Lane v. Town of Grafton

Lane v. Town of Grafton  (95-453); 166 Vt. 148; 689 A.2d 455

[Filed 3-Jan-1997]


       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.


                                 No. 95-453


Thomas M. Lane                                    Supreme Court

                                                  On Appeal from
     v.                                           Windham Superior Court

Town of Grafton                                   September Term, 1996


Robert Grussing III, J.

Michael J. Hertz, Brattleboro, for plaintiff-appellant

Janet Murnane of McNeil, Leddy & Sheahan, Burlington, for defendant-appellee


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


       GIBSON, J.   Plaintiff Thomas Lane appeals an order of the Windham
  Superior Court granting summary judgment in favor of defendant Town of
  Grafton on his negligence claims. Lane contends that the court erred in
  finding that he failed to meet notice requirements under 19 V.S.A. § 988
  and that his claims are therefore barred by governmental immunity.  We
  reverse.

       On April 14, 1992, as Lane was driving his truck across a bridge on
  the Grafton-Townshend Road in the Town of Grafton, a portion of the bridge
  caved in, resulting in damage to his vehicle and personal injuries.  The
  next day, Lane went to the Grafton Town Offices and told employees and a
  selectman about the accident, the damage to his truck, and his injuries. On
  April 23, nine days after the accident, Lane mailed a letter informing the
  Town:


          This is to notify you pursuant to 19 V.S.A. § 987 that Mr. Lane
          makes a claim against the Town of Grafton for personal injuries
          and property damage suffered by reason of the insufficiency or
          want of repair of a bridge in Grafton which caved in as he drove
          over it on Tuesday, April 14, 1992.


       Between June 1992 and October 1994, Lane corresponded with the Town
  regarding the

 

  extent and treatment of his injuries; he submitted medical reports and
  examination records on several occasions.  After two years of
  correspondence, the property damage claim was settled, but the personal
  injury claim remained unresolved.

       In January 1995, Lane filed a negligence claim in Windham Superior
  Court to recover for his personal injuries.  The Town moved for summary
  judgment, claiming that Lane's notice was inadequate because it failed to
  state how the bridge was out of repair or specify his personal injuries, as
  required under 19 V.S.A. §§ 987 and 988.  Thus, the Town claimed protection
  from Lane's claim under governmental immunity based on a lack of proper
  statutory notice.  The court granted the Town's motion in July 1995,
  concluding that although Lane's notice concerning the condition of the
  bridge was adequate, his failure to notify the town of specific injuries or
  the extent of his injuries was inadequate under § 988.  This appeal
  followed.

       When reviewing a motion for summary judgment, we apply the same
  standard as the trial court:  summary judgment is appropriate when the
  record clearly indicates there is no genuine issue of material fact and
  that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Bacon v.
  Lascelles,     Vt.    ,    , 678 A.2d 902, 905 (1996); V.R.C.P. 56(c)(3). 
  In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, we regard
  as true all allegations of the nonmoving party supported by admissible
  evidence, Bacon,     Vt. at    , 678 A.2d  at 905, and we give the nonmoving
  party the benefit of all reasonable doubts and inferences, Wilcox v.
  Manchester Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 159 Vt. 193, 196, 616 A.2d 1137, 1138
  (1992).

       The Town argues, and the trial court agreed, that Lane's notice of
  injury fails to meet the statutory requirements.  The statute states that
  "notice shall contain a description of the injury received or damage
  sustained.  If bodily injuries are claimed, the part of the body injured
  shall be stated, with the extent and effect of the injury upon the health
  of the person injured." 19 V.S.A. § 988.  The Town's argument of invalid
  notice is based on our historic decisions holding that general allegations
  of injury, without more, are insufficient under the statute.  See Perry v.
  Town of Putney, 52 Vt. 533, 536-37 (1880) (notice that "whole body was
  shaken,

 

  bruised, and injured" found insufficient); Nourse v. Town of Victory, 51
  Vt. 275, 277 (1878) (notice stating "also an injury was done to my knee"
  insufficient under statute).

       But Lane contends that the court erred in finding his notice failed to
  meet statutory requirements, arguing that his notice was adequate because
  it served the underlying purposes of the statute.  We agree.  When
  interpreting a statute, the goal of this Court is to give effect to
  legislative intent.  Burlington Elec. Dep't v. Vermont Dep't of Taxes, 154
  Vt. 332, 335, 576 A.2d 450, 452 (1990).  We do this by examining the
  purpose behind the statute.  Magoon v. Board of Civil Auth., 140 Vt. 612,
  614, 442 A.2d 1276, 1277 (1982).  We consider the broad subject matter of
  the law, its effects and consequences, and the reason and spirit of the law
  to discern legislative purpose.  State v. Papazoni, 159 Vt. 578, 581, 622 A.2d 501, 503 (1993). To determine the sufficiency of notice, therefore, we
  must examine the purpose behind statutory notice requirements.  Pratt v.
  Town of Old Saybrook, 621 A.2d 1322, 1325 (Conn. 1993).

