Myers v. Langlois

Myers v. Langlois  (97-399); 168 Vt. 432; 721 A.2d 129

[Filed 23-Oct-1998]


       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.


                                 No. 97-399


Gilbert Myers, Administrator                  Supreme Court
Estates of Adrienne Belanger Hebert,
Pauline Gauthier and Patricia Giles
                                              On Appeal from
     v.                                       Chittenden Superior Court

Marcy Langlois and                            June Term, 1998
Emilien Bergeron



Shireen Avis Fisher, J.

       John T. Leddy of McNeil, Leddy & Sheahan, Burlington, for
  Plaintiff-Appellant.

       Patricia S. Orr of Wilson, Powell & Lang, Burlington, for
  Defendant-Appellee.


PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ.

       SKOGLUND, J.  Plaintiff Gilbert Meyers, administrator of the estates
  of Adrienne Belanger Hebert, Pauline Gauthier,and Patricia Giles
  (decedents), appeals the superior court's grant of defendant Emilien
  Bergeron's summary judgment motion, which  thereby dismissed the three
  survival and wrongful death actions against defendant Bergeron.(FN1)
  Plaintiff contends the court erred by concluding that, because Quebec law
  applied to the actions against defendant Bergeron, plaintiff was limited to
  recovering benefits paid under Quebec law and was prohibited from bringing
  these actions in a Vermont court.  We affirm.

       Defendant Bergeron and the decedents were residents of the Province of
  Quebec.  On January 31, 1994, defendant Bergeron and the decedents left
  together from Clarenceville, Quebec, in defendant Bergeron's automobile. 
  They intended to play bingo in  Alburg, Vermont,

 

  and then return to their homes in Clarenceville later that evening.  While
  driving in Alburg, defendant Bergeron allegedly made an improper left turn
  off Route 2.  The automobile he was driving, and in which the decedents
  were passengers, was then struck by defendant Marcy Langlois's automobile. 
  Defendant Langlois, a Vermont resident, was allegedly travelling at an
  excessive rate of speed.  The decedents died of their injuries either
  immediately upon impact or soon thereafter.  Two of the decedents' estates
  incurred medical bills for services provided  by Vermont hospitals.  Each
  of the decedents' next of kin applied  for and received benefits available
  under the law of  Quebec.

       Plaintiff subsequently commenced separate survival and wrongful death
  actions, pursuant to 14 V.S.A. §§ 1451-1492, against defendants Bergeron
  and Langlois.  The actions were consolidated for discovery.  After
  discovery was partially complete, defendant Bergeron moved for summary
  judgment contending that he should be dismissed from the actions. Defendant
  Bergeron first argued that, based on Vermont's  choice-of-law principles,
  Quebec law applied.  He further asserted that plaintiff was precluded from
  maintaining the actions against him because the benefits provided to the
  decedents' next of kin under Quebec's no-fault compensation system for
  automobile accidents comprised plaintiff's exclusive  remedy.  In
  opposition, plaintiff claimed that the actions were governed by Vermont
  law, which has retained a fault-based compensation system for negligence
  claims related to automobile accidents.  The court agreed with defendant
  Bergeron's arguments,  granted summary judgment in his favor, and dismissed
  him from the case.  This appeal followed.

       When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we apply the same standard
  as the trial court. See Madden v. Omega Optical, Inc., 165 Vt. 306, 309,
  683 A.2d 386, 389 (1996).  Here, no material facts were in dispute, and the
  plaintiff contests only the decision that the defendant was entitled to
  judgment as a matter of law.  See id. (reiterating summary judgment
  standard). We therefore analyze whether the law was applied correctly.  See
  10A C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2716
  (3d ed. 1998) (discussing nature

 

  of summary judgment review).

                                     I.

