Faulkner v. Caledonia County Fair Assn. (2003-433); 178 Vt. 51; 869 A.2d 103
2004 VT 123
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
2004 VT 123
Dorrie L. Faulkner Supreme Court
On Appeal from
v. Caledonia Superior Court
Caledonia County Fair Association and June Term, 2004
Marc's Amusement Co., Inc.
Mark J. Keller, J.
Jan Peter Dembinski of Jan Peter Dembinski, PLC, Woodstock, and Herbert G.
Ogden of Liccardi Crawford & Ogden, P.C., Rutland, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
John Paul Faignant of Miller Faignant & Behrens, P.C., Rutland, for
PRESENT: Amestoy, C.J., (FN1) Dooley, (FN2) Johnson, Skoglund
and Reiber, JJ.
¶ 1. SKOGLUND, J. In this personal injury action, plaintiff
appeals the Caledonia Superior Court's August 28, 2003 decision granting
defendants' motion to dismiss. Plaintiff argues on appeal that this action
is sufficiently distinct from the lawsuit she filed, and eventually won,
for injuries sustained as a result of the same occurrence giving rise to
her current lawsuit. Because we agree with the trial court that the
doctrine of claim preclusion bars plaintiff from relitigating the personal
injury claims she pressed in her first lawsuit, we affirm.
¶ 2. The parties do not contest the relevant facts. In 1991,
plaintiff sustained injuries when a large metal panel struck her head while
she was on an amusement ride at the Caledonia County Fair run by defendant
Caledonia County Fair Association (County Fair). In 1994, plaintiff sued
the operator of the ride, defendant Marc's Amusement Co., Inc. (Marc's),
for damages resulting from her head injuries. In 1995, the U.S. District
Court rendered a verdict in her favor for $5,000, and she successfully
collected that amount.
¶ 3. On November 12, 1999, plaintiff suffered her first grand mal
seizure. On April 5, 2000, her treating physician diagnosed her with
epilepsy and determined that the 1991 head injury was the proximate cause
of the epilepsy. In November 2002, plaintiff sued both defendants, seeking
damages for the epilepsy that allegedly resulted from the 1991 injury.
Defendants jointly filed a motion to dismiss in May 2003.
¶ 4. In the decision currently on appeal, the trial court granted
defendants' motion to dismiss on two grounds. First, the court agreed with
defendants that plaintiff's epilepsy claim was barred by the doctrine of
claim preclusion, (FN3) because plaintiff's current claim differs from her
1994 claim only in that she currently alleges a more serious injury to her
head. Further, the court held that its ruling applied to both defendants
(even though plaintiff sued only Marc's in her first action) because they
were in privity. Second, the trial court found that plaintiff's claim was
time-barred under 12 V.S.A. § 512(4). (FN4) Plaintiff then filed this
¶ 5. In reviewing a trial court's grant of a motion to dismiss, this
Court accepts as true "all factual allegations pleaded in the complaint"
and draws "all reasonable inferences from those facts." Gilman v. Maine
Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 2003 VT 55, ¶ 14, 175 Vt. 554, 830 A.2d 71 (mem.).
"[W]hether preclusion applies to a given set of facts is a question of law,
which we review de novo." In re Tariff Filing of Cent. Vt. Pub. Svc.
Corp., 172 Vt. 14, 19, 769 A.2d 668, 673 (2001) [hereinafter In re CVPSC].
¶ 6. As a preliminary matter, we note that plaintiff does not
challenge the trial court's conclusion that, by virtue of the indemnity
obligation and the unity of interests between them, privity exists between
the two defendants for claim preclusion purposes. See In re Dunnett, 172
Vt. 196, 203 n.*, 776 A.2d 406, 412 n.* (2001) (stating that this Court
will not address issues on appeal that are not briefed). Although
plaintiff notes that in her first suit she sued Marc's and that in the
present suit she is suing Marc's and the County Fair, she presents no
argument or authority to suggest that the trial court's conclusion was
incorrect. Therefore, the trial court correctly concluded that if claim
preclusion barred plaintiff's claim against Marc's, it also barred her
claim against the County Fair.
