Watson v. Watson

Watson v. Watson (2002-293); 175 Vt. 622; 833 A.2d 869

2003 VT 80

[Filed 05-Sept-2003]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                                 2003 VT 80

                      SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2002-293

                              APRIL TERM, 2003

  Marie M. Watson	               }	APPEALED FROM:
                                       }
                                       }
       v.	                       }	Caledonia Family Court
                                       }
  David Watson	                       }
                                       }	DOCKET NO. 179-8-01 CaDm

                                                Trial Judge:  M. Kathleen Manley

             In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       ¶  1.  Husband challenges the Caledonia Family Court's award of
  permanent maintenance  to wife in this appeal from a final order of
  divorce.  We affirm.  

       ¶  2.  The parties, who have no children, were married for
  approximately seventeen years before they separated in the early summer of
  2001.  At that time, wife was forty years old and husband was forty-five. 
  The parties owned no real property together and had few assets at the time
  of the divorce hearing in May 2002.  Husband has an eighth grade education,
  and wife holds a high school diploma.  While married, both parties worked
  as truck drivers.  Their combined income was approximately $57,600.  In
  1999, wife suffered an aneurysm that left her unable to work.  Although
  husband has an arthritic condition in his knee and hip that makes it
  difficult to walk or stand for a long period of time, the condition does
  not affect his employability as a truck driver. 

       ¶  3.  Prior to her aneurysm, wife earned roughly $1,600 per month. 
  She now collects monthly social security disability benefits in the amount
  of $740.  Husband's take-home pay is approximately $2,390 each month.  The
  court found that the parties did not live extravagantly during their
  marriage but were able to take vacations.  Since their separation, husband
  has maintained the same living standard the parties enjoyed while they were
  married.  In contrast, wife's limited income does not allow her to maintain
  "even a modicum of a reasonable living style, much less the standard of
  living that was maintained by the parties at the time they were together." 
  The court found that unlike husband, wife could not contribute money to a
  savings or retirement account, purchase gifts for family and friends, take
  a vacation, or spend money on entertainment.  It also found that if wife
  had housing expenses on top of her other expenses, she would need public
  assistance.  The court consequently ordered husband to pay wife $700 per
  month in permanent maintenance.  Husband appealed the decision to this
  Court.
   
       ¶  4.  Maintenance seeks to, among other things, ameliorate the
  financial impact of divorce.  See Naumann v. Kurz, 152 Vt. 355, 359, 566 A.2d 1342, 1344 (1989) (maintenance intended to reduce financial impact of
  divorce and compensate spouse for homemaking contributions to family's well
  being).  Thus, the family court is authorized to award maintenance if the
  receiving party does not have enough income, through employment or
  otherwise, or property to provide for his or her reasonable needs at the
  standard of living enjoyed during the marriage.  15 V.S.A. § 752(a); Kohut
  v. Kohut, 164 Vt. 40, 43, 663 A.2d 942, 944 (1995).  The family court must
  consider the factors set forth in § 752(b) to determine the amount and
  duration of the award.  Kohut, 164 Vt. at 43, 663 A.2d  at 944; see 15
  V.S.A. § 752(b).  As long as the family court's order reflects that it
  considered the relevant factors under § 752(b), the court is not required
  to issue specific findings on each factor, and the party challenging the
  award on appeal "must show there is no reasonable basis" for it.  Kohut,
  164 Vt. at 43, 663 A.2d  at 944; Delozier v. Delozier, 161 Vt. 377, 381, 640 A.2d 55, 57 (1994). 

       ¶  5.  Husband first claims that the court's decision does not
  adequately reflect consideration of § 752(b)(1) and (6) because the court
  ignored the fact that wife retained $5,000 from the parties' joint savings
  account and husband agreed to assume most of the marital debt.  
  Subsections (b)(1) and (6) require the court to consider the financial
  resources and needs of the recipient spouse and the payor spouse's ability
  to satisfy the maintenance award while still meeting his or her own
  reasonable needs.  15 V.S.A. § 752(b)(1), (6).  Husband's argument has no
  merit.  The court's findings recognize explicitly what husband claims the
  court overlooked:

         Primarily the Court is basing its order on the disability
    suffered by Mrs. Watson, her contribution to the marriage
    financially during the time the parties were together and the fact
    that this is a long-term marriage.  The Court does not - and the
    Court is taking into account the fact that Mr. Watson is going to
    be paying the vast proportion of debts in this marriage, which sum
    is close to $9,000 in debts when one totals all of the two Sears
    cards, the Associates debt and the First U.S.A. bill and there's
    outstanding balances and the TransAmerica bill.

