In re Sinnott

Annotate this Case

In re Sinnott (2005-337); 178 Vt. 646; 891 A.2d 896

[2005 VT 109]

[Filed 25-Aug-2005]

ENTRY ORDER

SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2005-337

AUGUST TERM, 2005

In re Howard Sinnott, Esq. } Original Jurisdiction
}
}
} Professional Responsibility Board
}
}
} PRB File No. 2002-240

In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

The Professional Responsibility Board had submitted a recommendation
that attorney Howard Sinnott be disbarred. The recommendation is based
upon the affidavit of resignation submitted by attorney Sinnott and an
additional statement of facts and memorandum of law submitted by
disciplinary counsel. The undisputed facts reveal that attorney Sinnott
was indicted by a federal grand jury for offenses relating to the
misappropriation of over $500,000 in client funds, and that, in February
2005, pursuant to a plea agreement, attorney Sinnott pled guilty to two
felony counts of interstate transmission of stolen property, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 2341. Based on these facts, the Court finds clear and
convincing evidence that attorney Sinnott violated Rules 8.4(c) (conduct
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation), 8.4(d) (conduct
prejudicial to the administration of justice), and 8.4(h) (conduct that
adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law) of the Vermont
Rules of Professional Conduct. Accordingly, attorney Sinnott's resignation
and the recommendation of the Board that attorney Sinnott be disbarred are
accepted. We hereby order that Howard Sinnott is disbarred from the office
of attorney and counselor at law.

Attorney Sinnott shall comply with the requirements of A.O. 9, Rule
23.

FOR THE COURT:

_______________________________________
Paul L. Reiber, Chief Justice

_______________________________________
John A. Dooley, Associate Justice

_______________________________________
Denise R. Johnson, Associate Justice

_______________________________________
Marilyn S. Skoglund, Associate Justice

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79 PRB

[Filed 12-Aug-2005]

STATE OF VERMONT
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY BOARD

In re: Howard Sinnott, Esq.
PRB Docket No. 2002-240

Decision No. 79

Upon receipt of the Affidavit of Resignation submitted to the Board
and pursuant to Administrative Order No. 9, Rule 19, we recommend to the
Court that the above referenced Respondent be disbarred. Attached hereto
are the Affidavit of Resignation, Disciplinary Counsel's Statement of
Additional Facts - Paragraphs 1-4 and 6-10, Disciplinary Counsel's
Memorandum of Law, and Exhibits B-D.(FN1)

Dated at Montpelier, Vermont this 12th day of August, 2005.

_________________________
Joan Loring Wing, Esq. - Chair

attachments

cc: Howard Sinnott
Michael Kennedy, Disciplinary Counsel

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Footnotes

FN1. Respondent requested, and Disciplinary Counsel did not object, that
Paragraph 5 of the Statement of Additional Facts and Exhibit A be
stricken from the record.

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STATE OF VERMONT
PROFESSIONIAL RESPONSIBILITY BOARD

In Re: Howard Sinnott, Esq., Respondent
PRB File No. 2002.240

Memorandum of Law

NOW COMES Disciplinary Counsel Michael Kennedy and submits this
Memorandum of Law in support of his position that the Statement of
Additional Facts, which is incorporated by reference herein, supports a
finding that Attorney Sinnott violated the Vermont Rules of Professional
Conduct.

I Rule 8.4(b) of the Vermont Rules of Professional Conduct

Rule 8.4(b) prohibits attorneys from engaging in conduct involving a
serious crime. The Rule defines a "serious crime" as "illegal conduct
involving any felony", as well as certain types of lesser crimes.

In September of 2004, a federal grand jury returned a Second
Superseding Indictment against Attorney Sinnott (Exhibit C). In February of
2005, Attorney Sinnott pled guilty to Counts 11 and 13 of the Second
Superseding Indictment (Exhibit D). More specifically, Attorney Sinnott
pled guilty to two counts of violating 18 U.S.C. § 2341. The statute
prohibits the interstate transmission of stolen property. The crime is
punishable by up to ten years in prison. As such, it is a felony. See 18
U.S.C. § 3559(a). In that the crime to which he pled guilty is a felony, it
is also a "serious crime". Therefore, the facts support a finding that
Attorney Sinnott violated Rule 8.4(b) by engaging in conduct involving a
serious crime.

II The Offense of Misappropriation & Additional Violations

At its heart, this case involves the misappropriation, if not outright
theft, of client funds. That is, in pleading guilty to Counts 11 and 13 of
the Second Superseding Indictment, Attorney Sinnott admitted to having
transmitted in interstate commerce over $500,000 that he knew had been
stolen, converted, or taken by fraud from clients. Several jurisdictions
have defined "misappropriation". For instance, the Nebraska Supreme Court
recently stated that

"[i]n the context of attorney discipline proceedings,
'misappropriation' is any unauthorized use of client funds
entrusted to an attorney, including not only stealing, but
also unauthorized temporary use for the attorney's own
purpose, whether or not the attorney derives any personal
gain or benefit therefrom."

State ex rel. Counsel for Dis. v. Wintroub, 678 N.W.2d 103, 1 12 (Neb.
2004) (citing State ex rel. NSBA v. Malcolm, 561 N.W.2d 237 (Neb. 1997)).
Misappropriation is so serious that, in Nebraska, the presumptive response
thereto is disbarment. Wintroub, 678 N.W. 2d, at 112. Indeed, long before
it decided the Wintroub matter, the Nebraska Court touched on the serious
nature of the offense, stating that "[m]isappropriation of a client's funds
is more than a grievous breach of professional ethics. It violates the
basic notions of honesty and endangers public confidence in the legal
profession." State ex rel. NSBA v. Gridley, 545 N.W.2d 737 (Neb. 1996)
(citations omitted). The Gridley Court noted that the "fact that no client
suffered any financial loss is no excuse for a lawyer to misappropriate
clients' funds nor any reason why a lawyer should not receive a severe
sanction." Id., at 740 (citing ex rel. NSBA v. Veith, 470 N.W.2d 549 Neb.
1991)).

Nebraska's view of the offense of misappropriation is consistent with
views taken by other jurisdictions. For instance, in the District of
Columbia, misappropriation "is defined as 'unauthorized use by an attorney
of a client's funds entrusted to him or her, whether or not temporary or
for personal gain or benefit.' " In re Davenport, 794 A.2d 602, 603 (D.C.
2002) (quoting In re Choroszej, 624 A.2d 434, 436 (D.C. 1992)). The offense
is considered so serious in the District that "in virtually all cases of
misappropriation, disbarment will be the only appropriate sanction unless
it appears that the misconduct resulted from nothing more than simple
negligence." In re Addams, 579 A.2d 190, 19 1 (D.C. 1990); See
Thomas-Pinkney, 840 A.2d 700 (D.C. 2004) (Reckless misappropriation of
client funds warrants disbarment despite significant mitigating factors
that include the absence of a dishonest motive). As the District's Board
Professional Responsibility has stated, " '[t]he virtual certainty of
disbarment or a six-month suspension for acts of misappropriation serves
the public and the profession by providing a powerful deterrent for any
attorney who might contemplate engaging in this most serious misconduct."'
Davenport, at 603.

Similar reasoning prevails across the Anacostia River. In Maryland,

"it is well settled that the sanction for misappropriation of
client funds or funds entrusted to a lawyer is, in the
absence of compelling extenuating circumstances justifying a
lesser sanction, disbarment, because misappropriation 'is an
act infected with deceit and dishonesty.' "

Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Sperling, 844 A.2d 397,404 (Md. 2003) (quoting
Attorney Grievance, Comm'n v. Spery, 8 10 A.2d 487,49 1-92 (Md. 2002)).

The New Jersey Supreme Court has also had occasion to consider
attorneys' misappropriation of client funds. In New Jersey,
misappropriation is "any unauthorized use by the lawyer of clients' funds
entrusted to him, including not only stealing, but also temporary use for
the lawyer's own purpose, whether or not he derives any potential gain or
benefit therefrom." In the Matter of Wilson, 409 A.2d 1 15 3, 1 155 n. 1
(NJ 1979); See In the Matter of Barlow, 657 A.2d 1197, 1200 (NJ 1997).
Since it rendered the Wilson decision, the New Jersey Court "has not
retreated from the strict rule that knowing misappropriation of client
funds almost invariably warrants disbarment of an attorney." Barlow, 657 A.2d at 1200 (citations omitted). The Barlow Court went on to state that:

"Intent to deprive permanently a client of misappropriated
finds, however, is not an element of knowing
misappropriation. Nor is the intent to repay funds or
otherwise make restitution a defense to the charge of knowing
misappropriation. A lawyer who uses funds, knowing that the
funds belong to a client and that the client has not given
permission to invade them, is guilty of knowing
misrepresentation. The sanction is disbarment." Id., at 1201.

That disbarment should be routine in cases of knowing misappropriation
stems from the basic fact that "[w]hatever the need may be for the lawyer's
handling of clients' money, the client permits it because he trusts the
lawyer." Wilson, 409 A.2d at 1154. Furthermore, lawyers' "[a]buse of this
trust has always been recognized as particularly reprehensible:

'[T]here are few more egregious acts of professional
misconduct of which an attorney can be guilty than
misappropriation of a clients's funds held in trust.

Id., at 1155 (citing In re Beckman 400 A.2d 792, 793 (N.J. 1979)). Indeed,
citing Wilson, Vermont's Professional Conduct Board noted that the

"[t]heft of client funds is one of the most serious ethical
violations which an attorney can commit. It is an offense
which demands imposition of the most serious sanction." In re
Mitiguy, PCB No. 59 (September 30, 1993).

In sum, a lawyer commits an egregious breach of the ethics rules when
he or she uses client funds for anything other than a purpose authorized by
the client. The offense is so severe that only the most serious of
responses is warranted.

A. The facts support a finding that Attorney Sinnott's misappropriation
of client funds violated the Vermont Rules of Professional Conduct.

In essence, by pleading guilty to Counts 11 and 13 of the Second
Superseding Indictment, Attorney Sinnott admitted to misappropriating more
than $500,000 that he knew had been stolen, converted, or taken by fraud
from clients of LCCP. As such, he violated Rules 8.4(c), 8.4(d), and 8.4(h)
of the Vermont Rules of Professional Conduct.

1. Rule 8.4(c)

Rule 8.4(c) of the Vermont Rules of Professional Conduct prohibits
lawyers from engaging in conduct involving misrepresentation, dishonesty,
deceit, or fraud. Attorney Sinnott's conduct is fraught with dishonesty
and deceit. Each time that Attorney Sinnott transferred funds that he knew
had been stolen from clients, he engaged in conduct "infected with deceit
and dishonesty". Spery, 810 A.2d, at 491-92. In sum, the evidence supports
a finding that Attorney Sinnott violated Rule 8.4(c).

2. Rule 8.4(d)

Rule 8.4(d) of the Vermont Rules of Professional Conduct prohibits
attorneys from engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the
administration of justice. This prohibition is typically applied to
misconduct that interferes with a judicial proceeding or compromises the
integrity of the legal profession. In re Andres, PRB Dec. No. 41, at 5
(Sept. 18, 2002) (citing Section 31.301 ABA/BNA Lawyers' Manual on
Professional Conduct, 2002 ABA BNA).

The Gridley case is instructive here. In concluding that Attorney
Gridley violated, among other rules, the rule that prohibited attorneys
from engaging in conduct that was prejudicial to the administration of
justice, the Nebraska Court stated:

"Misappropriation of a client's funds is more than a grievous
breach of professional ethics. It violates the basic notions
of honesty and endangers public confidence in the legal
profession. Misappropriation of client funds, as one of the
most serious violations of duty an attorney owes to his
client, the public, and the courts typically warrants
disbarment." Gridley, 545 N.W. 2d, at 739.

Attorney Sinnott's misconduct impugned the integrity of the legal
profession. As did Attorney Gridley's, it represents such a betrayal of the
public's trust as to bring the bar into disrepute. Moreover, Attorney
Sinnott's misconduct detracts from the public's confidence in the
profession and constitutes a breach of the most basic duty he owed to his
clients, the public, and the bar. The facts support a finding that Attorney
Sinnott violated Rule 8.4(d).

3. Rule 8.4(h)

Rule 8.4(h) of the Vermont Rules of Professional Conduct prohibits
lawyers from engaging in conduct that adversely reflects on their fitness
to practice law. Attorney Sinnott's misappropriation of client funds
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law.

III Conclusion

Wherefore, Disciplinary Counsel respectfully recommends that the Board
conclude the facts support a finding that Attorney Sinnott violated the
Vermont Rules of Conduct. In addition, Disciplinary Counsel respectfully
recommends that the Board accept Attorney Sinnott's Affidavit of
Resignation.

DATED at Burlington, Vermont, on July 21, 2005

________________________________________
Michael Kennedy,
Disciplinary Counsel
32 Cherry Street, Suite 213
Burlington, Vermont 05403
(802) 859-3000

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[EXHIBIT A]

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EXHIBIT B

LANGROCK SPERRY & WOOL, LLP
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
A Limited Liability Partnership
Including a Professional Corporation

July 16, 2001

DELIVERED BY HAND

Michael E. Kennedy, Esq.
Disciplinary Counsel
Office of Disciplinary Counsel
32 Cherry Street, Suite 213
Burlington, VT 05401

Re:

PRB File No. 2001.173, 175

PRB File No. 2001.172, 174

Dear Mr. Kennedy:

This firm, acting as local counsel, and Edwards & Angell, LLP,
attorneys for the Law Centers for Consumer Protection and its predecessors
and affiliates (altogether, the "Law Centers"), submit the following answer
to the above referenced complaints against Thomas Daly and Howard Sinnott
(together, "Respondents").(FN1)

Your May 1, 2001 letters to Respondents, which enclosed packets of
information comprising the complaints, ask them to account for the
financial transactions and document the communications between the Law
Centers and the complainants, and explain what work the Law Centers
performed on their behalf.

As we demonstrate below, the complaints are without merit because the
Law Centers' financial transactions with the __________and __________,
including the refund of their monies, were handled appropriately; because
the Law Centers reasonably communicated with complainants; and because in
the __________ case, the Law Centers were in no position to settle their
overwhelming debts, and in __________ case, attempted to settle some of her
debts.

Background

The Law Centers operates a for-profit debt reduction program that
offers its more than 11,000 clients an alternative to bankruptcy. Over the
years, the Law Centers has helped thousands of debt-strapped persons and
families get a fresh start by avoiding the life-altering and ruinous
consequences of bankruptcy. At the same time, it has challenged the
business practices of large banking corporations who prey on vulnerable
individuals by offering easy credit they cannot afford.(FN2)

The Law Centers' debt reduction program is straightforward: a client
identifies unsecured debts the client wishes or needs to settle, and the
Law Centers attempts to negotiate a discounted lumpsum settlement of those
debts on an account-by-account basis. The Law Centers' fee is then
calculated at 28% of the total amount saved on the client's behalf. Thus,
if the client's debt is $10,000, and the Law Centers is able to settle
this debt for $4,000 (which would be typical), then it earns 28% of the
$6,000 saved, or $1,680. If, however, the Law Centers is unable to settle a
client's debts, or if the client discharges the Law Centers before any
debts are settled, then it earns nothing as a legal fee, and can only
collect certain minor fees, pursuant to its retainer agreement with the
client, to reimburse its costs for maintaining the client's funds.

