Chamberlain v. Metropolitan Property & Casualty Insurance Co.

Chamberlain v. Metropolitan Property & Casualty Insurance Co. (99-118); 
171 Vt. 513; 756 A.2d 1246 

[Filed 12-Jun-2000]



                                 ENTRY ORDER

                       SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 99-118

                               MAY TERM, 2000


James Chamberlain	               }	APPEALED FROM:
	                               }
	                               }
     v.	                               }	Caledonia Superior Court
	                               }	
Metropolitan Property and Casualty     }
Insurance Company	               }	DOCKET NO. 73-3-98 Cacv

		                                Trial Judge: Alan W. Cook, J.

             In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:


       Plaintiff James Chamberlain appeals a Caledonia Superior Court grant
  of summary  judgment to defendant Metropolitan Property and Casualty
  Insurance Company.  Plaintiff argues  that he is entitled to the "each
  accident" limit of $300,000 in underinsured motorist coverage under  his
  policy with defendant, thus the court erred in limiting his claim to the
  $100,000 "each person"  amount.  We affirm.  

       The relevant facts are undisputed.  Plaintiff and his former wife were
  injured in a motor  vehicle accident on May 31, 1992.  At the time of the
  accident, an automobile insurance policy  previously issued by defendant to
  plaintiff was in effect, that provided liability protections and  coverage
  for uninsured and underinsured motorists for bodily injury and property
  damage.  Plaintiff  and his former wife filed suit against the driver of
  the other vehicle.  Plaintiff  ultimately settled,  with defendant's
  permission, for the full amount of the other driver's automobile liability
  limit of  $100,000, while his former wife settled for less than that
  amount.  

       Plaintiff alone then pursued an underinsured-motorist claim against
  defendant, contending  that underinsured motorist coverage with a limit of
  $300,000 was available to him under the  policy's "each accident" limit. 
  Defendant, citing the policy's "each person" limit of $100,000,  denied the
  claim, arguing that plaintiff's loss was not underinsured pursuant to the
  terms of the  policy.  The relevant uninsured-motorist coverage language,
  (FN1) contained in Section IV of the  policy, states:

 
		
     Limits of Liability
		
     The limit shown in the Declarations for "each person" is the 
     maximum we will pay to any one person for all damages resulting 
     from any one accident.  The limit shown in the Declarations for 
     "each accident" is the maximum we will pay to two or more persons.

       Both parties moved for summary judgment.  The superior court granted
  defendant's motion, finding  the policy unambiguous and relying on language
  from a separate and unrelated section of the  insurance contract which
  showed that the "each accident" limitation on coverage was subject to the 
  "each person" limitation on coverage. (FN2)  Plaintiff appealed to this
  Court.
	
       Plaintiff argues that the court erred in relying on a separate section
  of the policy to limit his claim to  $100,000.  He contends that the policy
  language is ambiguous and, in conjunction with the facts of  this case, it
  affords plaintiff $300,000 of underinsured motorist coverage. 

       We review a grant of summary judgment using the same standard as the
  superior court. Madden v.  Omega Optical, Inc., 165 Vt. 306, 309, 683 A.2d 386, 389 (1996). Summary judgment is  appropriate "if the pleadings,
  depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,  together
  with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
  material fact and  that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
  law." V.R.C.P. 56(c)(3). In determining  whether a genuine issue of
  material fact exists, we take as true the facts alleged by the nonmoving 
  party, see Madden, 165 Vt. at 309, 683 A.2d  at 389, and give the nonmoving
  party the benefit of all  reasonable doubts and inferences.  See Wilcox v.
  Village of Manchester Zoning Bd. of Adjustment,  159 Vt. 193, 196, 616 A.2d 1137, 1138 (1992).

