Roddy v. Roddy

Roddy v. Roddy  (97-410); 168 Vt. 343; 721 A.2d 124

[Filed 2-Oct-1998]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.


                                 No. 97-410


Karen A. Roddy                              Supreme Court

                                            On Appeal from
     v.                                     Addison Family Court

Frederick L. Roddy                          June Term, 1998


Matthew I. Katz, J.

       Pamela A. Marsh of Marsh and Associates, P.C., Middlebury, for
  Plaintiff-Appellant.

       F. Rendol Barlow of Langrock Sperry & Wool, Middlebury, for
  Defendant-Appellee.


PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ.


       AMESTOY, C.J.   Mother appeals the family court's denial of her
  request to establish a "maintenance supplement" under 15 V.S.A. § 661, to
  be paid by her former husband for the benefit of the parties' children.  We
  affirm the family court's ruling because mother was unable to satisfy the
  threshold requirement of showing a "real, substantial and unanticipated
  change of circumstances" since the time of the parties' original divorce
  and child support order.

       The parties obtained an order and decree of divorce on June 30, 1993,
  under which mother was granted legal and physical parental rights and
  responsibilities for their minor children, born in 1988 and 1991.  Father
  was ordered to pay permanent maintenance of $1,000 per month and to pay
  $150,000 as a full and final marital settlement.  Mother received the right
  to occupy the home, which was owned by father, for up to two years or until
  she was able to purchase, build or otherwise acquire a different home.  A
  child support order was issued in August, 1993 under which father was to
  pay $1,307 per month and provide the children with health insurance.  On
  mother's motion, and based on the parties' stipulation, the court modified
  the child support order in December 1994 to require father to pay $1,525
  per month.

 

       In June 1995, approximately two years after the divorce order, mother
  filed for establishment of a maintenance supplement under 15 V.S.A. §
  661(a).  To support her request, mother contended that under the terms of
  the 1993 divorce order, she and the children had to vacate the home owned
  by father, that her job responsibilities had changed and that her job
  seemed "less secure,"  and that she was moving to Charlottesville, Virginia
  to pursue a Ph.D. in educational psychology.  She also contended that she
  no longer lived rent-free in father's house, and now had to pay a monthly
  rent of $700.  The magistrate denied the request on grounds that § 661(a)
  did not allow establishment of a maintenance supplement after a divorce had
  been finalized.  According to the magistrate, both mother's departure from
  the marital residence and subsequent obligation for rent or mortgage
  payments were anticipated under the terms of the divorce.  The magistrate
  found that mother "has chosen to try to circumvent the need of showing a
  real, substantial, and unanticipated change in circumstances by filing an
  action to establish maintenance supplement."    

       The family court reversed the magistrate's decision, finding that the
  plain meaning of § 661(a) permits a party to request establishment of a
  maintenance supplement at anytime during which there exists an order for
  child support.  Father appealed the family court's ruling to this Court,
  but the appeal was dismissed as improvidently granted.

       The magistrate subsequently conducted hearings on mother's request to
  establish a maintenance supplement and to modify child support.  In
  September 1996, the magistrate issued findings and conclusions on both
  issues.  With respect to modification of child support, the magistrate
  concluded that mother had satisfied her burden of showing a "real,
  substantial and unanticipated change in circumstances," and thus increased
  defendant's child support obligation to $1,992 per month.(FN1)  Regarding
  maintenance supplement, however, the magistrate found that although there
  was "no doubt that there is a disparity in the incomes of the   plaintiff
  [mother] and

 

  the defendant [father]," mother had not satisfied her burden of showing
  that  the disparity in incomes was resulting or would result in a lower
  standard of living for the children than they would have if they were
  living with the non-custodial parent.  The magistrate noted mother's
  statement that the  children were both happy and healthy, took swimming and
  riding lessons, and traveled frequently.  The magistrate was not persuaded
  that the fact that the children borrowed books from the library, as opposed
  to purchasing them, and wore second hand clothing, as opposed to new,
  provided a basis for concluding that they were experiencing a different
  standard of living than they would have if they had lived with their
  father.