In order to pay settlements of their debts and the Law Centers' fees,
all of the Law Centers' clients agree, pursuant to a specific provision in
every retainer agreement, to deposit funds in both an "office fees"
account, and a "creditor reserve" interest-bearing escrow fund. For obvious
reasons, the Law Centers' retainer is funded fully first (although, in the
usual instance, the client's deposits are split between the two accounts
after a few months). This way the Law Centers is assured of collecting
its fees at the time a settlement is achieved.

Many clients (like the __________ and __________) have extraordinary
debt problems that cannot be easily resolved. Indeed, it takes most clients
years to raise sufficient funds to settle the clients' debts in total and
pay the Law Centers' fees. The program is, therefore, inherently risky
because some creditors refuse to negotiate or wait for payment, but prefer
instead to sue for a judgment, a possibility the Law Centers obviously
cannot foreclose. Consequently, the Law Centers explicitly advises each
client - advice which is reaffirmed in the client's retainer agreement -
that it cannot "guarantee . . . that debt reductions will be obtained;"
that "the negotiation process for each debt can take several months or
longer, and no guarantee can be provided as to when the negotiation process
will be concluded;" that the Law Centers "will not finalize a negotiated
settlement until . . . sufficient funds [exist] to pay off the settlement
in full;" that any failure to make "regular payment to . . . creditors
[could result in] added interest, late fees, delinquencies, collection
efforts, and legal action;" and that a creditor's legal action "could
result in a judgment." (See Exhibit A ['__________' and __________'s
retainer agreements])

The instant complaints allege, in essence, that Messrs. Daly and
Sinnott should be called to task for failing to communicate with, work for,
or properly refund monies to the complainants during a period of time
starting in the fall of 1999 and ending in the early part of this year.
This time period was marked by enormous upheaval in the Law Centers'
operations resulting from the disciplinary proceeding and disbarment in
September 2000 of the Law Centers' founder and original sole principal and
shareholder, Andrew Capoccia.(FN3) And as one might expect given the
extraordinary media attention paid throughout upstate New York to the
Capoccia case - there were practically daily articles in the Albany
Times-Union - many of the Law Centers' clients (as well as staff)
disassociated themselves from the Law Center all at once, leaving a
skeletal staff inundated and overwhelmed by requests for refunds. Under
these circumstances, it should come as no surprise that some refunds to
clients were delayed, inadvertently miscalculated (in many cases, in favor
of the client), or left less than fully explained. Adding to this upheaval
was the Law Centers' need, driven by the economic downturn caused when its
clients departed in droves, to close numerous offices in New York and
consolidate its operations in one place, which came to be Bennington where
Mr. Sinnott lives.

As a result, although the relevant evidence cannot be fairly read to
support a conclusion that the current Law Centers' principals engaged in
professional misconduct, we are not looking to spin the events in these
matters to imply that the __________ and __________ (or their attorney) are
wholly without justification for their displeasure. That said, however, the
question before the Office of Disciplinary Counsel is whether the credible
evidence clearly and convincingly establishes, under the circumstances
presented, that Mr. Daly and/or Mr. Sinnott personally did anything
unreasonable or wrong under the Vermont Rules of Professional Conduct to
justify professional discipline.

We believe the answer to that question must be "no." As a practical
matter, it should be understood that Messrs. Daly and Sinnott did not
exercise actual supervisory control over the Law Centers' debt reduction
accounting practices until after Capoccia was disbarred in September 2000.
Prior to that time, they were associates in the Law Centers, and then,
starting in the spring of 2000, were made non-equity and non-shareholding
members in anticipation of Capoccia's disbarment.(FN4) Thus, it would be
incompatible with the Rules and unfair to seek to impose disciplinary
penalties against either Mr. Daly or Mr. Sinnott under a strict liability
theory in view of the fact that neither of them actually handled the
__________' or __________'s file. (Exhibit B.) See also VRPC § 5.1, 5.3 (a
partner or supervisory attorney shall make "reasonable" efforts to ensure
that employees and subordinate attorneys adhere to the Rules of
Professional Conduct; a partner or supervisory attorney shall be
responsible for unethical conduct by employees or subordinate attorneys in
the event he knows of or orders the unethical conduct).

In any event, as noted above and explained below, even if our concerns
about the fairness of any effort to blame Messrs. Daly and/or Sinnott for
events outside their control are cast aside, the fact remains that the
__________' and __________' complaints lack merit in their own right.

The __________' Complaint

_________ retained the Law Centers on March 21, 2000 (FN5) and
requested that the Law Centers attempt to settle $26,466 in total debt (See
Exhibit A.) The _________' monthly minimum payments on their six credit
card debts were $652 out of a net monthly salary of $2759. This meant the
__________ had to pay $7,824 per year just in monthly minimum payments; a
number which would swell to $23,472 over three years without any
appreciable reduction in the principal owed if they were unable to increase
their monthly payments or otherwise negotiate a settlement with their
creditors. (Exhibit C.) Given that the __________ still had a $68,000
mortgage to pay and another $10,000 loan against their retirement account,
it seems fair to conclude that debt settlement or bankruptcy were their
only real options. (Exhibit D.)

As evidenced by the funding schedule in their retainer agreement, the
__________ agreed to pay $212 per month by electronic debit, and understood
that funds would not begin to accumulate in their "creditor reserve" escrow
fund for settlement purposes until after the fourth month of debits, at
which time their escrow fund would increase by $62 per month. Thus,
assuming arguendo a 60% reduction could be achieved, they were plainly
aware that even their smallest debt could not be settled until $837.60 had
accumulated in their creditor reserve fund, an event which could not occur
for many months.

At the risk of stating the obvious, since the Law Centers do not make
minimum monthly payments to creditors or negotiate settlements before they
can be concluded, there is really very little the Law Centers can do as a
practical matter until sufficient funds to achieve a settlement have
accrued in a client's escrow. Here relevant excerpts from the work log kept
by the Law Centers regarding the __________' case shows that in the course
of numerous telephone calls, the __________ supplied documents to the Law
Centers as needed and asked for the date of their monthly debits to be
pushed back a few days. (Exhibit E.) They then apparently decided to
withdraw just six months into the program. The __________ formalized their
withdrawal in a letter to the Law Centers in December 2000.

They received a refund of the monies held on their behalf by the Law
Centers in April 2001. Our review of the __________' account records
revealed that they are also entitled to a small amount of additional funds
totaling $66. Those additional funds have been tendered to the along with a
letter from the Law Centers' attorneys accounting for all financial
transactions between them and the Law Centers. (Exhibit F.)(FN6)

***

Addressing the particular allegations in the complaint, the evidence
shows unequivocally that the Law Centers engaged in appropriate
communications with the __________. The communications may not have been
extensive; but there was no call for extensive communications because there
was nothing the Law Centers could practically do to effectuate settlements
until the deposited sufficient funds to permit meaningful settlement
discussions to occur.

Also, while the __________ were, of course, entitled to a reasonably
prompt refund and accounting, given that they were just one of many clients
who rushed to discharge the Law Centers in the wake of Capoccia's
disbarment, it would not be fair to impose a professional punishment on the
current principals as a consequence of the Law Centers' short-term
inability to process requests for withdrawal immediately. The bottom line
is the __________ received a refund within an acceptable period of time
after their formal request to withdraw was made; and the accounting
provided to their attorney - which comports substantially to the number the
__________' attorney could easily determine from the payment schedule in
the retainer agreement - merely confirms that the Law Centers handled this
matter reasonably, albeit not perfectly.

Accordingly, we respectfully submit that this inquiry should be closed
without further action.

__________'s Complaint

__________ retained the Law Centers on September 14, 1999. Her debts
were $9,255 and the schedule in her retainer agreement called for $156
monthly debits to fund the Law Centers anticipated fees and, starting four
months later, her creditor reserve fund. (See Exhibit A.) In December 1999,
Ms. __________ and the Law Centers agreed to speed up the funding process
by increasing her monthly debits to $216. (Exhibit G.) In June, 2000, Ms.
__________ made a lumpsum payment to her creditor reserve fund of $6,240.

Before Ms. __________ withdrew six months later in December 2000, the
Law Centers' work log reflects that the Law Centers and Ms. __________ were
communicating regularly and that the Law Centers in fact attempted to
settle some of her debts, but unfortunately was not successful. (Exhibit
H.) In this respect, we take note of the concern set forth in your May 1
letters to Messrs. Daly and Sinnott that Ms. __________ "continued to be
billed on a monthly basis after her accounts were supposed to have been
settled." For one thing, as the work log reveals, there were only two
debits after Ms. __________'s $6,240 check was deposited - debits which
were plainly inadvertent and were, as even Mr. Crystal acknowledges,
rectified. Secondly, the assumption that Ms. __________'s accounts were
"supposed to have been settled" presupposes that there were offers on the
table from all her creditors to fully settle her debts after her lump-sum
check was deposited. The evidence, however, shows that this was not true,
and that to the contrary, none of the creditors had made satisfactory
settlement offers while the Law Centers' offers to settle were rejected.

As for the issues of Ms. __________'s refund and accounting, her
situation is for all intents and purposes identical to the __________. She
withdrew in December 2000 and her refund was remitted three months later in
March 2001.(FN7) As with __________, the Law Centers has accounted to her
attorney and supplemented her refund per the terms set forth in the letter
annexed hereto as Exhibit F. Thus, this matter should be closed as well.

***

We wish to acknowledge once again that the __________ ' and __________
matters were not handled as well as, in a perfect world, they could have
been. Certainly, the accountings and refunds should, and in a normal
situation would have been provided sooner than they were. That said, the
evidence here fails to show that either client suffered material harm as a
consequence of anything the Law Centers did or did not do. Put differently,
these cases illustrate something the Law Centers constantly stresses to its
clients and explicitly states in its retainer agreements; namely, that its
debt reduction program will not work in every instance. Sometimes the
client's debts are just too large (like the __________), sometimes the
client's creditors will not respond to or make reasonable settlement offers
(as with __________), and sometimes there is another reason or a hybrid of
many reasons why the Law Centers cannot relieve a given client's debt
burden.

In closing, we urge you to view Messrs. Daly and Sinnott in
appropriate context and attempt to impose professional liability when they
are diligently trying to make the Law Centers as responsive and efficient
as practically possible. Indeed, it is fair to point out that
notwithstanding Messrs. Daly and Sinnott's best efforts now and in the
future, the general nature of the debt-reduction business means that not
every client overwhelmed with debt is going to be satisfied with the Law
Centers at the end of the day.

If you conclude, upon reviewing the Law Centers' operations in
context, that Messrs. Daly and Sinnott have not satisfactorily remediated
any of the problems which began during the turbulent fall of 2000, then
your scrutiny will of course be warranted. However, we submit that any
effort to impose discipline for minor, inconsequential delays and
shortcomings which occurred in the aftermath of the Capoccia disbarment -
which is the case with both the __________ and __________ matters - would
elevate the form of compliance with the Rules of Professional Conduct over
the substance of such compliance, and would accordingly constitute an
injustice.

Please feel free to contact Rick Supple at Edwards & Angell or me if
you have any questions or concerns about these complaints, or wish to
discuss anything else pertaining to the Law Centers. We also invite you to
visit the Law Centers' office in Bennington to get a first-hand look at
what the Law Centers is currently doing to improve its services for its
clients.

Very truly yours,

/s/
__________________________
Lisa B. Shelkrot, Esq.
Richard Supple, of counsel

Enclosures
210287.1

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Footnotes

FN1. Your letters to Mr. Sinnott indicate that he was named as a
respondent solely in view of his role as "supervising/sponsoring attorney"
for Mr. Daly pending Mr. Daly's formal admission to the Vermont bar. Since
Mr. Daly is now a member in good standing of the Vermont bar, we
respectfully submit that Mr. Sinnott should no longer be named as a
respondent in these matters.

FN2. As you may know, an individual who has run up a couple thousand
dollars of debt, but can only afford to pay the minimum monthly fee, will
not completely pay off his or her debt for approximately 50 years - i.e.
after generating a huge financial windfall for banks and credit card
companies.

FN3. Capoccia was disbarred for conduct entirely unrelated to the
refund and communications issues raised here. His purported sin was
overzealous advocacy on behalf of his clients in litigated matters.

FN4. Under New York law, if Capoccia were the only member of the Law
Centers at the time of his disbarment, then the Law Centers would have been
effectively forced to dissolve and abandon its many clients -- clients who
would have nowhere else to turn given the uniqueness of the Law Centers'
program. By making attorneys like Messrs. Daly and Sinnott nominal members,
Capoccia was able to avoid that potentially disastrous result without
diluting his authority until his disbarment was ordered.

FN5. The Law Centers' New York offices were then known as the Daly,
Cilingiryan, Murphy, Sinnott & Capoccia Law Centers LLC.

FN6. This letter also accounts for the transactions with Ms. __________.

FN7. We also note that Mr. Crystal's letter to you dated April 24,
2001 mistakenly states that Ms.__________'s escrow money should have been
deposited in an IOLA account. In fact, we are advised that under New York
law, attorneys are not required to hold client funds retained on a
long-term basis in an IOLA account, but may, as was done here, keep such
funds in an account where the interest is credited to the client.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

EXHIBIT C

UNITED STATES COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF VERMONT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )
)
v. ) No.
)
ANDREW CAPOCCIA ) (18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 1341,
HOWARD SINNOTT ) 1343, 1956, 2314,
THOMAS J. DALY ) 2315, & 2;
SHIRLEY DINATALE ) 26 U.S.C. § 7206)

SECOND SUPERSEDING INDICTMENT

Introduction

The grand jury charges:

1. In or about February 1997, the defendant ANDREW CAPOCCIA formed a
company known as Andrew F. Capoccia, LLC. In 1998, the firm changed its
name to the Andrew F. Capoccia Law Centers, LLC. The firm underwent
additional name changes, including to the Daly, Cilingiryan, Murphy &
Sinnott Law Centers, LLC. These entities will be collectively referred to
as the Capoccia Law Centers. The Capoccia Law Centers operated out of
offices in New York state.

2. The Capoccia Law Centers engaged in a debt reduction reductions in
clients' debts. The Capoccia Law Centers business that targeted consumers
who had difficulty paying unsecured debt, primarily credit card debt. The
Capoccia Law Centers represented debtors in negotiations with creditors.
The Law Centers promoted its business in radio, television and newspaper
advertising, and via an Internet website. The Law Centers frequently
claimed that it could negotiate 50% - 70% represented thousands of client
debtors.

3. ANDREW CAPOCCIA owned the Capoccia Law Centers. The defendants
HOWARD SINNOTT and THOMAS DALY were attorney-employees of the Capoccia Law
Centers. The defendant SHIRLEY DINATALE was an employee.

4. In or about June 2000, CAPOCCIA, SINNOTT and DALY signed an
agreement whereby the Daly, Murphy & Sinnott Law Centers, PLC agreed to
purchase for at least $12,000,000 the assets of the Capoccia Law Centers.
Subject to certain conditions, the purchase and sale agreement required the
Daly, Murphy & Sinnott Law Centers to pay 20% of its gross income to
CAPOCCIA over a period of ten years.