       An insurance policy must be interpreted according to its terms and the
  evident intent of the  parties as expressed in the policy language.  City
  of Burlington v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 163  Vt. 124, 127, 655 A.2d 719, 721 (1994).  Disputed terms are to be read according to their plain, 
  ordinary and popular meaning.  See id. at 127-28, 655 A.2d  at 721.  Whether
  a contract term is  ambiguous is a question of law.  See Hunter
  Broadcasting, Inc. v. City of Burlington, 164 Vt. 391,  395, 670 A.2d 836,
  839 (1995).  Any ambiguity in an insurance contract must be construed in
  favor  of the insured.  See Garneau v. Curtis & Bedell, Inc., 158 Vt. 363,
  367, 610 A.2d 132, 134 (1992).   The insurer, however, should not be
  deprived of unambiguous provisions put into a policy for its  benefit.  See
  Peerless Ins. Co. v. Wells, 154 Vt. 491, 494, 580 A.2d 485, 487 (1990).	

 

       Plaintiff contends that ambiguity exists because the underinsured
  motorist language of the  policy at issue does not state that its "each
  accident" limit of $300,000 is subject to its "each  person" limits of
  $100,000.  Plaintiff has directed our attention to several cases in which
  courts  have concluded that the absence of policy language making a "per
  occurrence" (or "each accident")  limit "subject to" a "per person" (or
  "each person") limit created an ambiguity that should be  resolved in favor
  of the insured.  See, e.g., Andrews v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 467 A.2d 254  (N.H. 1983); Mostow v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 668 N.E.2d 392 (N.Y.
  1996); Farm Bureau Mut. Ins.  Co., Inc. v. Winters, 806 P.2d 993 (Kan.
  1991).  

       We do not reach the issue decided in the above cited opinions because
  the case before us  differs in one fundamental and controlling aspect. 
  Here, unlike each of the cited cases where two or  more persons sought the
  benefit of the higher "per occurrence" limit, see Andrews, 467 A.2d  at 
  255; Mostow, 668 N.E.2d  at 393; Winters, 806 P.2d  at 994, plaintiff is the
  only person presenting  an underinsured claim under the policy.  His claim
  does not represent his former wife's interest or  that of any other
  individual who is a second person covered by the policy.  Thus, assuming 
  arguendo that the second sentence of the "Limits of Liability" language of
  Section IV (i.e., "The  limit shown in the Declarations for 'each accident'
  is the maximum we will pay to two or more  persons") would create the
  ambiguity claimed by plaintiff, only the first sentence (i.e., "The limit 
  shown in the Declarations for 'each person' is the maximum we will pay to
  one person for all  damages resulting from any one accident") is relevant
  to plaintiff's claim.  Ambiguity arises where  the language at issue can be
  "'reasonably or fairly susceptible of different constructions.'"  Northern 
  Sec. Ins. Co. v. Hatch, 165 Vt. 383, 386, 683 A.2d 392, 395 (1996) (quoting
  Town of Troy v.  American Fidelity Co., 120 Vt. 410, 418, 143 A.2d 469, 474
  (1985)).  There simply is no ambiguity  in the policy's statement that the
  limit shown in the Declarations for "each person" is the maximum  to be
  paid "to any one person for all damages resulting from any one accident." 
  (Emphasis added.)

       Under the terms of the policy at issue, the insurer's liability to
  plaintiff - the only person  making a claim for benefits provided pursuant
  to the underinsured provision - is capped by the  $100,000 limit shown in
  the Declaration for "each person."

       Affirmed.

	                               BY THE COURT:


	                               _______________________________________
	                               Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Chief Justice

	                               _______________________________________
                                       John A. Dooley, Associate Justice

	                               _______________________________________
	                               James L. Morse, Associate Justice

	                               _______________________________________
	                               Denise R. Johnson, Associate Justice
	
	                               _______________________________________
	                               Marilyn S. Skoglund, Associate Justice



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                                  Footnotes


FN1.  Under the claim at issue in this case, we treat the terms
  "uninsured" and "underinsured"  interchangeably.  

FN2.  Plaintiff asserts that the trial court erred in relying on a
  separate section of the policy  unrelated to underinsured motorist
  coverage.  We affirm the judgment below, but reach our conclusion  upon
  different grounds than the trial court.  See Waters v. Concord Group Ins.
  Cos., __ Vt. __, __, 725 A.2d 923, 925 (1999) (mem.) (construction of
  insurance contract language is matter of law, and Supreme  Court makes its
  own inquiry into proper legal effect of terms of agreement, employing trial
  court's  valid findings of fact).