¶ 7. The crux of plaintiff's argument is that the trial court erred
in applying claim preclusion because the cause of action in her current
lawsuit is distinct from her prior lawsuit. However, as the trial court
correctly explained, "plaintiff is pursuing the identical case she pursued
in 1994 except that she is alleging that the injury to her head was more
¶ 8. Under the doctrine of claim preclusion, a final judgment in
previous litigation bars subsequent litigation if the parties, subject
matter, and cause(s) of action in both matters are the same or
substantially identical. Pomfret Farms, L.P. v. Pomfret Assoc., 174 Vt.
280, 284, 811 A.2d 655, 659 (2002). The doctrine applies both to claims
that were or should have been litigated in the prior proceeding. In re
CVPSC, 172 Vt. at 20, 769 A.2d at 673. Claim preclusion flows from the
fundamental precept that a final judgment on the merits "puts an end to the
cause of action, which cannot again be brought into litigation between the
parties upon any ground whatever." Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110,
130 (1983) (quoting Comm'r v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597 (1948)).
¶ 9. The doctrine of claim preclusion advances the efficient and
fair administration of justice because it serves "(1) to conserve the
resources of courts and litigants by protecting them against piecemeal or
repetitive litigation; (2) to prevent vexatious litigation; (3) to promote
the finality of judgments and encourage reliance on judicial decisions; and
(4) to decrease the chances of inconsistent adjudication." In re CVPSC,
172 Vt. at 20, 769 A.2d at 673. By furthering these objectives, the
ensures "the very object for which civil courts have been
established, which is to secure the peace and repose of society by
the settlement of matters capable of judicial determination. Its
enforcement is essential to the maintenance of social order; for,
the aid of judicial tribunals would not be invoked . . . if . . .
conclusiveness did not attend the judgments of such tribunals."
Nevada, 463 U.S. at 129 (quoting S. Pac. R.R. Co. v. United States, 168 U.S. 1, 49 (1897)); see also Russell v. Atkins, 165 Vt. 176, 179, 679 A.2d 333, 335 (1996) (recognizing that "[r]es judicata is intended to protect
the courts and the parties from the burdens of relitigation").
¶ 10. The policies underlying the doctrine of claim preclusion are
so fundamental to our precedent-based legal system that the U.S. Supreme
Court has refused to recognize "public policy" and "simple justice" as
rationales for avoiding the doctrine's strict application. Federated Dep't
Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 401-02 (1981); see also 18 Charles
Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 4415, at 379 (2d ed.
2002) (noting that Federated Dep't Stores "virtually extinguishes the
prospect that a general fairness exception will be engrafted on claim
preclusion rules"). As the Supreme Court stated, " '[s]imple justice' is
achieved when a complex body of law developed over a period of years is
evenhandedly applied." Federated Dep't Stores, 452 U.S. at 401. The Court
also observed that " '[p]ublic policy dictates that there be an end of
litigation; that those who have contested an issue shall be bound by the
result of the contest, and that matters once tried shall be considered
forever settled as between the parties.' " Id. (quoting Baldwin v.
Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522, 525 (1931)). As a result, claim
preclusion generally will not yield to the equities of a particular case:
"The doctrine of res judicata serves vital public interests beyond any
individual judge's ad hoc determination of the equities in a particular
case. There is simply 'no principle of law or equity which sanctions the
rejection by a federal court of the salutary principle of res judicata.' "
Id. (quoting Heiser v. Woodruff, 327 U.S. 726, 733 (1946)).
¶ 11. With these considerations in mind, we turn to the question of
whether plaintiff's current lawsuit articulates a new claim, or attempts to
relitigate the claim concluded by her prior lawsuit. In determining
whether two causes of action are sufficiently similar for claim preclusion
purposes, this Court has focused on whether the same evidence will support
both of them. See, e.g., State v. Dann, 167 Vt. 119, 125, 702 A.2d 105,
109 (1997) ("For the purposes of claim preclusion, two causes of action are
the same if they can be supported by the same evidence."); Am. Trucking
Assn's v. Conway, 152 Vt. 363, 370, 566 A.2d 1323, 1328 (1989) ("This Court
has previously characterized causes of action as the same for purposes of
claim preclusion where 'the same evidence will support the action in both
instances.' " (quoting Hill v. Grandey, 132 Vt. 460, 463, 321 A.2d 28, 31
(1974))). This approach tracks the first Restatement of Judgments, which
deemed causes of action the same for claim preclusion purposes "if the
evidence needed to sustain the second action would have sustained the first
action." Restatement of Judgments § 61 (1942).