5. After the asset purchase, the Daly, Murphy & Sinnott Law Centers
continued to provide similar debt-reduction services to past clients of the
Capoccia Law Centers and in addition recruited new clients. The Daly,
Murphy & Sinnott Law Centers also underwent name changes. The Daly, Murphy
& Sinnott Law Centers and successor firms will collectively be referred to
as The Law Centers for Consumer Protection or LCCP. In approximately July
2000, LCCP moved its main base of operations from New York to Bennington,
Vermont.

6. The Law Centers for Consumer Protection was owned by HOWARD
SINNOTT. THOMAS DALY was an attorney-employee who at times assisted SINNOTT
in making management decisions on behalf of LCCP. SHIRLEY DINATALE and
co-conspirators Stephanie Gardner and Jerry Forkey were employees of LCCP.
In approximately June 2001, DINATALE was named the head of LCCP's
accounting department. ANDREW CAPOCCIA remained affiliated with LCCP in an
advisory capacity and participated in making management decisions.

7. At times material to this indictment, the Capoccia Law Centers
maintained bank accounts at Key Bank in New York and, later, at PNC Bank in
New Jersey. The Law Centers for Consumer Protection maintained accounts in
New Jersey at PNC Bank. The accounts for both firms included general or
retainer accounts, payroll accounts and creditor reserve fund or escrow
accounts. LCCP also had accounts at Chittenden Bank in Vermont and, for a
period in 2001, an account at First Massachusetts Bank in Massachusetts.

8. At times material to this indictment, Carol Capoccia, the wife of
ANDREW CAPOCCIA, maintained or controlled accounts at Key Bank in New York
and at First Union National Bank, Wachovia Bank, Republic Security Bank and
SunTrust Bank in Florida.

9. Clients enrolling in the debt reduction programs Offered by the
Capoccia Law Centers and The Law Centers for Consumer Protection entered
into written contracts or legal representation agreements. These contracts
specified the total amount of the enrolling client's unsecured debts and
projected the total savings the client would enjoy if he or she
successfully completed the debt reduction program. The contracts estimated
the retainer fees that the Capoccia Law Centers and LCCP would earn,
calculated as a percentage of the savings the client realized through the
negotiated settlement of debts. The firms did not earn their fees until
they settled debts on behalf of clients. Under the contracts, the client
agreed to make monthly payments to the Capoccia Law Centers or to LCCP to
fund the debt reduction program and to pay the firms' account maintenance
and retainer fees. Most of these monthly payments were made by automatic
debits from the client's bank account. The contracts specified what portion
of each monthly payment would be disbursed to the Capoccia Law Centers or
to LCCP as part of its anticipated retainer fee, and how much would be
deposited into the escrow account to build up a reserve of funds with which
to settle a client's debts. In entering into contracts with its clients,
LCCP used and caused the use of the United States mail.

10. Monthly retainer fees received from clients were deposited into
the general accounts the Capoccia Law Centers and LCCP maintained at Key
Bank and PNC Bank. At all times material to this indictment, the Capoccia
Law Centers treated retainer fees as income even before they were earned by
settling debts on behalf of clients. LCCP likewise treated unearned
retainer fees as income at least until April 2002. The Capoccia Law Centers
and LCCP used earned and unearned retainer fees to pay the operating
expenses of the firms.

11. Monthly payments by clients to the Capoccia Law Centers and The
Law Centers for Consumer Protection to fund the clients' debt reduction
programs were deposited into the escrow accounts at Key Bank and PNC Bank
and held on behalf of the firms' clients.

The Misappropriation Of Client Retainer Fees

12. At all times material to this indictment, the Capoccia Law Centers
experienced severe financial difficulties. Earned and unearned retainer
fees received from clients were insufficient to cover all the firm's
expenses, which included large payroll, advertising, legal and other costs,
and which also included substantial periodic payments to ANDREW CAPOCCIA.
Because of insufficient revenue, the Capoccia Law Centers frequently
deferred, or simply did not make, payments to creditors. The firm was also
unable to pay timely and complete refunds of unearned retainer fees to
clients who withdrew from the debt reduction program.

13. Despite its difficult financial situation, the Capoccia Law
Centers transferred, between July 1998 and June 2000, approximately
$1,700,000 from its operating accounts to bank accounts controlled by Carol
Capoccia. These transfers were to benefit ANDREW CAPOCCIA and included the
following:

APPROXIMATE DATE AMOUNT

July 29, 1998 $10,200
August 4, 1998 $10,200
August 11, 1998 $10,200
August 11, 1998 $72,000
August 12, 1998 $10,000
August 18, 1998 $14,000
August 18, 1998 $10,200
August 26, 1998 $10,200
September 1, 1998 $10,200
September 9, 1998 $10,200
September 11, 1998 $10,000
September 16, 1998 $10,200
September 22, 1998 $15,400
September 23, 1998 $6000
September 29, 1998 $15,400
October 6, 1998 $15,400
October 14, 1998 $15,400
October 20, 1998 $15,400
October 27, 1998 $15,400
November 3, 1998 $20,900
November 12, 1998 $20,900
November 17, 1998 $20,900
November 24, 1998 $20,900
December 1, 1998 $20,900
December 8, 1998 $20,900
December 15, 1998 $20,900
December 18, 1998 $105,000
December 22, 1998 $20,900
December 29, 1998 $20,900
January 6, 1999 $20,900
January 12, 1999 $20,900
January 19, 1999 $20,900
January 27, 1999 $41,800
February 3, 1999 $20,900
February 16, 1999 $41,800
March 2, 1999 $41,800
March 16, 1999 $41,800
April 9, 1999 $28,800
April 14, 1999 $10,000
April 27, 1999 $41,800
May 11, 1999 $41,800
May 25, 1999 $41,800
June 8, 1999 $41,800
June 22, 1999 $41,800
July 6, 1999 $41,800
July 20, 1999 $41,800
August 3, 1999 $41,800
August 17, 1999 $41,800
September 8, 1999 $41,800
September 20, 1999 $41,800
September 28, 1999 $41,800
October 12, 1999 $41,800
November 12, 1999 $21,500
November 24, 1999 $10,000
December 7, 1999 $18,800
December 21, 1999 $18,800
January 4, 2000 $18,800
May 24, 2000 $100,000
June 23, 2000 $100,000

14. Between approximately August 1999 and March 2000, the Capoccia Law
Centers paid an additional $650,000 to the Internal Revenue Service and
$173,500 to the New York State Department of Taxes for the personal tax
liability of ANDREW CAPOCCIA.

15. After acquiring the assets of the Capoccia Law Centers, The Law
Centers for Consumer Protection also experienced severe financial
difficulty. LCCP lacked the revenue to pay timely refunds of unearned
retainer fees to clients who withdrew from the debt reduction program. By
June 2001, LCCP owed more than one thousand withdrawing clients
approximately $1,000,000 in unearned retainer fees. Some of those demands
for refunds had been pending for more than one year. In addition, as set
forth in paragraphs 20-28 of this indictment, LCCP wrongfully converted,
between December 2000 and October 2001, more than $2,700,000 in client
escrow money and did not have sufficient income to repay the
misappropriated funds.

16. Although LCCP was in a difficult financial situation, ANDREW
CAPOCCIA and HOWARD SINNOTT caused the firm to continue to make substantial
periodic payments to accounts controlled by Carol Capoccia. These payments
included the following:

APPROXIMATE DATE AMOUNT

July 28, 2000 $100,000
August 3, 2000 $25,000
August 28, 2000 $l40,000
November 30, 2000 $110,000
January 3, 2001 $150,000
February 5, 2001 $200,000
April 2, 2001 $200,000
May 29, 2001 $200,000
June 14, 2001 $12,500
June 27, 2001 $100,000
July 11, 2001 $12,500
July 25, 2001 $12,500
July 26, 2001 $100,000
August 8, 2001 $12,500
August 23, 2001 $12,500
August 28, 2001 $125,000
September 7, 2001 $12,500
September 19, 2001 $12,500
September 28, 2001 $100,000
October 16, 2001 $12,500
October 31, 2001 $50,000
November 5, 2001 $12,500
November 28, 2001 $25,000
December 14, 2001 $12,500
December 26, 2001 $12,500
December 28, 2001 $75,000
January 9, 2002 $12,500
January 23, 2002 $12,500
February 6, 2002

17. Notwithstanding the volume of unpaid refunds and misappropriated
escrow funds, LCCP paid HOWARD SINNOTT and THOMAS DALY substantial sums of
money in addition to their salaries. These payments were in the nature of
bonuses. Between October 2000 and February 2002, LCCP paid more than
$200,000 in bonus money to a Chittenden Bank account titled "Howard
Account" on behalf of HOWARD SINNOTT, as follows:

APPROXIMATE DATE AMOUNT

October 31, 2000 $10,000
November 30, 2001 $7500
January 9, 2001 $10,000
March 5, 2001 $7500
April 2, 2001 $5000
May 29, 2001 $50,000
June 27, 2001 $25,000
July 26, 2001 $25,000
August 28, 2001 $20,000
October 1, 2001 $20,000
October 29, 2001 $5000
December 28, 2001 $10,000
February 27, 2002 $15,000

18. During the same period, LCCP also paid more than $200,000 in
bonuses to a Chittenden Bank account titled the "Tom Account" on behalf of
THOMAS DALY. On or about the dates listed below, LCCP made the following
bonus payments to THOMAS DALY:

APPROXIMATE DATE AMOUNT

October 31, 2000 $10,000
November 30, 2001 $7500
January 9, 2001 $10,000
March 5, 2001 $7500
April 2, 2001 $5000
May 24, 2001 $30,000
May 30, 2001 $20,000
June 27, 2001 $25,000
July 26, 2001 $25,000
August 28, 2001 $20,000
October 1, 2001 $20,000
October 29, 2001 $5000
December 28, 2001 $10,000
February 27, 2002 $15,000

19. In his year 2000 federal tax return, THOMAS DALY failed to report
any of this aforementioned bonus income. In his year 2001 federal tax
return, DALY reported only $20,000 of this bonus income.

The Misappropriation of Client Escrow Funds

20. LCCP contracted with ADP, Inc. to process LCCP's payroll. Prior to
each payroll, LCCP transferred sufficient funds from its general account
into the PNC Bank payroll account. The payroll funds were subsequently
transferred to an account ADP maintained in New York state

21. Because there were insufficient funds in its general account at
PNC Bank, The Law Centers for Consumer Protection, beginning in December
2000, used client escrow money to fund its payroll. The following
escrow-to-payroll transfers caused client escrow money to be diverted to
ADP to pay LCCP's payroll:

APPROXIMATE DATE AMOUNT

December 5, 2000 $104,500
January 16, 2001 $104,000
January 30, 2001 $105,500

22. On or about February 5, 2001, LCCP wired $200,000 to one of Carol
Capoccia's Florida bank accounts as partial payment to ANDREW CAPOCCIA
under the purchase and sale agreement. This payment to ANDREW CAPOCCIA was
made directly from LCCP's escrow account at PNC Bank.

23. Beginning no later than approximately late February 2001, the LCCP
general account at PNC Bank was frequently overdrawn. ANDREW CAPOCCIA and
Stephanie Gardner authorized PNC Bank automatically to transfer client
funds from the creditor reserve fund (escrow) account into the general
account to cover these overdrafts. In inducing PNC Bank to establish this
automatic overdraft-coverage system, CAPOCCIA and Gardner misrepresented
and concealed the fact that the creditor reserve fund account was actually
an escrow account containing money held on behalf of LCCP's clients.

24. In approximately Spring 2001, HOWARD SINNOTT, THOMAS DALY and
SHIRLEY DINATALE learned that escrow money was being diverted to cover
overdrafts in the general account. Among other things, the funds taken from
the escrow account were used to pay LCCP's day-to-day expenses, to refund
unearned retainer fees paid by withdrawing clients, and to make large
periodic payments to ANDREW CAPOCCIA, HOWARD SINNOTT and THOMAS DALY. On or
about the dates listed below, the following amounts were transferred from
the LCCP escrow account to the general account
to cover overdrafts:

APPROXIMATE DATE AMOUNT

March 2, 2001 $300,000
March 12, 2001 $50,000
March 13, 2001 $100,000
March 14, 2001 $50,000
March 15, 2001 $100,000
April 2, 2001 $200,000
April 5, 2001 $600,000
April 9, 2001 $56,797.60
April 12, 2001 $200,000
April 26, 2001 $100,000
May 25, 2001 $200,000
July 20, 2001 $50,000
July 31, 2001 $42,000
August 13, 2001 $100,000
September 26, 2001 $66,000
October 1, 2001 $60,000

These diversions of funds from LCCP's escrow account to its general account
totaled $2,274,797.60.

25. In the course of covering each overdraft, LCCP caused PNC Bank to
use the interstate wire communication system to send facsimile
transmissions between New Jersey, Ohio and Vermont.

26. PNC Bank continued to transfer money from the creditor reserve
fund account to cover overdrafts in LCCP's general account until
approximately mid-0ctobe'r 2001, when PNC Bank discovered the creditor
reserve account contained escrow money. At that point, PNC Bank
discontinued the overdraft coverage.

27. LCCP also misappropriated some client escrow funds by charging the
escrow account for service fees not authorized by the clients' contracts.

28. None of the millions of dollars misappropriated from LCCP's client
escrow account was ever repaid.

The 58% - 42% Split Of Extra Funds And Settlement Checks

29. On occasion, clients of The Law Centers for Consumer Protection
turned over to LCCP funds other than and in addition to the monthly
payments specified under their legal representation agreements. The clients
intended that these additional funds would be used to settle specific debts
that the clients owed, or to increase the reserve of funds held in escrow
for the purpose of making settlements. LCCP deposited extra funds and
settlement checks and money orders received from clients into the escrow
account it maintained at PNC Bank and into accounts at Chittenden Bank and
First Massachusetts Bank.

30. Beginning in approximately December 2000 and continuing until
about April 2002, The Law Centers for Consumer Protection regularly
diverted to its general accounts at PNC Bank and First Massachusetts Bank
approximately 42% of these additional funds clients tendered to LCCP to
settle debts or to fund their escrow accounts. Extra funds and settlement
checks were frequently split despite the fact that clients had fully paid
their retainer obligations under the legal representation agreements. LCCP
usually split these checks without the knowledge of the clients.

