State v. Marcy
Annotate this Case
State v. Marcy (94-173); 165 Vt 89; 680 A.2d 76
[Opinion Filed 22-Mar-1996]
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
to press.
No. 94-173
State of Vermont Supreme Court
On Appeal from
v. District Court of Vermont
Unit No. 3, Caledonia Circuit
Steven Marcy June Term, 1995
David Suntag, J.
Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General, and Susan R. Harritt, Assistant
Attorney General, Montpelier, for plaintiff-appellee
Robert Appel, Defender General, and Anna Saxman, Appellate Defender,
Montpelier, for defendant-appellant
PRESENT: Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.
JOHNSON, J. Defendant appeals his conviction by jury for simple
assault. He argues that the trial court erred by (1) admitting the assault
victim's tape-recorded statement as past recollection recorded, pursuant to
V.R.E. 803(5), and (2) denying defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal
pursuant to V.R.Cr.P. 29, because the sole evidence supporting defendant's
conviction is past recollection recorded, which defendant argues does not
meet the standards for reliability set out by this court in State v. Robar,
157 Vt. 387, 395, 601 A.2d 1376, 1380 (1991). We affirm the trial court,
holding that the tape-recorded statement of the victim was properly
admitted as past recollection recorded and that the victim's statement was
sufficiently reliable to support the conviction.
I.
The victim was defendant's wife. Following the assault on December
28, 1992, the victim obtained a restraining order against defendant. On
December 29, 1992, the day after the assault, a police officer went to the
victim's home in response to her complaint against defendant. The victim
told the officer that she had been assaulted by defendant, who had "pounded
her head against a door" and "choked her to the point where she nearly
blacked out," and that he had damaged several guns. At the time of the
interview, the officer observed scratches on the victim's face, which she
claimed were the result of the physical confrontation with defendant. The
officer also interviewed two other residents of the house. One of those
residents stated that he had seen defendant and his wife enter their
bedroom, that he had heard shouting, including the victim saying, "Don't do
it, please don't do this," and that he had heard noises coming from the
bedroom, including a banging against the door. The other resident stated
only that he had heard an argument inside the house.
After speaking with these three people, the police officer
tape-recorded an interview with the victim, which the officer testified was
consistent with what the victim had told him earlier. The officer also
testified that the victim appeared to be alert and to understand what she
was doing while he was tape-recording the interview, and that she showed no
indication that she was having trouble remembering the events of the
previous night.
At trial, the victim testified that she did not remember the assault.
She maintained that she only could remember visiting a psychiatrist's
office with defendant, who left the office without her, returning home
afterward, and following defendant into the bedroom to find out what had
upset him. She vaguely recalled something about guns being broken, but
could not
remember the details. She testified that she remembered getting a
restraining order on December 28, but she did not remember how she got to
the police station. She also remembered that a trooper had come to her
home, but she did not remember calling the police, and she did not remember
being choked by defendant.
The State then offered the victim's tape-recorded statement pursuant
to V.R.E. 803(5), as past recollection recorded. The State called several
witnesses (out of the presence of the jury), including the victim, the
police officer who took the statement, and a victim advocate with whom the
victim had spoken, to lay a foundation for the admission of the statement.
The court found that the statement satisfied the requirements of Rule
803(5).
II.
We first consider whether the trial court properly admitted the
victim's tape-recorded statement, pursuant to V.R.E. 803(5), as past
recollection recorded.(FN1) Rule 803(5), which is identical to its
counterpart in the Federal Rules of Evidence, establishes an exception to
the hearsay rule for a previously recorded recollection of an event, when
the witness has no present recollection of the event. State v. Lander, 155
Vt. 645, 645, 582 A.2d 128, 128 (1991) (mem.).
We have previously held that documents admitted pursuant to V.R.E. 803(5)
must meet three requirements:
"(1) The document must pertain to matters about which the declarant once had
knowledge; (2) The declarant must now have an insufficient recollection as to
such matters; (3) The document must be shown to have been made by the
declarant or, if made by one other than the declarant, to have been examined by
the declarant and shown to accurately reflect the declarant's knowledge when the
matters were fresh in his memory."
State v. Paquette, 146 Vt. 1, 3, 497 A.2d 358, 360 (1985) (quoting People
v. Kubasiak, 296 N.W.2d 298, 302 (Mich. 1980)).
Based on the victim's testimony and the circumstances under which the
statement was given, the trial court determined that the first two
requirements were easily met. As the victim of the assault, the witness
once had knowledge of it, and her tape-recorded statement relates that
knowledge in detail. Moreover, the court found that it was "clear and
without question[] that the declarant now has insufficient recollection
about any matters contained in that tape or . . . concern[ing] what did or
did not happen to her on [the date of the assault]." As the trial court's
findings are supported by the evidence, they are not clearly erroneous and
will not be disturbed on appeal. See State v. Zaccaro, 154 Vt. 83, 86, 574 A.2d 1256, 1258 (1990) (noting that trial court's findings of fact will not
be disturbed "unless they are unsupported by the evidence or clearly
erroneous"); see also Paquette, 146 Vt. at 4, 497 A.2d at 360
(requirements one and two met under circumstances similar to instant case).
The more difficult question is whether the tape-recorded statement
meets the third requirement. To meet this requirement, the statement must
pass two separate tests. First, the statement must be shown to have been
made by the witness, or if made by another, to have been adopted by the
witness. V.R.E. 803(5); see Paquette, 146 Vt. at 3, 497 A.2d at 361
(noting that
facts "sufficiently show that the statement was adopted by the witness")
(emphasis added). In this case, the testimony of the police officer who
tape-recorded the statement is sufficient to establish that the statement
was made by the witness.
Second, the statement must be shown to accurately reflect the
witness's knowledge when the matter was fresh in her memory. Paquette, 146
Vt. at 3, 497 A.2d at 360. Defendant, arguing that the statement should
not have been admitted, emphasizes that the statement was not sworn, and
that the witness never affirmed the truth or accuracy of the statement when
it was made. Defendant misconstrues the requirements of Rule 803(5).