¶ 12. As the U.S. Supreme Court has noted, however, "[d]efinitions
of what constitutes the 'same cause of action' have not remained static
over time." Nevada, 463 U.S. at 130. Indeed, the trend has been toward a
broader approach, embodied in the Restatement (Second) of Judgments,
requiring a plaintiff to address in one lawsuit all injuries emanating from
"all or any part of the transaction, or series of connected transactions,
out of which the action arose." Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24(1)
(1982) [hereinafter Restatement (Second)]; see also 18 Wright et al.,
supra, § 4407 n.22 (observing that "[t]oo many states have adopted the
Restatement test to provide a complete list" and collecting examples);
Note, Claim Preclusion in Modern Latent Disease Cases: A Proposal for
Allowing Second Suits, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1989, 1991 (1990) (observing that
most courts have abandoned "old tests," including whether the later case
involves the same evidence as the earlier case, in favor of the
Restatement's transactional approach). The Supreme Court, in comparing the
first and second Restatements, characterized the second Restatement's
transaction-based definition as a "more pragmatic approach." Nevada, 463 U.S. at 130 n.12.
¶ 13. Under the second Restatement, the scope of a "transaction" is
determined by "giving weight to such considerations as whether the facts
are related in time, space, origin, or motivation, whether they form a
convenient trial unit, and whether their treatment as a unit conforms to
the parties' expectations or business understanding or usage." Restatement
(Second) § 24(2). In making this assessment, "no single factor is
determinative." Id. § 24 cmt. b. Additionally, "even when there is not a
substantial overlap [between proofs relevant to two actions], the second
action may be precluded if it stems from the same transaction." Id. Thus,
it follows from this flexible definition that "[w]here one act causes a
number of harms to, or invades a number of different interests of the same
person, there is still but one transaction." Id. § 24 cmt. c.
¶ 14. Indeed, the current Restatement's approach precludes a second
lawsuit arising out of the same transaction as a prior lawsuit even where
the second action will include "evidence or grounds or theories of the case
not presented in the first action, or . . . remedies or forms of relief not
demanded in the first action." Id. § 25. Moreover, "[i]t is immaterial
that in trying the first action [plaintiff] was not in possession of enough
information about the damages, past or prospective, or that the damages
turned out in fact to be unexpectedly large and in excess of the judgment."
Id. § 25 cmt. c (emphasis added).
¶ 15. Adopting these principles, we conclude that plaintiff's claim
for relief in the instant case arises out of the same transaction that gave
rise to the prior lawsuit. The facts underlying both cases are
inextricably "related in time, space, origin, or motivation," Restatement
(Second) § 24(2), because both actions spring from the same "origin"-the
1991 accident. As a result, there is substantial overlap between the
proofs of both claims, with the only difference being evidence concerning
the existence and cause of plaintiff's epilepsy. However, this discrepancy
does not necessarily militate in favor of finding two distinct
transactions, because "even when there is not a substantial overlap [of
witnesses and proofs], the second action may be precluded if it stems from
the same transaction." Id. § 24 cmt. b. Indeed, viewed together,
plaintiff's two lawsuits depict one act-the 1991 accident-that caused harm
to plaintiff. In such situations, "there is still but one transaction."
Id. § 24 cmt. c.
¶ 16. Finally, viewing the two cases as stemming from the same
transaction does not undermine the expectations of the parties. There is
nothing in the record to suggest that, at the time of plaintiff's first
lawsuit, either party expected anything other than the typical result in a
personal injury case-namely, a verdict that would conclude the matter
between them. As the Restatement approach recognizes, "even when the
injury caused by an actionable wrong extends into the future and will be
felt beyond the date of judgment, the damages awarded by the judgment are
nevertheless supposed to embody the money equivalent of the entire injury."