31. The following were some of the extra funds and settlement checks
that were split as part of the scheme to misappropriate client funds:

APPROXIMATE DATE CLIENT AMOUNT

December 28, 2000 Janice Beckford $10,000
January 2, 2001 Janice Beckford $10,000
January 17, 2001 Carl Harris $11,000
January 30, 2001 John Irvine $30,000
January 30, 2001 Carroll Wilson $1000
January 31, 2001 Janice Beckford $3400
January 31, 2001 Bertram Wagner $5000
February 16, 2001 William Gardner $17,264
February 16, 2001 Richard Esposito $17,000
February 16, 2001 May Hines $2060
February 16, 2001 Karen and Andrew Hyland $1500
February 16, 2001 Mary Louise Penn $4644
February 16, 2001 Bradley Robison $28,000
February 20, 2001 Russ Rose $10,000
February 28, 2001 John Hardin $1861.79
March 5, 2001 William Drexel $8310
March 7, 2001 Colleen and David Brown $1750
March 7, 2001 Rand and Sarah Cushman $9000
March 7, 2001 Timothy DeGonzague $2440
March 7, 2001 Susan Sarawski $5200
March 16, 2001 Ronald McIntyre $11,570
March 22, 2001 Larry Dunn $2328
March 22, 2001 Carroll Wilson $1000
April 11, 2001 Thomas Kurzepa $3200
May 31, 2001 Mark Stevens $12,140
June 4, 2001 Vernon Gibbs $1000
June 4, 2001 May Hines $3090
June 4, 2001 Jean Howard $1024
June 4, 2001 Debra Kollmer $2000
June 7, 2001 Vernon Gibbs $1000
June 8, 2001 Walter Adamcewicz $1500
June 12, 2001 Karen Fullana $1350.89
June 12, 2001 Karen and Andrew Hyland $3500
June 12, 2001 Michael Marsh $1158
June 14, 2001 William Drexel $29,863
June 19, 2001 Stuart and Diana Beluke $3156
June 19, 2001 Jeffrey Hesbon $3049.53
June 22, 2001 Paul Kordovski $20,000
June 29, 2001 May Hines $1030
June 29, 2001 Joshua Holland $38,505
July 10, 2001 Paul Fobare $1800
July 10, 2001 Mary Louise Penn $4000
July 10, 2001 Charles Surre $4000
July 19, 2001 Flynn and Sherri Clanton $15,000
July 19, 2001 Vernon Gibbs $984
July 26, 2001 Karl Mersich $2000
July 26, 2001 Maryann Nina $3218
August 10, 2001 Robert Strzelczyk $700
August 16, 2001 Walter Adamcewicz $1000
August 21, 2001 Diana Calandriello $12,000
August 24, 2001 Walter Adamcewicz $1000
August 24, 2001 Robert Strzelczyk $500
September 7, 2001 Eric Brathwaite $2000
September 14, 2001 Robert Strzelczyk $2000
October 26, 2001 Sean Eastland $1600
October 31, 2001 Donnie Estes $150
November 8, 2001 James Wall $1000
November 14, 2001 Donnie Estes $267
November 14, 2001 Donnie Estes $300
November 14, 2001 Alicia Stefanopoulos $3240
December 5, 2001 Arsuna Grashin $1000
December 6, 2001 Kathleen Saal $4000
December 13, 2001 Walter Adamcewicz $1000
December 13, 2001 Sajid Hasan $1400
December 18, 2001 Bertram Wagner $5000
December 21, 2001 Gary Becker $1000
January 3, 2002 Bruce Crandall $1500
January 22, 2002 Steven Zajac $850
January 23, 2002 David Green $11,000
January 23, 2002 Rand and Sarah Cushman $3000
January 25, 2002 Shannon Walker $10,000
February 5, 2002 Aaron Yousey $10,000
February 6, 2002 Patricia Abamonte $3000
February 18, 2002 Ronald Iannelli $1305
February 22, 2002 Steven Soccoli $1388
February 26, 2002 Rita Krutchik $902
February 26, 2002 Stephan Erb $14,000
February 26, 2002 Dimitrios Stathopoulos $1500
March 1, 2002 John Hardin $10,000
March 8, 2002 Joan Teabout $20,000
March 13, 2002 Carey Zaweda $21,500
April 2, 2002 Tonia Bailey $1500
April 2, 2002 Salvatore Carrano $1000
April 2, 2002 Richard Fogelson $1400
April 2, 2002 Jenine (Morse) Goss $1900
April 15, 2002 Howard Dickey $1000

Diversion Of Money To Debt Settlement Associates

32. Debt Settlement Associates, Ltd. (DSA) was a Delaware company that
was incorporated on or about May 4, 2001. From offices in New York state,
DSA also engaged in the debt reduction business on behalf of clients. DSA
had no legal relationship to The Law Centers for Consumer Protection.
ANDREW CAPOCCIA, HOWARD SINNOTT and THOMAS DALY participated in creating
DSA. Carol Capoccia and Rodger Kolsky were part owners of DSA. SINNOTT and
DALY each loaned to or invested substantial sums of money in DSA. Kolsky
left LCCP to become the president of DSA and SHIRLEY DINATALE became an
employee of DSA. At all times material to this indictment, DSA maintained
general and payroll bank accounts in New Jersey at PNC Bank. DSA contracted
with ADP, Inc. to process its payroll.

33. Beginning in approximately August 2001 and continuing until
approximately April 2002, LCCP diverted more than $860,000 from its
accounts at PNC Bank to DSA to pay advertising, payroll and other operating
expenses of DSA. Some of the transfers consisted of wire transfers of funds
from LCCP's general account at PNC Bank to DSA's payroll account at PNC
Bank. Thereafter, the payroll funds were transferred to an account ADP
maintained in New York state. On or about the dates listed below, the
following sums of money were transferred from LCCP to DSA's payroll account
and then to ADP:

APPROXIMATE DATE AMOUNT

September 11, 2001 $10,000
September 28, 2001 $8,000
October 9, 2001 $7,132.56
October 23, 2001 $9,220.44
November 6, 2001 $ll,600
November 20, 2001 $l7,000
December 4, 2001 $18,400
December 18, 2001 $18,250
December 28, 2001 $18,250
January 15, 2002 $23,000
January 29, 2002 $25,000

34. On or about February 21, 2002, $25,000 was transferred by wire
from LCCP's general account at PNC Bank into DSA's general account at PNC
Bank. On the same day, $25,000 was transferred by wire from DSA to Carol
Capoccia's SunTrust Bank account in Florida. The money was first wired to
DSA to conceal the fact that LCCP was the source of the funds being
deposited into Carol Capoccia's account. 35. On or about February 28, 2002,
$60,000 was transferred by wire from LCCP's general account at PNC Bank
into DSA's general account at PNC Bank. On or about March 1, 2002, $60,000
was transferred by wire from DSA to the Carol Capoccia SunTrust Bank
account. Again, the money was first wired to DSA to conceal the fact that
LCCP was the source of the funds being deposited into Carol Capoccia's
account.

The Demise Of The Law Centers For Consumer Protection

36. Throughout 2001 and 2002, LCCP continued to suffer serious
financial difficulties. LCCP did not have enough cash or income to repay
the millions of dollars that had been misappropriated from the escrow
account. It also lacked money to keep up with an escalating demand by
withdrawing clients for refunds of unearned retainer fees. Finally, LCCP
lacked funds to repay the millions of dollars in retainer fees that had
been paid to the firm but not earned. These circumstances severely
undermined LCCP's ability to service its clients and to remain in business.

37. Despite these financial difficulties, LCCP continued to recruit
new clients into its debt reduction program, and to charge the bank
accounts of old and new clients for escrow and retainer fees. LCCP
misrepresented to, concealed from, and failed to disclose to, current or
prospective clients the following material facts, among others:

(a) Failing to disclose that more than $2.7 million dollars had been
misappropriated from the escrow account.

(b) Failing to disclose that LCCP was the subject of a federal
criminal investigation for stealing millions of dollars from its clients1
escrow account.

(c) Failing to disclose that the depletion of the escrow account
jeopardized LCCP's ability to remain in business, to settle debts on behalf
of clients and to refund escrow moneys to clients upon demand.

(d) Falsely representing that clients terminating the debt reduction
program would receive refunds of unearned fees.

(e) Failing to disclose that LCCP did not have enough money to pay
refunds of unearned fees to hundreds of clients who had previously
withdrawn from the debt reduction program.

(f) Failing to disclose that approximately 42% of the proceeds of many
extra funds and settlement checks were diverted to LCCP's general account
and used to pay operating expenses of the firm.

38. On or about January 27, 2003, The Law Centers for Consumer
Protection ceased doing business. When it discontinued operations, LCCP
owed to thousands of former clients, and did not have the funds to repay,
millions of dollars in escrow and unearned retainer fees.

COUNT 1

39. The grand jury repeats and realleges paragraphs 1-38 of this
indictment. Among other things, those paragraphs describe ANDREW CAPOCCIA'S
scheme, between 1997 and 2002, to convert to his own benefit and to the
benefit of others unearned retainer fees paid by clients to the Capoccia
Law Centers and to LCCP.

40. On or about the dates listed below, in the District of Vermont and
elsewhere, the defendant

ANDREW CAPOCCIA

transmitted and transferred in interstate commerce, from PNC Bank in New
Jersey, from Chittenden Bank in Vermont and from First Massachusetts Bank
in Massachusetts to various banks in Florida, the following sums of money
having a value of $5000 or more that derived from said unearned retainer
fees, knowing said moneys to have been stolen, converted and taken by
fraud:

APPROXIMATE DATE AMOUNT

May 24, 2000 $100,000
June 23, 2000 $100,000
July 28, 2000 $100,000
August 3, 2000 $25,000
August 28, 2000 $200,000
October 31, 2000 $l40,000
November 30, 2000 $110,000
January 3, 2001 $150,000
April 2, 2001 $200,000
May 29, 2001 $200,000
June 14, 2001 $12,500
June 27, 2001 $100,000
July 11, 2001 $12,500
July 25, 2001 $12,500
July 26, 2001 $100,000
August 8, 2001 $12,500
August 23, 2001 $12,500
August 28, 2001 $125,000
September 7, 2001 $12,500
September 19, 2001 $12,500
September 28, 2001 $100,000
October 16, 2001 $12,500
October 31, 2001 $50,000
November 5, 2001 $12,500
November 28, 2001 $25,000
December 14, 2001 $12,500
December 26, 2001 $12,500
December 28, 2001 $75,000
January 9, 2002 $12,500
January 23, 2002 $12,500
February 6, 2002 $37,500

(18 U.S.C. §§ 2314 & 2)

COUNT 2

41. The grand jury repeats and realleges paragraphs 1-38 of this
indictment.

42. Commencing on or about July 1, 2000 and continuing until on or
about January 27, 2003, in the District of Vermont and elsewhere, the
defendants

ANDREW CAPOCCIA
HOWARD SINNOTT
THOMAS DALY
SHIRLEY DINATALE

knowingly and willfully conspired and agreed with each other, with
Stephanie Gardner and Jerry Forkey, and with other persons to commit the
following offenses against the united States:

(a) to use wire communications in furtherance of a scheme and artifice
to defraud and to obtain money by means of false and fraudulent pretenses
and misrepresentations, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343;

(b) to use the United States Postal Service in furtherance of a scheme
and artifice to defraud and to obtain money by means of false and
fraudulent pretenses and misrepresentations, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
1341;

(c) to transmit in interstate commerce money having a value of $5000
or more that had been stolen, converted or taken by fraud, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 2314; and

(d) to receive money having a value of $5000 or more which had
crossed a state boundary after being stolen, converted, or taken, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2315.

Object Of The Conspiracy

43. It was the object of the conspiracy that the defendants and other
conspirators would divert to themselves, to The Law Centers for Consumer
Protection, and to Debt Settlement Associates, escrow and retainer money
that properly belonged to the clients of LCCP. The defendants would and did
use these diverted moneys to unjustly enrich themselves and to fund the
operational activities of LCCP and DSA.

Manner And Means

44. It was part of the conspiracy that the defendants would
misappropriate money from the client escrow account in order to pay for
LCCP's operational expenses, to benefit the defendants ANDREW CAPOCCIA,
HOWARD SINNOTT and THOMAS DALY, and to divert money to Debt Settlement
Associates.

45. It was further part of the conspiracy that the defendants
solicited retainer fees from clients, and used unearned retainer fees to
pay operational expenses of LCCP, to benefit the defendants ANDREW
CAPOCCIA, HOWARD SINNOTT and THOMAS DALY, and to divert money to DSA, under
circumstances in which the defendants knew, or deliberately closed their
eyes to the fact that the unearned retainer fees could not be repaid in
full upon demand.

46. It was further part of the conspiracy that the defendants made,
and caused others to make, materially false and fraudulent representations
and promises to LCCP's clients, and caused others to conceal from and fail
to disclose material facts to clients, in order to recruit clients into the
debt reduction program; to persuade clients to send additional moneys,
beyond those specified in the clients' contracts, to fund their debt
reduction programs; and to dissuade clients from withdrawing from the debt
reduction program.

Overt Acts

47. In furtherance of the conspiracy, the defendants and
co-conspirators committed, or caused to be committed, the following overt
acts in the District of Vermont:

(1) On or about December 5, 2000, a conspirator issued instructions
that caused PNC Bank to transfer $104,500 from LCCP's escrow account to its
payroll account.

(2) On or about January 16, 2001, a conspirator issued instructions
that caused PNC Bank to transfer $104,000 from LCCP's escrow account to its
payroll account.

(3) On or about January 30, 2001, a conspirator issued instructions
that caused PNC Bank to transfer $105,500 from LCCP's escrow account to its
payroll account.

(4) On or about February 5, 2001, a conspirator issued instructions
that caused PNC Bank to transfer $200,000 from LCCP's escrow account to a
Florida bank account controlled by Carol Capoccia.

(5) In approximately March 2001, conspirators issued instructions
that, over a seven-month period, caused PNC Bank to transfer $2,274,797.60
from LCCP's escrow account to cover overdrafts in its general account.

(6) Between August 1, 2001 and April 4, 2002, conspirators issued
instructions that caused PNC Bank to transfer more than $860,000 from
LCCP's accounts to Debt Settlement Associates.

(7) Between July 2000 and March 2002, conspirators issued instructions
that caused LCCP to transfer approximately $2,000,000 to accounts
controlled by Carol Capoccia.

(8) Between October 2000 and February 2002, conspirators issued
instructions that caused LCCP to pay more than $200,000 in bonus money to
HOWARD SINNOTT.

(9) Between October 2000 and February 20 02, conspirators issued
instructions that caused LCCP to pay more than $200,000 in bonus money to
THOMAS DALY.

(10) In or about October 2001, SHIRLEY DINATALE issued to employees of
LCCP a written formula for splitting clients' extra funds and settlement
checks and diverting approximately 42% of the proceeds to LCCP's general
account.

(11) On or about February 21, 2002, SHIRLEY DINATALE issued
instructions to divert $25,000 through Debt Settlement Associates to Carol
Capoccia's SunTrust account.

(12) On or about February 28, 2002, SHIRLEY DINATALE issued
instructions to divert $60,000 through Debt Settlement Associates to Carol
Capoccia's SunTrust account.

(18 U.S.C. § 371)

COUNT 3

48. The grand jury repeats and realleges paragraphs 1-38 of this
indictment. Among other things, those paragraphs describe the scheme
devised by ANDREW CAPOCCIA to take and convert for the benefit of ANDREW
CAPOCCIA and others money held on behalf of clients in LCCP's escrow
account

49. On or about the dates listed below, in the District of Vermont and
elsewhere, the defendant

ANDREW CAPOCCIA

transmitted and transferred in interstate commerce, from LCCP's payroll
account at PNC Bank in New Jersey to ADP's account in New York, the
following sums of money having a value of $5000 or more, knowing said
moneys to have been stolen, converted and taken by fraud:

APPROXIMATE DATE AMOUNT

December 5, 2000 $104,500
January 16, 2001 $104,000
January 30, 2001 $105,500

(18 U.S.C. §§ 2314 & 2)

COUNT 4

50. The grand jury repeats and realleges paragraphs 1-38 of this
indictment. Those paragraphs describe the scheme devised by ANDREW CAPOCCIA
to take and convert for the benefit of ANDREW CAPOCCIA money held on behalf
of clients in LCCP's escrow account.