Nothing in the language of the rule indicates that, to be admissible, the
prior statement must be sworn, or that the witness must affirm the accuracy
of the prior statement.
A number of courts have ruled statements inadmissible as past
recollection recorded because the statements were not sworn, signed by the
witness, or otherwise affirmed by the witness as accurate. Closer
examination of those cases reveals, however, that the statements involved
were not prepared by the witness, but by another person, usually a law
enforcement agent. See, e.g., United States v. Schoenborn, 4 F.3d 1424,
1427 (7th Cir. 1993) (noting that witness "did not adopt . . . as his own"
report prepared by FBI agent of interview with witness); People v. Hoffman,
518 N.W.2d 817, 825 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that denying admission
of police officer's typewritten notes of witness's statement was proper
where witness never adopted statements as true and accurate); People v.
Kubasiak, 296 N.W.2d 298, 302 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980) (holding that police
report of witness's statement was inadmissible because witness had not
adopted report as accurate when matter was fresh in his memory).
Understandably, where a prior statement was prepared by a person other than
the witness, courts
have relied on or even required evidence that the witness had sworn or
otherwise affirmed the accuracy of the prepared statement, to satisfy the
requirement that the witness adopted the statement.
Here, there is no dispute that the witness herself gave the
tape-recorded statement. The question before us is whether the State
presented sufficient evidence to show that the tape-recorded statement
accurately reflected the witness's knowledge of the assault. The trial
court, in finding the statement admissible, relied upon the following
evidence of its accuracy: the statement was given to a police officer
within a day of the assault; the tape-recorded statement was made shortly
after and was consistent with a prior interview with the police officer;
the statement revealed details of the assault; the statement described the
events chronologically; the witness spoke coherently, logically, and
relatively directly, responding appropriately to questions from the
officer; the witness did not appear sleepy or groggy to the officer,
despite her later testimony that she was taking prescription drugs at the
time the statement was given; and the police officer's interviews with the
other residents of the house provided some corroboration. The trial court
also emphasized that the witness never recanted the statement, or indicated
that the statement was inaccurate or given involuntarily, but rather
testified that if she had talked to a police officer she would have tried
to be truthful. Specifically, the witness testified that she would not
have "intentionally" or "deliberately" lied to the officer.
Defendant points to two elements of the witness's testimony as
throwing doubt on the accuracy of the statement. The witness testified
that she was using prescription drugs at the time the statement was given,
which could have affected her thinking. Also, when asked if she could
think of any reason why she might have wanted to tell the police officer
something that she did
not believe to be true at the time, she replied, "Maybe anger." The trial
court judge, who observed the testimony firsthand, found persuasive the
police officer's testimony that the witness spoke clearly and did not
appear sleepy or groggy at the time of the statement. The judge also found
that the witness had not recanted the statement or "given evidence saying
that what she said previously is incorrect." Again, the court's findings
on these two issues are not clearly erroneous, and will not be disturbed by
this Court. See Zaccaro, 154 Vt. at 86, 574 A.2d at 1258.
We agree with the court that, taken together, the evidence presented
by the State is sufficient to show that the tape-recorded statement of the
witness correctly reflects her knowledge of the assault at the time it was
made. In so doing, we adopt the reasoning of the Sixth Circuit, which in
interpreting the identical federal rule regarding past recollection
recorded recently stated:
Rule 803(5) does not specify any particular method of establishing the
knowledge of the declarant nor the accuracy of the statement. It is not a
sine qua non of admissibility that the witness actually vouch for the
accuracy of the written memorandum. Admissibility is, instead, to be
determined on a case-by-case basis upon a consideration . . . of factors
indicating trustworthiness, or the lack thereof.
United States v. Porter, 986 F.2d 1014, 1017 (6th Cir. 1993). In Porter,
the defendant was convicted on several charges involving drugs and
explosives. Part of the evidence supporting his convictions was a detailed
written statement given by his girlfriend to the FBI. Portions of the
statement were read to the jury after the girlfriend testified that she did
not remember much about what she had said in the statement, because "she
was confused and on drugs at the time the statement was made." Id. at
1016. She did not testify that the statement was accurate. The
trial court found "sufficient indicia of trustworthiness," including the
details contained in the statement, its internal consistency, and its
consistency with other evidence. Id. at 1017.(FN2)
Here, although the victim did not sign the statement, that factor is
much less important because the statement is a tape-recording in the
victim's own voice. The other evidence relied on by the trial court is
sufficient to establish the accuracy of the statement. The tape-recorded
statement of the victim was properly admitted as past recollection recorded
and could be relied upon by the jury.
We do not believe that our holding is inconsistent with our memorandum
decision in State v. Lander, 155 Vt. 645, 645, 582 A.2d 128, 128 (1990)
(mem.), where we held that a witness's prior statement was not admissible
as past recollection recorded. We noted that the witness had not
"adopt[ed] his prior statement as his own or aver[red] that the statement
accurately reflected his knowledge at the time of its making."(FN3) Id.
Lander, however, is a brief memorandum decision which does not provide the
relevant facts of the case. The decision does not indicate, for example,
whether the statement was prepared by the witness or by a third party, but
merely cites to Kubasiak, 292 N.W.2d at 302, where the court refused to
admit a police
officer's report of a witness's prior statement where the witness had not
adopted that report as true.
We are not persuaded that our memorandum decision in Lander should be
interpreted as altering the plain language of V.R.E. 803(5) to add a
requirement that the witness must testify that the statement accurately
reflects the witness's knowledge at the time the statement was made. Had
the drafters intended this result, they could easily have accomplished it
by changing the language of the rule. Instead, the rule is phrased in the
passive voice, requiring only that the memorandum or record be "shown to
have been made or adopted by the witness." V.R.E. 803(5) (emphasis added).