         On the other hand, the Court does not ignore the fact that
    the medical bills incurred are, in fact, marital debts and Mrs.
    Watson is going to be responsible for those and they are
    significant, the $3,000 plus that's owed to N.V.R.H.; and the
    Court is also factoring in that Mrs. Watson has received $5000 at
    the time the parties left the marital - broke up essentially. 
    That was by agreement of the parties.

         For those reasons and in viewing the parties' current ongoing
    income situation, the Court finds that Mr. Watson should, in fact,
    pay spousal support of a permanent nature to Mrs. Watson. 

  (Emphasis added.)  The court's award attempts to equalize the parties'
  post-divorce income to give wife a living standard like the one the parties
  enjoyed during their nearly eighteen-year marriage.  The award recognizes
  that wife is unable to work to support herself because of the ongoing
  effects of her 1999 aneurysm.  Husband is still able to work, and as the
  court found, he even increased his hours after the parties separated. 
  Although husband has been living at the same standard the parties enjoyed
  during their marriage, wife has not.  

       ¶  6.  Husband nevertheless argues that if he must pay wife $700 in
  maintenance each month, he will have to incur additional monthly debt of
  approximately $364 and will not be able to satisfy his own reasonable
  needs.  Thus, he argues, the court could not have considered his ability to
  pay maintenance as required by § 752(b)(6), because if it had, the court
  would have reached a different conclusion.  We disagree.  The court made
  findings on husband's monthly expenses, including a monthly loan payment of
  $536.90 for a 2001 truck he purchased before the parties separated.  It
  weighed the other factors in § 752(b) more heavily, however, based on the
  parties' circumstances.  In particular, the court's decision reflects its
  concern that wife cannot work to support herself because of her medical
  condition, and the parties owned no property capable of providing her with
  an income after the divorce.  Her financial situation without maintenance
  would leave her with an unreasonable living standard.  In this case, the
  court's findings as a whole show that it based the maintenance award on an
  appropriate consideration of all of the statutory factors in light of the
  evidence the parties presented, husband's ability to pay being only one of
  several.  Husband has not shown that the award is without a reasonable
  basis, and his first claim must, therefore, fail.

       ¶  7.  Citing our decision in Lalumiere v. Lalumiere, 149 Vt. 469,
  544 A.2d 1170 (1988), husband next claims that the court exceeded its
  authority by awarding permanent maintenance when wife did not request it. 
  He grounds this argument on wife's proposed factual findings requesting a
  lump-sum maintenance payment of $10,000, or a lump-sum payment of $7500
  followed by ten monthly payments of $250 each.  Husband's reliance on
  Lalumiere is misplaced.  In that case, we reversed a spousal maintenance
  award because the receiving spouse did not request it and the matter was
  not an issue at trial.  149 Vt. at 472, 544 A.2d  at 1172.  Therefore,
  husband had no notice or opportunity to present evidence or argument on the
  matter.  Id.  

       ¶  8.  This case is substantially different from Lalumiere.  Here,
  wife specifically requested maintenance in her form divorce complaint, and
  wife's counsel informed the court at trial that wife was seeking a
  permanent maintenance award.  In addition, at some point before the close
  of evidence, the court told counsel for both parties that "if there w[ere]
  no place from which to take a lump sum payment, then the Court would be
  looking to spousal support and that was a position that Ms. Watson had
  taken."  It went on to note that "there's nothing here the Court can find
  that would provide an adequate amount of a lump sum payment in this case." 
  Consequently, the court ordered husband to pay permanent maintenance. 
  Under these circumstances, husband's claim that the court exceeded its
  authority by awarding permanent maintenance because he had no notice or
  opportunity to be heard is wholly without merit.

       Affirmed.


                                       BY THE COURT:



                                       _______________________________________
                                       Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Chief Justice

                                       _______________________________________
                                       John A. Dooley, Associate Justice
  
                                       _______________________________________
                                       Denise R. Johnson, Associate Justice

                                       _______________________________________
                                       Marilyn S. Skoglund, Associate Justice

                                       _______________________________________
                                       Frederic W. Allen, Chief Justice (Ret.)
                                       Specially Assigned