Longfellow v. State
Annotate this Case
Longfellow v. State
1990 WY 152
803 P.2d 848
Case Number: 90-7
Decided: 12/18/1990
Supreme Court of Wyoming
MINDI HOBSON LONGFELLOW,
Appellant (Defendant),
v.
THE STATE OF WYOMING,
Appellee (Plaintiff)
Leonard
Munker, State Public Defender; Wyoming Defender Aid Program: Gerald M. Gallivan;
Theodore B. D'Arcy, Student Intern, Laramie, for appellant.
Joseph
B. Meyer, Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; Karen A.
Byrne, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Kaylin D. Kluge, Assistant Attorney
General, Cheyenne, for appellee.
Urbigkit, C.J., and Thomas,
Cardine, Macy and Golden, JJ.
GOLDEN
[¶1]
This case arises out of the short, brutal life and untimely death of
Christopher Hobson, aged not quite three months. Appellant Mindi Hobson, now
known as Mindi Hobson Longfellow, the child's mother,
challenges her conviction of felony child abuse under W.S. 6-2-503 (Cum.Supp.
1987) and of voluntary manslaughter under W.S. 6-2-105(a)(i) (Cum.Supp.
1987).
[¶2]
Appellant raises the following issues:
I. Whether there is
sufficient evidence to support the defendant's conviction of voluntary
manslaughter.
II. Whether testimony
concerning prior treatment of appellant's daughter, Valerie Hobson, by defendant
and the temperament of defendant was improperly admitted under Rule 404(b) of
the Wyoming Rules of Evidence.
[¶3]
We affirm.
FACTS
[¶4]
From his birth on September 10, 1987, until December 2, 1987, Christopher
Hobson resided with his mother, appellant Mindi Hobson, and her boyfriend, Brad
Longfellow, in
Brad's trailer in Cheyenne. On December 2, 1987, appellant spent most of the
morning and early afternoon caring for Christopher and for her daughter, Valerie
Hobson. Brad arrived home from work at about 4:30 p.m. that afternoon. Appellant
left the residence at approximately 5:00 p.m. to run some errands, leaving Brad
in charge of the children.
[¶5]
After appellant left, Brad and the children sat on the couch watching
television. Christopher had been propped up in a corner of the couch with a
pillow. The couch was about eighteen inches high.
[¶6]
Sometime around 6:00 p.m. Brad left the living room to place some wood on
the stove, located in another room. He heard a thud and returned to the living
room where he found Christopher lying on the floor in front of the couch.
Christopher was gasping for breath. He soon became limp and unconscious. After
several minutes of unsuccessful attempts to revive Christopher, Brad dialed 911
for help.
[¶7]
Emergency Management Services (911) logged the call in at 6:20 p.m. and
dispatched an ambulance to the trailer. Appellant passed the ambulance
about a mile from her house and "just knew it was going to her home." When the
personnel from the ambulance service arrived at Longfellow's residence, they found
that Christopher had no signs of heartbeat or resuscitation, and that he had
become cyanotic or blue in color.
[¶8]
Appellant returned home to find the emergency personnel attempting to
revive her son. Efforts to revive him at the scene were unsuccessful, and
Christopher was transported to DePaul Hospital, where his heartbeat and
breathing were finally stabilized. The attending physician noticed an obvious
swelling over the right scalp above and behind Christopher's right
ear.
[¶9]
Early on the morning of December 3, 1987, Christopher was transported to
Children's Hospital in Denver. He was treated there for approximately
twenty-four hours, after which it was determined that he had little chance of
recovery. Life support systems were withdrawn at 11:55 a.m. on December 4, 1987,
and Christopher was pronounced dead.
[¶10]
An autopsy was performed on Christopher at Denver General Hospital on
December 5th. The autopsy revealed numerous injuries, both old and recent. The
doctors discovered external scrapes and bruises of various ages, new and
old subdural hematomas, evidence of old torn or missing brain tissue, a total of
eighteen rib fractures in various states of healing, and a three and one-quarter
inch horizontal skull fracture. Christopher also had retinal hemorrhages of
various ages caused by brain damage. The cause of death was determined to be
brain injuries as a result of blunt trauma to the head. This caused brain
swelling, which cut off blood supply to the brain and ultimately resulted in
brain death.
