Quinn v. State

Quinn v. State (2001-540); 174 Vt. 562; 816 A.2d 425

[Filed 24-Oct-2002]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                      SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2001-540

                            SEPTEMBER TERM, 2002


  James W. Quinn, III	                }	APPEALED FROM:
                                        }
                                        }
       v.	                        }	Bennington Superior Court
                                        }	
                                        }
  State of Vermont	                }	DOCKET NO. 430-12-00 Bncv

                                                Trial Judge: Richard W. Norton

             In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:


       Petitioner James W. Quinn, III appeals from a decision of the
  Bennington Superior Court denying him post-conviction relief.  Petitioner
  asserts that the superior court erred in concluding that his guilty pleas
  were knowing and voluntary because: 1) his attorney coerced him to plead
  guilty by unduly pressuring him during the plea hearing; 2) he mistakenly
  believed that he could be charged as a habitual offender if he did not
  accept the State's plea offer; 3) he was under the mistaken belief that he
  would serve his sentence in Windsor; 4) he did not understand that his
  sentences for the sale of marijuana would run consecutively; and 5) he was
  taking medication that impaired his judgment.  We find that petitioner's
  attorney unduly coerced him to enter guilty pleas, and therefore reverse
  and remand.

       The superior court found the following relevant facts.  On February
  18, 1997, petitioner pled guilty to sexual assault and received a sentence
  of 115 days to ten years with all suspended but 115 days.  Petitioner was
  released on probation after serving the 115 days but was found in violation
  of probation after three days of contested hearings on November 5, 1999,
  March 3, 2000, and April 25, 2000.  Between the March 3 and April 25
  hearing dates, petitioner was charged with three felony counts of sale of
  marijuana and contempt of court.  Sentencing on the probation violation was
  set for June 22, 2000. 

       On June 22, 2000, petitioner's attorney negotiated a plea agreement
  with the State and a plea hearing was held in lieu of the sentencing
  hearing.  The plea agreement encompassed and resolved the violation of
  probation matter, the three sale of marijuana charges, and the contempt of
  court charge.  In exchange for petitioner's guilty pleas to two counts of
  sale of marijuana, the State agreed to drop one of the sale of marijuana
  charges and the contempt of court charge, and also agreed not to bring a
  habitual offender charge.  The plea agreement form indicated that the total
  recommended sentence for the three charges was for five years, 115 days to
  eighteen years.       	

 
          
       Petitioner now argues on appeal that his attorney coerced him to plead
  guilty during the plea hearing.  For post-conviction relief to be granted,
  petitioner must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a fundamental
  error rendered his conviction defective.  In re Hemingway, 168 Vt. 569,
  570, 716 A.2d 806, 808 (1998) (mem.).  A court's finding of fundamental
  error in the acceptance of a guilty plea is sufficient to award the relief
  requested.  Id.   In accepting a guilty plea, courts must ensure that the
  petitioner's plea is the "voluntary expression of his own choice," Brady v.
  United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970), because by entering a guilty plea
  the petitioner waives important constitutional rights.  In re Hall, 143 Vt.
  590, 594, 469 A.2d 756, 758 (1983); see generally V.R.Cr.P. 11(d) ("court
  shall not accept a plea of guilty . . . without first, by addressing the
  defendant personally in open court, determining that the plea is voluntary
  . . . .").

       In making our determination regarding post-conviction relief, we "will
  inquire into the circumstances surrounding a guilty plea to determine that
  the trial court discharged its responsibility to assure itself, before
  accepting the plea, that it was offered voluntarily, after proper advice,
  and with full understanding of its consequences."  In re Raymond, 137 Vt.
  171, 180, 400 A.2d 1004, 1009 (1979); see also Brady, 397 U.S.  at 749
  ("voluntariness of . . . plea can be determined only by considering all of
  the relevant circumstances surrounding it").  Furthermore, the findings in
  a post-conviction relief decision will not be disturbed absent clear error,
  and even when the evidence conflicts, we will defer to the superior court
  in this regard.  State v. Bristol, 159 Vt. 334, 336-37, 618 A.2d 1290, 1291
  (1992).  Thus, if there is any credible evidence to support the findings,
  and the court's conclusions follow from the findings, this Court will
  uphold the superior court's decision.  In re Plante, 171 Vt. 310, 313, 762 A.2d 873, 876 (2000).  Here, however, as in Bristol, we find that our
  disagreement is with the court's conclusions and not its factual findings. 
  See Bristol, 159 Vt. at 337, 618 A.2d  at 1291.
   
       The superior court, after examining the evidence at the hearing for
  post-conviction relief, found that petitioner did not prove by a
  preponderance of the evidence that his pleas were involuntary.  In making
  its determination, the court concluded that petitioner's attorney was
  merely "compell[ing him] to make some decision" but not "tell[ing] him
  which decision he must make."  We disagree.  

       Significantly, the superior court found that "[d]uring the June 22,
  2000 hearing [p]etitioner reluctantly changed his plea to guilty." 
  Petitioner's attorney knew that he "was in a very depressed state at the
  time and had made a couple of suicidal attempts or gestures prior to the
  June 22, 2000 hearing."  The "[p]etitioner expressed extreme reluctance to
  plead to the second charge" of sale of marijuana.  When the court asked
  petitioner during the plea hearing how he would plead to the second sale of
  marijuana charge, the following conversation occurred:

    COURT: And to a similar charge [ . . . ] of [selling] a substance
    containing marijuana to another, based again . . . 
    PETITIONER: I don't want to . . . 
    COURT: . . . on facts that an informant working with officers went
    to your residence [ . . . ] how do you plead to that charge? 

