Sandgate School District v. Cate

Sandgate School District v. Cate (2004-286); 178 Vt. 625; 883 A.2d 774

2005 VT 88

[Filed 28-Jul-2005]

                                        ENTRY ORDER

                                        2005 VT  88

                             SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2004-286

                                     

    Sandgate School District             }        APPEALED FROM:
                                         }
         v.                              }        Bennington Superior Court
                                         }
    Richard H. Cate,                     }
    Commissioner of Education            }
    and Alan Watts                       }        



       ¶  1. Plaintiff Sandgate School District (Sandgate) appeals a
  decision from the Bennington Superior Court denying its motion for relief
  from judgment.  The original motion for relief was filed after the superior
  court granted the opposing party's motion on the pleadings because Sandgate
  had failed to file a response.  We affirm.

       ¶  2. The facts of the underlying case are as follows:  Defendant
  Alan Watts and his family resided in the Sandgate School District. 
  Sandgate does not maintain its own schools, but issues tuition payments to
  families with children to offset costs incurred for schooling outside of
  the district or in private schools.  After Watts and his wife divorced, the
  children moved from the district with their mother.  Watts' residency
  status within the district became uncertain when he leased the Sandgate
  home in September 2001, retaining only the garage and a room above the
  garage that lacked plumbing.  Watts sold the home to his lessees in March
  2002.  Sandgate refused to issue tuition payments to Watts without proof of
  residency, and Watts appealed to the Department of Education, which ruled
  in Watts' favor.  In September 2003, Sandgate filed suit against Watts and
  Commissioner of Education Richard Cate, alleging that the Department erred
  when it found that Watts was a resident eligible for tuition payments.

       ¶  3. In the three months after Sandgate filed its complaint,
  defendant Cate filed two motions to dismiss on procedural grounds. 
  Sandgate responded to each motion in turn, and each was denied by the
  superior court.  In January 2004, the court issued an entry order requiring
  the parties to file a discovery stipulation regarding deadlines by which
  the parties would file transcripts and legal briefs relating to the case. 
  Neither party made any filings to comply with the court order.  Two days
  after the court's entry order was issued, defendant Cate filed a motion for
  judgment on the pleadings.  Sandgate filed no response to defendant's
  motion.

       ¶  4. In April 2004, the superior court issued an entry order
  granting defendant's motion because of Sandgate's failure to respond.
  Sandgate then filed a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Vermont
  Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b).  Sandgate explained that it did not respond
  to defendant's motion because the court had denied defendant's two previous
  motions.  It believed defendant's motion on the pleadings added no new
  substantive arguments to those presented in the previous motions and had
  assumed that the court would deny defendant's motion.  The court denied
  Sandgate's Rule 60(b) motion without a hearing.  Sandgate then appealed to
  this Court.

       ¶  5. Sandgate maintains that the superior court abused its
  discretion when it declined to grant relief from the judgment and erred by
  not holding a hearing on its Rule 60(b) motion.  Sandgate's original motion
  was made under Rule 60(b) generally;  its brief on appeal appears focused
  on Rule 60(b)(6), but also cites cases that rely on Rule 60(b)(1).  As an
  excuse for its failure to respond to the motion on the pleadings, Sandgate
  points to its incorrect belief that a response was unnecessary.  Sandgate
  also argues that if the trial court's decision is affirmed, it will be
  without a venue in which to argue the merits of its case.  Additionally,
  Sandgate invites this Court to decide the substantive legal issues of the
  original case and clarify an allegedly muddy residence standard under 16
  V.S.A. §  1075(a)(3).  Because we find that the superior court did not err
  in denying Sandgate's Rule 60(b) motion, we decline to examine the other
  issues raised in Sandgate's appeal.