[¶11]
The pathologist who performed the autopsy testified that the blunt trauma
injuries were inconsistent with a fall from a couch, and that the accumulated
injuries were probably caused by "three or four episodes of significant force."
These injuries exhibited what he called "typical classical child abuse
findings."
[¶12]
On the day following Christopher's funeral, December 11, 1987, police
interviewed both appellant and Brad Longfellow concerning Christopher's
death. Both were considered suspects at that point. Initially, Brad Longfellow was
arrested and charged in connection with Christopher's death. After he passed a
polygraph test, the charges against him were dismissed.1 The investigation then
focused on appellant Mindi Hobson. She was arrested and charged with
second-degree murder of Christopher under W.S. 6-2-104 (June, 1983 Repl.), and
child abuse of both Christopher and Valerie in violation of W.S.
6-2-503.
[¶13]
The charge of abuse of Valerie was dropped on preliminary hearing and
appellant proceeded to trial on the other charges. Before trial, defense counsel
filed a motion in limine seeking, inter alia, to exclude testimony as to
appellant's abusive treatment of her daughter Valerie. The trial court reserved
ruling on this aspect of the motion until trial, when it decided that the
testimony should first be presented outside the presence of the jury at which
time the court would make a ruling on its admissibility.
[¶14]
At her jury trial, the state presented, over appellant's objection,
testimony by appellant's brother, her sister-in-law, and Chris Vannest,
appellant's former husband, concerning her alleged abuse of Valerie Hobson. The
state also questioned Brad Longfellow about appellant's
temper.
[¶15]
Appellant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter and felony child abuse.
On December 1, 1989, she was sentenced to five to six years for voluntary
manslaughter and four to five years for felony child
abuse.
DISCUSSION
[¶16]
We discuss appellant's second issue first, because a determination of
whether the challenged evidence was properly admitted under W.R.E. 404(b) is a
necessary prerequisite to a decision on appellant's sufficiency of the evidence
claim. The evidence which tied appellant to the homicide was circumstantial. The
evidence of appellant's character and prior conduct was therefore an essential
part of the state's case and of our substantial evidence
review.
Admissibility of Evidence Under Rule 404(b)2
[¶17]
Appellant challenges the admission of testimony regarding her temper and
her previous abuse of Valerie Hobson. She characterizes this evidence as
irrelevant and as impermissible character evidence under W.R.E. 404(b), which
reads in pertinent part:
(a) Character evidence
generally. -- Evidence of a person's character or a trait of his character
is not admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted in conformity
therewith on a particular occasion, except:
(1) Character of Accused. --
Evidence of a pertinent trait of his character offered by an accused, or by the
prosecution to rebut the same;
* * * *
(b) Other crimes,
wrongs, or acts. -- Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident.
Standard of
Review
[¶18]
W.R.E. 404(b) generally prohibits the introduction of evidence of
extrinsic acts for the purpose of proving the accused's character and conformity
therewith. However, the rule recognizes certain exceptions where the
evidence is introduced for another purpose. These exceptions, enumerated in Rule
404(b), are illustrative rather than exhaustive. In determining admissibility on
another ground beyond those stated, we look to see whether the trial court
abused its discretion in light of our previous decisions. Gezzi v. State, 780 P.2d 972, 974 (Wyo. 1989).
[¶19]
On appeal, we give great deference to a trial court's determination
concerning admissibility of 404(b) evidence. So long as there is a legitimate
basis for a court's decision we cannot say that there was an abuse of
discretion. Pena v. State, 780 P.2d 316, 318 (Wyo. 1989).
[¶20]
This discretion is not without parameters, however. This court previously
adopted a five-part test for admissibility of Rule 404(b)
evidence:
1. The extent to which the prosecution plainly, clearly,
and convincingly can prove the other similar crimes.
2. The
remoteness in time of those crimes from the charged offense.
3. The
extent to which the evidence of other crimes is introduced for a purpose
sanctioned by W.R.E. 404(b).
4. The extent to which the element of
the charged offense, that the evidence is introduced to prove, is actually at
issue.
