Town of Andover v. State

Town of Andover v. State (98-428); 170 Vt. 552; 742 A.2d 756

[Filed 14-Oct-1999]


                                 ENTRY ORDER

                       SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 98-428

                            SEPTEMBER TERM, 1999



Town of Andover, et al.	               }	APPEALED FROM:
	                               }
	                               }
     v.	                               }	Washington Superior Court
	                               }	
State of Vermont, et al.	       }
	                               }	DOCKET NO. 648-11-97Wncv	



             In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:


       Plaintiff municipalities sued the State of Vermont seeking a
  declaration that the Equal  Educational Opportunity Act of 1997 (Act 60),
  16 V.S.A. §§ 4001-4029, is unconstitutional  because it requires
  municipalities to (a) set tax rates for other municipalities; (b) initiate
  revenue  bills to fulfill the general obligations of the State; and (c)
  undertake the State's constitutional  responsibility for providing equal
  educational opportunities.  The State moved to dismiss on the  ground that
  plaintiffs lacked capacity to challenge the validity of a legislative
  enactment.  The  trial court ruled that municipalities lack capacity to sue
  the State and dismissed the case as to the  municipalities, but allowed
  thirty days to substitute other plaintiffs.  The trial court granted a 
  motion under V.R.C.P. 54(b) to permit the filing of an appeal by the
  dismissed plaintiffs, which  is now before us.  We reverse and remand.

       Plaintiffs make two contentions on appeal.  The first is that the
  Declaratory Judgments Act, 12  V.S.A. §§ 4711-4725, provides an independent
  ground of jurisdiction for their lawsuit against  the State.  We agree with
  the trial court and the State that the Declaratory Judgments Act  provided
  a procedural vehicle and remedy that was not previously available to
  litigants in  general, but the Act did not extend the jurisdiction of the
  courts over subject matter or parties.   See Gifford Memorial Hosp. v.
  Randolph, 119 Vt. 66, 70, 118 A.2d 480, 483 (1955).  Thus, if  the
  municipalities do not have capacity to sue, as the trial court decided, the
  Declaratory  Judgments Act does not provide it.  
	
       Plaintiffs also challenge the trial court's conclusion that they lack
  capacity to sue the State.  Capacity has been defined as a party's
  "personal right to come into court" and is usually  conceived of as "a
  procedural issue dealing with the personal qualifications of a party to
  litigate."  See 6A C. Wright, A. Miller &  M. Kane, Federal Practice and
  Procedure § 1559, at 441  (1990).  "Incapacity to sue exists where there is
  some legal disability, such as infancy or lunacy,  or a want of title in
  the plaintiff to the character in which he sues."  Underhill v. Rutland
  R.R.  Co., 90 Vt. 462, 468, 98 A. 1017, 1018 (1916) (internal citations
  omitted).  It is not true that  municipalities always lack capacity to sue
  the State.  
	
       Plaintiffs argue that their claims are within an exception to the
  general rule barring local  government challenges to state legislation. 
  They rely on City of New York v. State, 655 N.E.2d 649, 652 (N.Y. 1995),
  which held, inter alia, that where municipalities assert that compliance 

 

  with a state statute will force them to violate the constitution, there is
  no bar to suit and towns  and cities have capacity to bring the claim.  See
  also, 17 E. McQuillin, Municipal Corporations  § 49.02, at 177 (3d ed. rev.
  1993) ("A municipality may sue to question the constitutionality of a 
  statute changing its form of government or affecting its operations. . .
  .").  The trial court  dismissed plaintiffs under the general rule, without
  consideration of whether compliance with the  statute at issue would in
  fact require the municipalities to violate constitutional provisions.   

       Reversed and remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with
  this opinion.




	                               BY THE COURT:



	                               _______________________________________
	                               Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Chief Justice

	                               _______________________________________
	                               John A. Dooley, Associate Justice

	                               _______________________________________
	                               James L. Morse, Associate Justice

	                               _______________________________________
	                               Denise R. Johnson, Associate Justice
	
	                               _______________________________________
	                               Marilyn S. Skoglund, Associate Justice