       Plaintiff first contends that according to Vermont's  choice-of-law
  principles Vermont law should govern the actions. We disagree.  We have
  adopted the test articulated in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
  Laws for determining which law applies in a given cause of action.  Miller
  v. White, ___ Vt. ___, ___, 702 A.2d 392, 393 (1997).(FN2)  Under this test,
  the parties' rights and liabilities are determined by the local law  of the
  state that has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and to
  the parties.  Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145(1) (1969); see
  also Amiot v. Ames, 166 Vt. 288, 292, 693 A.2d 675, 677 (1997) (choice of
  law in tort action that implicates states or countries beyond Vermont
  determined by analyzing which state or country has most significant
  relationship to occurrence and to parties); Jean v. Francois, 642 N.Y.S.2d 780, 782 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1996) (stating resolution of choice-of-law issue in
  tort cases involves "grouping of contacts" or "center of gravity"
  approach).

       In applying the significant relationship test, we refer to the general
  principles set forth in Restatement § 6.  See Miller, ___ Vt. at ___, 702 A.2d  at 394 (citing Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 6(2)(a)-(g)
  (1971)).  Given the jurisdictions involved in this case, the principles
  include:  (a) the needs of the international system; (b) the relevant
  policies of Vermont; (c) the relevant policies and interests of Quebec in
  the determination of the particular issue; (d) the protection of justified
  expectations; (e) the basic policies underlying tort law; (f) certainty,
  predictability and uniformity of result; and, (g) ease in determination and
  application

  

  of the law to be applied. Depending on the area of law involved, some § 6
  factors carry more weight than others.  See id. at ___, 702 A.2d  at 394
  (significant relationship test as applied to tort law stresses relevant
  policies of Vermont and Quebec and needs of international system); see also
  Amiot, 166 Vt. at 293, 693 A.2d  at 678 (noting § 6(d)-(f) factors less
  important to tort law than to other fields of law).  Since the actions at
  issue here, as in Miller, constitute torts, our analysis stresses the first
  three § 6 principles, i.e., the relevant policies of Vermont and Quebec and
  the needs of the international system.  ___ Vt. at ___, 702 A.2d  at 394.

       Section 145(2) further delineates application of § 6 principles to
  tort cases:

     Contacts to be taken into account in applying the
     principles of § 6 to determine the law applicable to an
     issue include:

         (a)   the place where the injury occurred,
         (b)   the place where the conduct causing the
               injury occurred,
         (c)   the domicil, residence, nationality, place of
               incorporation and place of business of the
               parties, and
         (d)   the place where the relationship, if any,
               between the parties is centered.

     These contacts are to be evaluated according to their
     relative importance with respect to the particular issue.

  Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145(2) (1971). Thus, to analyze
  the principles established in §§ 145(2) and 6(2), we first review the
  parties' contacts with  Vermont and Quebec.

       In the case before us, the accident and alleged causative conduct took
  place in Vermont.  The decedents and defendant Bergeron, however, were all
  Quebec residents, and their relationship was centered in Quebec. They were
  friends and neighbors in Quebec who agreed to take a short day-trip
  together, leaving from and returning to Quebec.  Moreover, defendant
  Bergeron's car was  registered and insured under Quebec law.

       Although the accident and the allegedly negligent conduct causing it
  occurred in Vermont, the issue in this case is not a conflict between laws
  that define different standards of care.  Rather, the issue is one of loss
  allocation.  In judging the respective policy interests of

 

  Quebec and Vermont, the forum state, the question therefore becomes which
  of the two quite different systems of recovery should prevail.

       Quebec's Automobile Insurance Act (Act) provides for  no-fault based
  compensation through a government-operated insurance system, the Societe de
  l'Assurance du Quebec  (Societe), to Quebec residents injured in an
  automobile accident regardless where the accident occurred.(FN3)  See R.S.Q.
  1995 ch. A-25, Automobile Insurance Act §§ 5, 7. Through enactment of the
  no-fault scheme, Quebec "seeks to  expedite compensation to victims of
  automobile accidents, reduce the amount of tort litigation in Quebec
  courts, and guarantee relatively low automobile insurance rates."   Miller,
  ___ Vt. at ___, 702 A.2d  at 395.  If a Quebec resident dies as a result of
  an automobile accident, the Act ensures compensation for any person
  entitled to a death benefit.  See R.S.Q. 1995 ch. A-25, Automobile
  Insurance Act § 6.  The Quebec Act states that "[c]ompensation under this
  title stands in lieu of all  rights and remedies by reason of bodily injury
  and no action in that respect shall be admitted before any court of
  justice," id. § 83.57, thereby eliminating the right of  an accident victim
  to bring a personal injury lawsuit in Quebec.  The Act further provides
  that "[a] person  entitled to compensation under this title by reason of an
  accident that occurred outside Quebec may benefit by the compensation while
  retaining his remedy with respect to any compensation in excess thereof
  under the law of the place where the accident occurred."  Id. § 83.59. 
  Section  83.59 applies, however, only when an accident occurs outside
  Quebec and the lawsuit is brought in a court outside the province.  See
  Szeto v. Federation (La) Cie d'Assurances du Canada, 1986 R.J.Q. 218, 220
  (translated  from French).

