State v. Campbell

State v. Campbell (2001-146); 173 Vt. 575; 789 A.2d 926

[Filed 17-Dec-2001]

[Motion for Reargument Denied 04-Feb-2002]


                                 ENTRY ORDER

                      SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2001-146

                             NOVEMBER TERM, 2001


State of Vermont	               }	APPEALED FROM:
                                       }
                                       }
     v.	                               }	District Court of Vermont,
                                       }	Unit No. 1, Windsor Circuit
Sarah B. Campbell	               }
                                       }	DOCKET NO. 1583-10-00 Wrcr

                                                Trial Judge: Walter M. Morris

             In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:


       Defendant Sarah Campbell appeals from the judgment entered in the
  Windsor County District  Court on her conditional plea of guilty to a
  charge of driving under the influence.  Defendant argues  that the trial
  court erred in denying her motion to suppress evidence obtained when a
  police officer  approached defendant's parked vehicle and inquired whether
  its occupants needed assistance.  We  hold that the officer acted within
  the community care taking exception to the warrant requirement  and
  accordingly affirm the judgment of the trial court.

       The relevant facts are not in dispute.  On October 6, 2000, at
  approximately two a.m., an  officer of the Hartford Police Department was
  traveling west on Route 4 in a marked police cruiser.   The night was dark
  and rainy, and there were no other vehicles in the vicinity.  As the
  officer  approached the Quechee Gorge information booth, he noticed a car
  pulled off the eastbound side of  the road.  As the officer passed the
  vehicle it flashed its lights once.  Concerned that he was being  signaled
  for assistance, the officer turned his cruiser, illuminating his blue
  lights as he pulled behind  the vehicle. 

       When the officer stepped out of the cruiser, he observed two
  passengers in the vehicle who  appeared to be romantically engaged.  He
  approached the vehicle, the engine of which was running,  and tapped on the
  driver's side window with his flashlight.  Defendant was in the driver's
  seat and  rolled down the window at which point the officer smelled
  intoxicants and asked defendant whether  she had been drinking.  Defendant
  was subsequently arrested and processed for driving under the influence. 

       Defendant was arraigned and filed a motion to suppress all evidence
  derived from the stop and  seizure of her vehicle.  A hearing was held in
  Windsor County District Court on December 21, 2000,  and the trial court
  denied the motion to suppress from the bench, finding the officer's
  testimony to be  credible and concluding that given the circumstances, the
  officer's reasonable inquiry to 
                                      
 
 
  determine whether the passengers of the vehicle needed assistance was
  within the community care  taking doctrine.  On March 14, 2001, defendant
  entered a plea of guilty conditioned on this appeal. 

       The state concedes that there was a seizure in this case.  Under the
  Fourth Amendment to the  United States Constitution and Chapter I, Article
  11 of the Vermont Constitution, a seizure requires  reasonable and
  articulable suspicion that the defendant is engaged in unlawful activity. 
  State v.  Marcello, 157 Vt. 657, 658, 599 A.2d 357, 358 (1991) (mem.). 
  "This does not mean, however, that  suspicion of criminal conduct is the
  only possible justification for a seizure.  Indeed, we have  recognized in
  other contexts that a seizure can be reasonable even in the absence of such
  suspicion."   State v. Pierce, 12 Vt. L.W. 335, 336 (2001).  

       A seizure does not require suspicion of criminal conduct where police
  officers are acting   under the community care taking doctrine, "an
  essential role as public servants to 'assist those in  distress and to
  maintain and foster public safety.'"  Marcello, 157 Vt. at 658, 599 A.2d  at
  358  (quoting State v. Pinkham, 565 A.2d 318, 319 (Me. 1989)).  The
  distinguishing feature of a stop and  seizure under the community care
  taking exception is that it is "generated from a desire to aid victims 
  rather than investigate criminals."  State v. Mountford, ___, Vt. ___, ___,
  769 A.2d 639, 645 (2000).  A police officer acting under the community care
  taking doctrine must have "specific and articulable  facts" that led him to
  reasonably believe the defendant was in need of assistance.  Marcello, 157
  Vt.  at 658, 599 A.2d  at 358. 

       We agree with the trial court that the officer in this case acted
  reasonably.  Given that the  officer was in a marked police cruiser when
  defendant flashed her lights at him, that it was a  particularly stormy
  night, and that defendant's car was in the Quechee Gorge Information Booth 
  parking lot, the officer had every reason to believe that the driver or
  passengers of the vehicle were  seeking his assistance.  Defendant argues
  that the facts of this case are identical to those in State v.  Burgess,
  163 Vt. 259, 657 A.2d 202 (1995).  In Burgess, we held that the community
  care taking  doctrine did not apply where an officer approached a legally
  parked vehicle on the side of the road  and inquired whether they needed
  assistance.  163 Vt. at 262, 657 A.2d  at 204.  Burgess is clearly 
  distinguishable from this case: whereas in Burgess  "[t]here was nothing .
  . . to indicate that  defendant was in any type of distress," here the
  officer was signaled by the vehicle.  Id.    

       Defendant argues that once the officer had exited the cruiser and
  observed that the driver and  passenger of the vehicle were romantically
  involved, he no longer had reason to suspect that they  were in need of
  assistance.  Had the officer not seen the vehicle flash its lights at him,
  defendant's  assertion might be plausible.  However, under these set of
  facts, one can envision circumstances  where one of the passengers needed
  assistance despite the fact that they appeared to be embracing, or  even
  because such an embrace was non-consensual.  In any event, the officer "did
  not know the  nature of defendant's problem . . . [and] [t]he most
  reasonable course of action under these 

 

  circumstances was . . . to determine if assistance was needed."  Marcello,
  157 Vt. at 658, 599 A.2d  at  358.  


       Affirmed.



                                       BY THE COURT:



                                       _______________________________________
                                       Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Chief Justice

                                       _______________________________________
                                       John A. Dooley, Associate Justice

                                       _______________________________________
                                       James L. Morse, Associate Justice

                                       _______________________________________
                                       Denise R. Johnson, Associate Justice

                                       _______________________________________
                                       Marilyn S. Skoglund, Associate Justice