Martineau v. Guertin

Martineau v. Guertin (98-181); 170 Vt. 415; 751 A.2d 776

[Filed 24-Mar-2000]


       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal  revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter  of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any  errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.


                                 No. 98-181

Micheline M. Martineau	                         Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
     v.		                                 Chittenden Superior Court

Normand Guertin	                                 January Term, 1999


Linda Levitt, J.


Philip C. Woodward of Dinse, Knapp & McAndrew, P.C., Burlington, and John A. 
  Baglini of Higgins & Slattery, Providence, Rhode Island, for 
  Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Thomas E. McCormick and Thomas P. Simon of McCormick, Fitzpatrick, Kasper & 
  Burchard, P.C., Burlington, for Defendant-Appellee.


PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ.


       MORSE, J.   Micheline Martineau, executrix of the estate of her
  deceased husband Jean  Martineau, and other family members appeal the
  superior court's summary judgment  applying  Quebec law and dismissing
  their wrongful death suit.  We conclude that the superior court should 
  have allowed plaintiffs' suit to proceed under Vermont law; accordingly, we
  reverse the court's  decision and remand the matter for further
  proceedings.

       The material facts are not in dispute.  In October 1994, Jean
  Martineau and defendant  Normand Guertin were Canadian citizens legally
  domiciled in the Province of Quebec.  For the  preceding seven years,
  Martineau had lived and worked as a subcontractor in Connecticut 
  performing carpentry work for a general contractor.  He had a valid "green
  card" that allowed  him to work in the United States, but was not a
  year-round resident of Connecticut.  Defendant  did not have a green card,
  but worked and resided with Martineau in Connecticut at the time of  the
  accident.  The families of both men, including their wives, lived in Quebec
  year round.

 

       On October 31, 1994, following a visit with their wives, Martineau and
  defendant left  Quebec separately but rendezvoused in Swanton, Vermont,
  from where they intended to drive to  Connecticut in Martineau's car, which
  had been registered and insured in Connecticut.  With  Martineau driving,
  the two men headed for Connecticut.  In White River Junction, Vermont, 
  defendant took over the driving.  Shortly thereafter, defendant lost
  control of the car and struck  a guardrail while traveling in the
  southbound lane of Interstate 91 near Hartford, Vermont.   Martineau died
  at the scene of the accident.

       Plaintiffs filed a wrongful death action in Chittenden Superior Court
  in May 1996.  In  response, defendant stated as one of his affirmative
  defenses that Quebec law governed and  foreclosed the action.  In March
  1998, defendant filed a motion for summary judgment,  contending that
  Quebec's no-fault system of compensation provided the exclusive remedy for 
  plaintiffs, thus barring their wrongful death claim.  The superior court
  granted the motion after  applying the most-significant-relationship test
  recently adopted by this Court, ruling that Quebec  law governed the
  parties' dispute, and that Quebec's Automobile Insurance Act's exclusive-
  remedy provision barred plaintiffs' wrongful death action.  On appeal,
  plaintiffs contend that  Vermont law should govern, and that, in any event,
  Quebec law does not bar plaintiffs' suit.

       In reviewing an order granting summary judgment, we apply the same
  standard as the trial  court: summary judgment is appropriate when there
  are no genuine issues of material fact and the  moving party is entitled to
  judgment as a matter of law.  See Sabia v. Neville, 165 Vt. 515, 523,  687 A.2d 469, 474 (1996).  Because no material facts are in dispute, we need
  determine only  whether the trial court correctly applied the law to the
  particular facts of this case in determining  that defendant was entitled
  to judgment as a matter of law.  See Myers v. Langlois, 168 Vt. 432,  434,
  721 A.2d 129, 130 (1998).