We conclude that the language of the rule contemplates a more flexible
case-by-case determination of the admissibility of a statement as past
recollection recorded, that evaluates the trustworthiness of the prior
statement instead of focusing on hypertechnical evidentiary requirements.
See United States v. Williams, 571 F.2d 344, 350 (6th Cir. 1978)
("touchstone for admission of evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule
has been the existence of circumstances which attest to its
trustworthiness"); see also State v. Discher, 587 A.2d 1336, 1341 (Me.
1991) (past recollection recorded exception does not spell out method for
establishing initial knowledge or contemporaneity and accuracy of record,
but leaves determination to circumstances of particular case).
III.
We next consider whether the trial court erred in denying defendant's
motion for judgment of acquittal pursuant to V.R.Cr.P. 29. Defendant
argues that, even if properly admitted, the victim's tape-recorded
statement was insufficient evidence to sustain a conviction. "The standard
for sufficiency of the evidence is that, `taken in the light most favorable
to the
State and excluding modifying evidence, there [must be] sufficient evidence
to fairly and reasonably support a finding of [guilt] beyond a reasonable
doubt.'" State v. Robar, 157 Vt. 387, 391, 601 A.2d 1376, 1378 (1991)
(quoting State v. Papazoni, 157 Vt. 337, 338, 596 A.2d 1276, 1276 (1991))
(alterations in original).
We have previously considered whether a prior statement admitted as
past recollection recorded may be sufficient to support a conviction where
the prior statement is the sole evidence of guilt. In Robar, we declined
to adopt the rule of United States v. Orrico, 599 F.2d 113, 118-19 (6th
Cir. 1979), in which the Sixth Circuit held that where past recollection
recorded or prior inconsistent statements are the sole evidence for a
central element of a case, that evidence is insufficient to support a
finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Robar, 157 Vt. at 392-93, 601 A.2d at 1378-79. Instead, noting our concern that the result not be
"overly rigid in circumstances where the prior statement is particularly
reliable," id. at 395, 601 A.2d at 1380, we adopted the less rigid standard
set out by the New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Mancine, 590 A.2d 1107
(N.J. 1991). Robar, 157 Vt. at 395, 601 A.2d at 1380. In Mancine, the New
Jersey court held that an uncorroborated, prior inconsistent statement
could stand as sufficient proof of the elements of a crime if the
"statement was made under circumstances supporting its reliability and the
defendant has an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant." Mancine, 590 A.2d at 1119.
Applying our decision in Robar to the facts of this case is somewhat
difficult, because in Robar we gave only a brief explanation of why the
prior statement at issue did not meet the test for reliability set out in
Mancine. Robar, 157 Vt. at 395-96, 601 A.2d at 1380-81. In support of our
holding in Robar that a witness's prior inquest testimony, admitted at
trial as past
recollection recorded, was not sufficiently reliable to sustain the
defendant's conviction, we pointed out that the inquest testimony was given
six months after the event, that the testimony was apparently given as part
of a deal involving possible criminal charges against the witness, and that
the witness may have mistakenly believed that the defendant had already
confessed. Id. at 395-96, 601 A.2d at 1380.
We agree with the trial court that the facts of this case bring it
closer to Mancine, where the court allowed the conviction to stand, than to
Robar. The tape-recorded statement of the victim in this case raises none
of the reliability concerns present in Robar. The victim gave the
statement the day after the assault. There is no suggestion that the
victim was subject to coercive tactics when she gave her statement. See
id. at 395, 601 A.2d at 1380. The Mancine court found the prior statement
to be reliable because it was given two days after the relevant events and
was a more complete version of a statement made earlier, and because the
statement had a "`casual,' easy `flow.'" Mancine, 590 A.2d at 1118. Here,
the victim's statement, given the day after the assault, was consistent
with an earlier statement given to the same police officer. The trial
court found that the statement "did not appear to be forced, coerced or
strained," but rather had "a flow" and sounded "fairly comfortable."
The reliability of the victim's tape-recorded statement is further
bolstered by the presence of some corroborating evidence. The police
officer testified that he saw scratches on the victim at the time she gave
her statement. Defendant himself told the police officer that he "had been
involved in a physical confrontation with his wife" on the night in
question (although he claimed that he had acted in self-defense). The
victim's testimony also placed defendant at the scene of the assault. See
id. at 1117 (holding that "prior inconsistent statement for which
substantial
evidence exists corroborating any of its specific elements and enhancing
its seeming reliability is corroborated in its entirety and may be used for
all purposes").
Robar requires not only that the prior statement meet certain
standards of reliability, but also that the defendant have an opportunity
to cross-examine the witness. Robar, 157 Vt. at 395, 601 A.2d at 1380. We
noted in Robar that the cross-examination of the witness was "perfunctory"
because the witness had testified that she had no memory of the inquest and
the events surrounding it. Id. at 396, 601 A.2d at 1380-81. In this case,
the victim similarly claimed no recollection of the assault or giving the
statement. Nevertheless, cross-examination was far from "perfunctory."
Where a prior statement has been admitted as past recollection
recorded, cross-examination as to the substance of the prior statement
will not be possible, because the statement will be admitted only if the
witness claims to have no recollection of the relevant events. Unless we
were to say that such a statement is not sufficient to support a criminal
conviction, a position we rejected in Robar, id. at 395, 601 A.2d at 1380,
the cross-examination is limited to the reliability of the prior statement.
Here, defense counsel questioned the victim regarding her lack of
recollection, and brought out the victim's use of prescription drugs at the
time the statement was given. Defense counsel also questioned the police
officer regarding his observations of the victim and the circumstances
under which he took the victim's statement. Defendant thus had ample
opportunity for cross-examination as to the reliability of the victim's
statement.
The tape-recorded statement of the victim, properly admitted as past
recollection recorded,(FN4) was sufficient evidence to support defendant's
conviction for simple assault, because it was made under circumstances
supporting its reliability and defendant had an opportunity to
cross-examine the victim.
