Lalande Air & Water Corp. v Pratt
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Lalande Air & Water Corp. v. Pratt (2000-202); 173 Vt. 602; 795 A.2d 1233
[Filed 20-Mar-2002]
ENTRY ORDER
SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2000-202
SEPTEMBER TERM, 2001
Lalande Air and Water Corporation } APPEALED FROM:
}
}
v. } Washington Superior Court
}
Linda Pratt }
} DOCKET NO. 52-2-95 Wncv
Trial Judge: Stephen B. Martin
In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:
Defendant Linda Pratt appeals from a superior court judgment in favor
of Lalande Air & Water Corp. on Pratt's counterclaim for violation of the
Consumer Fraud Act. Pratt contends the court erred in ruling that her
failure to establish the element of reliance entitled Lalande to judgment
as a matter of law. We affirm the judgment, although for reasons other
than those stated by the trial court.
This is the second appeal arising out of this on-going landlord-tenant
dispute. As summarized in the earlier appeal, Lalande Air and Water Corp.
v. Pratt, No. 99-110 (Nov. 24, 1999) (unpub. mem.), the facts are as
follows. In April 1991, Pratt and her father purchased a trailer in
Weston's Mobile Home Park, located in the Town of Berlin. At the time,
the park was owned by Kenneth and Margaret Weston. Pratt's father resided
in the trailer until his death in January 1994. Since 1988 and throughout
the proceedings in this case, Pratt has resided in Massachusetts. She
became the sole owner of the trailer either shortly before or after her
father's death.
In February 1994, the Westons notified their tenants that rent for the
lots would be increased from $185 to $220 per month. A number of the
mobile home tenants challenged the rent increase under a former provision
of the Mobile Home Parks Act permitting a hearing before the Commissioner
of Housing and Community Affairs for any rent increase over a certain
percentage effective between January 1, 1994 and June 1, 1995. See 10
V.S.A. § 6250 (expired June 1, 1995). In October 1994, the Commissioner
issued a written decision, ruling that the Westons would be permitted only
a 5% increase, resulting in a monthly rental of $194.25. The Commissioner
took judicial notice of litigation then pending that challenged the
constitutionality of the rent control provision of § 6250. The Westons
appealed the Commissioner's decision to the superior court.
In the meantime, in September 1994, plaintiff Lalande began managing
the park, which it had purchased from the Westons. In October and
November of 1994, Pratt submitted checks for monthly rent in the amount of
$194.25 each. Lalande, however, refused to accept the checks, demanding
that Pratt pay the previously imposed rent increase of $220 per month
while the appeal of the Commissioner's ruling was pending.
In February 1995, Lalande filed an action against Pratt for past due
rent or, in the alternative, for possession of the premises. Pratt
counterclaimed, alleging that Lalande's attempt to collect rent in excess
of the amount ordered by the Commissioner constituted an abuse of process
and violated the Consumer Fraud Act.
In July 1996, the parties settled the appeal of the Commissioner's
decision, agreeing that Pratt would pay monthly rent of $203, but
apparently reserving the issue of the rent to be paid for the months of
October and November 1994 which was the subject of the eviction action.
In March 1998, Lalande moved for summary judgment on Pratt's
counterclaim. The trial court granted the motion, ruling in separate
orders that Pratt was not a "consumer" as defined under the Consumer Fraud
Act because she was domiciled in Massachusetts and had rented the unit, and
that the commencement of the eviction action did not amount to an abuse of
process. Pratt appealed the trial court's ruling that she was not a
consumer under the Act, and this Court reversed the decision, and remanded
for trial of the counterclaim. See Lalande, No. 99-110, slip op. at 2-3.
In the meantime, the matter had proceeded to trial on Lalande's claim for
past due rent, resulting in a judgment in favor of Lalande in the amount
of $481.15, consisting of two months rent at $194.25 per month, plus
interest and other expenses.
Trial commenced on the consumer-fraud counterclaim in April 2000.
After the close of the evidence, the trial court granted Lalande's motion
for judgment as a matter of law, concluding that although Lalande's
efforts to collect rent in excess of the Commissioner's ruling may have
been "unfair," there was no evidence that Pratt had relied on any false or
fraudulent representations, and therefore no basis for finding that
Lalande had violated the Act. This appeal followed.
