Stowe Citizens for Responsible Government v. State

Stowe Citizens for Responsible Government v. State  (98-116); 169 Vt. 559; 
730 A.2d 573

[Filed 3-Mar-1999]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                       SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 98-116

                             JANUARY TERM, 1999


Stowe Citizens for Responsible Government	} APPEALED FROM:
                                                }
                                                }
     v.	                                        } Lamoille Superior
                                                }	
State of Vermont	                        }
                                                } DOCKET NO. 205-10-97 Lecv


       In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       Plaintiff Stowe Citizens for Responsible Government, Inc. appeals the
  superior court's summary  judgment ruling rejecting plaintiff's
  constitutional challenge to the Equal Educational Opportunity  Act of 1997
  ("Act 60").  Plaintiff contends that by relying on the discretion of voters
  in property-wealthy communities to provide additional tax revenue to
  supplement state funding for public  education, Act 60 unconstitutionally
  delegates legislative authority to those communities and fails  to satisfy
  the State's obligation to provide all Vermont schoolchildren a
  substantially equal  educational opportunity as established in Brigham v.
  State, 166 Vt. 246, 268, 692 A.2d 384, 397  (1997).  We conclude that Act
  60 does not unconstitutionally delegate legislative authority to the  Town
  of Stowe or any other Vermont municipality.  Further, because plaintiff has
  not presented  an actual or justiciable controversy with respect to its
  contention that Act 60 fails to satisfy the  State's constitutional
  obligation under Brigham, we do not reach the merits of that argument.  
  Accordingly, we affirm the superior court's judgment.

       The material facts are undisputed.  As of the 1997-1998 school year,
  before the enactment of Act  60, the Stowe school district was spending
  approximately $8845 per student, compared to a  statewide average of $6447. 
  In fiscal year 1997, property in Stowe was taxed at a rate of 
  approximately seventy-one cents per $100 of grand list value, compared to
  the statewide average  of $1.33.  Thus, under the previous funding system,
  Stowe was able to tax at a low rate and yet  raise revenues for education
  well above that collected by property-poor towns.

       In Brigham, 166 Vt. at 249, 692 A.2d  at 386, this Court held that that
  system, with its substantial  dependence on local property taxes and
  resulting wide disparities in revenues available to local  school
  districts, was unconstitutional because it deprived children of an equal
  educational  opportunity.  Following our decision, the Legislature passed
  Act 60, with a stated objective of  making "educational opportunity
  available to each pupil in each town in substantially equal terms"  in
  accordance with Brigham.  16 V.S.A. § 4000(a).  The Act aimed to provide
  school districts  with substantially equal access to similar per-pupil
  revenues through a combination of state block  grants and local education
  spending.  See 16 V.S.A. § 4000(b) (statement of policy).


 


       The first equalization mechanism in Act 60 is a statewide property tax
  of $1.10 per $100 of grand  list value, 32 V.S.A. § 5402(a), which funds a
  "general state support grant" determined on a per-pupil basis, 16 V.S.A. §
  4011.  For fiscal year 1999, the amount of the general state support grant 
  is $5000 per student, adjusted for inflation from fiscal year 1997.  See
  1997, No. 60, § 24(a).  The second equalization mechanism authorizes school
  districts, through approval by the local  electorate, to raise additional
  revenue to fund education above the state support grant, but subjects  the
  additional funds to an equalized-yield formula so that any specified
  property tax rate will  produce the same funds per student in every
  district.  See 16 V.S.A. §§ 428, 511, 4025-28.   Under this mechanism, a
  portion of the additional local funds raised by property-wealthy districts 
  are redistributed to property-poor districts to equalize the yield.  See
  id. § 4027.  The equalized-yield provision is designed to ensure that
  districts with the same per-pupil spending will have  similar property tax
  burdens.