Affirmed.
FOR THE COURT:
_______________________________________
Associate Justice
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Footnotes
FN1. V.R.E. 803(5) provides:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the
declarant is available as a witness:
. . . .
(5) Recorded Recollection. A memorandum or record concerning a matter
about which a witness once had knowledge but now has insufficient
recollection to enable him to testify fully and accurately, shown to have
been made or adopted by the witness when the matter was fresh in his memory
and to reflect that knowledge correctly. If admitted, the memorandum or
record may be read into evidence but may not itself be received as an
exhibit unless offered by an adverse party.
FN2. The facts in Porter are not directly analogous to this case,
because the witness in Porter had signed the statement under penalty of
perjury at the time it was made, and had also initialed the statement
several times where she had changed the wording. As in many past
recollection recorded cases, the statement in Porter was prepared by a law
enforcement agent, rather than by the witness herself. The reasoning in
Porter is, however, still applicable. That the witness signed the
statement when it was made was not determinative, but was one factor
supporting the accuracy of the statement.
FN3. The dissent emphasizes this statement as announcing a
foundational requirement for admission under Rule 803(5). We note,
however, that the statement was based on "a review of the record," State v.
Lander, 155 Vt. 645, 645, 582 A.2d 128, 128 (1990), and may more fairly be
read as a recounting of the facts of the case.
FN4. Although the issue was not raised on appeal, the dissent argues
that permitting the jury to hear the tape in the victim's own voice also
violated V.R.E. 803(5), which states that a memorandum or record, admitted
as past recollection recorded, "may be read into evidence but may not
itself be received as an exhibit unless offered by an adverse party." This
restriction, which has been criticized by some commentators, see 3 Wigmore,
Evidence § 754 (Chadbourn rev. 1970), reflects a concern that "undue weight
might be given to the document itself." Reporter's Notes, V.R.E. 803. If
the written memorandum or record was admitted into evidence, it would be
available to the jury during deliberations.
While it is true that a writing may tend to take on greater
significance with the jury simply because the statement is in writing and
in the hands of the jury, the playing of a tape recording does not raise
the same problem. It seems ludicrous to suggest that in this case the jury
should hear another person read a transcript of the tape, rather than hear
the victim actually making the statement. Why should the jury not judge
the credibility of the prior statement by hearing it from the victim's
mouth?
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Concurring
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
to press.
No. 94-173
State of Vermont Supreme Court
On Appeal from
v. District Court of Vermont,
Unit No. 3, Caledonia Circuit
Steven Marcy June Term, 1995
David Suntag, J.
Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General, and Susan R. Harritt, Assistant
Attorney General, Montpelier, for plaintiff-appellee
Robert Appel, Defender General, and Anna Saxman, Appellate Defender,
Montpelier, for defendant-appellant
PRESENT: Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.
Allen, C.J., concurring. I agree that the trial court properly
admitted the tape recording of the victim's statement and did not err in
denying defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal; I therefore join the
majority in affirming. I write separately, however, to point out that the
disagreement between the majority and the dissent on the foundational
requirements of Rule 803(5) need not be resolved to decide this appeal.
Even under the dissent's more restrictive interpretation of the rule, the
foundational requirements were satisfied in this case.
To ensure that a statement accurately reflects the witness's
knowledge, that witness "must either testify (1) that he recalls having
made an accurate memorandum or (2) that though he now does not recollect
his state of mind when making the record, he would not have made it unless
it were correct." 4 Weinstein's Evidence 803(5)[01], at 803-180 (1995).
Under the second approach, the witness can testify that he would not have
written or signed a memorandum unless he had been convinced it was correct.
Id. at 803-181; 2 McCormick on Evidence § 283, at 259 (4th ed. 1992).
Although this case involved a tape recording rather than a signed
statement, the witness's testimony is analogous to the foundational
predicate for a written memorandum. See e.g. Dennis v. Scarborough, 360 So. 2d 278, 279 (Ala. 1978) (the witness testified that "he must have known
the recording's veracity (though not whether the statement itself was
accurate) because he otherwise would not have written them down."); Walker
v. Larson, 169 N.W.2d 737, 742 (Minn. 1969) (witness "testified that he had
never signed any paper which did not contain true facts within his own
knowledge."). Referring to statements in a transcript of the tape
recording, the State's Attorney asked the victim, "[W]ould you have said
them if they were not true?" The victim replied, "I don't believe I would
have." The State's Attorney then asked the victim, "Is there a single
thing in those two pages [of the transcript] that you think you would have
deliberately said to the police officer if they were not true?" She
replied, "No." In its Rule 803(5) analysis, the trial court relied upon
this testimony by the witness, saying: "She[] further testified that . . .
if she had talked to a police officer, and that is now established, about
this incident, she would have endeavored to be truthful. . . . She has not
given evidence saying that what she said previously is incorrect."(FN1)
In United States v. Patterson, 678 F.2d 774 (9th Cir. 1982), the court
concluded that the foundational requirement was satisfied under
circumstances similar to this case. In Patterson, the government sought
to introduce the defendant's grand jury testimony as past recollection
recorded. The court concluded that the witness's testimony that "he did
not think he had lied to the grand jury" was sufficient to establish that
the grand jury testimony accurately reflected the witness's knowledge. Id.
at 779. In sum, the tape recording of the victim's statements was properly
admitted under either the majority or dissent's interpretation of the
foundational requirements of Rule 803(5).
I have been authorized to state that Justice Gibson joins in this
concurrence.
_______________________________________
Chief Justice
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Footnotes
FN1. Although the trial court may have determined the admissibility
of the tape recording under the disputed interpretation of Rule 803(5), we
can affirm its admissibility determination on any legal ground which would
justify the result. Richard v. Union High Sch. Dist. No. 32, 137 Vt. 132,
134, 400 A.2d 987, 989 (1979) ("Error will not result in reversal if the
record before us discloses any legal ground which would justify the result,
even though the ground may not have been raised below and may not be
briefed.").
