Stalb v. Stalb
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Stalb v. Stalb (2000-042); 171 Vt. 630; 768 A.2d 1269
[Filed 21-Dec-2000]
ENTRY ORDER
SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2000-042
DECEMBER TERM, 2000
Alan Stalb } APPEALED FROM:
}
}
v. } Washington Family Court
}
Aglaia Stalb }
} DOCKET NO. 356-8-94 WnDmd
Trial Judge: Mary Miles Teachout
In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:
Defendant appeals from a family court order finding defendant in
contempt for conduct committed in the course of a master's hearing to
deliver and/or determine the value of certain property awarded to
plaintiff by paragraph two of the amended final divorce order. Plaintiff
cross-appeals from the court's approval of the value set by the master for
the missing property. We affirm the master's valuation, but reverse the
family court's finding of contempt.
In this extremely contentious divorce, plaintiff was awarded certain
property in the possession of defendant, which was itemized on defendant's
trial exhibit V. Paragraph two of the amended final divorce order
required the parties to arrange for the delivery of these items, and for
defendant to pay plaintiff the reasonable value of items that could not be
delivered. Any dispute regarding the value of items not delivered was to
be determined by a master appointed by the court. The order of reference
for the master stated:
Matter referred to Property Master pursuant to paragraph #2
of Amended Final Order filed 8/26/97. Each party shall have 1 hr
to present evidence and the Master shall be paid for 2 additional
hours to prepare report. Plaintiff shall pay 20% of the cost and
defendant shall pay 80%.
Needless to say, the implementation of paragraph two did not go
smoothly. Prior to the hearing of the master, there was general confusion
between the parties about delivery of the subject property and most of the
attempts to deliver appear to have been unsuccessful because of a lack of
communication. Thus, when the master scheduled a hearing, it was unclear
whether most of the items were still in defendant's possession at the
marital residence, the Northfield Inn, had been delivered to plaintiff via
depositing them in the Inn garage, or had vanished. Upon this uncertain
territory, the master attempted to implement paragraph 2.
Plaintiff's counsel requested that the hearing be held at the
Northfield Inn to allow
identification of property at the Inn that defendant had not delivered to
him. Defendant objected on the grounds that the amended final order,
paragraph 10, prohibited either party from going to the other's place of
business or residence. The master inquired of the court whether he should
refer the matter to the court or decide the issue on his own. The court
told the master, through the court clerk, that it was within the master's
authority to set the time and place of the hearing, and the master decided
to hold the hearing at the Inn. When the parties arrived, defendant and
her counsel refused access to the Inn to plaintiff, except to use the
bathroom. Access was permitted to plaintiff's counsel and the master.
The hearing proceeded outside, and the master set a value of $3,000 on the
undelivered personal property.
Plaintiff then filed an objection to the value set by the master as
well as a motion for sanctions and contempt. The court upheld the
master's valuation and held defendant in contempt for refusing plaintiff
access to the Inn to identify his personal property. In light of the
hostile relationship between the parties, the court reasoned that the
master had implicit authority through the order of reference to hold the
hearing at the Inn and to permit plaintiff to enter defendant's residence,
because he could not rely on the representations of defendant about
whether or not property had been turned over. Notwithstanding paragraph
10 of the amended final divorce order, the court found that it was
unreasonable to refuse access to plaintiff to allow him to identify items
that were listed on exhibit V and awarded to him, and that access to the
Inn by plaintiff's counsel was insufficient to allow plaintiff to identify
his property.
On appeal, defendant presents several reasons for her contention that
the court erred by holding her in contempt for refusing to allow plaintiff
into the Inn. We reach only one of her claims because we find it
dispositive. Defendant contends that she was never served with any
written order requiring her to allow plaintiff into the Inn, and that the
only written order on the subject prohibits plaintiff from entering her
premises without her written consent. The general rule is that "before a
person may be held in contempt for violating a court order, the order
should inform him in definite terms as to the duties imposed upon him."
State v. Pownal Tanning Co., 142 Vt. 601, 605, 459 A.2d 989, 991 (1983).