       Mother appealed to the family court, claiming the magistrate had
  misapplied § 661(a) by finding that the parties had disparate incomes but
  declining to order a maintenance supplement.  The family court affirmed the
  magistrate's decision:                                                     

     [T]here is no question the father is far more solvent, far better
     positioned to pay bills when they come due.  But whether that
     "disparity has resulted or will result in a lower standard of living 
     for the children" is quite another issue.  This is not a situation 
     where the non-custodial parent is flaunting wealth, living lavishly
     or otherwise setting up the troubling situation of parental inequity
     for the children to face.

  Mother appeals the family court's affirmance of the magistrate's conclusion
  that she failed to satisfy the requirement of § 661(a).  Father
  cross-appeals, claiming that § 661 does not allow a party to establish a
  maintenance supplement post-divorce, or that, at a minimum, a party seeking
  to establish a maintenance supplement post-divorce must first establish a
  real, substantial, and unanticipated change in circumstances.

       The maintenance supplement statute, 15 V.S.A. § 661, provides as
  follows:

     (a) A party may request a maintenance supplement to be paid while
     a child support obligation arising out of an action for divorce exists.
     After considering the respective financial circumstances of the parties
     . . . the court shall order payment of a maintenance supplement to the
     custodial parent to correct any disparity in the financial circumstances
     of the parties if the court finds that the disparity has resulted or will
     result in a lower standard of living for the child than the child would
     have if living with the noncustodial parent.

 

     (b) Any sum awarded under this section shall be taken into
     consideration in making an order under section 752 of this title
     [establishment of maintenance].
     (c) On motion of . . . any . . . person to whom a maintenance
     supplement has previously been granted . . . and upon a showing of
     a real, substantial and unanticipated change of circumstances, the
     court may annul, vary or modify a supplement order.

  15 V.S.A. § 661.  Although both parties contend that the meaning of § 661
  is plain, they do not agree on what § 661 means.

       We first consider mother's argument that the plain meaning of § 661
  permits her to bring an action for a maintenance supplement at any time
  while a child support obligation arising out of a divorce action exists,
  without a showing of a real, substantial and unanticipated change of
  circumstances.  Mother contends that since the explicit requirement of a
  changed circumstance showing occurs in § 661(c) and makes direct reference
  only to a "person to whom a maintenance supplement has previously been
  granted," the Legislature intended to exclude from the "changed
  circumstance" requirement persons who had not received a maintenance
  supplement.  15 V.S.A. § 661(c).  Mother emphasizes that § 661(a) provides
  that a person may request a maintenance supplement to be paid while a child
  support obligation arising out of an action for divorce exists, without
  making any reference to a changed circumstance requirement.

       While it is true that the language of § 661(c) contemplates a showing
  of "changed circumstances" before a previously established maintenance
  supplement may be modified, that requirement does not lead inexorably to
  the conclusion that the initial establishment, post-divorce, of a
  maintenance supplement may be made without showing changed circumstances
  since the time of divorce.  15 V.S.A. § 661(c).  Mother's construction
  would run afoul of well-settled principles of res judicata and collateral
  estoppel, a result we conclude was not intended by the legislature.(FN2)
  Subsection (c)'s required showing of "real, substantial, and unanticipated  

 

  change of circumstances " demonstrates legislative concern that principles
  of  res judicata and collateral estoppel be preserved in connection with
  maintenance supplement proceedings conducted after divorce and child
  support orders are final.  Assuming for purposes of argument that mother
  can satisfy the substantive standard under § 661(a), but is unable to show
  changed circumstances since the time of her divorce, she only proves the
  rule:  she could have, and should have, sought the maintenance supplement
  in connection with the original divorce and child support proceeding. 
  "[N]o one is entitled  to break a case down into a myriad of single issue
  actions to obtain  the desired judgment.  Judicial time schedules and
  fairness to one's opponent  prohibit this practice."  B & E Corp. v.
  Bessery, 130 Vt. 597, 601, 298 A.2d 544, 546 (1972).

       Mother's construction would foster troublesome and absurd results.  A 
  party who responsibly raised the maintenance supplement issue during the
  pendency of a divorce and child support action, and to whom a supplement
  was awarded, would be required to show changed circumstances in order to
  modify the supplement post-divorce.  See 15 V.S.A. § 661(c).  An
  identically situated party who did not raise the supplement issue during
  the divorce action would be permitted to seek a maintenance supplement with
  no showing of changed circumstances.  See 15 V.S.A. § 661(a). Mother's
  interpretation creates an  incentive to forego requesting a maintenance
  supplement until sometime after the divorce and child support orders are
  issued thereby delaying fair and final resolution of the issues.  This
  court construes statutes to avoid absurd results manifestly unintended by
  the legislature.  See In re Cottrell, 158 Vt. 500, 504, 614 A.2d 381, 383
  (1992).