Id. § 25 cmt. c. Therefore, the fact that "in trying the first action
[plaintiff] was not in possession of enough information about the damages,
past or prospective, or that the damages turned out in fact to be
unexpectedly large and in excess of the judgment" is "immaterial" to the
claim preclusion analysis. Id. (emphasis added). Accordingly, we hold
that both actions arise out of the same transaction for claim preclusion
purposes, and, as a result, that this action is barred by the judgment in
the previous action. (FN5)
¶ 17. This case is distinguishable from the cases upon which
plaintiff relies that permitted subsequent actions for late-emerging latent
diseases resulting from exposure to asbestos or other workplace chemicals.
See, e.g., Pustejovsky v. Rapid-American Corp., 35 S.W.3d 643 (Tex. 2000)
(holding that plaintiff's suit against several suppliers of asbestos
products for asbestos-related cancer twelve years after settling suit
against a different asbestos supplier for asbestosis was not precluded by
claim preclusion); Rogers v. Kunja Knitting Mills, U.S.A., 520 S.E.2d 815
(S.C. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that claim preclusion did not bar plaintiff's
second lawsuit for damage to internal organs resulting from workplace
exposure to chemicals, despite earlier suit for dermatitis contracted from
same exposure). In the asbestos cases, courts permit plaintiffs to file
second suits for asbestos-related cancer, after filing asbestosis suits,
because cancer is a distinct injury unrelated to asbestosis, and it does
not surface until well beyond the limitations period. See Wilson v.
Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 684 F.2d 111, 117 n.33 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(Ginsburg, J.) (noting that defendant conceded that asbestos-related cancer
is separate and distinct from, and not a complication of, asbestosis). As
then Circuit Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote in Wilson, an asbestos case
"requires [the court] to focus, not on judgments and their preclusive
effects, but on statutes of limitations." Id. at 118. By contrast, the
instant case involves a traumatic injury the consequences of which turned
out to be more severe than they appeared at the time of plaintiff's first
lawsuit, not two separate and distinct diseases or injuries. Therefore,
the asbestos and similar workplace exposure cases are inapposite. See
Pustejovsky, 35 S.W.2d at 653-54 (limiting holding to asbestos-related
diseases resulting from workplace exposure).
¶ 18. The instant case is best viewed not as a latent disease case,
but as a "traumatic event/latent manifestation" case, "in which the
plaintiff has sustained both immediate and latent injuries caused by a
noticeable, traumatic occurrence." Albertson v. T.J. Stevenson & Co., 749 F.2d 223, 231 (5th Cir. 1984). Several courts have held that in such
cases, a single cause of action accrues for limitations purposes with the
occurrence of the traumatic event. See, e.g., Stephens v. Dixon, 536 N.W.2d 755, 758 (Mich. 1995) (holding that plaintiff's claim for
late-emerging neck disorder accrued when plaintiff sustained injuries in
car accident, not when she became aware of the disorder); Jones v. Trs. of
Bethany Coll., 351 S.E.2d 183, 187 (W. Va. 1986) (holding that claim
accrues when plaintiff sustains noticeable injury from a traumatic event,
even though there may be a latent injury arising from the same event).
Indeed, two courts have confronted late-emerging epilepsy claims stemming
from traumatic head injuries and concluded that each plaintiff's claim
accrued at the time of the initial injuries, not when the epilepsy emerged.
LeBeau v. Dimig, 446 N.W.2d 800, 802-03 (Iowa 1989); Rowe v. John Deere,
533 A.2d 375, 377-78 (N.H. 1987). The instant case fits the "traumatic
event/latent manifestation" profile-plaintiff's claim accrued when she
suffered the blow to her head in 1991, and it is "immaterial" for claim
preclusion purposes that her injuries turned out to be more severe than
those for which she sought damages in her 1994 lawsuit. Restatement
(Second) § 25 cmt. c.
¶ 19. Finally, we reject plaintiff's argument that Article 4 of
Chapter I of the Vermont Constitution militates against applying claim
preclusion here because doing so would be unfair. While the Restatement
recognizes that the policies behind claim preclusion may be overcome "for
an extraordinary reason," id. § 26(1)(f), such exceptions are "not lightly
to be found but must be based on a clear and convincing showing of need,"
id. § 26 cmt. I. As examples, the Restatement offers cases involving the
validity of a continuing restraint on liberty, child custody, divorce, or a
prior litigation that "failed to yield a coherent disposition." Id.