       This Court recently adopted the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts
  approach to choice-of-law questions in tort actions.  See Amiot v. Ames,
  166 Vt. 288, 292, 693 A.2d 675, 677 (1997).  That approach is the result of
  a compromise among those who favored the more certain 

 

  and predictable rules of the First Restatement and those who believed that
  courts should be able  to weigh the most significant factors in any given
  case before deciding which forum's law to  apply.  Consequently, the Second
  Restatement consists of a series of narrowly worded sections  establishing
  choice-of-law preferences for specified torts or particular issues
  counterbalanced by  open-ended criteria that act as an escape valve in
  situations when applying the specific,  presumptive sections would make
  little sense.  See P. Borchers, Courts and the Second Conflicts 
  Restatement: Some Observations and an Empirical Note, 56 Md. L. Rev. 1232,
  1237-40 (1997).

       Thus, under this approach, the first step is to ascertain whether a
  specific section of the  Restatement governs what law should ordinarily
  apply to the particular action or legal issue.  See  L. McDougal, Toward
  the Increased Use of Interstate and International Policies in Choice-of-Law 
  Analysis in Tort Cases under the Second Restatement and Leflar's
  Choice-Influencing  Considerations, 70 Tul. L. Rev. 2465, 2469 (1996).  If
  such a section exists, generally the law  of a particular state is presumed
  to be the correct forum unless another state has a more significant 
  interest in the litigation.  See id. at 2469-70.

       The present case is a wrongful death action.  Section 175 of the
  Restatement provides that  the "law of the state where the injury occurred
  determines the rights and liabilities of the parties"  in an action for
  wrongful death unless some other state has a more significant relationship
  to the  occurrence and the parties under the principles stated in § 6.  See
  also Restatement (Second) of  Conflicts §§ 178  (law selected by
  application of § 175 determines measure of damages in  wrongful death
  action); 145(1) (generally, rights and liabilities of parties with respect
  to tort  action are governed by law of state with most significant
  relationship to occurrence and parties  under principles stated in § 6).

       The general choice-of-law guidelines to be considered under § 6 of the
  Second Restatement  are

     (a) the needs of the interstate and international systems, (b) the 
     relevant policies of the forum, (c) the relevant policies of other 
     interested states and the relative interests of those states in the 
     determination of the particular issue, (d) the protection of 
     justified 

 

     expectations, (e) the basic policies underlying the particular field 
     of law, (f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and 
     (g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be  
     applied.

  The first three (or perhaps four) of these general guidelines carry the
  greatest weight in the field  of tort law.  See Miller v. White, 167 Vt.
  45, 48, 702 A.2d 392, 394 (1997); Amiot, 166 Vt. at  293, 693 A.2d  at 678. 
  Contacts to be taken into account in applying these principles in tort
  cases  are "(a) the place where the injury occurred, (b) the place where
  the conduct causing the injury  occurred, (c) the domicile, residence,
  nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of  the parties,
  and (d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is
  centered."   Restatement, supra § 145(2).

       In sum, the law of the state where the injury occurred is presumed to
  govern in wrongful  death actions unless another state has a more
  significant relationship to the parties and the  occurrence under the above
  criteria.  The issue here, then, is whether Quebec's interests in 
  resolving the parties' dispute is significant enough to overcome the
  presumption that Vermont law  governs.  See Restatement, supra §§ 6, cmt.
  f; 175, cmt. d.

       Various comments in the relevant sections of the Restatement concern
  circumstances  similar to the instant case and thus touch upon this issue. 
  For example, according to one  comment, "where one state is the state of
  domicile of the defendant, the decedent and the  beneficiaries, it would
  seem that, ordinarily at least, the wrongful death statute of this state
  should  be applied to determine the measure of damages."  Id. § 178, cmt.
  b; accord id. § 145 cmt. d.  Another comment states that the law of the
  parties' common domicile should determine whether  a guest passenger has a
  right of action against the driver for injuries suffered as the result of
  the  latter's negligence, at least when their common domicile is the place
  "from which they departed  on their trip and that to which they intended to
  return."  Id. § 145, cmt. d.  Comment c to § 145  also notes that "when the
  tort rule is designed primarily to compensate the victim for his injuries, 
  the state where the injury occurred, which is often the state where the
  plaintiff resides, may have  the greater interest in the matter."  Id. §
  145, cmt. c (but also 

 

  cautioning that factor must not be overemphasized).