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Dissenting
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
to press.
No. 94-173
State of Vermont Supreme Court
On Appeal from
v. District Court of Vermont,
Unit No. 3, Caledonia Circuit
Steven Marcy June Term, 1995
David Suntag, J.
Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General, and Susan R. Harritt, Assistant
Attorney General, Montpelier, for plaintiff-appellee
Robert Appel, Defender General, and Anna Saxman, Appellate Defender,
Montpelier, for defendant-appellant
PRESENT: Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.
DOOLEY, J., dissenting. The majority opinion represents an
unprecedented weakening of the foundational requirements of the hearsay
exception for past recollection recorded, V.R.E. 803(5), and an abandonment
of the restrictions on the use of such evidence as the sole basis to
convict a criminal defendant. The effect is that hearsay evidence, the
reliability of which cannot be challenged by normal means, acquires such
weight that defendant is stripped of the ability to mount an effective
defense. Although I am sympathetic to the majority's goals in this
domestic violence case, I cannot agree to the distortion of neutral and
essential principles of evidence law and fair play that reaching those
goals necessitates. Accordingly, I dissent.
At the outset, I believe that we should be more forthcoming about what
is really
motivating the decision. This case involves an allegation of spousal abuse
in which, as in many such cases, the abused spouse is the only witness to
the assault. And too often, after filing a complaint with the police, the
abused spouse recants or seeks not to press charges against the abusive
spouse. See C. Klein & L. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for Battered
Women: An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 Hofstra L. Rev. 801,
1187-88 (1993). The reality is that both the trial judge and the majority
believe that this is a case of recantation by convenient memory lapse.
That is, they are skeptical of the victim's assertion that she remembers
neither the assault nor the statement. What the opinion really says is
that spousal abusers should not be able to avoid criminal responsibility by
such a ploy.
I share the skepticism about the victim's memory failure, but am
unwilling to join result-oriented decision-making that eliminates
important safeguards on the truth-finding function of trials. In this
instance, evidentiary doctrine created to prevent those who feign amnesia
from subverting the criminal justice process is equally applicable when the
memory lapse is real.(FN1) The result is to open up the realm of
"trial-by-statement" where it is impossible to test the accuracy of the
statement or resolve evidentiary conflicts in any reliable way.
I am also troubled that there is an internal inconsistency in the
majority's approach to the problem that confronts us. The hearsay rule
that allows for the admission of the critical statement is applicable if
the declarant "now has insufficient recollection to enable him to testify
fully and accurately." V.R.E. 803(5). What the majority is really holding
is that because this essential element of the hearsay exception is not met,
we should broaden the exception to let in more hearsay than we would
otherwise allow. I fear that we are standing normal evidence analysis on
its head to reach the desired result.
I.
On the hearsay point, what is in issue is contained in State v.
Lander, 155 Vt. 645, 582 A.2d 128 (1990) (mem), where we reversed a
criminal conviction because critical evidence was erroneously admitted
under V.R.E. 803(5):
When a witness has no present recollection of a prior event,
a previously recorded recollection of the event is admissible under
V.R.E. 803(5) despite the proscription against the use of hearsay,
V.R.E. 802, provided that the proponent lays the necessary
foundation. . . . Defendant raised a timely objection to the use of
the witness's statement based on the inadequacy of the foundation.
A review of the record indicates that the witness did not adopt his
prior statement as his own or aver that the statement accurately
reflected his knowledge at the time of its making. . . . Therefore,
the statement lacked a foundation sufficient to justify its admission
into evidence.
Id. at 645, 582 A.2d at 128 (citations omitted; emphasis supplied). There
is no dispute that the foundation required in Lander is missing here. The
majority has two answers to this obvious obstacle.(FN2)
The first is to distinguish Lander on the basis that the statements
involved were prepared by another person rather than by the witness. The
majority cites four cases for the significance of this distinction. None
state that this distinction is critical so that the evidence would have
been admissible if the statement had been prepared by the witness. In
United States v. Schoenborn, 4 F.3d 1424, 1428 (7th Cir. 1993), for
example, the court quoted from its earlier opinion in United States v.
Williams, 951 F.2d 853, 858 (7th Cir. 1992) that in a third-party-
transcription case, the evidentiary foundation must include both testimony
to the accuracy of the transcription and testimony by the person whose past
recollection is in issue "to the accuracy of his oral report to the person
who recorded the statement." What Schoenborn holds is that third-
party-transcription cases impose an additional foundational requirement
beyond that imposed in Lander; it clearly does not hold that the Lander
requirements are inapplicable in such cases.
The majority's new distinction is curious because it does not even
apply to the facts of this case. V.R.E. 803(5) plainly states that a
"memorandum or record . . . shown to have been made or adopted by the
witness" may be admissible as past recollection recorded. (emphasis added).
Here, the tape recording was made by the officer, not the witness. The
police were in possession of the tape until trial. Indeed, we have a copy
because the original is lost. Moreover, the officer testified that part of
the tape was erased during transcription. The tape recording has pauses
and jumps, as the machine was stopped and started during the interview.(FN3)
The use of the majority's new distinction to distinguish Lander is
also curious, since there is no indication in that published entry order
decision that it is a third-party-transcription case. This the first time I
have ever observed that we have guessed at the facts of an appellate
precedent in order to distinguish it on grounds never mentioned in the
precedent.
In any event, no commentator supports the distinction made by the
majority. McCormick comes the closest to the majority by acknowledging
that the foundational requirements in issue may be more easily satisfied
where there is no third-party-transcription, but is clear that the witness
must in some way acknowledge the accuracy of the prior statement. See 2
McCormick on Evidence § 283, at 259-60 (4th ed. 1992). Weinstein states
that in any case the witness whose statement is admitted must testify that
he now recalls that it was accurate or that he would not have made it if it
were not correct. 4 Weinstein's Evidence 803(5)[01], at 803-180 to -181
(1995).