5. The extent to which the prosecution has a
substantial need for the probative value of the evidence of the other
crimes.
Garcia v. State, 777 P.2d 1091, 1096 (Wyo. 1989) (quoting
Bishop v. State, 687 P.2d 242, 246 (Wyo. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1219, 105 S. Ct. 1203, 84 L. Ed. 2d 345 (1985)).
[¶21]
These factors do not serve as absolute requirements for the trial court's
exercise of its sound discretion. We give considerable deference to the trial
court's discretionary balancing of these Rule 404(b) factors and to its
additional required determination under W.R.E. 403 that the probative value of
the evidence exceeds the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant. Gezzi, 780 P.2d at 978; Garcia, 777 P.2d at 1096. That one of the stated factors is absent
does not necessarily prevent the trial court from exercising its discretion and
allowing in the 404(b) evidence. Pena, 780 P.2d at 318. In most instances,
however, the factors will be present when evidence of the other crimes is
properly admissible. Coleman, 741 P.2d at 105.
[¶22]
The broad latitude we allow for the admission of 404(b) evidence has led
at least one justice to characterize it as "a rule of evidence which has been
emasculated by judicial exceptions." Gezzi, 780 P.2d at 986 (Macy, J.
specially concurring.) In recent years, this court has adopted a liberal
attitude toward admitting evidence of prior crimes, wrongs or acts. Pena, 780 P.2d at 318; Lauthern v. State, 769 P.2d 350, 358 (Wyo.
1989).
Application
[¶23]
The testimony specifically complained of was given by Thomas Rick,
appellant's brother, Tammy Rick, appellant's sister, Chris Vannest, one of
appellant's former husbands, and Brad Longfellow.3
[¶24]
Thomas Rick testified, over appellant's objection:
Q. * * *
What was [appellant's] behavior with Valerie?
A. She was a typical
mother I assume, real easy going.
Q. Did you ever see her
discipline Valerie?
A. No.
Q. Did you ever see her
yell at Valerie?
A. No.
* * * *
Q. Did you ever
see bruises on Valerie?
* * * *
A. Yes. At one time I had
seen some small bruises on her rear end.
* * * *
Q. Were you
concerned about the bruises?
A. Yeah, in a way I was. You know,
there was some pretty bad diaper rash there too, and I was pretty concerned
because I'm a father myself and those kind of things you keep under
control.
Q. Did you do anything about it?
A. I
consulted my wife about it, spoke with her about it.
Q. Did you do
anything else?
A. Yes, I did. * * * I was concerned about the
children, the child, and I called the social workers to
investigate.
Tammy Rick testified as follows, also over
objection:
Q. Okay. Did you ever see bruises on Valerie?
* *
* *
A. Yes, I did.
* * *
Q. Were you concerned
about those bruises?
A. Yes.
Q. Why?
* *
*
A. Because they didn't look like a normal bruise. You know, like
a falling down, whatever. They looked like a battered
bruise.
[¶25]
After a hearing outside the presence of the jury at which appellant's
counsel objected to his testimony, Chris Vannest testified as
follows:
Q. Did you ever see Mindi get angry with
Valerie?
A. Yes.
Q. What did she do?
A.
She threw an infant's small toy at her.
Q. Did she
ever do anything else?
A. Spanked her and shook
her.
Q. How did she spank Valerie?
A. Like you would
spank a five to eight year old, something like that, an older child.
* *
* *
Q. And you observed her shake Valerie?
A.
Yes.
Q. How did she do that?
A. Grab her from the
front by the arms and pick her up off the bed and shook her and through [sic]
her down.
* * * *
Q. Did you ever have to physically
restrain Mindi to stop her from hurting Valerie?
A. Yes.
* *
* *
Q. Did you ever see any bruises on Valerie?
A.
Yes.
Q. What type of bruises did you see on
Valerie?
A. Around the bottom of her ankles and a [sic] imprint,
hand imprint on her back.
[¶26]
Mr. Vannest went on to describe his concern about the alleged abuse
reported it to a social worker. He also stated that Mindi showed remorse after
the incidents with Valerie.