       Read together, 19 V.S.A. §§ 987 and 988 indicate that notice serves
  two purposes:  (1) to alert towns of bridge conditions endangering public
  safety so they may be promptly repaired, and (2) to inform towns of
  impending claims so that there may be timely investigation thereof. Section
  987 requires written notice within twenty days to a town selectman "stating
  the time when and the place where the injury was received, and pointing out
  in what respect the bridge or culvert was insufficient or out of repair." 
  Where personal injury occurs, the claimant must state so pursuant to § 988. 
  By requiring a description of time and place of the accident, as well as
  the manner in which the bridge was out of repair, notice allows a town to
  promptly remedy hazardous road conditions and avoid additional accidents. 
  Notification that the person was injured informs the town of a potential
  claim, allowing it to investigate and gather evidence. Notice also allows a
  town to defend against fraudulent claims and may facilitate settlement. 
  But a claimant may not know the full extent of his or her injuries within
  twenty days of the accident.

       We find that Lane's notice was adequate to alert the town that the
  bridge was dangerous and inform it of the pending claim, thereby allowing
  the town to begin investigation.  Nine days

 

  after the accident, Lane sent a letter notifying the Town of the location
  of the bridge where the accident occurred and the date of the accident. 
  The letter informed the Town that Lane had suffered personal injuries along
  with property damage and that he was making a claim for his damages.

       Our prior interpretations of the statute have consistently recognized
  that the statute's purpose is to alert the town to threats to public safety
  and the existence of valid claims, not be an obstacle for plaintiffs.  See
  Perry, 52 Vt. at 537 (statute not designed to render difficult the
  statement of injuries, so much as to define and locate fictitious claims). 
  Further, statutory notice requirements serve as a starting point for
  investigation and are not intended to provide a complete statement of a
  claim.  Pratt v. Town of Sherburne, 53 Vt. 370, 374 (1881).  "The object of
  the requirement [is] to give the Town such notice of the injury that [it]
  in the exercise of reasonable diligence [can] ascertain its character and
  extent."  Id.

       Although we historically have required a more complete description of
  personal injury to maintain an action under the statute, such specificity
  was based on pleading practices at the time.  In 1872, the year the statute
  was enacted, the absence of rules of discovery and the lack of access to
  pretrial information were compensated for by very specific pleading
  requirements, which served to inform opposing parties of all relevant facts
  underlying a claim and the issues to be raised at trial.  See Currier v.
  King, 81 Vt. 285, 289, 69 A. 873, 873 (1908) (circumstances necessary to
  constitute cause of complaint or ground of defense must be stated in
  pleadings); Zamatha v. Harak, 58 A.2d 704, 706 (Conn. 1948) (pleadings
  should state actual controversial issues, questions or claims to be
  determined, and give notice of issues to which proof will be directed). 
  Thus, the notice a town historically received through § 988, along with the
  pleading, likely contained the only information concerning the accident the
  town would receive prior to trial.  Earlier courts, accordingly, required
  such notice to be highly detailed to allow the town to investigate the
  claim and prepare defenses.

       The law has changed since 1872.  As a result of discovery rules that
  mandate disclosure
                    
 

  and allow access to pretrial information, modern pleadings require less
  specificity.  See Solomon v. Atlantis Dev., Inc., 147 Vt. 349, 358, 516 A.2d 132, 137 (1986).  Our rules require only "a short and plain statement
  of the claim" and a demand for judgment in the pleading.  V.R.C.P. 8(a). 
  Thus, a pleading is sufficient as long as it gives fair notice of the claim
  and the grounds upon which it rests.  Solomon, 147 Vt. at 358, 516 A.2d  at
  137.  In view of a town's receipt of notice within twenty days of the
  accident that a claimant has suffered personal injuries and its ability to
  subsequently obtain pretrial information through discovery, notice is
  adequate even with a less specific statement of injury.  In light of modern
  pleading practices, our past interpretations of § 988 requirements have
  become unnecessarily burdensome.  To the extent this decision conflicts
  with our historic interpretation of 19 V.S.A. § 988, we overrule those
  cases as inconsistent with modern pleading practices.

       Lane also asserts that the twenty-day notice deadline is directory
  only and that the town eventually did receive complete information on his
  injuries.  But the argument that the notice deadlines are directory, not
  mandatory, was never raised before the trial court.  Failure to raise a
  reason why summary judgment should not be granted at the trial level
  precludes raising it on appeal.  Denton v. Chittenden Bank, 163 Vt. 62, 69,
  655 A.2d 703, 708 (1994).  Because the argument is not properly before us,
  we decline to rule on it.

       Reversed and remanded.

                              FOR THE COURT:



                              _______________________________________
                              Associate Justice