 

    PETITIONER: Why can't I wait . . .  Why can't I think about it.
    ATTORNEY: You're being a baby, now come on now.
    PETITIONER: I don't want to.
    COURT: You indicating you wish not to plead to that charge, Mr.
    Quinn?
    PETITIONER: Can I come back and make a plea . . .
    ATTORNEY: Stop it, Jimmy, you've got to make a decision now.  If
    you don't do this now, we're not going to do it, come on.  

       Coercion by the defendant's attorney will render a plea involuntary. 
  In re Fuller, 135 Vt. 575, 580-81, 381 A.2d 1056, 1060 (1977); see also
  United States v. Carr, 80 F.3d 413, 416 (10th Cir. 1996) ("guilty plea
  entered upon the advice of counsel is invalid if the plea was coerced");
  Iaea v. Sunn, 800 F.2d 861, 867 (9th Cir. 1986) (listing cases); Edwards v.
  Garrison, 529 F.2d 1374, 1380 (4th Cir. 1975) ("A guilty plea is not
  voluntary and must be stricken if [accused's] free will is overborne by . .
  . the accused's lawyer.").  We recognize that mere advice regarding which
  plea to enter or "[p]ressure upon a client to elect one alternative or the
  other" based on the prosecution's case generally does not constitute undue
  coercion by the attorney.  In re Fuller, 135 Vt. at 580-81, 381 A.2d  at
  1060; Iaea, 800 F.2d  at 867.  However, "[t]he voluntariness standard may be
  violated by coercion in the form of impermissible pressure of counsel on
  his client to plead guilty."  Ray v. Rose, 392 F. Supp. 601, 619 (W.D.
  Tenn. 1975); see also Coddington v. Langley, 202 F. Supp. 2d 687, 694-95,
  702 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (finding plea involuntary where defendant was coerced
  into pleading by his attorney after his attorney called him "retarded" and
  threatened to "kick his ass" unless he pled guilty); but see Carr, 80 F.3d 
  at 417 (rejecting defendant's claim that his plea was involuntary because
  his attorney yelled at him to plead guilty and called him a "f-ing idiot",
  where record during Rule 11 colloquy "clearly demonstrates that [defendant]
  entered his plea willingly and voluntarily at the time he made it").  In
  the case before us, petitioner's attorney engaged in this type of pressure
  during the actual plea hearing thereby increasing its coercive nature. 
  Additionally, the court's finding that his attorney knew at the plea
  hearing that petitioner was in a very depressed state and had recently
  attempted suicide further indicates the heightened coerciveness of the
  situation.

       The superior court supported its ultimate determination regarding
  voluntariness with a factual finding that both petitioner and his attorneys
  stated that his guilty pleas were voluntary.  Generally, a petitioner's
  "[a]ssertions in open court of voluntariness and lack of coercion, while
  not binding on a post-conviction proceeding, are cogent evidence against
  later claims to the contrary."  In re Raymond, 137 Vt. at 181, 400 A.2d  at
  1009.  Here, the trial court made its inquiry into the voluntariness of
  petitioner's pleas before his attorney exerted undue influence during the
  hearing. (FN1)  Thus, petitioner's assertion, in this case, should not have
  been weighed heavily against this claim of coercion by his attorney.  See
  Coddington, 202 F. Supp. 2d  at 700 (finding plea decision was 

 

  taken away from petitioner by his attorney's coercion when, among other
  things, he "was coerced severely by counsel after his in-court statement
  that he was not coerced").  

       In looking at the totality of the circumstances surrounding
  petitioner's pleas, we conclude that petitioner's attorney was unduly
  coercive in pressuring him to enter a guilty plea.  Thus, we find that
  petitioner's pleas were not entered voluntarily.  While we acknowledge the
  difficult situations that lawyers often face when counseling their clients
  regarding plea bargaining, the plea entered still must ultimately be the
  client's decision, and the attorney must abide by that decision.  In re
  Fuller, 135 Vt. at 580, 381 A.2d  at 1060; Vermont Rules of Prof'l Conduct
  1.2(a).  

       In light of our disposition of petitioner's first argument, it is
  unnecessary to address petitioner's other arguments on appeal.  Judgment
  and sentence of the district court shall be vacated and petitioner's guilty
  pleas stricken.  Case remanded to district court for further proceedings.

       Reversed and remanded.



                                       BY THE COURT:



                                       _______________________________________
                                       Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Chief Justice

                                       _______________________________________
                                       John A. Dooley, Associate Justice

                                       _______________________________________
                                       James L. Morse, Associate Justice

                                       _______________________________________
                                       Denise R. Johnson, Associate Justice

                                       _______________________________________
                                       Marilyn S. Skoglund, Associate Justice

        
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                                  Footnotes


FN1.  It is unclear from the record whether the trial court heard the
  discussion between petitioner and his attorney during the plea hearing. 
  Although petitioner's attorney testified that the trial court judge did not
  hear the discussion, the superior court made no finding as to whether the
  conversation was heard by the judge.