       ¶  6. The standard of review for Rule 60(b) motions is well
  established.  The trial court has discretion when ruling on a motion for
  relief from judgment under Rule 60(b).  Estate of Emilo v. St. Pierre, 146
  Vt. 421, 423, 505 A.2d 664, 665 (1985).  Absent a clear and affirmative
  abuse of discretion, a motion for relief from judgment will not be
  disturbed on appeal.  Id. The moving party carries the burden of proving
  that such an abuse occurred.  Green Mountain Bank v. Magic Mountain Corp.,
  148 Vt. 247, 248, 531 A.2d 604, 605 (1987).

       ¶  7. Rule 60(b)(1) provides for relief from judgment for the
  reasons of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.  However,
  Rule 60(b)(1) "does not operate to protect a party from tactical decisions
  which in retrospect may seem ill advised."  Okemo Mountain, Inc. v. Okemo
  Trailside Condos., Inc., 139 Vt. 433, 436, 431 A.2d 457, 459 (1981).  Rule
  60(b)(6) provides for relief from judgment for reasons not addressed in the
  first five subsections of Rule 60(b).  Alexander v. Dupuis, 140 Vt. 122,
  124, 435 A.2d 693, 694 (1981).  Relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(6) is
  intended to "prevent hardship or injustice and thus [is] to be liberally
  construed and applied.  Nevertheless, clause (6) of the Rule may not be
  used to relieve a party from free, calculated, and deliberate choices he
  has made."  Estate of Emilo, 146 Vt. at 423-24, 505 A.2d  at 665-66
  (internal quotations and citations omitted).

       ¶  8. This Court has held that where a party simply disregards the
  court's rules, such neglect is inexcusable and there is no error in a trial
  court's denial of a Rule 60(b) motion.  For example, in Margison v.
  Spriggs, 146 Vt. 116, 499 A.2d 756 (1985), the defendant appealed the
  denial of his Rule 60(b) motion for relief from a summary judgment.  In
  opposing summary judgment, the defendant had filed a memorandum, but no
  responsive affidavits.  In support of his Rule 60(b) motion, the defendant
  pointed to his counsel's belief that a responsive memorandum would suffice,
  despite District Court Civil Rule 56(e)'s provision requiring a party to
  set out specific facts showing that there is a genuine triable issue.  We
  affirmed the trial court's denial of the  Rule 60(b) motion, holding that
  the defendant's failure to submit the affidavits because he believed a
  responsive memorandum was sufficient was not excusable neglect.  Id. at
  120, 499 A.2d  at 758-59.  In words that ring remarkably true to the instant
  case, we noted that "[a]t best, this was an ill-advised tactical decision,
  or mistake of law, for which Rule 60(b) does not provide relief."  Id. at
  120, 499 A.2d  at 759 (citations omitted);  see also Okemo Mountain, Inc.,
  139 Vt. at 436, 431 A.2d  at 459 (affirming trial court's denial of a
  party's Rule 60(b) motion and holding that the party's failure to introduce
  evidence at trial because the party believed the strength of their case
  made the evidence unnecessary was not an excusable mistake or error);  Kotz
  v. Kotz, 134 Vt. 36, 41, 349 A.2d 882, 885 (1975) (ruling that a party's
  failure to file an answer was not due to mistake, inadvertence, or
  excusable neglect, and that "the fact that the defendant and his then
  counsel gambled and lost is not ground for granting relief from ...
  judgment").  While the defendant in Margison did file some response, albeit
  incomplete, in this case Sandgate opted not to file any response under the
  assumption that the court would dismiss the defendant's motion on the
  pleadings, as it had the defendant's two previous motions.  Sandgate's
  decision to rest on that assumption is akin to the "tactical decisions" at
  issue in  Margison;  Okemo Mountain, Inc., and Kotz, and is not the sort of
  mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect contemplated by Rule 60(b).