       Because Stowe is a property-wealthy district, a portion of any funds
  raised through taxes imposed  on Stowe property to support spending above
  the State's base grant would be redistributed to  property-poor districts. 
  Under Act 60's transitional provisions, Stowe's tax rate will increase to 
  approximately $1.00 in fiscal year 1999, and to an undetermined rate for
  the year 2000.  See Act  60, §§ 24(b)(2); 50(a).  Should Stowe vote for
  additional education spending before the year 2002,  another transitional
  provision would allow Stowe to keep as much as seventy-three percent of the 
  local funds it raised.  See id. § 24(b)(1)(B) (limiting percentage of local
  funds that would have to  go to state fund).  Stowe could also raise
  additional funds for public education through local  option taxes.  See 24
  V.S.A. § 138 (authorizing municipalities to levy tax on sales, rooms,
  meals,  and alcoholic beverages from 1999 to 2002 to facilitate transition
  and reduce dislocations that may  be caused by Act 60).  Assuming that
  there are no additional changes to Act 60, Stowe could pay  up to seventy
  percent of locally raised revenue into the state education fund after the
  transitional  provisions expire.

       With this background, we examine plaintiff's challenge to Act 60. 
  Plaintiff is a non-profit  corporation comprised of Stowe taxpayers and
  parents.  In October 1997, plaintiff filed a  complaint for declaratory
  relief, challenging the constitutionality of Act 60.  The superior court 
  granted the State's motion for summary judgment, finding no constitutional
  deficiency to Act 60.  On appeal, plaintiff contends that an integral part
  of Act 60's attempt to meet the State's  obligation under Brigham -- its
  equalized-yield mechanism -- improperly relies on uncertain  political
  processes in the property-wealthy communities to provide additional funding
  for  education beyond the base amount available from the State's block
  grant.  According to plaintiff,  by relying on the discretion of voters in
  property-wealthy communities to meet the State's  obligation under Brigham,
  Act 60 unconstitutionally delegates legislative authority to those 
  communities.

       Plaintiff's attempt to cloak its argument under the legal mantle of
  the delegation doctrine does not  withstand scrutiny.  "In this State as
  elsewhere it is a doctrine well established and frequently  reiterated by
  the courts that the functions of the Legislature which are purely and
  strictly  legislative cannot be delegated but must be exercised by it
  alone."  Village of Waterbury v.  Melendy, 109 Vt. 441, 448, 199 A. 236,
  239 (1938) (emphasis added); State v. Auclair, 110 


 

  Vt. 147, 162, 4 A.2d 107, 115 (1939) (accord).  This doctrine is not
  violated when the  Legislature vests municipalities "with certain powers of
  legislation as to matters purely of local  concern."  Melendy, 109 Vt. at
  448, 199 A.  at 239; 16 E. McQuillin, The Law of Municipal  Corporations §
  4.08, at 27 (3d ed. 1994) ("[I]t is a fundamental rule that the power to
  make laws  cannot be delegated, except to the extent that such power may be
  conferred upon municipal  corporations for local self-government.").  Nor
  is the doctrine violated when the Legislature gives  municipalities the
  authority or discretion merely to execute, rather than make, the laws.  See 
  Melendy, 109 Vt. at 451, 199 A.  at 241.  The doctrine is violated, however,
  when the delegation  of authority is so vague and uncertain that, in
  exercising its discretion, the municipality must, in  effect, make the law. 
  E.g., id. at 453, 199 A.  at 241 (statute empowering board to petition for 
  apportionment of state-incurred expenses among towns benefitting from flood
  control projects  unconstitutionally delegated legislative authority
  because it failed to state nature or kind of benefits  that would trigger
  apportionment of expenses, failed to provide any rule or standard by which 
  benefits would be determined or assessments made, and failed to indicate
  any policy or plan for  apportionment of expenses).