       Father's plain meaning argument would similarly lead to results not
  intended  by the Legislature.  Although father concedes that § 661 does not
  expressly prohibit an independent

  

  maintenance supplement action, he contends that § 661(c) is exclusive and
  limits such actions to a "person to whom a maintenance supplement has been 
  previously granted." 15 V.S.A. § 661(c). Because mother has not been 
  previously granted a maintenance supplement, father asserts that she is not
  entitled to establish a maintenance supplement post-divorce.  Father's 
  interpretation of § 661 would require us to construe paragraph (a), which
  provides that "a party may request a maintenance supplement to be paid
  while a  child support obligation arising out of an action for divorce
  exists," to  limit establishment of maintenance supplements to requests
  made only during the pendency of a divorce action.  15 V.S.A. § 661(a).

       The fundamental rule of statutory interpretation is to give effect to
  the intent of the Legislature.  See Viskup v. Viskup, 150 Vt. 208, 210, 552 A.2d 400, 401 (1988).  To that end, this Court analyzes not only a
  statute's  language, but also the "subject matter, its effects and
  consequences, and the  reason and spirit of the law."  In re R.S. Audley,
  Inc., 151 Vt. 513, 517, 562 A.2d 1046, 1049 (1989).   First and foremost,
  we reject the contention that the legislature intended to preclude
  altogether the establishment of a maintenance supplement post-divorce, as
  father's construction of § 661 would  require.  The purpose of § 661, by
  its clear language, is "to correct any  disparity in the financial
  circumstances of the parties if the court finds that the disparity has
  resulted or will result in a lower standard of living for the child than
  the child would have if living with the non-custodial parent."  15 V.S.A. §
  661(a).  Despite the ambiguous reference to  "maintenance" in the
  provision's title, the statute clearly serves the purpose  of safeguarding
  children's -- instead of parents' -- interests, and therefore may be viewed
  as a component of child support generally.   We held in Viskup that the
  legislature intended to allow parents to seek establishment of child
  support post-divorce, even though the parent had not made the request at
  the time of the original adjudication of divorce and child custody.  See
  150 Vt. at 211, 552 A.2d  at 402.  We now hold that the legislature intended
  the same principle to apply to maintenance supplements under § 661.  See
  Emmons v. Emmons, 141 Vt. 508, 512, 450 A.2d 1113, 1115 (1982) (holding
  that statutes dealing with "same subject   


 

  matter should be construed with reference to each other as parts of one
  system"). 

       Where, however, a party seeks establishment of a maintenance
  supplement under § 661 after a divorce and child support order have become
  final, the party must satisfy the threshold showing of a "real, substantial
  and unanticipated  change of circumstances" under § 661(c) before the
  family court may consider  the substantive standard of § 661(a).  See
  Viskup, 150 Vt. at 211-12, 552 A.2d  at 402 (allowing initial establishment
  of child support post-divorce on showing of real, substantial and
  unanticipated change of circumstances). Because mother errs in contending
  that she is not required to make a showing of real, substantial, and
  unanticipated change of circumstance in order to establish a maintenance
  supplement post divorce, the order denying her request is affirmed.

       Affirmed.
                                      FOR THE COURT:



                                      _______________________________________
                                      Chief Justice

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                                  Footnotes



FN1.  Father does not appeal the child support modification.

FN2.  Res judicata bars litigation of a claim or defense if there exists a
  final judgment in former litigation in which the parties, subject matter
  and causes of action are identical or substantially similiar.  See Berlin
  Convalescent Center v. Stoneman, 159 Vt. 53, 56, 615 A.2d 141, 143 (1992). 
  The doctrine covers claims that were actually litigated, as well as those
  which could have been litigated.  See id. at 56, 615 A.2d  at 143-144. 
  Collateral estoppel or issue preclusion bars the subsequent re-litigation
  of an issue which was actually litigated and decided in a prior case
  between the parties resulting in a final judgment on the merits, where that
  issue was necessary to the resolution of the case.  See id. at 56, 615 A.2d 
  at 144.