Butson v. Department of Employment & Training

Butson v. Dept. of Employment & Training (2004-456); 179 Vt. 599; 892 A.2d 255

2006 VT 10

[Filed 12-Jan-2006]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                                 2006 VT 10

                      SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2004-456

                            SEPTEMBER TERM, 2005


  In re Appeal of Kenneth Butson	}	APPEALED FROM:
                                        }
                                        }	Employment Security Board
                                        }	
  	                                }
                                        }	DOCKET NO. 05-04-167-13


             In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       ¶  1.  Claimant Kenneth Butson appeals a decision by the Employment
  Security Board, holding that he must repay to the Department of Employment
  and Training (DET) unemployment compensation benefits received for the time
  period that overlaps with the period for which he later received workers'
  compensation benefits and that he is not entitled to reduce his repayment
  to DET by a share of the attorneys' fees incurred to obtain the workers'
  compensation benefits.  The Board found that nothing in the relevant
  statutes allowed Mr. Butson to reduce the repayment obligation created by
  21 V.S.A. § 1347(b).  We affirm.

       ¶  2.  Claimant received unemployment compensation benefits for the
  weeks ending April 20, 2002 through January 4, 2003, totaling $8,440.00. 
  He later filed a workers' compensation claim for a job-related injury he
  received in February of 2002.  He eventually received workers' compensation
  benefits covering the period from April 20, 2002 through January 4, 2003
  and greater in amount than the unemployment compensation benefits
  previously received.  Under 21 V.S.A. § 1347(b), he was required to repay
  DET for the unemployment compensation payments he received for the time
  period for which he also received workers' compensation benefits.  He
  argued that he should, however, be able to reduce the repayment by a
  proportionate share of the attorneys' fees he incurred in collecting the
  workers' compensation benefits.  He argued that the reduced repayment was
  authorized by equitable considerations and the common fund doctrine.  Both
  DET and the Board rejected this argument.  He then appealed to this Court. 
   
       ¶  3.  The question before us is first one of statutory
  construction.  See Daniels v. Vermont Ctr. for Crime Victims Servs, 173 Vt.
  521, 523 790 A.2d 376, 379 (2001) (mem.) (looking primarily to plain
  language of statute to determine whether or not common fund doctrine
  applies).  If the governing statute requires the reimbursement of all
  payments, deductions cannot be made under the common fund doctrine, even to
  reflect equitable considerations.  Here, the statute requires:

    Any person who receives remuneration . . . which is allocable in
    whole or in part to prior weeks during which he or she received
    any amounts as benefits under this chapter shall be liable for all
    such amounts of benefits or those portions of such amounts equal
    to the portions of such remuneration properly allocable to the
    weeks in question.
      
  21 V.S.A. § 1347(b) (emphasis added).  It is undisputed that claimant
  received "remuneration" covered by the statute and he is liable to repay to
  DET at least part of the unemployment compensation benefits he received. 
  DET and the Board interpreted the statute as requiring reimbursement for
  the full amount, without deduction of any costs of collection.  Generally,
  this Court will defer to an agency's interpretation of a statute it has
  been charged to execute.  Lemieux v. Tri-State Lotto Comm'n, 164 Vt. 110,
  112-13, 666 A.2d 1170, 1172 (1995). In this case, the agency's
  interpretation is consistent with the plain language of the statute.  See 
  In re Bennington Sch., Inc., 2004 VT 6 ¶ 13, 176 Vt. 584, 845 A.2d 332
  (mem.) (explaining that when construing a statute, we look first to the
  plain language and assume the Legislature's intent was expressed in the
  language).  The statute, by its express terms, requires claimant to repay
  all of the benefits he received for the time period duplicated by his
  workers' compensation benefits, without any indication that he may reduce
  this amount for any purpose. 

       ¶  4.  The legislative history of 21 V.S.A. § 1347(b) shows that
  this plain reading of the statute  mirrors the Legislature's intent to
  prohibit beneficiaries from reducing their repayment amount to account for
  attorneys' fees.  See In re Killington, Ltd., 159 Vt. 206, 216, 616 A.2d 241, 247 (1992) (noting that "legislative history is helpful in construing
  a statute where it clearly shows the intent of the legislature").  In 1981,
  the Legislature added a second sentence to 21 V.S.A. § 1347(b) as follows: 
  "In the discretion of the commissioner, the amount of money to be repaid
  can be reduced to compensate for any attorneys['] fees paid to obtain such
  remuneration."  1981, No. 86, § 14.  This language would have authorized
  exactly the result claimant seeks here.  In 1987, however, the Legislature
  deleted the language it added in 1981, striking the authorization for the
  commissioner to reduce the repayment amount to account for attorneys' fees. 
  See 1987, No. 100, § 3.  The amendment makes clear that the absence of
  authority to subtract collection costs in the statutory language is
  intentional.  See Diamond v. Vickrey, 134 Vt. 585, 589, 367 A.2d 668, 671
  (1976) ("It is well settled that, in interpreting amendatory language in a
  statute, we are guided by the rule that the Legislature intended to change
  the law.").
   