"The order must be specific and definite so that it leaves no reasonable
basis for doubt as to its meaning." Id.; see also Keitel v. Keitel, 716 So. 2d 842, 844 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (order of contempt cannot be
based on violation of implicit provision of order; order must be clear and
definite); Humphrey v. Martin, 755 So. 2d 551, 554 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000)
(defense to contempt is an inability to obey order because it is vague or
not sufficiently specific); In re Borkert, No. 04-00-00535-CV, 2000 WL
1727085, at *2 (Tex. Ct. App. Nov. 22, 2000) (contemptuous acts must be
directly contrary to express terms of court order; contempt cannot rest
upon implication or conjecture of provisions of court order).
Here, the family court based its finding of contempt on its conclusion
that defendant violated an order of the master, for which we have no
record, which was implicitly authorized by the order of reference. The
court found:
[I]t was reasonable for the Master to require Defendant to permit
Plaintiff to enter the Inn for the purpose of identification of
the personal property
at issue. Such authority was implicit in the Order of Reference,
if not spelled out literally.
The issue, however, is whether there is "specific and definite" language in
any order imposing on defendant the obligation to allow plaintiff into the
Inn, such that defendant would know that she was violating the order if
she refused to do so.
There is no such language in the order of reference, and there is no
record of the master's proceeding. We cannot uphold a finding of contempt
based upon language implicit in a written order authorizing an oral order
for which we have no record, particularly when the oral order contradicts
the specific and definite language of paragraph 10 of the amended final
divorce order, prohibiting plaintiff from going to the Inn. At minimum,
there is reasonable doubt as to whether defendant had an obligation to
allow plaintiff in the Inn. See Rogoff v. Rogoff, 758 So. 2d 712, 712
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (reversing contempt order because property
settlement incorporated into final divorce order was not so clear and
precise to support finding that plaintiff's actions were willful and wanton
violation of express terms). Accordingly, the court erred in finding
defendant in contempt, and we therefore, vacate the finding of contempt
and the sanctions imposed for the contempt.
Plaintiff cross-appeals, arguing that the value of the property
awarded was too low and the award should have been in accordance with the
evidence he submitted at the master's hearing, which showed a value of
$8,343. The master rejected plaintiff's evidence, however, and found that
plaintiff's values were too high. The total value of personal property
awarded to plaintiff by the amended final order was $13,000. After
finding that approximately 27% of the property awarded to plaintiff was
not delivered to him, and considering the nature of the items, the Master
concluded that the total value of the property was $3,000. This figure
included the value of those items that could have been identified and
turned over to plaintiff, but were not because of defendant's refusal to
cooperate. The court upheld the master's decision on the ground that the
aggregate value of all personal property was $13,000 and that the master's
job was to assign values to that portion of the property not delivered to
plaintiff, not to relitigate the value of personal property.
On appeal, plaintiff contends that the $13,000 figure in the final
divorce order was the value of his antiques, which were not involved in
the master's hearing, not the value of the personal property listed on
exhibit V. Paragraph 36 of the final divorce order issued June 23, 1997
states in part:
Alan submitted to Aglaia a list of personal property items he
wishes to have returned from the Northfield Inn. The total value
of these items is $13,000. The items are listed and described
with specificity on Defendant's Exhibit V.
Thus, we reject plaintiff's claim. We agree with the court below that this
issue was closed by the final order, paragraph 36 and the amended final
order, paragraph 2, which awarded plaintiff his separate personal
property in the value of $13,000.
The $3,000 valuation of personal property is affirmed. The finding of
contempt and the sanctions - $700 in attorney's fees and $441 in master's
fees - are vacated. Defendant shall pay $352.80 of the cost of the
master.
BY THE COURT:
_______________________________________
Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Chief Justice
_______________________________________
John A. Dooley, Associate Justice
_______________________________________
James L. Morse, Associate Justice
_______________________________________
Denise R. Johnson, Associate Justice
_______________________________________
Marilyn S. Skoglund, Associate Justice
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