Finally, Brad Longfellow testified as
follows:
Q. Did you ever observe Mindi lose her
temper?
* * * *
A. Since this time I've seen her lose her
temper.
Q. How about prior to this time?
A.
No.
* * * *
Q. Do you recall telling Detective Glick that
Mindi's the one with the bad temper?
A. No.
[¶27]
The state elicited both specific instances of abuse of Valerie and
general testimony regarding appellant's temper. Our required review of prior
precedent leads us to the factually-similar case of Grabill v. State, 621 P.2d 802 (Wyo. 1980).
[¶28]
In Grabill, the victim's mother went grocery shopping and left the victim
at home with her boyfriend. When she returned, she found a bruise on the baby's
right ear. The comatose baby was taken to a hospital where it was discovered
that she had suffered brain damage from a blow to the head. At the boyfriend's
trial for child abuse, the prosecution presented testimony concerning his prior
abuse of other children from his two marriages. We found this "prior bad acts"
evidence admissible under W.R.E. 404(b) because of its relevance to the question
of intent and of which of two persons inflicted the injury -- the defendant or
the victim's mother. Grabill, 621 P.2d at 810.
[¶29]
The same concerns are present in this case: identity and intent. The
prosecution needed to establish whether appellant or Brad Longfellow was
responsible for the crimes against Christopher. This put "identity" at issue.
The prosecution also needed to establish "intent" for purposes of the
"intentionally or recklessly" requirement of the child abuse statute, W.S.
6-2-503(a)(ii) (Cum.Supp. 1987). We hold that the testimony regarding abuse of
Valerie was properly entered into evidence for purposes sanctioned by Rule
404(b).
[¶30]
Appellant argues that since second degree murder is a general intent
crime, there was no need to prove intent in this case by admission of the 404(b)
evidence. However, even a general intent crime requires a showing that the
prohibited conduct was undertaken voluntarily. Crozier v. State, 723 P.2d 42, 52
(Wyo. 1986). The instances of prior abuse were therefore relevant to show
general intent. Also, specific intent is an element of the other crime charged,
child abuse. Intent was therefore at issue in this case and was a valid reason
for admitting the 404(b) evidence.
[¶31]
We examine the admitted testimony in light of the remaining Bishop
factors:
(1) The prosecution put on sufficient
testimony to "plainly, clearly, and convincingly prove" the prior bad acts, at
least to the extent required for their admission under Rule 404(b). A total of
four witnesses, including Officer Glick, testified to appellant's abuse of
Valerie.
(2) The instances were not too remote from the date of the
alleged abuse of Christopher to lack probative value or to be unfairly
prejudicial to appellant. They occurred within two years prior to the
circumstances of this case.
(3) The elements of identity and intent
were very much at issue in this case.
(4) The prosecution had a
substantial need for the probative value of the evidence of the prior bad acts,
because of the circumstantial nature of its case against appellant and because
of the existence of two possible suspects.
[¶32]
We hold the Bishop factors satisfied in this case. Having so held, we
must next determine whether the testimony's prejudicial nature outweighed its
probative value. W.R.E. 403; Gezzi, 780 P.2d at 978. This requires a finding
that the evidence was not only prejudicial to the defendant, but unfairly so.
Elliott v. State, 600 P.2d 1044, 1049 (Wyo. 1979). The function of performing
the comparisons required by Rule 403 is generally held to be discretionary
with the trial court. Id. We do not find that the trial court abused its
discretion in this instance.
[¶33]
The state also offered testimony about appellant's temper. We think this
was admissible as evidence within the "course of conduct" exception of W.R.E.
404(b). This court has described such evidence:
The testimony does
not bear upon separate criminal occurrences or bad acts. Rather, it is helpful
to explain what happened between appellant and his victim, and is integral to
understanding the context of the crime charged. In some jurisdictions it is
defined as the evidence of the context of the offense and consequently
admissible with the reasoning that "events do not occur in a vacuum and the jury
has the right to have the offense placed in its proper
setting."
Scadden v. State, 732 P.2d 1036, 1044 (Wyo. 1987)
(citations omitted).