Nothing in the language of the rule supports the distinction. The
rule requires the proponent of admission to show that the statement
reflects the witnesses' "knowledge correctly." V.R.E. 803(5) (emphasis
supplied). If the drafters intended the new majority result, they would
have used "statement" not "knowledge."
In short, the majority has created a distinction without a difference
in order to distinguish a precedent of this Court which is dead against it.
There is no support for the proposition that the difference can eliminate
the foundation requirement of Lander that the witness "aver that the
statement accurately reflected his knowledge at the time of its making."
Lander, 155 Vt. at 645, 582 A.2d at 128.
The second answer is to ignore the holding of Lander as if the
inconvenient words within it have somehow disappeared. The majority's view
is that Lander cannot mean what it says because the plain language of Rule
803(5) does not include the Lander requirement. Part of the reason for the
brevity of Lander, I am sure, is that it restated the widely-accepted
requirements of the rule. See 4 Weinstein's Evidence § 803(5)[01] at
803-180 to -181. The rule was drafted to be a codification of the common
law hearsay exception, which included the Lander requirements. See id. at
803-172 (rule is codification of law that was long-favored in the federal
courts); 3 Wigmore on Evidence § 747(a) (hearsay exception for past
recollection recorded requires that witness be able to assert that record
correctly represented his knowledge and recollection at time of making).
We have said often that our overall aim in construing statutes is to
implement the intent of the Legislature. See, e.g., Lemieux v. Tri-State
Lotto Comm'n, 6 Vt. L.W. 199, 200 (Aug. 11, 1995). The same principle
applies to construing our rules, but it is our intent that we must follow.
Few of our evidence rules have a "plain meaning" when applied to myriad of
circumstances that arise in the courtroom. Unlike the Vermont Legislature,
we have devices in
our rule drafting to explain the intent of the draftspersons. Thus, we
have frequently looked to reporter's notes, and other indicia of intent to
determine the proper interpretation of rules. See State v. Bean, 6 Vt.
L.W. 87, 88 (March 31, 1995). Also in construing a statute or rule, we
presume that the common law is not changed except by clear and unambiguous
language. See Estate of Kelley v. Moguls, Inc., 160 Vt. 531, 533, 632 A.2d 360, 362 (1993).
The intent behind Rule 803(5) is clear: to codify the common law rule,
which contains the Lander foundation requirements. The wording of the rule
does not clearly and unambiguously modify the common law requirements. It
still requires that the past record reflect the declarant's knowledge
"correctly," and here, this requirement has not been met. The majority's
attempt to find nuances in the drafting of Rule 803(5), while ignoring the
statements of intent, only insures that the outcome will not reflect our
intent.(FN4)
For its new approach, the majority relies on one precedent, United
States v. Porter, 986 F.2d 1014 (6th Cir. 1993), a decision followed by no
other state or federal court. The Majority relies primarily on Porter for
the contention that the accuracy of the statement can be shown according to
objective indicia of reliability in lieu of the witness's own attestations.
See id. at 1017. Although Porter contains some broad language, I cannot
read it as supporting the majority's conclusion, and the facts are
distinguishable from the present case. In Porter, the witness admitted
making the statement and signing it under penalty of perjury. She
testified that she tried to tell the truth to the police officer, but
acknowledged that she was high on drugs at
the time and could not be certain of what she had told the police.
Therefore, she explicitly affirmed that the document reflected her
knowledge when the statement was made. Id. at 1017.
Porter is, in the words of McCormick, an example of the "extreme,
[where] it is even sufficient if the individual testifies to recognizing
his or her signature on the statement and believes the statement correct
because the witness would not have signed it if he or she had not believed
it true at the time."(FN5) 2 McCormick on Evidence § 283 at 259 (4th ed.
1992). Here, the wife, unlike the witness in Porter, does not remember
meeting the police officer and giving the statement to him. She
consistently testified that because of her memory loss, she could not
verify the accuracy and truthfulness of the statement. If Porter
represents the "extreme" case, we have now gone well beyond the extreme and
made that normal.
The majority's analysis would render the witness's presence on the
witness stand superfluous. See People v. Simmons, 177 Cal. Rptr. 17, 21
(Cal. Ct. App. 1981). If third party testimony can establish objective
facts indicating the reliability of the statement, then the witness's own
attestations to the statement's accuracy become unnecessary. Extending the
majority's logic, third party testimony could make admissible a statement
that a witness claims is false, inaccurate, or was never made. The
majority's holding transforms Rule 803(5) into an exception for prior
inconsistent statements not made under oath, see V.R.E. 801(d)(1)(A), and
into a "catch-all exception" for hearsay that does not fit within a
statutory exception. Unlike the federal courts, we specifically decided
that we would not adopt a "catch-all" hearsay exception. See Reporter's
Notes, V.R.E. 803 (noting that Federal Rule of Evidence 803(24), providing
for the catchall hearsay exception, was not adopted in Vermont). If we are
to amend V.R.E. 803(5), we should do so by rules amendment and not by
decision.
I can find no decision from any court that would allow admission in
this case, and the
evidence clearly does not meet the foundation requirement set forth in
State v. Lander. Even if I thought Porter would go this far, the majority
gives no explanation for overruling Lander. I would hold that the evidence
did not meet the requirements of V.R.E. 803(5) and is, therefore,
inadmissible hearsay. Since the evidence was central to the state's case,
indeed was the entirety of the case, I would reverse the conviction on that
basis.
II.
The concurring opinion has an different theory of admissibility. My
main problem is that it is not supported by the facts found by the trial
judge.
