Murray v. Luzenac Corp.

Murray v. Luzenac Corp. (2002-140); 175 Vt. 529; 830 A.2d 1

2003 VT 37

[Filed 27-Mar-2003]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                                 2003 VT 37

                      SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2002-140

                             JANUARY TERM, 2003

  John Murray	                       }	APPEALED FROM:
                                       }
                                       }
       v.	                       }	Commissioner of Labor and 
                                       }        Industry	
  Luzenac Corporation	               }
                                       }	DOCKET NO.  R-02095



             In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       ¶  1.  Defendant  Luzenac Corporation appeals the decision of the
  Commissioner of Labor and Industry granting plaintiff's summary judgment
  motion.  Defendant claims that the Commissioner erred by: (1) holding that
  plaintiff's claim was not time-barred pursuant to the Occupational Disease
  Act (ODA), 21 V.S.A. § 1006(a)(1987) (repealed by 1999, No. 41, § 8(a)(1));
  (2) applying the "discovery rule" from 21 V.S.A.  § 660(b); and (3) relying
  upon the Commissioner's earlier decision in Sheltra v. Vt. Asbestos Group. 
  Although the Commissioner's analysis and reliance on Sheltra was erroneous,
  see Sheltra v. Vt. Asbestos Group, 2003 VT 22, No. 02-116 (Vt. February 18,
  2003) (mem.) (reversing Commissioner's decision), we affirm because
  plaintiff's claim in this case was not time-barred, and 21 V.S.A. § 660(b)
  was properly applied.

       ¶  2.  The following facts are undisputed.  Plaintiff, John Murray,
  was an employee, as defined in the Vermont Workers' Compensation Act, 21
  V.S.A. § 601(14), of Luzenac Corporation until his last day of work on
  September 15, 1994.  Plaintiff was diagnosed with silicosis on June 1,
  2000, which the parties stipulate is an occupational disease caused by
  plaintiff's exposure to talc.  On October 9, 2000, plaintiff filed a
  workers' compensation claim with the Department of Labor and Industry. 
  Both parties moved for summary judgment to determine whether 21 V.S.A. §
  660(b) applied to plaintiff's claim or if it was barred by a statute of
  repose contained in the repealed ODA, 21 V.S.A. § 1006(a).  The
  Commissioner ruled that § 1006(a) did not bar plaintiff's claim, and the
  "discovery rule" of 21 V.S.A. § 660(b) applied in its place.  The
  Commissioner wrote:

    By providing that a claimant now has "two years from the date the
    occupational disease is reasonably discoverable and apparent" to
    bring the claim, 21 V.S.A. § 660(b), the Legislature determined
    that it would not bar a claim before the claimant could have known
    of its existence.  Because discovery and accrual of this claim,
    like the claim in Sheltra, came since the enactment [of 21 V.S.A.
    § 660(b)], it is viable and not barred by the statute of
    limitations.

       ¶  3.  Although we find error in the Commissioner's analysis, the
  outcome is correct in this case, and we affirm.  See Vt. State Colls.
  Faculty Fed'n v. Vt. State Colls., 151 Vt. 457, 463, 561 A.2d 417, 421
  (1989) ("[W]e will affirm a judgment which is correct even if the grounds
  stated in its support are erroneous.").  We base our decision here not on
  the time of discovery or accrual, but rather on whether plaintiff's claim
  was already barred by the five year limitation when the statute of repose
  was repealed in 1999.

       ¶  4.  Section 1006(a) of the repealed ODA contained a statute of
  repose which read: "Compensation shall not be payable for disablement by
  reason of occupational disease unless such disablement results within five
  years after the last injurious exposure to such disease in the employment .
  . . ."  21 V.S.A. § 1006(a) (1987) (repealed by 1999, No. 41, § 8(a)(1)). 
  Before the five-year limitation period had lapsed on plaintiff's claim,
  however, the Legislature created 21 V.S.A. § 660(b), effective July 1,
  1999, and repealed § 1006(a).  Section 660(b) provides that: "[A] claim for
  occupational disease shall be made within two years of the date the
  occupational disease is reasonably discoverable and apparent." 
  Importantly, our workers' compensation statute is "remedial in nature and
  must be liberally construed to provide injured employees with benefits
  unless the law is clear to the contrary."  St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.
  v. Surdam, 156 Vt. 585, 590, 595 A.2d 264, 266 (1991). 