[¶34]
Testimony about appellant's temper was helpful to explain what happened
between her and Christopher and was integral to the jury's understanding of a
pattern of child abuse. We find that evidence of temper was properly admitted
under the "course of conduct" exceptio to W.R.E. 404(b), and that is probative
value was not outweighed by danger of unfair
prejudice.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
[¶35]
Appellant challenges her conviction of voluntary manslaughter on the
ground that there was insufficient evidence to support it. In another case also
involving voluntary manslaughter, this court set forth the standard applicable
to our review of sufficiency of the evidence:
After conviction, on
appeal, we view all the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, drawing
all possible, reasonable inferences therefrom to determine whether any rational
trier of fact could have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, the elements of the
crime necessary for conviction. If, after viewing the evidence in this light,
there exists sufficient evidence to support a conviction, the jury's verdict of
conviction must be affirmed.
Griffin v. State, 749 P.2d 246, 248
(Wyo. 1988) (citations omitted).
[¶36]
This standard has been applied in previous child abuse cases to uphold
convictions where the evidence leading to conviction was purely circumstantial.
In Grabill, appellant challenged his conviction on sufficiency of evidence
grounds. Rejecting this challenge, we said:
This type of case is by
necessity usually presented by the State on circumstantial evidence. The
jury chose to accept the circumstantial evidence against appellant rather than
his denial. The evidence was such as to form the basis for the jury to draw a
reasonable inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Grabill,
621 P.2d at 806.
[¶37]
Appellant's claim of insufficiency of the evidence is rooted in two
assumptions: that she had no opportunity to commit the crime after 4:30 p.m.,
and that the crime must have taken place after that time.
[¶38]
Brad Longfellow returned home at 4:30 p.m.
When he received Christopher from appellant, he did not notice any injuries.
Appellant was absent from the scene from approximately 5:00 to 6:30 p.m. Brad
did not place his call to 911 until approximately 6:20 p.m., several minutes
after Christopher fell off the couch. Thus, appellant argues, in order for her
to have caused the fatal injuries, she would have had to inflict them before
4:30 p.m., at least one and one half hours before the time Christopher fell off
the couch.
[¶39]
Assuming that appellant's argument is correct to this point, we turn to
the medical evidence. Appellant claims that the medical testimony raises doubts
about whether the incident could have occurred before 4:30 p.m.
and therefore whether appellant could have struck the fatal blow. The
question is whether this uncertainty would prevent a rational jury from finding
appellant guilty of voluntary manslaughter beyond a reasonable doubt.4
[¶40]
At trial, Dr. George Thomas testified concerning the time of
Christopher's injury:
Q. * * * Do you have any idea what the time
would be for the brain to swell to a point where it would be flattened by the
skull?
A. Well, that can be variable. It may be very very rapid or
there may be a period of time for it to develop, and this is something that I
think is very difficult to estimate the particular time in a particular case. I
don't think it really can be done.
* * * *
Q. What would be
some of the symptoms of brain swelling?
A. Well, some of the
symptoms would be things such as irritability of a child; in other words,
seeming to be fussy, possibly crying. Another symptom would be -- could be what
we call lethargy which is a situation when the child's activities slow down, the
child appears to be sleepy. * * *
Dr. Thomas further
testified:
Q. Can you say that the injury occurred and that any
type of symptom would occur within a certain period of time?
A. I
can't give you times. All I could say is that the more severe injury one has
whether it be a child or an adult, the shorter period of time of consciousness
that one is going to have where they had injury. The less severe the longer
period of time one would have and there may be what we call as I said before the
late period where there may not be any symptoms and symptoms begin to develop
and one may go through a number of these symptoms or all the symptoms that we
talked about or none of the symptoms. So because of all these variables we can't
narrow it down. The best way to narrow these down is through circumstantial
evidence which is witnesses and other things which would help to narrow it
down. (emphasis added).
Q. Do you have any way of knowing how
long a time period it was from the time that the blunt trauma was applied
to cause that skull fracture to the time when Christopher may have experienced
cardiac respiratory failure.
A. No, I don't know.
[¶41]
Dr. Melinkovich, who attended Christopher at DePaul Hospital, testified
that when a skull fracture occurs, there is always some evidence which appears
immediately. Swelling appears "quite instantly" and an infant with such a
fracture would be irritable, lethargic, tired or unconscious. Dr.