Through transcript pages of examination and cross-examination, the
prosecutor and defense counsel attempted to induce defendant's wife to
answer hypothetical statements that might support or oppose admissibility
of the tape recording. The result is that she did both. At one point, as
the concurring opinion cites, she answered "I don't believe I would have"
to a question whether she would have made the statements on the tape if
they were not true. At another point, she answered "anger" to a question
asking whether there is a reason why she might tell someone something she
did not believe was true.
Under V.R.E. 104(a), preliminary fact questions pertaining to
admissibility are for the trial court. See Reporter's Notes to V.R.E.
104(a). In this case, the farthest the court went was to find "if she
talked to a police officer, and that is now established, she would have
endeavored to be truthful." The trial court adopted the theory of
admissibility now accepted by the majority; it did not adopt the theory of
the concurrence.
The rule requires that the recording be shown "to reflect ... [the
witness's] knowledge correctly." V.R.E. 803(5). I cannot accept that the
recording has been shown to have reflected accurately the victim's
knowledge when she does not remember making the recording and can state
only "she would have endeavored to be truthful." Indeed, if this witness
meets the
foundation requirement, it is difficult to conceive of a witness who would
not.
I can find no case that goes this far. In United States v. Patterson,
678 F.2d 774, 779 (9th Cir. 1982), the case relied upon by the concurrence,
the witness recalled giving testimony to the grand jury and said "he did
not think he had lied to the grand jury" and added that "he recalled the
events in question better when he testified before the grand jury." This
foundation testimony, which is specific to the prior statement, is far
stronger than that here.
As I indicated above, the foundation here is much weaker than what
McCormick describes as "the extreme." As McCormick indicates, the more
common requirement is that the witness testify to a "habit or practice to
record such matters accurately" even though he or she cannot speak to the
accuracy of the particular recording at issue. See 2 McCormick, supra, §
283, at 259. Here, there is no showing of habit or practice.
I do not agree that we can affirm the trial court by relying on
foundational facts not found below. If we accept the fact-finding of the
trial court, as we must, the foundation requirements are not met.
III.
Even if the taped hearsay statement is admitted, I would still reverse
the conviction because the hearsay was the sole basis for appellant's
conviction, and cross-examination of the witness was futile. See State v.
Robar, 157 Vt. 387, 391-96, 601 A.2d 1376, 1378-81 (1991). In Robar, we
held that the State cannot meet its burden of proof if the sole evidence
upon which the conviction is based is past recollection recorded, unless
the prior statement meets specific standards of reliability. Id. at 395,
601 A.2d at 1380. A statement may suffice to prove the elements of a crime
if the statement were made under circumstances supporting its reliability,
and if the defendant has the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.
Id. Mere perfunctory cross-examination, however, is not sufficient to
ensure that a defendant receives a fair trial. Id. at 396, 601 A.2d at
1380-81.
We must remember that the Robar holding was based on cases that dealt
with prior inconsistent statements where the opportunity for
cross-examination is greater. See 2 McCormick on Evidence, § 251, at 120
(evidence of prior inconsistent statement has the safeguards of examined
testimony because "witness who has told one story aforetime and another [on
the stand] has opened the gates to all the vistas of truth which. . .
cross-examination was invented to explore"). The leading precedent was
State v. Mancine, 590 A.2d 1107, 1117 (N.J. 1991) which held that
corroboration for each element of the crime was unnecessary as long as
there is general corroboration and the reliability of the statement is
supported by the circumstances under which it is given. The decision
stressed:
[T]he defendant must have the opportunity to cross-examine the
declarant, because cross-examination. . . may be the only method
of bringing forth facts necessary for a fair assessment of the
circumstances under which the statement was given and in the trial
setting, is the sole means by which the factfinder can assess the
credibility of the prior statement and the recanting one . . . . The
crucible of cross-examination reveals `most, if not all, relevant
circumstances surrounding the prior inconsistent statement,'
regardless of the witness' status.
Id. at 1117-18 (quoting State v. A. Gross, 577 A.2d 806, 812 (N.J. 1990)).
Obviously, the function of cross-examination would not have been served in
Mancine if the witness took the stand and testified that she did not
remember the prior inconsistent statement or any of the circumstances under
which it was given. Under those circumstances, the "crucible of cross-
examination" would reveal absolutely nothing. Similarly, a full memory
loss will make absolutely useless cross-examination on a record of past
recollection.
In principle, the majority opinion appears to agree with the foregoing
statement of our law and the fact that the hearsay statement was the sole
basis for the conviction. In practice, it clearly doesn't agree with the
cross-examination requirement. To demonstrate this point, we need only
look to how the requirement was applied in State v. Robar, our main
precedent in this area.
In Robar, the witness had given a full statement, under oath at an
inquest, and the statement described defendant's involvement in the charged
burglary. She could not remember the events at trial, nor her testimony at
the inquest, but she did recall testifying at the inquest and stated that
her testimony at the inquest was the truth. Cross-examination elicited
that she was extremely drunk on the night of the burglary. We held that
the cross-examination was "perfunctory" and deficient. Id. at 896, 601 A.2d at 1380-81.
Defendant here had less opportunity to cross-examine than the
defendant in Robar. As in Robar, defendant showed that the witness might
have been in an impaired state, here because of prescription drugs, but
that is all that cross-examination showed. The fact that the witness had
no recollection of the events or the statement was necessarily established
in direct examination. The cross-examination of the police officer, even
if relevant to whether defendant had a fair opportunity to cross-examine
the alleged victim, could not go to the accuracy of the statement.
The majority deals with this deficiency by stating that the limited
opportunity to cross-examine is present in every impaired memory case, and
cannot be the basis for exclusion. I agree that the lack of memory of the
events covered in the statement cannot alone prevent effective
cross-examination. But here the witness professed to remember neither
making the statement, nor the events covered in it. When the witness
recalls making the statement, meaningful cross-examination is available
about the circumstances under which the statement was made.(FN6) See D.