       ¶  5.  We have decided two cases that raise issues similar to that
  in this case, Daniels v. Vermont Center for Crime Victims Services, 173 Vt.
  at  523, 790 A.2d  at 379, and Guiel v. Allstate Insurance Co., 170 Vt. 464,
  467-69, 756 A.2d 777, 780-81 (2000).  Claimant argues that, notwithstanding
  the plain language of the statute, our prior decision in Guiel compels us
  to apply an equitable exception to this case.  Guiel was an insurance
  subrogation action in which the insurer sought reimbursement from a damages
  settlement obtained by the insured for amounts the insurer had paid the
  insured, without deduction of any of the attorneys' fees the insured paid
  to obtain the settlement.  In Guiel, we required the insurer to bear the
  proportional cost of the attorneys' fees that resulted in the successful
  damages settlement under the common fund doctrine, "which permits a
  prevailing party-whose lawsuit has created a fund that is intended to
  benefit not only that party but others as well-to recover, either from the
  fund itself or directly from those others enjoying the benefits, a
  proportional share of the attorney's fees and costs incurred in the
  lawsuit."  Guiel, 170 Vt. at 468, 756 A.2d  at 780.  The common fund
  doctrine is an equitable exception to the rule that each party bears his or
  her own attorneys' fees as a matter of fairness.  Id.  Claimant argues here
  that, without the application of the common fund doctrine, he and other
  potential claimants would have a greatly reduced incentive to pursue
  workers' compensation benefits because a disproportionate share of the
  proceeds would go to DET.  By applying the common fund doctrine, he argues,
  DET will actually receive greater overall reimbursement of benefits because
  more potential claimants will seek and successfully recover compensation
  through other agencies if proportional attorneys' fees will be covered. 

       ¶  6.  In Guiel, we found that application of the common fund
  doctrine was consistent with the applicable statute.  See id. at 469-70,
  756 A.2d  at 781 (finding nothing in the statutory language at issue
  prohibited an insurer from having to pay the proportionate share of
  attorneys' fees incurred by insured).  We noted that the statutory language
  providing a right of subrogation "to the amount of such payment" of
  insured's loss or expense under the applicable policy was merely "a limit
  on the extent of the right of subrogation and is not intended to preclude
  application of the common fund doctrine."  Id. (internal quotations
  omitted).  Moreover, in Guiel we upheld the finding that the insurer sought
  to benefit from the services of insured's counsel without paying for them,
  a situation inapplicable to the circumstances here.  We subsequently made
  clear, however, in Daniels that if the statute at issue required full
  reimbursement, we would not apply the common fund doctrine.  173 Vt. at
  522-23, 790 A.2d  at 378-79 (construing statute granting right of
  subrogation "to the extent of the cash payments granted" to require full
  reimbursement to government agency).  Further, we noted in Daniels the
  distinction between the intent behind a regulatory statute that specifies
  the content of an insurance policy and a statute that governs the
  reimbursement right of a governmental agency.  Id. at 524, 790 A.2d  at 380. 
        
       ¶  7.  As we stated above, the situation we have here is one of a
  clear statutory mandate requiring full reimbursement to a governmental
  agency.  Accordingly, deductions cannot be made under the common fund
  doctrine, even for equitable considerations.  Claimant's policy arguments
  are for the Legislature and not this Court, and we must implement the
  statute as it is written.

       Affirmed.                


                                       BY THE COURT:


                                       _______________________________________
                                       Paul L. Reiber, Chief Justice

                                       _______________________________________
                                       John A. Dooley, Associate Justice
     
                                       _______________________________________
                                       Denise R. Johnson, Associate Justice

                                       _______________________________________
                                       Marilyn S. Skoglund, Associate Justice

                                       _______________________________________
                                       Brian L. Burgess, District Judge,
                                       Specially Assigned