       ¶  5.  The paramount issue in this case then is whether 21 V.S.A. §
  660(b) applies to claims where the last injurious exposure to an
  occupational disease occurred prior to July 1, 1999 but the time limitation
  for such a claim had not yet lapsed under § 1006(a).  We hold that it does. 
  Our decision today is in accord with the decisions of other courts.  For
  example, many jurisdictions allow parties to take advantage of new or
  amended statutes which extend time limitations for the filing of a workers'
  compensation claim as long as the claim was not time-barred prior to the
  effective date of the new statute or amendment.  See, e.g., Gaines v.
  Orange County Pub. Utils., 710 So. 2d 139, 140 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)
  (citing Corbett v. General Eng'g & Mach. Co., 37 So. 2d 161, 162 (Fla.
  1948)); Kindred v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 756 P.2d 401, 407 (Idaho 1988);
  Danforth v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 624 A.2d 1231, 1232 (Me. 1993); Nichols v.
  Wilbur, 473 P.2d 1022, 1022-23 (Or. 1970); Goff v. Mills, 308 S.E.2d 778,
  780 (S.C. 1983); Lester v. State Workmen's Comp. Comm'r, 242 S.E.2d 443,
  446 (W.Va. 1978); Annotation, Validity, and Applicability to Causes of
  Action Not Already Barred, of a Statute Enlarging Limitation Period, 79
  A.L.R. 2d 1080, 1100-04 (1961); but see State v. Labor & Indus. Review
  Comm'n, 334 N.W.2d 279, 280 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that amendment of
  statute of limitations extending time limit from six years to twelve years
  for filing of workers' compensation claim did not apply to claim which
  accrued before statute's effective date where state had statute which
  explicitly stated that statutes of limitation must be prospectively applied
  only).    
   
       ¶  6.  A significant difference distinguishes the present case from
  our recent decisions in Carter v. Fred's Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 13 Vt.
  L. W. 345 (2002) (mem.), and Sheltra v. Vt. Asbestos Group, 2003 VT 22, No.
  02-116 (Vt. February 18, 2003) (mem.).  In Carter and Sheltra, we
  determined that the plaintiff's claims were time-barred under 21 V.S.A. §
  1006(a) because, in both cases, the plaintiff's cause of action had expired
  under the ODA's statute of repose before the effective date of the new
  statute, 21 V.S.A. § 660(b).  Carter, 13 Vt. L. W. at 346; Sheltra, 2003 VT
  22,  3-5.  The plaintiff's last injurious exposure in Carter was 1981, and
  in Sheltra, plaintiff's last injurious exposure was February 1994.  Thus,
  in both Carter and Sheltra, five years had elapsed before July 1, 1999,
  when § 1006(b) was repealed and § 660(b) became effective.  

       ¶  7.  Here, plaintiff's last injurious exposure occurred on
  September 15, 1994, and therefore, the statute of repose had not barred his
  claim at the time the statute was repealed.  While a right may accrue to a
  party upon the running of a time limitation in a statute of repose or
  limitations which then bars the action, Capron v. Romeyn, 137 Vt. 553, 555,
  409 A.2d 565, 567 (1979), a defendant cannot claim a vested right in such a
  statute where the time limitation has not run and thereby barred the
  action.  See Shirley v. Reif, 920 P.2d 405, 412 (Kan. 1996); see also Davis
  & McMillan v. Indus. Accident Comm'n, 246 P. 1046, 1047-48 (Cal. 1926) ("It
  is clear from the decisions of the courts of this state as well as those of
  other jurisdictions that a person has no vested right in the running of a
  statute of limitations unless it has completely run and barred the
  action."); Dobson v. Quinn Freight Lines, Inc., 415 A.2d 814, 816 (Me.
  1980) ("Legislation which lengthens the limitation period on existing
  viable claims does not have the effect of changing the legal significance
  of prior events or acts.  It does not revive an extinguished right or
  deprive anyone of vested rights.  No one has a vested right in the running
  of a statute of limitations until the prescribed time has completely run
  and barred the action.").

       ¶  8.  Unlike Carter and Sheltra where the five-year period between
  the last injurious exposure to the disease and disablement had elapsed
  while 21 V.S.A. § 1006(a) was in effect, thus giving rise to a right of the
  defendant which could not be affected by "[t]he amendment or repeal of an
  act or statutory provision," 1 V.S.A. § 214(b), defendant here had no such
  vested right on July 1, 1999 when 21 V.S.A. § 1006 was repealed.  Hence, 1
  V.S.A. § 214 is not implicated under the facts of this case.

       ¶  9.  Finally, defendant argues that our decision in Montgomery v.
  Brinver Corp., 142 Vt. 461, 463, 457 A.2d 644, 645 (1983), requires that
  the ODA's statute of repose must also govern claims that had not been
  time-barred by the statute when it was repealed.  We disagree.  In
  Montgomery we explained that "[t]he right to compensation for an injury
  under the Workmen's Compensation Act is governed by the law in force at the
  time of occurrence of such injury."  Id.  Our holding today does not affect
  plaintiff's right to compensation.  The ODA provided plaintiff with the
  right to compensation  for  his  injury, and  the  current  statutory 
  framework  continues  to  grant plaintiff this right. 

       Affirmed.


                                       BY THE COURT:



                                       _______________________________________
                                       Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Chief Justice

                                       _______________________________________
                                       John A. Dooley, Associate Justice

                                       _______________________________________
                                       Denise R. Johnson, Associate Justice

                                       _______________________________________
                                       Marilyn S. Skoglund, Associate Justice

                                       _______________________________________
                                       Frederic W. Allen, Chief Justice (Ret.) 
                                       Specially Assigned