State v. Nickerson

State v. Nickerson (98-530 & 98-531); 170 Vt. 654; 756 A.2d 1240

[Filed 10-May-2000]


                                 ENTRY ORDER

                  SUPREME COURT DOCKET NOS. 98-530 & 98-531

                            SEPTEMBER TERM, 1999


State of Vermont	               }	APPEALED FROM:
                                       }
                                       }
     v.	                               }	
                                       }	
Christopher Nickerson	               }	District Court of Vermont,
                                       }	Unit No. 3, Orleans Circuit
State of Vermont	               }
                                       }
     v.	                               }
                                       }
Robert Rash	                       }	DOCKET NOS. 10-3-98Oscs &
                                       }		    17-4-98Oscs 

                                                Trial Judge: Cashman, J.


             In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:


       In these two consolidated cases, defendants Christopher Nickerson and
  Robert Rash were charged  with operating a motor vehicle while under the
  influence of intoxicating liquor (DWI), pursuant to  23 V.S.A. § 1201.  In
  Nickerson's case, the district court held that, because his arrest was
  unlawful,  the evidence resulting from that arrest had to be suppressed in
  the criminal case.  In Rash's case, the  court held that, because the
  police officer had no reasonable and articulable suspicion for stopping 
  his car, the evidence resulting from that stop had to be suppressed in the
  criminal case.  In both cases,  however, the court held that Article 11's
  exclusionary rule does not apply to civil license suspension  proceedings. 
  Defendants appeal this latter holding.  The State does not appeal from the
  suppression  of evidence in the criminal cases.  We reverse as to the
  court's holding that the exclusionary rule does  not apply to civil license
  suspension proceedings.

       The facts are not in dispute.  Nickerson was denied entry into Canada
  at the Derby, Vermont,   customs station because a customs official
  determined that he was driving under the influence of  alcohol.  The
  customs officer notified the State police, and a State trooper arrived and
  independently  determined that Nickerson was under the influence of
  alcohol.  The trooper arrested him and  transported him to the police
  barracks for DWI processing.  Nickerson filed a motion to suppress 
  statements he made to the trooper.  The court granted the motion as to the
  criminal case, citing State  v. LeBlanc, 149 Vt. 141, 145 (1987) (stop was
  invalid where arresting officer was outside his  territorial jurisdiction);
  however, the court held that Article 11's exclusionary rule does not apply
  to 

 

  civil license suspension proceedings.

       In Rash's case, a private citizen called the police barracks and told
  the dispatcher that he had  observed an automobile whose driver was DWI. 
  The citizen gave a specific description of the  vehicle he had seen.  Based
  on this information, a police officer stopped Rash's car because it 
  matched the description given by the dispatcher.  The officer subsequently
  arrested Rash and charged  him with DWI.  Rash filed a motion to suppress
  statements he made to the officer.  The court granted  the motion as to the
  criminal case, concluding that the officer had no reasonable and
  articulable  suspicion to stop Rash's car.  However, the court held that
  Article 11's exclusionary rule does not  apply to civil license suspension
  proceedings.

       These cases are controlled by our recent decision in State v. Lussier,
  Nos. 98-394 & 99-017, slip. op.  (Vt. Apr. 28, 2000).  In Lussier, we held
  that Article 11's exclusionary rule applies to civil license  suspension
  proceedings.  See id. at 1.  It bears emphasizing that both defendants in
  Lussier  challenged the reasonableness of the underlying stop; whereas, in
  the instant case, while Rash has  challenged the reasonableness of the
  underlying stop, Nickerson has challenged the lawfulness of his  arrest. 
  In Lussier, we emphasized "our belief that the exclusionary rule's ban
  against the admission  of unlawfully obtained evidence should extend to
  civil suspension proceedings," id., and supported  our holding with case
  law from other jurisdictions that held that a lawful arrest was a
  prerequisite for  an officer to have reasonable grounds to support a civil
  suspension.  See id. at 10-11 (citing People v.  Krueger, 567 N.E.2d 717,
  721-22 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991); Watford v. Bureau of Motor Vehicles, 674 N.E.2d 776, 778 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996); Pooler v. MVD, 755 P.2d 701, 702-03
  (Or. 1988) (en banc)).  Thus, our decision in Lussier is not limited to
  challenges to the underlying stop.

       As noted, the State has not appealed the suppression of evidence in
  the criminal cases.  Thus, we do  not reach the issue of whether the
  suppression rulings were correct.  Because the court held that the 
  evidence must be suppressed in the criminal cases, it must also be
  suppressed in the civil license  suspension proceedings.

       Reversed and remanded.

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                                 Dissenting


       AMESTOY, C.J., dissenting.   I respectfully dissent.  As explained
  more fully in my dissent to the  Court's decision in State v. Lussier, Nos.
  98-394 & 99-017, slip op. (Vt. Apr. 28, 2000),  I believe  that the
  Legislature could, and did, exclude the validity of the underlying
  motor-vehicle stop from  consideration in a civil suspension proceeding.  
  The majority's revision of the statute is even more  pronounced in this
  case, where  Nickerson based his defense on an invalid arrest allegedly
  outside  the arresting officer's territorial jurisdiction.  How this
  constitutes the equivalent of a claim that the  officer lacked "reasonable
  grounds to believe the person was operating . . . a vehicle in violation of 
  section 1201," 23 V.S.A. § 1205(h)(1), is beyond my understanding, where
  defendant was apparently  so inebriated that he was unable to drive his
  vehicle past the Derby, Vermont, customs station.  

       This Court has previously recognized that the purpose of a summary
  civil suspension is to protect the  "public safety by quickly removing
  potentially dangerous drivers from the roads."  State v. Strong,  158 Vt.
  56, 61, 605 A.2d 510, 513 (1992).   Today's decision compromises that
  legislative objective,  without advancing privacy interests which are fully
  protected by 
                                      
 

  constitutional safeguards in any corollary criminal proceeding.  As an
  exercise in statutory  construction, the majority analysis is merely
  unsupported.  As a pronouncement of constitutional  principle, it suffers
  from a more serious failing; it is unsound.  I am authorized to state that
  Justice  Skoglund joins in this dissent.



  Dissenting:	                         BY THE COURT:


  __________________________________	 _______________________________________
  Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Chief Justice	 John A. Dooley, Associate Justice

  __________________________________	 _______________________________________
  Marilyn S. Skoglund, Associate Justice James L. Morse, Associate Justice

                                         _______________________________________
	                                 Denise R. Johnson, Associate Justice