       By contrast, Vermont maintains a traditional tort recovery scheme
  under which negligent automobile drivers, or their private insurance
  carriers, must compensate automobile accident

 

  victims for their injuries.  To minimize risky conduct and reduce the
  quantity and severity of injury-causing events, traditional tort systems
  tend to provide clearer standards of conduct  and higher levels of
  compensation than no-fault systems.  Miller, ___ Vt. at ___, 702 A.2d  at
  395.

       As we noted in Miller, in determining which law governs allocation of
  post-event losses, the law of the parties'  jurisdiction normally controls
  where the tortfeasor and the victims share a common domicile.  See ___ Vt.
  at ___, 702 A.2d  at 394; see also Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws
  § 178 cmt. b (1971) (where one state is domicile of defendant, decedent,
  and beneficiaries, ordinarily wrongful death statute of this state should
  apply to determine measure of damages).  Indeed, one court long ago noted:

     Limitations of damages . . . have little or nothing to
     do with conduct. They are concerned not with how people
     should behave but with how survivors should be
     compensated, [therefore,] [t]he state of the place
     of the wrong has little or no interest in such
    compensation when none of the parties reside there.

  Reich v. Purcell, 432 P.2d 727, 731 (Cal. 1967) (Traynor, C.J.).  This
  preference for applying the law of the parties'  jurisdiction rests on the
  recognition that the domiciliary jurisdiction has weighed the competing
  considerations underlying its own loss allocation rule and therefore has an
  interest in the parties' acceptance of both the benefits and  the burdens
  of identifying with that jurisdiction.  See Miller, ___ Vt. at ___, 702 A.2d  at 394 (relying on Cooney v. Osgood Mach., 612 N.E.2d 277, 280 (N.Y.
  1993)).

       Thus, while the accident and causative conduct occurred in Vermont,
  the parties' residency and the fact their  relationship was centered in
  Quebec comprise the more significant contacts with respect to the issues
  raised in this case.  See generally Jean, 642 N.Y.S.2d 780 (concluding
  Quebec compensation law applied to case involving automobile accident in
  New York because all parties were residents of Quebec or incorporated
  therein and had no significant contacts with New York); O'Connor v.
  O'Connor, 519 A.2d 13, 25-26 (Conn. 1986) (Connecticut damage law applies
  in case involving Connecticut defendant and plaintiff who were involved in
  single-car accident in Quebec); cf. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
  Laws §

 

  157(2) (1971) (where conflict of laws concerns regulation of primary
  conduct, e.g., standard of care, normally local law of state where injury
  occurred would apply).  Since the choice-of-law issue presented relates to
  allocation of post-event losses, not regulation of conduct, the goals of
  Vermont's system would not be realized by permitting the  actions to go
  forward here.  Quebec has demonstrated strong policy concerns by enacting a
  comprehensive automobile insurance act that provides no-fault compensation
  and allocates loss between Quebec residents.  We therefore conclude that
  Quebec's significant interest in maintaining its no-fault  insurance scheme
  outweigh the parties' contacts with Vermont.

