State v. Woodcock

State v. Woodcock  (98-261); 168 Vt. 588; 719 A.2d 32

[Filed 6-Jul-1998]




                                 ENTRY ORDER

                       SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 98Ä261

                               JUNE TERM, 1998


State of Vermont                }     APPEALED FROM:
                                }
                                }
     v.                         }     District Court of Vermont
                                }     Unit No. 1, Windham Circuit
James Bissell Woodcock          }
                                }     DOCKET NO. 768Ä6Ä98Wmcr


       In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       The State appeals a district court order that ruled that an accused
  may not be held without bail under 13 V.S.A. § 7553a (person charged with
  violent felony may be held without bail under certain circumstances) unless
  the State shows a threat of physical violence to a specific individual. 
  Defendant is charged with armed robbery of a gas station, and the court
  ordered defendant to be released upon deposit of $25,000 bail, which
  defendant has been unable to pay. The State appeals to a single justice
  pursuant to 13 V.S.A. § 7556(b) (person detained with conditions of release
  imposed), and the appeal is reviewed pursuant to V.R.A.P. 9(a).  I reverse.

       The controlling statute is 13 V.S.A. § 7553a, which reads:

     A person charged with an offense that is a felony, an
     element of which involves an act of violence against another
     person, may be held without bail when the evidence of guilt is
     great and the court finds, based upon clear and convincing
     evidence, that the person's release poses a substantial threat of
     physical violence to any person and that no condition or
     combination of conditions of release will reasonably prevent the
     physical violence.

  (Emphasis added.)  The court denied the State's request to hold defendant
  without bail, ruling, as a matter of law, that under this provision, the
  State must demonstrate a threat of physical violence to a particular
  individual.  As the court declared, "The State does not argue that Mr.
  Woodcock's wanton use of a gun against Mr. Parker poses an ongoing threat
  to Mr. Parker but rather the State argues that essentially Mr. Woodcock is
  a threat to society."  Accordingly, the court concluded that the State had
  not demonstrated the required particularized threat to an individual.

       Based on the statute's plain language, the legislative history and the
  Court's precedent, I conclude that the court incorrectly construed §
  7553(a).  First, the plain language of the statute ÄÄ "threat of physical
  violence to any person" ÄÄ indicates that the Legislature intended to allow
  denial of bail upon a showing of a general threat of danger to "any
  person," and did not intend to require a showing of a threat to a
  particularized individual.  See Russell v. Armitage, ___ Vt. ___, ___, 697 A.2d 630, 637 (1997) (Court's goal in interpreting statutes is to give
  effect to legislative intent, which Court attempts to discern first from
  statutory language).

       Second, the statutory language tracks the language of the 1994
  constitutional amendment

 

  to Chapter II § 40 of the Vermont Constitution, which indicates that the
  Legislature intended the statute to have the same effect as the
  constitutional amendment.  See State v. Madison, 163 Vt. 360, 367, 658 A.2d 536, 541 (1995) (Legislature's decision to track precisely language of
  Constitution indicates it intended statute to have same effect as
  constitutional bail amendment); compare Vt. Const. ch. II, § 40(2) with 13
  V.S.A. § 7553a.  A review of the legislative history of the 1994
  constitutional amendment, Proposal 7, demonstrates that the change in our
  Constitution, and the corresponding change in the statutory language, were
  intended to protect the public in general.

       The original language of Proposal 7 was drafted by the Governor's Bail
  Amendment Task Force and presented in its report of December 12, 1990. 
  Subsection (2) allowed denial of bail where the person accused of a felony
  "poses a substantial threat of physical violence to any person."  Report of
  the Governor's Bail Amendment Task Force 4, 7 (Dec. 12, 1990).  The report
  states: "Subsection (2), the heart of the proposed amendment, adds public
  safety and danger to the community as a legitimate consideration in
  establishing an accused's bail."  Id. at 5.

       The Task Force's language was redrafted several times by the Senate
  Judiciary Committee.  The Committee's early drafts of Proposal 7 had two
  separate sections, one addressing denial of bail where there was a general
  danger to society and an additional subsection allowing denial of bail
  where there was a threat to a specific individual in domestic abuse cases. 
  Draft No. 5 of Proposal 7, which was distributed for public comment,
  contained both provisions, the general-danger provision and the
  specific-threat provision.  Beginning with Draft No. 6, the
  individualized-threat provision was no longer part of the proposal, which
  retained only the section addressing a threat "to any person" as originally
  proposed by the Task Force.  Only the general-danger provision remained in
  the final draft of Proposal 7 passed by the Legislature and voted into law
  by the people of Vermont.

       In addition to the development of Proposal 7 in the Senate Judiciary
  Committee, the Report of Senator Bloomer, the Chair of the Judiciary
  Committee, indicates that it was the intent of the Committee to allow
  judges to deny bail when "the person is a danger to members of society." 
  Journal of the Senate at 401 (April 1, 1992) (remarks of Senator John
  Bloomer). Further, the report states, "This concept, to allow persons to be
  held for purposes of public safety, is a new concept for this state."  Id.
  at 402 (remarks of Senator John Bloomer).

       Third, Vermont precedent supports this interpretation.  In State v.
  Sauve, 159 Vt. 566, 621 A.2d 1296 (1993), the Court held that the Vermont
  Constitution forbids preventative detention for public safety, "that is,
  imprisoning accused but unconvicted defendants because they may endanger
  the public."  Id. at 570Ä71, 621 A.2d  at 1299.  Although the constitutional
  bail provision had been amended in 1982, the Court noted that the amendment
  had been criticized because it did nothing to allow consideration of an
  accused's danger to the community as a basis for pretrial detention. 
  Noting that Proposal 7 was under consideration by the Legislature at that
  time, the Court stated, "Unless this new concept is enacted, we must
  continue to evaluate bail statutes as mandated by chapter II, § 40, and as
  discussed in our prior cases." Id. at 573, 621 A.2d  at 1300; see also State
  v. Madison, 163 Vt. 390, 396, 659 A.2d 124, 127Ä 28 (1995) (Morse, J.)
  (holding State demonstrated conditions of release would not prevent
  "defendant from posing a significant threat not only to the victim but to
  other young women).

       My review of the drafts of Proposal 7, the tape-recordings of the
  meetings of the Senate Judiciary Committee, the Report of the Chair of the
  Committee, and the Court's precedent lead me to conclude that the language
  "threat of physical violence to any person" in both the constitutional
  amendment and the statute were intended to allow denial of bail for a
  general

 

  danger, not just for a threat to a specific individual.  Accordingly, in
  this case, the trial court erred by ruling, as a matter of law, that the
  State must show a threat to a particular individual. Because of its error
  in construing the rule, the court abused its discretion under § 7553(a) by
  failing to exercise it.  Therefore, I remand the case to the trial court to
  reconsider of the State's motion to hold defendant without bail in light of
  this ruling.

       Reversed and remanded.


                              FOR THE COURT:


                              _______________________________________
                              Marilyn S. Skoglund, Associate Justice