51. On or about February 5, 2001, in the District of Vermont and
elsewhere, the defendant

ANDREW CAPOCCIA

received money having a value of $5000 or more which had crossed state
boundaries after being stolen, unlawfully converted and taken, namely,
$200,000 transferred by wire from LCCP's escrow account at PNC Bank in New
Jersey to a Florida account controlled by Carol Capoccia, knowing said
money to have been stolen, unlawfully converted and taken.

(18 U.S.C. §§ 2315 & 2)

COUNT 5

52. The grand jury repeats and realleges paragraphs 1-38 of this
indictment. Those paragraphs describe the scheme devised by ANDREW CAPOCCIA
to take and convert for the benefit of ANDREW CAPOCCIA and others money
held on behalf of clients in LCCP's escrow account.

53. On or about the dates listed below, in the District of Vermont and
elsewhere, the defendant

ANDREW CAPOCCIA,

having devised the scheme and artifice to defraud and for obtaining money
by means of false and fraudulent pretenses, representations and promises,
and for the purpose of executing such scheme and artifice, caused to be
transmitted by wire in interstate commerce, between New Jersey, Ohio and
Vermont, facsimile transmissions authorizing and enabling overdrafts in
LCCP's general account at PNC Bank to be covered by a transfer of funds
from the escrow account:

APPROXIMATE DATE AMOUNT

March 2, 2001 $300,000
March 12, 2001 $50,000
March 13, 2001 $100,000
March 14, 2001 $50,000
March 15, 2001 $100,000
April 2, 2001 $200,000

(18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 & 2)

COUNT 6

54. The grand jury repeats and realleges paragraphs 1-38 indictment.
Those paragraphs describe the scheme by HOWARD SINNOTT, THOMAS DALY and
others to take and convert money held on behalf of clients in LCCP's escrow
account.

55. On or about the dates listed below, in the District of Vermont and
elsewhere, the defendants

HOWARD SINNOTT
THOMAS DALY,

APPROXIMATE DATE AMOUNT

April 5, 2001 $600,000
April 9, 2001 $56,797.60
April 12, 2001 $200,000
April 26, 2001 $100,000
May 25, 2001 $200,000

(18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 & 2)

Count 7

56. The grand jury repeats and realleges paragraphs 1-38 of this
indictment. Those paragraphs describe the scheme devised by ANDREW
CAPOCCIA, HOWARD SINNOTT, THOMAS DALY, SHIRLEY DINATALE clients in LCCP's
escrow account.

57. On or about the dates listed below, in the District of Vermont and
elsewhere, the defendants

ANDREW CAPOCCIA
HOWARD SINNOTT
THOMAS DALY
SHIRLEY DINATALE,

APPROXIMATE DATE AMOUNT

July 20, 2001 $50,000
July 31, 2001 $42,000
August 13, 2001 $100,000
September 26, 2001 $66,000
October 1, 2001 $60,000

(18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 & 2)

COUNT 8

58. The grand jury repeats and realleges paragraphs 1-38 of this
indictment. Those paragraphs describe the scheme devised by HOWARD SINNOTT
and THOMAS DALY to divert client escrow money from LCCP's PNC escrow
account to LCCP's First Massachusetts Bank account and then to LCCP's
general account at PNC Bank.

59. On or about April 27, 2001, in the District of Vermont and
elsewhere, the defendants

HOWARD SINNOTT
THOMAS DALY

knowingly and willfully conducted a financial transaction affecting
interstate commerce, to wit, the wire transfer of $500,000 from First
Massachusetts Bank in Massachusetts to PNC Bank in New Jersey, which
involved the proceeds of specified unlawful activity, to wit, a violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (wire fraud), with the intent to promote the carrying
on of specified unlawful activity, and that while conducting such financial
transaction knew that the funds involved in the wire transfer represented
the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity.

(18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a) (1) (A) (i) & 2)

COUNT 9

60. The grand jury repeats and realleges paragraphs 1-38 of this
indictment. Those paragraphs describe the scheme to divert approximately
42% of the proceeds of client extra funds and settlement checks from LCCP's
escrow account to its general account.

61. On or about the dates set forth below, in the District of Vermont
and elsewhere, the defendants

ANDREW CAPOCCIA
HOWARD SINNOTT
THOMAS DALY
SHIRLEY DINATALE

transported, transmitted and transferred in interstate commerce, between
PNC Bank, Chittenden Bank and First Massachusetts Bank, checks containing
$5000 or more of the proceeds of clients' extra funds and settlement
checks, knowing said moneys to have been stolen, converted and taken by
fraud:

APPROXIMATE DATE AMOUNT

February 16, 2001 $56,797.60
April 5, 2001 $18,214.98
April 10, 2001 $7587.11
April 19, 2001 $7389.93
April 30, 2001 $12,809.27
May 2, 2001 $21,352.33
May 4, 2001 $8284.43
May 8, 2001 $5261.96
May 18, 2001 $8654.63
May 23, 2001 $6041.28
June 4, 2001 $28,931.95
June 5, 2001 $11,026.53
June 6, 2001 $8205.10
June 7, 2001 $12,535.69
June 12, 2001 $15,683.45
June 13, 2001 $15,602.33
June 15, 2001 $29,009.95
June 20, 2001 $24,688.60
June 26, 2001 $25,449.68
June 27, 2001 $18,454.59
July 3, 2001 $21,014.99
July 6, 2001 $13,402.73

(18 U.S.C. §§ 2314 & 2)

COUNT 10

62. The grand jury repeats and realleges paragraphs 1-38 of this
indictment. Those paragraphs describe the scheme to divert approximately
42% of the proceeds of client extra funds and settlement checks from LCCP's
escrow account to its general account.

63. On or about the dates set forth below, in the District of Vermont
and elsewhere, the defendants

ANDREW CAPOCCIA
HOWARD SINNOTT
THOMAS DALY
SHIRLEY DINATALE

having devised the scheme and artifice to defraud and for obtaining money
by means of false and fraudulent pretenses, representations and promises,
and for the purpose of executing such scheme and artifice, knowingly caused
to be delivered by the United States Postal Service and by private and
commercial interstate carrier checks diverting to LCCP's general account
portions of clients' extra funds and settlement checks:

APPROXIMATE DATE AMOUNT

July 10, 2001 $8517.07
July 18, 2001 $13,275.50
July 27, 2001 $12,981.25
January 24, 2002 $24,487.44
January 25, 2002 $9179.61
February 6, 2002 $16,254
February 26, 2002 $22,343.82
March 8, 2002 $14,869.30
March 15, 2002 $22,533

(18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 & 2)

COUNT 11

64. The grand jury repeats alleges paragraphs 1-3 8 of this
indictment. Among other things, those paragraphs describe ANDREW CAPOCCIA'S
and HOWARD SINNOTT'S scheme to convert to SINNOTT'S benefit unearned
retainer and escrow fees paid by clients to The Law Centers for Consumer
Protection.

65. On or about the dates listed below, in the District of Vermont and
elsewhere, the defendants

ANDREW CAPOCCIA
HOWARD SINNOTT

transmitted and transferred in interstate commerce, from Chittenden Bank in
Vermont to locations outside Vermont, the following sums of money having a
value of $5000 or more that derived from said unearned retainer and escrow
fees, knowing said moneys to have been stolen, converted and taken by
fraud:

APPROXIMATE DATE AMOUNT

May 29, 2001 $200,000
May 31, 2001 $51,000
July 5, 2001 $25,000
August 2, 2001 $23,000
August 31, 2001 $15,000
October 9, 2001 $20,550
January 3, 2002 $9500
March 1, 2002 $15,000

(18 U.S.C. §§ 2314 & 2)

COUNT 12

66. The grand jury repeats and realleges paragraphs 1-38 of this
indictment. Among other things, those paragraphs describe ANDREW CAPOCCIA'S
and THOMAS DALY'S scheme to convert to DALY'S benefit unearned retainer and
escrow fees paid by clients to The Law Centers for Consumer Protection.

67. On or about the dates listed below, in the District of Vermont and
elsewhere, the defendants

ANDREW CAPOCCIA
THOMAS DALY

transmitted and transferred in interstate commerce, from Chittenden Bank in
Vermont to locations outside Vermont, the following sums of money having a
value of $5000 or more that I derived from said unearned retainer and
escrow fees, knowing said moneys to have been stolen, converted and taken
by fraud:

APPROXIMATE DATE AMOUNT

July 6, 2001 $5000
August 6, 2001 $5000
September 24, 2001 $50,000
October 18, 2001 $50,000

(18 U.S.C. §§ 2314 & 2)

COUNT 13

68. The grand jury repeats and realleges paragraphs 1-38 of this
indictment. Those paragraphs describe the scheme devised to fund the
operations of Debt Settlement Associates, Inc. with money diverted from the
retainer and escrow accounts of The Law Centers for Consumer Protection.

69. On or about the dates listed below, in the District of Vermont and
elsewhere, the defendants

ANDREW CAPOCCIA
HOWARD SINNOTT
THOMAS DALY
SHIRLEY DINATALE

transported, transmitted and transferred in interstate commerce, from DSA's
account at PNC Bank in New Jersey to ADP's account in New York, the
following sums of money having a value of $5000 or more, knowing said
moneys to have been stolen, converted and taken by fraud:

APPROXIMATE DATE AMOUNT

September 11, 2001 $10,000
September 28, 2001 $8000
October 9, 2001 $7132.56
October 23, 2001 $9220.44
November 6, 2001 $11,600
November 20, 2001 $17,000
December 4, 2001 $18,400
December 18, 2001 $18,250
December 28, 2001 $18,250
January 15, 2002 $23,000
January 29, 2002 $25,000

(18 U.S.C. §§ 2314 & 2)

COUNTS 14-15

70. The grand jury repeats and realleges paragraphs 1-38 of this
indictment. Among other things, those paragraphs describe the scheme
devised by the defendants to conceal that The Law Centers for Consumer
Protection was the source of funds being sent to Carol Capoccia's SunTrust
Bank account.

71. On or about the dates listed below, in the District of Vermont and
elsewhere, the defendants

ANDREW CAPOCCIA
HOWARD SINNOTT
SHIRLEY DINATALE

knowingly and willfully conducted a financial transaction affecting
interstate commerce, to wit, the wire transfer of funds from PNC Bank in
New Jersey to SunTrust Bank in Florida, which involved the proceeds of
specified unlawful activity, to wit, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2314,
knowing that the transaction was designed in part to conceal and disguise
the nature, location, source, ownership and control of such proceeds, and
that while conducting such financial transaction knew that the funds
involved in the wire transfer represented the proceeds of some form of
unlawful activity:

COUNT APPROXIMATE DATE AMOUNT

COUNT 14 February 21, 2002 $25,000
COUNT 15 February 28 - March 1, 2002 $60,000

(18 U.S.C. §§ 1956 (a) (1) (B) (i) & 2)

72. The grand jury repeats and realleges paragraphs 1-38 of this
indictment. Among other things, those paragraphs describe the scheme
devised by HOWARD SINNOTT and THOMAS DALY to solicit retainer and escrow
fees from new clients by means of false pretenses and by the failure to
disclose material facts.

73. On or about the dates listed below, in the District of Vermont and
elsewhere, the defendants

HOWARD SINNOTT
THOMAS DALY

having devised the scheme and artifice to defraud and for obtaining money
by means of false and fraudulent pretenses, representations and promises,
and for the purpose of executing such scheme and artifice, placed in any
post office or authorized depository for mail welcoming letters and
executed legal representation agreements to be sent and delivered by the
Postal Service to the following newly-enrolled clients of The Law Centers
for Consumer Protection:

APPROXIMATE DATE CLIENT

September 24, 2002 Roberta and Richard Armstrong
September 4, 2002 Gary and Mary Austin
July 22, 2002 Eric Aikens
August 29, 2002 Kimberly Allen
October 4, 2002 Minnie Amiels
November 15, 2002 Chester Bedard
August 6, 2002 Aleeshia Bailey and Charles Hudson
September 30, 2002 Milton Bailey
August 16, 2002 Pamela and Douglas Bergeron
November 15, 2002 Sharon Brake
September 30, 2002 Felicia Bracey
August 30, 2002 Bridget Bouthiette
November 4, 2002 Michael Bajek
September 27, 2002 James and Rosita Baker
July 16, 2002 Diana Balavender
December 24, 2002 George Bishop
October 31, 2002 Donald and Janet Bogan
December 19, 2002 Beulah Bolden
August 19, 2002 Barbara Boston
December 11, 2002 Patricia Brown
October 7, 2002 Wallace Brown
September 6, 2002 La Verne Budd
December 2, 2002 Lawrence and Kathleen Buck
September 3, 2002 Roberta Bundy
November 5, 2002 Jennifer Burd
August 22, 2002 Amy and John Calligan
October 21, 2002 Kacem Crump
October 16, 2002 Patricia Caruthers
October 11, 2002 Michelle Campbell
August 2, 2002 Barbara Carter
October 31, 2002 Faith Chavis-Ragin
December 24, 2002 Mary Cooper
August 13, 2002 Willie Crawley
August 26, 2002 Janice Greene
October 1, 2002 Richard Doran
October 21, 2002 Mark and Shelley Daughdrill
August 9, 2002 Michael Dawkins
October 29, 2002 Winfield and Kimberly Dobruck
August 26, 2002 Maria Donovan
November 19, 2002 Bernard and Marylou Doherty
November 8, 2002 Mayra Dube
August 20, 2002 Christine DuBose
November 5, 2002 Thomas and Andrea Eckert
August 26, 2002 Robert Edwards
November 15, 2002 Manfred Eggert
August 28, 2002 Michael Eppes
August 2, 2002 Douglas Felts
November 19, 2002 Russell Fiore
December 9, 2002 Darlene Fleming
October 11, 2002 Lillie Fobbs

(18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 & 2)

COUNT 17

74. The grand jury repeats and realleges paragraphs 1-38 of this
indictment. Among other things, those paragraphs describe how THOMAS DALY
understated to the Internal Revenue Service the amount of bonus income he
realized during the tax year 2000.

75. On or about October 13, 2001, in the District of Vermont and
elsewhere, the defendant

THOMAS DALY

willfully made and subscribed a year 2000 IRS Form 1040 and accompanying
schedules and attachments, which were verified by written declaration that
it was made under the penalties of perjury and was filed with the Internal
Revenue Service, which he did not believe to be true and correct as to
every material matter in that he failed to report that he had realized
bonus income from the Law Centers for Consumer Protection of at least $6000
during the tax year.

(26 U.S.C. § 7206(1))

COUNT 18

76. The grand jury repeats and realleges paragraphs 1-38 of this
indictment. Among other things, those paragraphs describe how THOMAS DALY
understated to the Internal Revenue Service the amount of bonus income he
realized during the tax year 2001.

77. On or about March 30, 2002, in the District of Vermont and
elsewhere, the defendant

THOMAS DALY

willfully made and subscribed a year 2001 IRS Form 1040 and accompanying
schedules and attachments, which were verified by a written declaration
that it was made under the penalties of perjury and was filed with the
Internal Revenue Service, which he did not believe to be true and correct
as to every material matter in that he reported that he had realized
$20,000 in bonus income from the Law Centers for Consumer Protection during
the 2001 tax year, whereas as he then and there well knew and believed, he
actually realized bonus income of at least $167,000.