Greenwald, The Forgetful Witness, 60 U. Chi. L. Rev. 167, 179 (1993)
(witness who remembers making statement can still testify whether he was
lying or uncertain when he made it, but "[l]ines of inquiry like this. . .
are of course blocked when not only the content but the making of the
statement are forgotten."). Thus, the cross-examination goes to the
reliability of the statement, the heart of the question before the jury as
discussed in Mancine. Without memory of giving the past statement, the
witness is as close to a mannequin as we are ever likely to have.
The examination and cross-examination here shows the uselessness of
questioning a witness with no memory of any relevant event. Instead of
eliciting evidence, the questions are actually arguments to demonstrate
that absolutely anything could be true as far as the witness was concerned.
See Simmons, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 21 (witness unable to recall making
statement or circumstances surrounding its preparation "simply has no
knowledge at all").
This exact distinction troubled the Court in Robar. We found the
cross-examination deficient not because the witness had no memory of the
events but because she had "no memory of the inquest and the events
surrounding it." Robar, 157 Vt. at 396, 601 A.2d at 1380. There is no way
we can find that the opportunity here meets the cross-examination
requirement of Robar. None of this deficiency is answered by corroboration
of the statement on which the majority relies. Robar is clear that indicia
of reliability, supplied by corroboration, and an opportunity for
cross-examination, are separate requirements. Moreover, the corroboration
is as consistent with defendant's version of events as with the version
contained in the statement. Corroboration adds nothing to the issue before
the Court.
IV.
One other issue is symbolic of what is going on in this case.
Although V.R.E. 803(5) admits past recollection recorded as an exception to
the hearsay rule, the use of this evidence is carefully limited. Thus, the
record "may be read into evidence but may not itself be received as an
exhibit unless offered by an adverse party." The limitation is to "avoid
the danger that
undue weight might be given to the [record] . . . itself." Reporter's
Notes to V.R.E. 803(5). The limitation was ignored in this case. The tape
recording was played for the jury, rather than its content being read into
evidence. See State v. Discher, 597 A.2d 1336, 1339 (Me. 1991) (once tape
recording admitted as past recollection recorded, court permitted only
transcript of tape recording to be read aloud to jury). It was replayed
for the jury during their deliberations, at their request. The point was
to give this recording the maximum weight possible because the taped
hearsay statement was the primary evidence against defendant. The jury
could have convicted defendant because the witness against him "sounded"
credible.
The majority's answer to this point demonstrates what went wrong here.
They find it "ludicrous to suggest that in this case the jury should hear
another person read a transcript of the tape, rather than hear the victim
actually making the statement." It is, of course, equally "ludicrous" to
have someone read a written statement, rather than giving it to the jury
for its perusal. No doubt, the jury will be in a better position to judge
reliability if it hears or sees the statement.
Following Federal Rule 803(5), we adopted this "ludicrous" restriction
for a reason. Past recollection recorded is evidence of debatable quality,
and we did not want excessive reliance placed on it. Unfortunately, this
decision is going in the opposite direction. The recorded statement is
virtually all of the prosecution's case, and the majority wants the full
force of it to get before the jury. As our disagreements on the first two
issues demonstrate, the majority has no concerns about the quality of this
evidence, and a restriction built on such concerns looks ludicrous.
If this issue had been preserved, I would have voted to reverse also
because we cannot say that the jury's verdict was not substantially swayed
by the improper playing of the tape. See United States v. Ray, 768 F.2d 991, 995 (8th Cir. 1985) (conviction for failure to appear reversed where
transcript constituting past recollection was submitted to jury and
constituted only
evidence of defendant's notice to appear). I raise it now to emphasize
that evidence which, at best, is marginally reliable under evidence
principles, and impossible to test through cross-examination, became the
centerpiece of the prosecution's case and was put in front of the jury in
the most damaging way possible. It adds to my firm conclusion that this
trial did not meet minimum standards of fairness that allows us to affirm
its result.
I dissent.
_______________________________________
Associate Justice
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Footnotes
FN1. By comparison, Rule 801(d)(1)(A), admitting prior inconsistent
statements as "not hearsay," can be used when the court finds a witness is
feigning a memory loss. See 2 McCormick on Evidence § 251, at 121 (4th ed.
1992). That rule has an additional safeguard that the prior statement must
be "given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury." V.R.E.
801(d)(1)(A).
FN2. A footnote suggests a third, that the Lander requirements were
descriptions of history not law. In the paragraph quoted above, the next
to the last statement can and should be taken as a description of what is
in the record. The last sentence, commenced with "Therefore," clearly
states that the consequence of this history is that the "statement lacked a
foundation sufficient to justify its admission." It can be interpreted
only as a statement of law, inconsistent with the majority's position here.
FN3. I am not suggesting that the tape recording was doctored. I am
suggesting that the same issues of accuracy of transcription exist for a
tape recording as for written statement which is reduced to writing by a
third party.
FN4. One of the nuances is that the rule is drafted in the passive
voice and should have been stated in the active voice if the draftspersons
had intended that the witness testify to the accuracy of the content of the
recording. Virtually all of the hearsay exceptions are stated in the
passive voice showing that the real motivation behind the drafting of any
exception is parallelism with other exceptions.
I also note that the majority's textual approach explains only part of
its rationale. It does not explain, for example, the majority's
distinction between statements prepared by the witness and those prepared
by third persons. There is no support for this distinction in the text of
the rule.
FN5. The prosecution might have brought this case within the rule by
playing the tape for the wife, and eliciting similar responses about it.
The prosecution did not do so.
FN6. The majority is mistaken when they argue that our interpretation
of the Robar requirements would mean that past recollection recorded could
never be sufficient to uphold a conviction. The case before us presents
the atypical past recollection recorded situation. Usually, the witness may
not remember all or some of underlying events, but typically she remembers
the circumstances under which she made the statement. See, e.g., U.S. v.
Porter, 986 F.2d at 1017 (witness did not remember underlying events, but
recalled circumstances under which she made and signed the statement given
to police).
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