       Finally, in the interest of the international justice system, we will
  respect the policy choices made by Quebec in providing comprehensive,
  no-fault insurance to its residents. Compare Gagnon v. Lucas, 3 S.C.R.
  1022, 1066 (Can. 1994) (holding, in international arena, it is generally
  accepted that laws of domiciliary forum apply in tort claims involving
  residents of one country, regardless where tort took place). And it is
  Quebec after all that is most directly concerned with the consequences of
  limiting the compensable damages for the survivors of this tragedy.

       Plaintiff also argues that Vermont law should govern damages because,
  if Quebec law is applied and we determine that court did not err in
  dismissing defendant Bergeron, defendant Langlois would be denied her
  statutory right to compare the negligence of defendant Bergeron to her own
  in assessing damages.  See 12 V.S.A. § 1036.  The argument is irrelevant,
  however, because defendant Langlois is no longer a party to the litigation.

                                     II.

       Plaintiff next contends that, even if Quebec law is applicable, the
  court erred in dismissing defendant Bergeron because Quebec law does not
  provide the exclusive remedy for a Quebec resident who was killed or
  injured in an automobile accident in Vermont.  Relying on § 83.59 of the
  Quebec Act, discussed above, and on the Canadian court's holding in Szeto, 
  R.J.Q. at 220-21, plaintiff claims that Quebec law specifically recognizes
  the right of a Quebec

 

  resident to pursue civil remedies available in the jurisdiction where the
  accident occurred in addition to receiving compensation from the Societe.

       We note that § 83.59 does not contain a per se choice-of-law
  provision.  The section merely allows a Quebec resident to recover
  compensation under both the Act and the laws of the jurisdiction where the
  accident occurred. Nevertheless, § 83.59 requires the accident victim who
  files a lawsuit in another jurisdiction to submit to the other
  jurisdiction's choice-of-law provisions.  See Jean, 642 N.Y.S.2d  at 781. 
  We therefore need not address defendant Bergeron's argument that permitting
  the Vermont actions would  give the plaintiff the opportunity for double
  recovery.

       Finally, plaintiff argues that the Act's limited  compensation is not
  the only available remedy since the Act requires that an automobile owner
  who drives in Quebec have liability insurance providing indemnity for any
  liability incurred by the insured for bodily injuries caused by an
  automobile accident outside of Quebec.  See R.S.Q. 1995 ch. A-25,
  Automobile Insurance Act §§ 85, 88.  Plaintiff therefore seeks to recover
  damages specifically covered by defendant Bergeron's insurance contract. 
  Plaintiff failed to raise this  claim before the trial court.  Therefore,
  we decline to address it.(FN4)  See Bell v. Bell, 162 Vt. 192, 201, 643 A.2d 846, 852 (1994) (holding that failure to raise issue at trial, precludes
  this Court from considering it on appeal).

       Affirmed.

                         FOR THE COURT:



                         _______________________________________
                         Associate Justice



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                                  Footnotes



FN1.   After the court dismissed the case against defendant Marcy
  Bergeron, defendant Langlois settled the cases against her.

FN2.  The facts in Miller v. White, present nearly a mirror image of
  the facts in this appeal.___Vt.___,702 A.2d 392.  In Miller, the defendant and
  plaintiff were both residents of Vermont. During a short trip to Quebec,
  they were involved in a single-car accident in an automobile owned and
  operated by defendant and registered in Vermont.  Plaintiff brought suit in
  Franklin Superior Court claiming that defendant's negligence caused the 
  accident and injured the plaintiff.  On appeal, we affirmed the trial
  court's determination that Vermont law governed the  personal injury
  action, basing our conclusion on application of the choice-of-law test as
  set forth in Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws.  See id. at ___, 702 A.2d  at 397.

FN3.  Individuals who are not Quebec residents but  are injured  in an
  automobile accident while in Quebec may also recover under Quebec's
  Automobile Insurance  Act, but only to the extent that they are "not 
  responsible for the accident."  R.S.Q. 1995 ch. A-25,  Automobile Insurance
  Act § 9; see also Miller v. White, ___ Vt. at ___, 702 A.2d  at 395.

FN4.  Since we decline to address plaintiff's claim  concerning
  defendant's insurance, defendant's motion to file a copy of the insurance
  contract as a supplemental appendix is moot.