(26 U.S.C. § 7206(1))

NOTICE OF SENTENCING ENHANCEMENTS

78. The grand jury repeats and realleges paragraphs 1-38 of this
indictment.

79. As to the defendant ANDREW CAPOCCIA,

a. As to Counts 1-5, 7 and 9-13

(1) The offenses and relevant conduct caused a loss of more
than $20,000,000 (U.S.S.G. § 2Bl.l(b)(1) );

(2) The offenses involved 50 or more victims and were
committed through mass-marketing (U.S.S.G. § 2Bl.l(b)(2));

(3) The offenses involved sophisticated means (U.S.S.G. §
2Bl.l (b)(8)(C));

(4) The defendant knew and should have known that a large
number of victims of the offenses were vulnerable (U.S.S.G. §
3Al.l(b));

(5) The defendant was the organizer and leader of criminal
activity that involved five or more participants and was
otherwise extensive (U.S.S.G. § 3Bl.1);

(6) The defendant abused a position of private trust
(U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3).

80. As to the defendant HOWARD SINNOTT,

a. As to Counts 2, 6, 7, 9-11, 13 and 16

(1) The offenses and relevant conduct caused a loss of more
than $2,500,000 (U.S.S.G. § 2Bl.1(b)(1) );

(2) The offenses involved 50 or more victims and were
committed through mass-marketing. (U.S.S.G. § 2Bl.1(b)(2) );

(3) The defendant knew and should have known that a large
number of victims of the offenses were vulnerable (U.S.S.G. §
3Al.l(b));

(4) The defendant was a manager and supervisor of criminal
activity that involved five or more participants and was
otherwise extensive (U.S.S.G. § 3Bl.l);

(5) The defendant abused a position of private trust
(U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3).

81. As to the defendant THOMAS DALY,

a. As to Counts 2, 6, 7, 9, 10, 12, 13 and 16

(1) The offenses and relevant conduct caused a loss of more
than $2,500,000 (U.S.S.G. § 2Bl.l(b) (1));

(2) The offenses involved 50 or more victims and were
committed through mass-marketing (U.S.S.G. § 2Bl.l(b) (2);

(3) The defendant knew and should have known that a large
number of victims of the offenses were vulnerable (U.S.S.G. §
3Al.l(b));

(4) The defendant abused a position of private trust
(U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3).

b. As to Counts 17 and 18

(1) The offenses caused a tax loss of more than $30,000
(U.S.S.G. § 2Tl.l(a));

(2) The defendant failed to report income exceeding $10,000
in any year from criminal activity (U.S.S.G. § 2Tl.1(b)(1).

82. As to the defendant SHIRLEY DINATALE,

a. As to Counts 2, 7, 9, 10 and 13

(1) The offenses and relevant conduct caused a loss of more
than $1,000,000 (U.S.S.G. § 2Bl.l(b)(1));

(2) The offenses involved 50 or more victims and were
committed through mass-marketing (U.S.S.G. § 2Bl.l(b)(2));

(3) The defendant knew and should have known that a. large
number of victims of the offenses were vulnerable (U.S.S.G. §
3Al.l(b));

(4) The defendant abused a position of private trust
(U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3).

COUNT 19 -- FORFEITURE ALLEGATION NO. 1

From his engagement in the violations stated in Count 1, ANDREW
CAPOCCIA shall forfeit to the United States any and all proceeds of the
statutory violations specified, including but not limited to the following:

(a) $2,000,000 moved from the LCCP accounts at PNC Bank, Chittenden
Bank and First Massachusetts Bank to banks in Florida; and

(b) $l,820,000 removed from LCCP accounts to accounts controlled by
Carol Capoccia, including:

(i) Contents in Account No. 059-644190-69, in the name of or
for the benefit of Carol Capoccia, LLC, at Prudential
Securities;

(ii) Contents in Account No. TBJ967131E6, in the name of or
for the benefit of Valentino Enterprises, Inc., at Prudential
Securities;

(iii) Contents in Account No. 35-740-093, in the name of or
for the benefit of Carol Capoccia, LLC, at Wachovia Bank;

(iv) Contents in Account No. 325450051868, in the name of or
for the benefit of Carol Capoccia, LLC, at Key Bank;

(v) Contents in Account No. 325490036895, in the name of or
for the benefit of Eugene A. Bizzarro and/or Deana Bizzarro
Karam, at Key Bank;

(vi) Contents in Account No. 0417003221519, in the name of or
for the benefit of Carol Capoccia, at SunTrust Bank;

(vii) Contents in E-Trade Account No. 1091-1898, in the name
of or for the benefit of Eugene A. Bizzarro, at E-Trade
Securities, Inc.;

(viii) Jewelry, a Beaded Compact, a Silver Plated Travel
Photo Album, and 6 Waterford Lismore Brandy Balloons;

(ix) Improvements, in the Minimum Amount of $75,000, to 56
Bentwood Drive East, Guilderland, New York; and

(x) U.S. Funds in the Amount of $50,000, in the Possession
or Control of Eugene A. Bizzarro.

If any of the above-described forfeitable property, as a result of any
act or omission of the defendants

(1) cannot be located upon the exercise of due diligence;

(2) has been transferred or sold to, or deposited with, a third
person;

(3) has been placed-beyond the jurisdiction of this court;

(4) has been substantially diminished in value; or

(5) has been commingled with other property which cannot be subdivided
without difficulty,

it is the intent of the United States, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 982 (b)(1).
and 21 U.S.C. § 853(p), to seek forfeiture of any other property of ANDREW
CAPOCCIA up to the value of the above forfeitable property, including but
not limited to the following:

(a) 56 Bentwood Drive East, Guilderland, New York;

(b) Contents in Account No. 059-644190-69, in the name of or
for the benefit of Carol Capoccia, LLC, at Prudential
Securities;

(c) Contents in Account No. TBJ967131E6, in the name of or
for the benefit of Valentino Enterprises, Inc. at Prudential
Securities;

(d) Contents in Account No. 35-740-093, in the name of or for
the benefit of Carol Capoccia, LLC, at Wachovia Bank;

(e) Contents in Account No. 325450051868, in the name of or
for the benefit of Carol Capoccia, LLC, at Key Bank;

(f) Contents in Account No. 325490036895, in the name of or
for the benefit of Eugene A. Bizzarro and/or Deana Bizzarro
Karam, at Key Bank;

(g) Contents in Account No. 0417003221519, in the name of or
for the benefit of Carol Capoccia, at SunTrust Bank; and

(h) Contents in E-Trade Account No. 1091-1898, in the name of
or for the benefit of Eugene A. Bizzarro, at E-Trade
Securities, Inc. [items (b)-(h) will henceforth be referred
to herein as the "Capoccia Assets."]

(18 U.S.C. §§ 981 (a)(1)(C), 1956, 1957,
1961, 2314 and 2315; 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c))

COUNT 20 -- FORFEITURE ALLEGATION NO. 2

From his engagement in the violations stated in Count 2, the
defendants, ANDREW CAPOCCIA, HOWARD SINNOTT, THOMAS J. DALY and SHIRLEY
DINATALE, shall forfeit to the United States any and all proceeds of the
statutory violations specified in the charged conspiracy, including but not
limited to the following:

(a) $2,274,797.60 removed from the LCCP account at PNC Bank;

(b) 860,000 removed from LCCP ' s accounts to Debt Settlement
Associates;

(a) Contents in Account No. 8019327712, in the name of or for
the benefit of Debt Settlement Associates, Ltd., at PNC Bank;

(a) Contents in Account No. 059-644190-69, in the name of or
for the benefit of Carol Capoccia, LLC, at Prudential
Securities;

(b) Contents in Account No. TBJ967131E6, in the name of or
for the benefit of Valentino Enterprises, Inc., at Prudential
Securities;

(iii) contents in Account No. 35-740-093, in the name of or
for the benefit of Carol Capoccia, LLC, at Wachovia Bank;

(iv) Contents in Account No. 325450051868, in the name of or
for the benefit of Carol Capoccia, LLC, at Key Bank;

(v) Contents in Account No. 325490036895, in the name of or
for the benefit of Eugene A. Bizzarro and/or Deana Bizzarro
Karam, at Key Bank;

(vi) Contents in Account No. 0417003221519, in the name of or
for the benefit of Carol Capoccia, at SunTrust Bank;

(vii) Contents in E-Trade Account No. 1091-1898, in the name
of or for the benefit of Eugene A. Bizzarro, at E-Trade
Securities, Inc.;

(viii) Jewelry, a Beaded Compact, a Silver Plated Travel
Photo Album, and 6 Waterford Lismore Brandy Balloons;

(ix) Improvements, in the Minimum Amount of $75,000, to 56
Bentwood Drive East, Guilderland, New York;

(x) U.S. Funds in the Amount of $50, 000, in the Possession
or Control of Eugene A. Bizzarro.

If any of the above-described forfeitable property, as a result of any
act or omission of the defendants

(1) cannot be located upon the exercise of due diligence;

(2) has been transferred or sold to, or deposited with, a third
person;

(3) has been placed beyond the jurisdiction of this court;

(4) has been substantially diminished in value; or

(5) has been commingled with other property which cannot be subdivided
without difficulty,

it is the intent of the United States, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 982 (b)(1)
and 21 U.S.C. § 853(p), to seek forfeiture of any other property of ANDREW
CAPOCCIA, HOWARD SINNOTT, THOMAS J. DALY and SHIRLEY DINATALE up to the
value of the above forfeitable property, including but not limited to the
following:

(a) 56 Bentwood Drive East, Guilderland, New York; and

(b) The Capoccia Assets.

(18 U.S.C. §§ 9 81 (a)(1)(C), 1956, 1957,
1961, 2314 and 315; 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c))

COUNT 21 -- FORFEITURE ALLEGATION NO. 3

From his engagement in the violations stated in Count 3 the defendant
ANDREW CAPOCCIA shall forfeit to the United States any and all proceeds of
the statutory violations specified in the charged conspiracy, including but
not limited to the following:

(a) $314,000 in U.S. Funds

If any of the above-described forfeitable property, as a result of any
act or omission of the defendant

(1) cannot be located upon the exercise of due diligence;

(2) has been transferred or sold to, or deposited with, a third
person;

(3) has been placed beyond the jurisdiction of this court;

(4) has been substantially diminished in value; or

(5) has been commingled with other property which cannot be subdivided
without difficulty,

it is the intent of the United States, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 982 (b)(1)
and 21 U.S.C. § 853(p), to seek forfeiture of any other property of ANDREW
CAPOCCIA up to the value of the above forfeitable property, including but
not limited to the following:

(a) 56 Bentwood Drive East, Guilderland, New York; and

(b) The Capoccia Assets.

(18 U.S.C. §§ 981 (a)(1)(C), 1956, 1957, 1961, 2314;
28 U.S.C. § 246l(c))

COUNT 22 -- FORFEITURE ALLEGATION NO. 4

From his engagement in the violations stated in Count 4 the defendant
ANDREW CAPOCCIA shall forfeit to the United States any and proceeds the
statutory violations specified the charged conspiracy, including but not
limited to the following:

(a) $200,000 transferred from LCCP escrow account to Republic Security
Account 53150; Wachovia Account No. 35-740-093; and

(b) $200,000 in Prudential Account TBJ967131E6, in the name of or for
the benefit of Valentino Enterprises, Inc.

If any of the above-described forfeitable property, as a result of any
act or omission of the defendant

(1) cannot be located upon the exercise of due diligence;

(2) has been transferred or sold to, or deposited with, a third
person;

(3) has been placed beyond the jurisdiction of this court;

(4) has been substantially diminished in value; or

(5) has been commingled with other property which cannot be
subdivided without difficulty,

it is the intent of the United States, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 982 (b)(1)
and 28 U.S.C. § 853(p), to seek forfeiture of any other property of ANDREW
CAPOCCIA up to the value of the above forfeitable property, including but
not limited to the following:

(a) 56 Bentwood Drive East, Guilderland, New York; and

(b) The Capoccia Assets.

(18 U.S.C. §§ 981 (a)(1)(C), 1956, 1957, 1961, 2314 and 2315;
28 U.S.C. § 2461 (c))

COUNT FORFEITURE ALLEGATION NO. 5

From his engagement in the violations stated in Count 5 the defendant
ANDREW CAPOCCIA shall forfeit to the United States any and all property
which constitutes or is derived from any proceeds traceable to such
violations, including but not limited to the following:

(a) $800,000 in U.S. Funds; and

(b) $100,000 in Prudential Account No. TBJ967131E6, in the name of or
for the benefit of Valentino Enterprises, Inc.

If any of the above-described forfeitable property, as a result of any
act or omission of the defendant

(1) cannot be located upon the exercise of due diligence;

(2) has been transferred or sold to, or deposited with, a third
person;

(3) has been placed beyond the jurisdiction of this court;

(4) has been substantially diminished in value; or

(5) has been commingled with other property which cannot be subdivided
without difficulty,

it is the intent of the United States, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 982(b) (1)
and 21 U.S.C. § 853(p), to seek forfeiture of any other property of ANDREW
CAPOCCIA up to the value of the above forfeitable property, including but
not limited to the following:

(a) 56 Bentwood Drive East, Guilderland, New York; and

(b) The Capoccia Assets.

(18 U.S.C. §§ 981 (a)(1)(C), 982, 1343; 28 U.S.C. § 2461 (c))

COUNT 24 -- FORFEITURE ALLEGATION NO. 6

From their engagement in the violations stated in Counts 6 and 8
defendants HOWARD SINNOTT and THOMAS DALY shall forfeit to the United
States any and all property which constitutes or is derived from any
proceeds traceable to such violations, including but not limited to the
following:

(a) $1,156,797.60 in U.S. Funds;

(b) $500,000 in U.S. Funds;

(d) $100,000 in Prudential Account No. 059-644190-69 in the name of
Carol Capoccia.

If any of the above-described forfeitable property, as a result of any
act or omission of the defendants

(1) cannot be located upon the exercise of due diligence;

(2) has been transferred or sold to, or deposited with, a thlrd
person;

(3) has been placed beyond the jurisdiction of this court;

(4) has been substantially diminished in value; or

(5) has been commingled with other property which cannot be subdivided
without difficulty,

it is the intent of the United States, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 982 (b)(1)
and 21 U.S.C. § 853 (p), to seek forfeiture of any other property of HOWARD
SINNOTT and THOMAS DALY up to the value of the above forfeitable property,
including but not limited to the following:

(a) 1997 Ford Explorer, VIN lFMDU35P4VZA49374.