       We relied on these considerations in recent cases in which we
  determined that the place  of the parties' common domicile should dictate
  the law governing tort suits primarily concerned  with allocation of loss
  rather than standard of conduct.  In Miller, we held that Vermont law 
  governed a case involving an automobile accident that occurred in Quebec
  because both parties  were domiciled in Vermont, their relationship
  centered in Vermont, they were operating a vehicle  registered and insured
  in Vermont, and they were on a short trip that started and ended in 
  Vermont.  See 167 Vt. at 53, 702 A.2d  at 397.  We emphasized that because
  the social and  economic repercussions of the injuries resulting from the
  accident would occur in Vermont,  Vermont had a strong interest in assuring
  proper compensation to the victim.  See id. at 52, 702 A.2d  at 396.

       The converse situation arose in Myers, a case in which Quebec
  residents were involved  in an accident on a short day-trip to Vermont in a
  car registered and insured under Quebec law.  See 168 Vt. at 435, 721 A.2d 
  at 131.  Noting that the case concerned how the estate of the  decedents
  should be compensated rather than what standard of conduct to apply, we
  applied the  law of Quebec, where the decedents and one of the defendants
  were domiciled.  See id. at 437-38,  721 A.2d  at 132.  Given the nature of
  the issue being considered, we concluded that the parties'  common
  residency and relationship in Quebec was more significant than the fact
  that the accident  and causative conduct occurred in Vermont.  See id.

       The trial court essentially applied the same reasoning in this case,
  and defendant relies on  Miller and Myers in asking this Court to uphold
  the trial court's decision.  Some of the  circumstances of this case are
  similar to those in Miller and Myers, particularly Myers.  As in  Myers,
  this case primarily concerns how to compensate plaintiffs for their loss
  rather than how  to define the standard of care by which defendant will be
  held liable

       But there are also significant differences.  Although Martineau, 
  plaintiffs, and defendant  were all legally domiciled in Quebec at the time
  of the accident, Martineau had a green card and 

 

  had been living and working in Connecticut for seven years.  Martineau's
  car was registered in  Connecticut and insured by a company based in
  Connecticut.  Defendant had also been living and  working with Martineau in
  Connecticut at the time of the accident.  Thus, the relationship between 
  Martineau and defendant was centered in Connecticut at the time of the
  accident, although  apparently they had met years earlier in Quebec. 
  Further, the two men were not on a short trip  to and from Quebec, but
  rather were leaving Quebec to return to Connecticut for their work.  
  Moreover, the accident occurred on route directly between their families'
  residence and the state  in which they worked and lived, and thus did not
  occur under completely fortuitous  circumstances.  See Amiot, 166 Vt. at
  292, 693 A.2d  at 678 (significant relationship often exists  in other forum
  "where the place of injury has little relationship to the parties");
  Restatement,  supra § 145 cmt. e, (place of injury is not significant in
  selecting governing law when place of  injury is result of fortuitous
  circumstances and bears little relation to occurrence and parties).

       Because both Connecticut and Vermont have a traditional tort system of
  recovery for  automobile accidents, and neither party claims that
  Connecticut law should apply to this dispute,  the Connecticut contacts
  must be grouped with the Vermont contacts in determining whether the 
  Quebec contacts are significant enough to override the presumption in favor
  of applying Vermont  law.  See Restatement, supra, § 145, cmt. i (stating
  that when contacts involving tort are located  in two or more states with
  same law governing issue in question, "the case will be treated for 
  choice-of-law purposes as if these contacts were grouped in a single
  state"); J. Meschewski,  Choice of Law in Alaska: A Survival Guide for
  Using the Second Restatement, 16 Alaska L. Rev.  1, 18 (1999) (discussing
  grouping of contacts in three-way cases).  When we group the  Connecticut
  contacts with the Vermont situs of the accident, the significance of the
  parties'  common legal domicile is considerably reduced.