Melinkovich also indicated that he could not say definitively how long it would
take the fluid to build up in the child's brain to cause cardiac
arrest.
[¶42]
Although neither doctor could say for certain at what time Christopher
received the fatal injury, enough evidence was presented to the jury that it
could have found that the skull fracture occurred before 4:30 p.m. Both doctors
testified that an infant with a skull fracture may remain lethargic and
conscious for a period of time. Dr. Henry, another physician, testified that the
head injury could have occurred "a number of hours" before the paramedics
arrived at the scene.5 Although Brad Longfellow testified that he noticed
the lump on Christopher's head only after Christopher's fall from the
couch, the jury could have discounted this testimony in light of the doctors'
insistence that the blunt trauma Christopher suffered was inconsistent with the
fall from the couch. Drawing all possible, reasonable inferences in favor of the
state from the evidence presented, we hold that a reasonable jury could have
determined that the fatal blow was struck before 4:30
p.m.
CONCLUSION
[¶43]
Evidence of appellant's prior abuse of her daughter Valerie and of her
temperament was properly admitted under W.R.E. 404(b) in order to prove course
of conduct, intent and identity. There was sufficient evidence for the jury's
verdict finding appellant guilty of voluntary manslaughter. We affirm
appellant's conviction on both counts.
FOOTNOTES
1 The trial court properly prohibited appellant's counsel from presenting
evidence at trial concerning the charges initially filed against Brad Longfellow or of his
having passed a polygraph examination.
2 Appellant's challenge is to admissibility under W.R.E. 404(b) and relevance. These claims overlap. We have stated that the requirement of Rule 404(b) that evidence be admitted for some other purpose besides proving character to show conformity therewith is merely a special rule of relevance. Coleman v. State, 741 P.2d 99, 103 (Wyo. 1987). Therefore, we do not find it necessary to consider the question of relevance apart from admissibility of the challenged evidence under Rule 404(b).
3 Curiously, appellant fails to specifically complain of what may have
been the most damaging testimony offered concerning her prior alleged abuse of
Valerie. Appellant was interviewed by the police before being charged, while
both she and Brad Longfellow were still considered
suspects. Danny Glick, a detective with the Laramie County Sheriff's Department,
testified concerning the interview:
Q. Did there come a time during
this interview when Ms. Hobson admitted abusing Valerie?
A.
Yes.
Q. What did she tell you?
A. * * * About an hour
or so into the interview when I expressed to her that I had people that had told
me different about how she treated Valerie, it was like somebody turned on a
switch. She admitted at that point that, yes, she had abused Valerie.
* *
* *
Q. * * * Did Ms. Hobson admit striking Valerie in
anger?
A. Yes.
Q. Did she say how often that
occurred?
A. Frequent enough to even scare her.
Q. Did
she indicate what kind of behavior this discipline or abuse was?
A.
Out of control.
Q. Okay. What did she say she did to
Valerie?
A. * * * There were bruises and marks left all over
Valerie's body to include her face.
Q. Did she say that she hit her
on her arms?
A. Arms, legs, back and face I believe it
was.
Q. Did she ever say that she shook Valerie?
A.
Yes.
Q. What else?
A. And threw her onto a
bed.
Q. And Ms. Hobson told you that Mr. Vannest had to restrain
her?
A. Yes.
Detective Glick also testified as to
appellant's temper. Appellant has implicitly challenged all admission of
testimony regarding her prior abuse of Valerie and her temper. Our analysis of
404(b) evidence, infra, would allow for the admission of the foregoing
statements at trial.
4 W.S. 6-2-105 (Cum.Supp. 1987) defines voluntary manslaughter as
follows:
(a) A person is guilty of manslaughter if he unlawfully
kills any human being without malice, expressed or implied, either:
(i)
voluntarily, upon a sudden heat of passion.
5 There was also evidence admitted at the preliminary hearing that
Christopher could have received his injury at least three hours before his fall
from the couch. However, this evidence was not presented at trial, and thus
cannot be a part of our sufficiency of evidence review.
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