       Here, the challenged equalized-yield provision contained in Act 60
  specifies all of the details of  the mechanism for equalizing the funding
  of public education.  Further, while local town votes,  including those of
  property-wealthy towns, may have some statewide impact on the level of 
  funding for public education, the fact remains that Act 60's
  equalized-yield provision does not  delegate the Legislature's lawmaking
  functions.  Generally, a statutory provision that does not  take effect
  unless assented to by the voters of a municipality "is not invalid as a
  delegation of  legislative power, provided the statute is complete in
  itself."  McQuillin, supra § 4.10, at 30  (noting that most jurisdictions
  permit legislature to condition operation of statute upon vote of  people);
  see State v. Parker, 26 Vt. 357, 363, 365 (1854) (Legislature may enact
  laws whose  operation or suspension depend upon contingency; numerous
  examples exist of statutes that are  dependent upon future contingencies
  for their very vitality).  Neither is a law invalid because it  delegates
  to municipalities powers concerning essentially state functions, such as
  education or  taxation.  See McQuillin, supra § 4.13, at 44-45; see also
  Brigham, 166 Vt. at 259, 264, 692 A.2d  at 392, 395 (Legislature has
  implemented education clause by authorizing school districts  to raise
  revenue through local property taxes, but neither this nor any other means
  of financing  public education is constitutionally mandated; state may
  delegate to local towns authority to  finance and administer schools within
  their borders, but it cannot abdicate its basic responsibility  for
  education).  Act 60 does not unconstitutionally delegate legislative
  authority to Vermont  municipalities.

       Stripped of its delegation-doctrine vestment, plaintiff's principal
  argument is that because Act 60's  equalized yield provision depends on
  voters in property-wealthy districts to provide additional  funds for
  education beyond the basic state grant, it fails to satisfy the State's
  constitutional  obligation as established in Brigham.  This is the same
  argument raised by the plaintiffs in  Anderson v. State, 9 Vt. L.W. 344
  (1998), which we declined to address because the plaintiffs  did not
  present an actual or justiciable controversy.  Id. at 345.  As in Anderson,
  we decline  plaintiff's invitation to consider invalidating Act 60 based on
  predictions that future events will  demonstrate the statute's failure to
  fulfill the State's constitutional obligations.  See 


 

  id. (for actual or justiciable controversy to exist, consequences of
  dispute must be reasonably  expected and not based upon fear or
  anticipation; whether voters in Stowe or other towns will  approve extra
  funding for education is "a debatable prediction of voter behavior, not a
  fact we can  recognize"); see also Kimbell v. Hooper, 164 Vt. 80, 88, 665 A.2d 44, 49 (1995) (law will not  be declared unconstitutional on its face
  based on possibility that it might be unconstitutionally  enforced under
  speculative circumstances).

       Finally, we find no merit to plaintiff's brief argument that Act 60
  fails to consider factors such  as economies of scale with respect to
  school districts in towns the size of Stowe.  Contrary to  plaintiff's
  assertion, Act 60 does take into account differences in financial burdens
  on school  districts resulting from size and other factors.  See Act 60, §
  22(d) (upon application,  commissioner may pay extraordinary transportation
  expenditures incurred due to geographic or  other conditions); § 93 (public
  schools with less than 100 students are eligible for support grants; 
  commissioner is required to conduct study of small schools to evaluate ways
  to mitigate financial  burdens).  In any event, we emphasized in Brigham
  that "absolute equality of funding is neither  a necessary nor practical
  requirement to satisfy the constitutional command of equal educational 
  opportunity. . . . [D]ifferences among school districts in terms of size .
  . . and other factors will  invariably create unavoidable differences in
  per-pupil expenditures."  166 Vt. at 268, 692 A.2d   at 397 (emphasis in
  original).  Plaintiff has failed to make any showing that circumstances in 
  Stowe create constitutionally significant disparities in funding among
  school districts under Act  60.

       Affirmed.


BY THE COURT:


_______________________________________
Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Chief Justice

_______________________________________
John A. Dooley, Associate Justice

_______________________________________
James L. Morse, Associate Justice

_______________________________________
Denise R. Johnson, Associate Justice


_______________________________________
Marilyn S. Skoglund, Associate Justice