, 344 (Colo. 1984) (certified  copy of clerk's minutes
  indicating that guilty plea was entered and accepted by trial court in 
  Minnesota was sufficient documentation of "conviction" under Colorado
  extradition statute); State v.  Snider, 465 P.2d 739, 740 (Or. Ct. App.
  1970) (California "abstract of judgment" satisfied Oregon's  requirement of
  "judgment of conviction" for purpose of extradition).  

       Thus, the overwhelming weight of authority supports the principle of
  affording full faith and  credit to extradition requests supported by
  documentation that can fairly be construed as equivalent  to a judgment of
  conviction under the law of the requesting state. Whatever its merits on
  the 

 

  particular facts before it, therefore, Sousie is not controlling here.  The
  supporting documents  submitted by the Acting Governor of Massachusetts
  were sufficient for extradition purposes.

       Petitioner's other arguments in this regard are unpersuasive and
  require no extended  discussion.  In addition to Sousie, petitioner relies
  on Deyo v. Snelling, 139 Vt. 341, 428 A.2d 1117  (1981), and in particular
  our observation there that in extradition matters "[n]o substitutes are 
  allowed." Id. at 343, 428 A.2d  at 1119.   In Deyo, however, the question
  was whether a defendant's  "waiver of his right to a preliminary hearing"
  could substitute for the statutory requirement of an  "affidavit to the
  facts [of the crime]."  Id.  Here we are not confronted with such a patent
  effort to  "substitute" dissimilar documents, but rather with a question of
  equating two functionally equivalent  documents from different states. 
  Petitioner also asserts that the Record of Criminal Case is  inadequate as
  a computer-generated summary rather than the "actual" document of court
  action.  As  noted, however, a docket entry of judgment is all that
  Massachusetts appears to require, and it is well  settled that certified
  computer printouts of public records showing prior convictions are
  admissible as  the self-authenticating equivalent of the document itself. 
  See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 973 F.2d 603, 605 (8th Cir. 1992);
  Snavely v. City of Huntsville, 785 So. 2d 1162, 1168 (Ala. Ct. Crim. App. 
  2000); State v. Sterling, 535 S.E.2d 329, 330 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000); Pierce
  v. State, 737 N.E.2d 1211,  1213 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000); State v. Ellis, 504 S.E.2d 787, 788 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998); McDonald v.  State, 846 P.2d 694, 697
  (Wyo. 1993). Finally, petitioner expresses "concern" about an entry in the 
  Massachusetts document showing an "amended judgment or sentence" entered on
  July 13, 1999.   Petitioner did not raise this issue below and therefore
  failed to preserve it for appeal.  See State v.  Jones, 160 Vt. 440, 448,
  631 A.2d 840, 846 (1993).  Although a timely objection might have allowed 
  the State to address the meaning of this entry, we are not persuaded that
  it undermines the  document's basic reliability as proof of defendant's
  underlying judgment of conviction.  
                
       Petitioner also claims on appeal that her continued incarceration
  violates federal law requiring  her discharge if she is not delivered to
  Massachusetts within thirty days of her arrest on the  extradition warrant. 
  See 18 U.S.C. § 3182 (requiring asylum state to deliver person detained on 
  extradition warrant to agent of requesting state and further providing that
  "[i]f no such agent appears  within thirty days from the time of the
  arrest, the prisoner may be discharged").  This issue was not  raised
  before the trial court, and therefore was not preserved for review on
  appeal.  See Jones, 160  Vt. at 448, 631 A.2d  at 846.  Nor has petitioner
  asserted plain error in this regard.  Accordingly, we  need not address the
  issue. See State v. White, __ Vt. __, __, 782 A.2d 1187, 1192 (2001) (where 
  defendant failed to raise issue below or claim plain error on appeal, Court
  would not address it).   We  note, however, that the vast majority of
  courts that have considered the question have concluded that  the
  thirty-day provision in the federal statute is permissive, not mandatory. 
  See, e.g., Long v.  Cauthron, 731 S.W.2d 792, 794  (Ark. Ct. App. 1987)
  ("The thirty-day provision in the federal  statute does no more than
  release the asylum state from its constitutional obligation to hold the 
  prisoner if the demanding state does not appear within thirty days. Nothing
  in it prohibits a state from  holding him for a reasonable time
  thereafter."); Breckenridge v. Hindman, 691 P.2d 405, 408 (Kan.  App. Ct.
  1984) ("Most courts have given a permissive interpretation to the word
  'may' [in § 3182].");  Godsey v. Houston, 584 So. 2d 389, 391 (Miss. 1991)
  ("18 U.S.C. § 3182 does not mandate  discharge if the agent of the
  demanding state fails to appear within thirty days"); Prettyman v. 
  Karnopp, 222 N.W.2d 362, 365 (Neb. 1974) ("The language appearing in said
  section: 'If no such 

 

  agent appears within thirty days from the time of the arrest, the prisoner
  may be discharged' is clearly  permissive, not mandatory."); State v.
  Paskowski, 647 S.W.2d 238, 240 (Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. 1983)  ("we cannot
  attribute a mandatory meaning to that portion of 18 U.S.C. § 3182 in
  question").  
 	
       At oral argument, petitioner also renewed her habeas claim that her
  continued  incarceration   violated due process. The contention is
  unpersuasive.  Although incarcerated on June 22, 2001, on  the extradition
  warrant, she also began serving her sentence on the Vermont convictions on
  July 20,  and remained incarcerated on those counts until the sentence was
  stayed in late November. Where  the subject of an extradition warrant has
  been charged or convicted under the laws of this State, our   statutory
  scheme expressly authorizes the State to hold that person until the
  sentence has been  served.  See 13 V.S.A. § 4959.  Moreover, even if we
  assumed that petitioner's incarceration during  this period was
  attributable to the extradition warrant, we note that she did not file a
  habeas petition  until December 7, which was denied on December 20. 
  Accordingly, we discern no basis to conclude  that her continued
  incarceration was unreasonable.  

       Affirmed.
     

                                       BY THE COURT:


                                       _______________________________________
                                       Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Chief Justice

                                       _______________________________________
                                       John A. Dooley, Associate Justice

                                       _______________________________________
                                       James L. Morse, Associate Justice

                                       _______________________________________
                                       Denise R. Johnson, Associate Justice

                                       _______________________________________
                                       Marilyn S. Skoglund, Associate Justice



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                                  Footnotes


FN1.  The statute also requires "a statement by the executive authority of
  the demanding state that  the person claimed has escaped from confinement
  or has broken the terms of his bail, probation or  parole," and
  authentication of the documents by the executive authority making the
  demand.  13  V.S.A. § 4943(a).  No claim is made that the supporting
  documents were deficient in this regard.

FN2.  The other supporting documents included a signed statement by the
  Acting Governor of  Massachusetts attesting to the fact that petitioner had
  been charged with a violation of probation in  Massachusetts stemming from
  a larceny conviction and had fled from Massachusetts and taken  refuge in
  Vermont; an affidavit signed by a clerk-magistrate of the Massachusetts
  trial court stating  that petitioner had pled guilty to the crime of
  larceny over $250, was placed on probation until April  1994, and had
  violated probation resulting in an arrest warrant in 1990; a Massachusetts
  trial court  document signed by petitioner setting forth the terms of her
  probation; a warrant issued in October  1990 ordering petitioner to appear
  on charges of probation violations; and various affidavits attesting  to
  the authenticity of the documents presented. 

FN3.  This section provides: "A Person charged in any State with Treason,
  Felony, or other  Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found in
  another State, shall on Demand of the executive  Authority of the State
  from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having 
  Jurisdiction of the Crime."