Because plaintiff alleges only that her injuries stemming from the 1991
accident turned out to be more serious than they appeared at the time of
the first lawsuit, she has not "clearly and convincingly shown that the
policies favoring preclusion . . . are overcome for an extraordinary
reason," id. § 26(1)(f). As explained above, the U.S. Supreme Court has
recognized that "the mischief which would follow the establishment of
precedent for so disregarding this salutary doctrine against prolonging
strife would be greater than the benefit which would result from relieving
some case of individual hardship." Federated Dep't Stores, 452 U.S. at 402
(quotations omitted). (FN6)
¶ 20. We are mindful that claim preclusion may cause harsh results
in individual cases, but on balance we conclude that applying it here best
serves the interests of all litigants and promotes the efficient
administration of justice, in light of the powerful policy concerns laid
out above. As the U.S. Supreme Court aptly recognized, the "doctrine of
res judicata is not a mere matter of practice or procedure inherited from a
more technical time than ours. It is a rule of fundamental and substantial
justice, of public policy and of private peace, which should be cordially
regarded and enforced by the courts." Federated Dep't Stores, 452 U.S. at
401 (quotations omitted). Therefore, the trial court correctly dismissed
the instant case.
FOR THE COURT:
FN1. Chief Justice Amestoy sat for oral argument but did not participate in
FN2. Justice Dooley sat for oral argument but did not participate in this
FN3. Although the trial court used the term "res judicata," the terms "res
judicata" and "claim preclusion" are often used interchangeably. See,
e.g., In re Tariff Filing of Cent. Vt. Pub. Svc. Corp., 172 Vt. 14, 20, 769 A.2d 668, 673 (2001). We use the term "claim preclusion" throughout this
opinion because "[t]he concept of res judicata embraces two doctrines,
claim preclusion and issue preclusion (or collateral estoppel), that bar,
respectively, a subsequent action or the subsequent litigation of a
particular issue because of the adjudication of a prior action." In re
Quechee Lakes Corp., 154 Vt. 543, 559, 580 A.2d 957, 966 (1990) (quotations
omitted). Because the question before us is whether the current action is
barred by plaintiff's prior lawsuit, this case requires us to consider the
doctrine of claim preclusion.
FN4. Because we hold that the doctrine of claim preclusion bars plaintiff's
current lawsuit, we do not reach the issue of whether the suit was timely
under 12 V.S.A. § 512(4).
FN5. We also note that the Restatement contemplates an exception to the
application of claim preclusion when "[t]he court in the first action has
expressly reserved the plaintiff's right to maintain the second action."
Restatement (Second) § 26(1)(b). If a party provides the court with
"special reasons" for doing so, the court should afford the party "an
opportunity to litigate in a second action that part of the claim which he
justifiably omitted from the first action." Id. § 26 cmt. b. The record
here does not reveal that plaintiff requested or the court decided in the
first action to reserve plaintiff's right to pursue a second action in the
event that her injuries turned out to be more severe.
FN6. In this regard, it is also worth noting a distinction between the
criteria for application of claim preclusion and those used in the context
of the related concept of issue preclusion (or collateral estoppel).
"[I]ssue preclusion bars the subsequent relitigation of an issue which was
actually litigated and decided in a prior case between the same parties
resulting in a final judgment on the merits, where that issue was necessary
to the resolution of the action." Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. Conway, 152 Vt.
363, 369, 566 A.2d 1323, 1327 (1989). In determining whether to apply
issue preclusion, we consider, among other elements, whether applying that
doctrine in the later action is fair. Berlin Convalescent Ctr. v.
Stoneman, 159 Vt. 53, 56-57, 615 A.2d 141, 144 (1992). As set forth above,
the claim preclusion inquiry does not involve an assessment of the fairness
of applying the doctrine in a subsequent action. Therefore, we reject
plaintiff's argument that, under Article 4 of Chapter I of the Vermont
Constitution, it would be unfair to apply claim preclusion here.