(18 U.S.C. §§ 981 (a)(1)(C), 982, 984, 1343, 1956,
1957, 1961 and 2314; 28 U.S.C. § 2461 (c))

COUNT 25 - - FORFEITURE ALLEGATION NO. 7

From their engagement in the violations stated in Count 7 the
defendants ANDREW CAPOCCIA, HOWARD SINNOTT, THOMAS DALY, and SHIRLEY
DINATALE shall forfeit to the United States any and all property which
constitutes or is derived from any proceeds traceable to such violations,
including but not limited to the following:

(a) $318,000 in U.S. Funds;

(b) $12,500 in Prudential Account TBJ967131E6 in the name of or for
the benefit of Valentino Enterprises, Inc.;

(c) $79,500 in Prudential Account TBJ967131E6 in the name of or for
the benefit of Valentino Enterprises, Inc.; (d) $12,500 in Prudential
Account TBJ967131E6 in the name of or for the benefit of Valentino
Enterprises, Inc.;

(e) $12,500 in Prudential Account TBJ967131E6 in the name of or for
the benefit of Valentino Enterprises, Inc.;

(f) $75,000 in Prudential Account TBJ967131E6 in the name of or for
the benefit of Valentino Enterprises, Inc.;

(g) $100,000 in Prudential Account TBJ967131E6 in the name of or for
the benefit of Valentino Enterprises, Inc.; and

(h) $12,500 in Prudential Account TBJ967131E6 in the name of or for
the benefit of Valentino Enterprises, Inc.

If any of the above-described forfeitable property, as a result of any
act or omission of the defendants

(1) cannot be located upon the exercise of due diligence;

(2) has been transferred or sold to, or deposited with, a third
person;

(3) has been placed beyond the jurisdiction of this court;

(4) has been substantially diminished in value; or

(5) has been commingled with other property which cannot be subdivided
without difficulty,

it is the intent of the United States, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 982(b)(1)
and 21 U.S.C. §853 (p), to seek forfeiture of any other property of ANDREW
CAPOCCIA, HOWARD SINNOTT, THOMAS J. DALY, and SHIRLEY DINATALE up to the
value of the above forfeitable property, including but not limited to the
following:

(a) 56 Bentwood Drive East, Guilderland, New York;

(b) The Capoccia Assets; and

(18 U.S.C. §§ 981 (a)(1)(C), 982, 984, 1343; 28 U.S.C. § 2461 ( c ) )

COUNT 26 -- FORFEITURE ALLEGATION NO. 8

From their engagement in the violations stated in Counts 9 and 10 the
defendants ANDREW CAPOCCIA, HOWARD SINNOTT, THOMAS J. DALY, and SHIRLEY
DINATALE shall forfeit to the United States any and all property which
constitutes or is derived from any proceeds traceable to such violations,
including but not limited to the following:

(a) $520,840.10 taken from clients' extra funds and settlement checks.

If any of the above-described forfeitable property, as a result of any
act or omission of the defendants

(1) cannot be located upon the exercise of due diligence;

(2) has been transferred or sold to, or deposited with, a third
person;

(3) has been placed beyond the jurisdiction of this court;

(4) has been substantially diminished in value; or

(5) has been commingled with other property which cannot be
subdivided without difficulty,

it is the intent of the United States, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 982 (b)(1)
and 21 U.S.C. § 853 (p), to seek forfeiture of any other property of ANDREW
CAPOCCIA, HOWARD SINNOTT, THOMAS J. DALY, and SHIRLEY DINATALE up to the
value of the above forfeitable property, including but not limited to the
following:

(a) 56 Bentwood Drive East, Guilderland, New York;

(b) The Capoccia Assets; and

(18 U.S.C. §§ 981 (a)(1)(C), 982, 1341, 1956, 1957,
1961, 2314; 28 U.S.C. § 246l(c))

COUNT 27 -- FORFEITURE ALLEGATION NO. 9

From their engagement in the violations stated in Count 11 the
defendants ANDREW CAPOCCIA and HOWARD SINNOTT shall forfeit to the United
States any and all property which constitutes or is derived from any
proceeds traceable to such violations, including but not limited to the
following:

(a) $265,050. in monies wrongfully taken from unearned client retainer
fees and escrow funds; (b) $200,000 paid as bonus money to Howard Sinnott;

(c) Contents of Account No. 10945230 at Heritage Family of Funds,
managed by D.B. McKenna & Co., Bennington, VT, in the names of Howard and
Janet M. Sinnott; and

(d) 1997 Ford Explorer, VIN lFMDU35P4VZA49374.

If any of the above-described forfeitable property, as a result of any
act or omission of the defendants

(1) cannot be located upon the exercise of due diligence;

(2) has been transferred or sold to, or deposited with, a third
person;

(3) has been placed beyond the jurisdiction of this court;

(4) has been substantially diminished in value; or

(5) has been commingled with other property which cannot be subdivided
without difficulty,

it is the intent of the United States, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 982 (b)(1)
and 21 U.S.C. § 853(p), to seek forfeiture of any other property of
ANDREW CAPOCCIA and HOWARD SINNOTT up to the value of the above forfeitable
property, including but not limited to the following:

(a) 56 Bentwood Drive East, Guilderland, New York; and

(b) The Capoccia Assets.

(18 U.S.C. §§ 981 (a)(1)(C), 982, 1956, 1957,
1961, 2314; 28 U.S.C. § 2.461 (c))

COUNT 28 -- FORFEITURE ALLEGATION NO. 10

From their engagement in the violations stated in Count 12 the
defendants ANDREW CAPOCCIA and THOMAS J. DALY shall forfeit to the United
States any and all property which constitutes or is derived from any
proceeds traceable to such violations, including but not limited to the
following:

(a) $110,000 in monies wrongfully taken from unearned client retainer
fees and escrow funds; and

(b) Contents of Account No. 11033301 at Heritage Family of Funds,
managed by D.B. McKenna & Co., Bennington, VT, in the name of Daly &
Sinnott.

If any of the above-described forfeitable property, as a result of any
act or omission of the defendants

(1) cannot be located upon the exercise of due diligence;

(2) has been transferred or sold to, or deposited with, a third
person;

(3) has been placed beyond the jurisdiction of this court;

(4) has been substantially diminished in value; or

(5) has been commingled with other property which cannot be subdivided
without difficulty,

it is the intent of the United States, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 982 (b)(1)
and 21 U.S.C. § 853 (p), to seek forfeiture of any other property of ANDREW
CAPOCCIA and THOMAS J. DALY up to the value of the above forfeitable
property, including but not limited to the following:

(a) 56 Bentwood Drive East, Guilderland, New York; and

(b) The Capoccia Assets.

(18 U.S.C. §§ 981 (a)(1)(C), 982, 1956, 1957,
1961, 2314; 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c))

COUNT 29 -- FORFEITURE ALLEGATION NO. 11

From their engagement in the violations stated in Count 13 the
defendants ANDREW CAPOCCIA, HOWARD SINNOTT, THOMAS J. DALY and SHIRLEY
DINATALE shall forfeit to the United States any and all property which
constitutes or is derived from any proceeds traceable to such violations,
including but not limited to the following:

(a) $165,853 in U.S. Funds

If any of the above-described forfeitable property, as a result of any
act or omission of the defendants

(1) cannot be located upon the exercise of due diligence;

(2) has been transferred or sold to, or deposited with, a third
person;

(3) has been placed beyond the jurisdiction of this court;

(4) has been substantially diminished in value; or

(5) has been commingled with other property which cannot b? subdivided
without difficulty,

it is the intent of the United States, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 982(b)(1)
and 21 U.S.C. § 853(p), to seek forfeiture of any other property of ANDREW
CAPOCCIA, HOWARD SINNOTT, THOMAS J. DALY and SHIRLEY DINATALE up to the
value of the above forfeitable property, including but not limited to the
following:

(a) 56 Bentwood Drive East, Guilderland, New York;

(b) The Capoccia Assets; and

(18 U.S.C. § 981 (a)(1)(C), 982, 1956, 1957, 1961, 2314;
28 U.S.C. § 2461(c))

COUNT 30 -- FORFEITURE ALLEGATION NO. 12

From their engagement in the violations stated in Counts 14 and 15 the
defendants ANDREW CAPOCCIA, HOWARD SINNOTT and SHIRLEY DINATALE shall
forfeit to the United States any and all property which was involved in
such violations, or any property traceable to such property, including but
not limited to the following:

(a) $85,000 in U.S. Funds; and

(b) $85,000 in U.S. Funds transferred from DSA's PNC Account to
SunTrust Account 0417003221519 for the benefit of Carol Capoccia and later
transferred to a Fleet Bank Account in the name of Carlo Spano and then, in
part, to SEFCU Account No. 52164, also in the name of Carlo Spano.

If any of the above-described forfeitable property, as a result of any
act or omission of the defendants

(1) cannot be located upon the exercise of due diligence;

(2) has been transferred or sold to, or deposited with, a third
person;

(3) has been placed beyond the jurisdiction of this court;

(4) has been substantially diminished in value; or

(5) has been commingled with other property which cannot be subdivided
without difficulty,

it is the intent of the United States, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 982 (b)(1)
and 21 U.S.C. § 853 (p), to seek forfeiture of any other property of
ANDREW CAPOCCIA, HOWARD SINNOTT and SHIRLEY DINATALE up to the value of the
above forfeitable property, including but not limited to the following:

(a) 56 Bentwood Drive East, Guilderland, New York; and

(b) The Capoccia Assets.

(18 U. S.C. §§ 982 (a) (1)(A), 1956 (a)(1)(B)(i),
and 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c))

COUNT 31 -- FORFEITURE ALLEGATION NO. 13

From their engagement in the violations stated in Count 16 the
defendants [...] HOWARD SINNOTT, and THOMAS J. DALY shall
forfeit to the United States any and all property which constitutes or is
derived from any proceeds traceable to such violations.

If any of the above-described forfeitable property, as a result of any
act or omission of the defendants

(1) cannot be located upon the exercise of due diligence;

(2) has been transferred or sold to, or deposited with, a third
person;

(3) has been placed beyond the jurisdiction of this court;

(4) has been substantially diminished in value; or

(5) has been commingled with other property which cannot be subdivided
without difficulty,

it is the intent of the United States, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 982 (b)(1)
and 21 U.S.C. § 853(p), to seek forfeiture of any other property of [...],
HOWARD SINNOTT, and THOMAS J. DALY up to the value of the above forfeitable
property, including but not limited to the following:

(a) [...] East, Guilderland, New York;

(b) [...] Assets; and

(18 U.S.C. §§ 981(a)(1)(C), 982, 1341; 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c))

A TRUE BILL

/s/
__________________________
FOREPERSON

/s/
_____________________________
DAVID V. KIRBY (GLW & JJG)
Acting United States Attorney

Burlington, Vermont
September 14, 2004

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

EXHIBIT D

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF VERMONT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )
)
v. ) Crim. No.
)
HOWARD SINNOTT )

PLEA AGREEMENT

The United States of America, by and through the United States
Attorney for the District of Vermont (hereafter "the United States"), and
the defendant, HOWARD SINNOTT, agree to the following disposition of
pending criminal charges,

1. SINNOTT agrees to plead guilty to Counts 11 and 13 of the second
superseding indictment, which charge him with interstate
transmittal/transportation of stolen money, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
2314. SINNOTT acknowledges that Count 27 of the second superseding
indictment alleges that the following property:

a. Contents of Account No. 109 45230 at Heritage Family of
Funds, managed by D.B. McKenna & Co., Bennington, VT, in the
names of Howard and Janet M. Sinnott; and

b. 1997 Ford Explorer, VIN lFMDU35P4VZA49374;

is forfeitable to the United States pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 981 (a)(1)(C),
982, 984, 1956, 1957, 1961, 2314, and 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c) as property
which constitutes or is derived from any proceeds traceable to such
violations charged in Count 11 to which he is pleading guilty. SINNOTT
consents to forfeiture of the above-mentioned property pursuant to 18
U.S.C. §§ 98l(a)(1)(C), 982, 1956, 1957, 1961, 2314, and 28 U.S.C. § 2461
(c) pursuant to paragraphs 9 through 12 of this plea agreement. Sinnott
further consents to the forfeiture of the money or other property frozen or
restrained in, or seized from, his IRA Account No. 77615762 held by D.B.
McKenna & Co., Bennington, Vermont, pursuant to Count 27 of the second
superseding indictment and 18 U.S.C. §§ 981 (a)(1)(C), 982, 1956, 1957,
1961, 2314, and 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c), and paragraphs 9 through 12 of this
plea agreement.

2. SINNOTT understands, agrees and has had explained to him by counsel
that the two crimes to which he will plead guilty are both felonies for
which the Court may impose the following sentence on each count: up to ten
years of imprisonment, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2314; a fine of up to
$250,000 or twice the gross loss, whichever is greater, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 3571 (b) and (d); a period of supervised release of not more than
three years, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583 (b) ; and a $100 special
assessment. SINNOTT also understands that the Court must order full
restitution as part of any sentence.

3. It is the understanding of the parties to this agreement that the
plea will be entered under oath and in accordance with Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The defendant represents that he
intends to plead guilty because he is, in fact, guilty of the crimes to
which he will enter a plea.

4. SINNOTT understands that this agreement is conditioned upon his
providing the United States Attorney, at the time this plea agreement is
executed, a bank cashier's check payable to the Clerk, U.S. District Court,
in payment for the mandatory special assessment of $200 for which he will
be responsible when sentenced. The United States agrees to safeguard and
pay the special assessment imposed at sentencing to the Clerk of the Court
immediately after sentencing. In the event that this plea agreement is for
any reason terminated or the defendant's guilty plea is not accepted by the
Court, the special assessment shall be promptly refunded. In the event that
the tendered bank check is not honored for whatever reason, the defendant
understands that he will still be liable for the amount of the special
assessment which the Court imposes. SINNOTT understands and agrees that, if
he fails to pay the special assessment in full prior to sentencing, the
United States' obligations under this plea agreement will be terminated,
the United States will have the right to prosecute him for any other
offenses he may have committed, and will have the right to recommend the
Court impose any lawful sentence. Under such circumstances, SINNOTT will
have right to withdraw his plea of guilty.

5. SINNOTT agrees and understands that it is a condition this
agreement that he refrain from committing remain further crimes, whether
federal, state or local, and that he strictly abide by all conditions of
release if he is permitted to at liberty pending sentence.

6. Pursuant to Rule 11 (c)(1)(C) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the parties stipulate and agree that the Court shall impose
concurrent sentences of between 27 months and 41 months imprisonment on
Counts 11 and 13. The parties reserve the right to argue for any sentence
within the stipulated range. If the Court declines to impose a sentence
within the agreed upon range, the plea will be vacated on the motion of
either party and the United States may prosecute the defendant on all
charges in the indictment.

7. The parties further stipulate that the Court should employ the
following Guidelines analysis in sentencing the defendant:

a. The November 1, 2001 Guidelines manual governs. b. The two
counts are. grouped pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3Dl.2(d).

c. The base offense level is 6 (U.S.S.G. § 2Bl.l(a)).

d. The loss resulting from the offenses of conviction and
relevant conduct is in the $1,000,000 to $2,500,000 range
(U.S.S.G. § 2Bl.l (b)(1)(I)).

e. The offenses involved 50 or more victims (U.S.S.G. § 2Bl.
1(b)(2)(B)).

f. The defendant abused a position of private trust (U.S.S.G.
§ 3B1.3).

g. The defendant is entitled to a 2-level role reduction
(U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2).

h. The defendant is entitled to 3-level credit for acceptance
of responsibility (U.S.S.G. § 3El.l).

i. Other factors which the Court must take into consideration
in formulating a sentence under the Sentencing Reform Act
justify a downward adjustment to the stipulated range of
imprisonment.

j. Accordingly, the Court will sentence the defendant as a
level 18, 19 or 20 and criminal history category I offender,
for which the advisory Guidelines range is 27-41 months'
imprisonment.