       ¶  9. In support of its argument that relief from judgment should be
  granted, Sandgate cites Vahlteich v. Knott, 139 Vt. 588, 433 A.2d 287
  (1981), and Bingham v. Tenney, 154 Vt. 96, 573 A.2d 1185 (1990).  However,
  both cases involved pro se litigants, to whom the Court has traditionally
  given wider leeway in the event of error.  Indeed, in both cases we
  concluded that without Rule 60(b) relief, "unconscionable advantage" would
  be taken of the pro se litigants.  Vahlteich, 139 Vt. at 591, 433 A.2d  at
  288;  Bingham, 154 Vt. at 100, 573 A.2d  at 1187.  In contrast, Sandgate is
  represented by counsel and had filed two prior responses to motions,
  indicating that Sandgate and its attorneys understood both the mechanics
  and the necessity of filing a response.

       ¶  10.  Sandgate also argues that denying the motion for relief from
  judgment effectively denies Sandgate the opportunity to present its
  arguments on the merits of the case, and that such a denial was an extreme
  measure for the superior court to take.  Furthermore, Sandgate asserts that
  the legal implications of the case have significance for other school
  districts wrestling with residency concerns, and therefore the case has
  importance beyond the immediate concerns of Sandgate.  Sandgate's argument
  is unconvincing.  Sandgate itself missed the opportunity to present the
  arguments of its case when it failed to file a response to the motion on
  the pleadings.  That the case may be important to other parties does not
  relieve Sandgate's burden to comply with the court's requirements in a
  timely manner.

       ¶  11.  Because Sandgate has not given any convincing reason that it
  is eligible for relief from judgment due to mistake, inadvertence, or
  excusable neglect under Rule 60(b)(1) or any other reason under Rule
  60(b)(6), we conclude that the superior court did not abuse its discretion
  when it denied Sandgate's motion for relief from judgment.

       ¶  12.  Next, Sandgate contends that the superior court erred by not
  holding a hearing on its Rule 60(b) motion.  Sandgate correctly asserts
  that hearings are preferred for Rule 60(b) motions.  West v. West, 139 Vt.
  334, 335, 428 A.2d 1116, 1117 (1981).  Such hearings, however, are at the
  discretion of the trial court and are unnecessary where the grounds for the
  motion are frivolous or totally lacking in merit.  Id. Moreover, when a
  court finds that the explanations offered by a party are unreasonable, it
  is within its discretion to deny the motion without a hearing.  Altman v.
  Altman, 169 Vt. 562, 564, 730 A.2d 583, 586 (1999) (mem.).

       ¶  13.  Sandgate's motion for relief was without merit;  it did not
  state with particularity the grounds for relief under Rule 60(b), nor did
  it provide a sufficient reason for its failure to file a response.  See
  Gardner v. Town of Ludlow, 135 Vt. 87, 92, 369 A.2d 1382, 1385 (1977)
  (affirming the trial court's denial of Rule 59 motion without a hearing
  where motion insufficiently demonstrated that party's rights were affected
  by ruling, was poorly crafted, provided no excuse for the party's lack of
  diligence, and did not state with particularity the grounds relied upon for
  relief);  West, 139 Vt. at 335, 428 A.2d  at 1117 (applying Gardner to Rule
  60(b) motion).  Thus, the court did not err when it denied Sandgate's
  motion without a hearing.

       ¶  14.  Sandgate has not demonstrated that it is entitled to relief
  from judgment under Rule 60(b).  The dismissal on the pleadings is the
  direct result of Sandgate's deliberate inaction, and Rule 60(b) does not
  exist to repair damage that results from a party's strategical errors.  We
  therefore conclude that the superior court properly exercised its
  discretion when it denied Sandgate's motion for relief from judgment.

       Affirmed.

   BY THE COURT:


                                             
  _______________________________________
  Paul L. Reiber, Chief Justice
                                             
  _______________________________________
  John A. Dooley, Associate Justice
                                             
  _______________________________________
  Denise R. Johnson, Associate Justice

  _______________________________________
  Marilyn S. Skoglund, Associate Justice

  _______________________________________
  Frederic W. Allen, Chief Justice (Ret.),
  Specially Assigned