The Consumer Fraud Act provides that "[u]nfair methods of competition
in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce, are
hereby declared unlawful." 9 V.S.A. § 2453(a). In addition to
enforcement actions by the attorney general or state's attorneys, the Act
provides a private right of action to "[a]ny consumer who contracts for
goods or services in reliance upon false or fraudulent representations or
practices prohibited by section 2453, or who sustains damages or injury as
a result of any false or fraudulent representations prohibited by section
2453 of this title, or prohibited by any rule or regulation made pursuant
to section 2453." Id. § 2461(b). In Bisson v. Ward, 160 Vt. 343, 348-51,
628 A.2d 1256, __ (1993), we held that the Act applies to the
landlord-tenant relationship, and therefore allowed tenants to bring an
action for damages and attorney's fees resulting from a landlord's
deceptive act of renting an apartment knowing that it was in violation of
health and safety codes. In Russell v. Atkins, 165 Vt. 176, 181-82, 679 A.2d 333, __ (1996), we held that the Act applied to the owners of a
mobile home park who had conditioned the lease of a mobile home site to
the purchase of a mobile home from them, noting that such a "tying scheme"
had been declared illegal by the Federal Trade Commission, and that the Act
explicitly directed that Vermont courts be guided by the construction of
similar terms in the Federal Trade Commission Act. See 9 V.S.A. §
2453(b).
Here, as noted, the trial court ruled that Pratt had failed as a
matter of law to establish a violation of the Act because there was no
evidence that she had detrimentally relied on any false or fraudulent
representation by Lalande; she had not relied on Lalande's representation
that the full monthly rent of $220 was due, had never paid the rent
increases demanded by Lalande, and essentially prevailed at trial in the
sense that she was ordered to pay only the amount required by the
Commissioner. Pratt contends, however, that the court erred in focusing
exclusively upon the
"deceptive act" component of the Act, observing that § 2453 also prohibits
"unfair . . . acts or practices in commerce," and arguing that
detrimental reliance is not an element of such a claim. She relies, in
this regard, on Russell, 165 Vt. at 181-82, 679 A.2d at __, which
recognized a "tying scheme" as violative of the Act, although no element
of misrepresentation or reliance was part of the claim. She also cites
Federal Trade Comm'n v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 241 (1972),
the seminal United States Supreme Court decision broadly construing the
"unfair practice" component of the Federal Trade Commission Act to include
practices that offend public policy, that are immoral, unethical,
oppressive or unscrupulous, or cause substantial injury to consumers.
We have not had occasion to consider directly whether the Consumer
Fraud Act provides a private cause of action for "unfair" as opposed to
deceptive acts, or requires "reliance" for such a claim. Nor need we do
so here. For even assuming that Pratt was entitled to assert such a claim,
the evidence here failed to show that Lalande engaged in any "unfair
practice" under the Act. The gravaman of Pratt's consumer fraud claim was
that Lalande had improperly attempted - by sending demand letters and
ultimately filing a civil action - to collect monthly rent in excess of the
Commissioner's ruling. Contrary to Pratt's assertion, however, we are not
persuaded that these actions can be construed as so oppressive or
unscrupulous as to constitute an unfair practice. As noted, an appeal of
the Commissioner's ruling was pending at the time of Lalande's efforts to
collect the full rental increase, and the Commissioner herself had taken
judicial notice of pending litigation challenging the constitutionality of
the rent control statute. Absent something more in the way of unfounded
or oppressive legal tactics, proof that Lalande's lawsuit was an act of
retaliation for an assertion of tenant rights, or some other
unconscionable conduct, we cannot conclude that the rent-collection
efforts in this case constituted an unfair practice under the Consumer
Fraud Act. See Quitta v. Fossati, 808 S.W.2d 636, 644-45 (Tex. Ct. App.
1991) (landlord's efforts to enforce lease did not violate Deceptive Trade
Practices Act absent "evidence of overreaching or victimization, . . . or
unconscionable acts, or a false, misleading or deceptive act on the part of
appellants"). Accordingly, we perceive no basis to disturb the judgment.
See Samplid Enters., Inc. v. First Vermont Bank, 165 Vt. 22, 28, 676 A.2d 774, __ (1996) (Court may affirm judgment where right result was reached
for wrong reason).
Affirmed.
BY THE COURT:
_______________________________________
John A. Dooley, Associate Justice
_______________________________________
James L. Morse, Associate Justice
_______________________________________
Denise R. Johnson, Associate Justice
_______________________________________
Marilyn S. Skoglund, Associate Justice
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