8. The United States agrees that in the event that SINNOTT fully and
completely abides by all conditions of this agreement, the United States
will:

a. Not prosecute SINNOTT, in the District of Vermont, for any
other offenses, known to the United States Attorney at the
time this agreement is signed, which relate to SINNOTT'S
involvement with the Law Centers for Consumer Protection,
Debt Settlement Associates, or any related entity; and

b. Move at the time of sentencing to dismiss the remaining
counts of the second superseding indictment.

9. SINNOTT agrees he will not contest the forfeiture of the
above-mentioned property listed in Paragraph 1 above and Count 27 of the
second superseding indictment, and the D.B. McKenna & Co. IRA account, file
any claim to that property or cause any other person to file a claim to it.
SINNOTT agrees all items of property are forfeitable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§§ 98l(a)(1)(C), 982, 984, 1956, 1957, 1961, 2314, and 28 U.S.C. §
2461(c).

10. SINNOTT agrees that he will cooperate with the Government by
taking whatever steps are deemed necessary by the Government in order to
carry out and implement the terms and conditions of these paragraphs.
SINNOTT agrees that the Ford Explorer may be forfeited once the court has
accepted the plea agreement, even if sentencing has not yet taken place.
The Government agrees not to seek a preliminary order of forfeiture of the
accounts maintained at D.B. McKenna & Co. until sentencing. SINNOTT agrees
that if for any reason this criminal forfeiture cannot be accomplished, the
Government may at any time (without regard to any statute of limitations or
doctrine of laches) bring a civil forfeiture complaint against all or part
of the same property. In the event of any such filing, SINNOTT, will not
file a claim nor contest the forfeiture in any way and will not cause any
other person to file a claim or contest the forfeiture. Under such
circumstances, SINNOTT agrees that the property may be sold immediately or
at any time of the Government's choosing.

11. SINNOTT agrees that by entering into this plea agreement he
voluntarily and knowingly waives any claim he may have that the forfeiture,
administrative or judicial, civil or criminal, of the property or any other
administrative or judicial forfeiture action arising out of the course of
conduct that provides the factual basis of the information herein, alone or
in conjunction with this prosecution, in any way violates any of his
rights, including his rights under the Fifth and Eighth Amendments to the
United States Constitution. SINNOTT's waiver specifically includes any
claim that any such forfeiture, whether preceding or following this
criminal prosecution, would constitute double jeopardy, cruel and unusual
punishment, an excessive fine, a disproportionate punishment, or a
violation of due process. SINNOTT's waiver also includes a waiver of any
rights to a jury trial on the forfeiture of assets.

12. SINNOTT agrees that forfeiture of the above-mentioned property
listed in Count 27 of the second superseding indictment shall not be deemed
as satisfaction of any fine, restitution, cost of imprisonment or any other
penalty this Court may impose upon SINNOTT, in addition to forfeiture.
Nevertheless, because it intends to use all forfeited proceeds to pay
restitution to victims in this case, the United States agrees that the net
value that the Government realizes upon the seizure or sale of any property
forfeited pursuant to this plea agreement shall be credited against any
restitution judgment the Court may impose on SINNOTT. The parties agree
that partial funding of SINNOTT'S obligation for restitution and/or fine
shall be effectuated as set forth in paragraph 13.

13. SINNOTT understands that the Court will enter a judgment for
restitution against him in this criminal case. Accordingly, he wishes to
liquidate certain real estate and to pay the net proceeds to the United
States in partial satisfaction of such obligation(s).

(a) SINNOTT represents that he has a current ownership
interest in only two parcels of real property. The first
property is located on Monument [Avenue] in Bennington,
Vermont and includes a house and other improvements
("Bennington Property"). The second property consists of
22.5 acres, more or less, of undeveloped land located in
Wilmington, Vermont ("Wilmington Property"). SINNOTT
represents that he owns these two parcels of real estate with
his wife as tenants by the entireties and that he has an
undivided one-half interest in both parcels. SINNOTT
represents that the net equity (fair market value less
encumbrances) in the Bennington Property exceeds his net
equity in the Wilmington Property. SINNOTT agrees that he
shall not transfer title to or allow any encumbrances upon
these two parcels prior to sentencing and entry of judgment
as to him. SINNOTT also agrees that the United States will
obtain fair market appraisals of these two parcels and that
its agents may enter upon the parcels for this purpose upon
reasonable notice to SINNOTT.

(b) SINNOTT agrees and understands that the United States
shall have an immediate statutory lien on the Bennington
Property and the Wilmington Property pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §
3613 as security for any fine and/or restitution imposed by
the Court upon entry of judgment as to him.

(c) So long as the appraised net equity in the Bennington
Property exceeds the appraised net equity in the Wilmington
Property, SINNOTT and his wife shall offer the Bennington
Property for sale immediately and shall use their best
efforts to sell the property within twelve months of the
signing of this plea agreement. SINNOTT shall immediately
notify the United States of the name and address of the
proposed purchaser(s) and proposed sale price and the United
States shall have three business days to approve or
disapprove the sale[, such consent not to be unreasonably
withheld.] Any listing agreement with a real estate broker
or agent shall provide that any sale is contingent upon the
approval of United States. Upon sale of the Bennington agrees
to pay to the United States fifty percent of the net sale
proceeds in whole or partial satisfaction of any obligation
for restitution that he is ordered to pay. The term "net sale
proceeds" means the gross sale price less reasonable costs
for real estate brokerage fees (including advertising) and
the payoff of any mortgages or liens encumbering the property
that have a priority over the lien of the United States (as
well as any necessary fees for the filing of mortgage
satisfactions or other miscellaneous fees such as a state
transfer tax obligation, if applicable) plus credits, if any,
for prorated taxes, municipal fees, heating fuel and any
other applicable prorations. At the sale closing, the United
States shall release its lien only insofar as the lien
encumbers the Bennington Property. A copy of a draft
settlement statement that projects the closing costs and
credits shall be provided to the United States three days in
advance of the closing. The United States shall apply this
payment in partial satisfaction of SINNOTT'S obligation for
restitution.

(d) SINNOTT further understands that the statutory lien of
the United States shall remain upon his fifty percent share
in the Wilmington Property for the statutory life of the lien
or until SINNOTT pays to the United States fifty percent of
the value of the above noted appraisal of the Wilmington
Property to be commissioned by the United States pursuant to
paragraph 13(a). The United States agrees not to foreclose
its lien on the Wilmington Property provided that SINNOTT
does not transfer title to the Wilmington Property, continues
to own it with his wife by the entireties, permits no liens,
mortgages or other encumbrances to cloud the title, and pays
all taxes and municipal assessments when due. If SINNOTT pays
to the United States a sum equal to fifty percent of the
appraised value of the Wilmington Property pursuant to
paragraph 13(a), the United States shall release its
statutory lien as to the Wilmington Property only insofar as
the lien encumbers the Wilmington Property. The United States
shall apply this payment in partial satisfaction of SINNOTT'S
obligation for a criminal fine and/or restitution.

14. SINNOTT agrees that he will provide a copy of any financial
affidavit prepared during the course of the Probation Office's presentence
investigation to the United States at the same time it is provided to the
Probation Office. In addition, he specifically hereby authorizes the
Probation Office to provide the United States with a copy of any and all
financial affidavits submitted to it by him.

15. If the United States determines, in its sole discretion, that the
defendant has committed any offense after the date of this agreement, or
violated any condition of release, or has failed to cooperate fully with
the Probation Department regarding the offense of conviction, or has
provided any intentionally false, incomplete or misleading information to
Probation, the United States' obligations under paragraph 8 of this
agreement will be void; the United States will have the right to recommend
that the Court impose any sentence authorized by law; and will also have
the right to prosecute the defendant for any other offenses he may have
committed in the District of Vermont. The defendant understands and agrees
that, under such circumstances, he will have no right to withdraw his
previously entered plea of guilty.

16. In voluntarily pleading guilty, SINNOTT acknowledges that he
understands the nature of the charges to which the plea is offered. He also
acknowledges that he has the right to plead not guilty or to persist in a
plea of not guilty; that he has the right to be tried by a jury and at that
trial a right to the assistance of counsel; that he has the right to
confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses; that he has the right against
compelled self-incrimination; that if a plea of guilty is accepted by the
Court, there will be no further trial of any kind, so that by pleading
guilty he waives the right to a trial and the other rights enumerated here.

17. The United States specifically reserves the right to allocute at
sentencing. There shall be no limit on the information the United States
may present to the Court and the Probation Office relevant to sentencing
and the positions the United States may take regarding sentencing (except
as specifically provided elsewhere in this agreement). The United States
also reserves the right to correct any misstatement of fact made during the
sentencing process, to oppose any motion to withdraw a plea of guilty
previously entered and to support on appeal any decisions of the sentencing
Court whether in agreement or in conflict with recommendations and
stipulations

18. It is further understood and agreed by the parties that should the
defendant's plea not be accepted by the Court for whatever reason, or later
be withdrawn or vacated, this agreement may be voided at the option of the
United States and the defendant may be prosecuted for any and all offenses
otherwise permissible.

19. It is further understood that this agreement is limited to the
Office of the United States Attorney for the District of Vermont and cannot
bind other federal, state or local prosecuting authorities.

20. SINNOTT expressly states that he makes this agreement of his own
free will, with full knowledge and understanding of the agreement and with
the advice and assistance of his counsel, Lisa Shelkrot, Esq. SINNOTT
further states that his plea of guilty is not the result of any threats or
of any promises beyond the provisions of this agreement. Furthermore,
SINNOTT expressly states that he is fully satisfied with the representation
provided to him by his attorney and has had full opportunity to consult
with his attorney concerning this agreement, concerning the applicability
and impact of the sentencing guidelines (including, but not limited to, the
relevant conduct provisions of U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, and concerning the
potential terms and conditions of supervised release.

21. No agreements have been made by the parties or their counsel other
than those contained herein.

22. It is agreed that a copy of this agreement shall be filed with the
Court before the time of the defendant's change of plea.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
DAVID V. KIRBY
United States Attorney

Date: February 8, 2005

/s/
_______________________
GREGORY L. WAPLES
JAMES J. GELBER
Assistant U.S. Attorneys

Date: 2/8/05

/s/
_________________________
HOWARD SINNOT
Defendant

I, Lisa B. Shelkrot, Esq., have read, fully reviewed and explained
this agreement to my client, Howard Sinnott, and I hereby approve of it.

Date: 2/8/05

/s/
________________________
LISA B. SHELKROT, ESQ.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

STATE OF VERMONT
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY BOARD

In Re: Howard Sinnott, Esq., Respondent
PRB File No. 2002.240

Statement of Additional Facts

NOW COMES Michael Kennedy and, pursuant to Rule 19B of Administrative
Order 9, submits this Statement of Additional Facts.

1. The Respondent, Howard Sinnott, is an attorney licensed to practice
law in the State of Vermont.

2. From 2000 to 2002, Attorney Sinnott operated a law firm in
Bennington. The firm was called "The Law Centers for Consumer Protection"
(hereinafter "LCCP") and focused on representing clients who were in debt.

3. LCCP was a direct descendant of a New York firm that was known as
The Law Centers of Andrew Capoccia. The Capoccia firm formed in 1997 and
focused on providing debt reduction services to clients who had difficulty
making payments on unsecured debt. The firm attempted to convince a
client's creditors to agree to settle the client's debt for a reduced sum.
The firm took its fee in the form of a percentage of the net reduction it
negotiated on behalf of a client. Attorney Sinnott was an associate in
Attorney Capoccia's firm.

4. In the spring of 2000, and for reasons not related to this
proceeding, it became clear that Attorney Capoccia was going to be
disbarred by New York disciplinary authorities. In anticipation of
Attorney Capoccia's disbarment, Attorney Sinnott and other lawyers in the
Capoccia firm purchased the firm's assets, charged its name, and moved its
base of operations to Bennington, Vermont. Upon arriving in Vermont, LCCP
continued to focus on providing debt reduction services.

[5. ... ]

6. In June of 2001, two ethics complaints were filed against Attorney
Sinnott here in Vermont. Through counsel, Attorney Sinnott filed an answer
to the complaints. Exhibit B is a copy of his answer. Attorney Sinnott's
answer describes the manner in which firm's debt reduction program
operated.

7. By October of 2001, over twenty ethics complaints had been filed
against Attorney Sinnott in Vermont. On October 1, 2001, Disciplinary
Counsel petitioned the Supreme Court for the interim suspension of Attorney
Sinnott's license to practice law. The petition was denied.

8. On March 10, 2003, a grand jury in the United States District Court
for the District of Vermont indicted Attorney Sinnott and other
lawyers/employees associated with LCCP.

9. On September 14, 2004, the grand jury returned a "Second
Superseding Indictment" against Attorney Sinnott. Exhibit C is a copy of the
Second Superseding Indictment.

10. On February 8, 2005, Attorney Slnnott entered into a plea
agreement in which he pled guilty to Counts 11 and 13 of the Second
Superseding Indictment. Exhibit D is a copy of the plea agreement. Attorney
Sinnott has yet to be sentenced.

DATED at Burlington, Vermont, on July 21, 2005

/s/
___________________________
Michael Kennedy
Disciplinary Counsel
32 Cherry Street, Suite 213
Burlington, Vermont 05403
(802) 859-3000

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

State of Vermont
Professional Responsibility Program

In Re: Howard Sinnott, Esq., Respondent
PRB File No. 2002.240

Affidavit of Resignation

NOW COMES Howard Sinnott, being duly sworn, and, pursuant to Rule
19(A) of Administrative Order 9, submits this Affidavit of Resignation.

1. I am an attorney licensed to practice law in Vermont.

2. I was admitted to the Vermont Bar on September 2, 1986.

3. I desire to resign from the Vermont Bar.

4. This resignation is freely and voluntarily rendered.

5. I was not subjected to coercion or duress in tendering this
resignation.

6. I have reviewed Administrative Order 9 and I am fully aware of the
implications of submitting this resignation.

7. I am aware that Disciplinary Counsel is presently investigating
whether I am guilty of misconduct that violates the Vermont Rules of
Professional Conduct. Specifically, I am aware that Disciplinary Counsel is
investigating whether I violated the Rules of Professional Conduct by
conspiring with others to transmit interstate commerce money that had been
stolen, converted or taken by fraud from funds that had been entrusted to
my law firm by clients thereof.

8. I acknowledge that the material facts upon which Disciplinary
Counsel's investigation is predicated are true. That is, I acknowledge that
on February 8, 2005, I executed a plea agreement in which 1 pled guilty to
two counts of a federal indictment that charged me with the interstate
transmittal/transportation of stolen money, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
2314

9. I am submitting this resignation because I know that if
disciplinary charges were predicated upon the misconduct under
investigation by Disciplinary Counsel that I could not successfully defend
against them.

10. I am aware that, pursuant to Rule 19(B) of Administrative Order 9,
Disciplinary Counsel will file a statement of facts relating to the
misconduct under investigation.

11. The facts recited herein are based on my personal knowledge and I
believe them to be true.

Dates at [Bennington], Vermont, on this 2 day of July, 2005.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/
________________________
Howard Sinnott

Subscribed and sworn before me At [Bennington], Vermont, on this day
14 day of July, 2005.

/s/
_____________________________
Notary Public
My commission expires on 2/10/07

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