       As for the general guidelines contained in § 6 of the Restatement, we
  have considered  them in some detail in other tort cases involving Quebec
  and Vermont, examining the policies and  purposes behind the no-fault
  system of compensation provided by Quebec's Automobile 

 

  Insurance Act, and comparing that system to Vermont's traditional tort
  system of compensation.  See Myers, 168 Vt. at 436-37, 721 A.2d at 131-32;
  Miller, 167 Vt. at 49-51, 702 A.2d  at 395.  We recognize that Quebec has an
  interest in the present dispute because the social and economic 
  consequences of the accident will be felt in Quebec, the residence of the
  plaintiffs.  On the other  hand, there is no indication that allowing
  plaintiffs to seek compensation in Vermont will   undermine or interfere
  with Quebec's no-fault system of compensation.

       Indeed, Quebec's interests diminish when Quebec residents are involved
  in accidents  outside the province.  While Quebec's Automobile Insurance
  Act compensates Quebec residents  on a no-fault basis regardless of whether
  they are injured within or outside Quebec borders, see  R.S.Q. 1997 ch.
  A-25, Automobile Insurance Act § 7, it also explicitly allows Quebec
  residents  injured outside the province to seek recovery under the law of
  the place of their injuries, id. §  83.59.  Further, the Act mandates that
  insurance (1) be obtained to protect the insured owner  against any
  liability incurred while driving the automobile of a third party, (2)
  provide protection  for persons against any liability incurred as the
  result of bodily injuries caused by automobile  accidents occurring outside
  Quebec, and (3) equal the minimum amount of liability insurance  prescribed
  by law in the state, province, or territory of Canada or the United States
  where the  accident occurred.  See id. §§  85, 88.  Here, in conformity
  with these provisions, defendant was  apparently covered under a private
  liability policy making the insurer liable for the minimum  amount
  prescribed by the Canadian province or the American state where the
  accident occurred.  Defendant does not dispute plaintiffs' contention that
  any liability resulting from a tort suit in  Vermont would be covered
  directly by the private liability insurer rather than Quebec's no-fault 
  system.

       Moreover, while the expectations of the parties and the need for
  predictability are  generally not significant factors in tort cases such as
  this because of the unplanned nature of  accidents, see Amiot, 166 Vt. at
  293, 693 A.2d  at 678, those factors have some significance in  analyzing
  the contract aspects of a tort case.  See Jepson v. General Cas. Co. of
  Wisconsin, 513 N.W.2d 467, 470 (Minn. 1994); Hunker v. Royal Indemnity Co., 204 N.W.2d 897, 903 (Wis.  1973).  Here, the car involved in the accident was
  registered in Connecticut and insured by a  Connecticut company at the time
  Martineau was living and working in that state.  Therefore, the  parties
  would have reasonably expected that Connecticut law, or at least American
  tort law, would  govern any suit arising from an accident concerning the
  use of that car, particularly if the accident  occurred in the United
  States.

       The preceding discussion demonstrates that the circumstances of this
  case present a close  and difficult call as to whether Quebec or Vermont
  law should govern the parties' dispute.  One  of the advantages of the
  Second Restatement's approach is that it has a built-in default rule for 
  cases such as this.  See Hataway v. McKinley, 830 S.W.2d 53, 59 (Tenn.
  1992) (Restatement is  easier to apply than other approaches in difficult
  cases because it provides default mechanism that  allows courts to apply
  law of place where injury occurred in situations when no state has 
  overriding interest in litigation).  Given the particular circumstances of
  this case, any interest  Quebec may have in applying its law to the instant
  litigation is not significant enough to overcome  the presumption that the
  law of Vermont - the place where the injury and wrongful conduct  occurred
  - should govern the dispute.

       Reversed and remanded.

                                       FOR THE COURT:



                                       _______________________________________
                                       Associate Justice