State v. Flynn

State v. Flynn  (95-098); 164 Vt 637; 674 A.2d 792

[Filed 2-Feb-1996]

                               ENTRY ORDER

                      SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 95-098

                            NOVEMBER TERM, 1995


State of Vermont                     }     APPEALED FROM:
                                     }
                                     }
     v.                              }     District Court of Vermont,
                                     }     Unit No. 3, Caledonia Circuit
Nancy Ellen Flynn                    }
                                     }     DOCKET NO. 18-3-94Cacs


       In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:


       In this driving while under the influence (DUI) civil suspension, the
  State appeals a judgment for defendant.  We reverse.

       Officer Gerald Cote witnessed defendant drive through an intersection
  controlled by a stop sign, which the parties agree was illegally located. 
  The parties also agree that 23 V.S.A. § 1021(b) applied to defendant's
  failure to stop.  Section 1021(b) states:

      No provision of this chapter for which signs are required may be
      enforced if at the time and place of the alleged violation an official
      sign is not in approximately proper position and sufficiently legible
      to be seen by an ordinarily observant person.

       After apprehending defendant, the officer detected alcohol on
  defendant's breath and processed him for DUI.  The district court ruled the
  stop was illegal because of the wrong placement of the stop sign, which was
  on a barrel in the middle of the intersection.  Accordingly, judgment was
  entered for defendant.

       The officer's stop of defendant was valid if he had a reasonable
  suspicion that defendant had violated 23 V.S.A. § 1048(b) (driver
  approaching stop sign shall stop).  This case is governed by State v. Ryea,
  153 Vt. 451, 571 A.2d 674 (1990) and State v. Lanoue, 156 Vt. 35, 587 A.2d 405 (1991).  In both Ryea and Lanoue, the Court upheld a stop where the
  officer mistakenly thought defendant was operating with a suspended
  license.  We concluded that, where an officer makes a stop based on
  suspicion which is reasonable at the time, a later determination that the
  factual basis for the suspicion was inaccurate will not invalidate the
  stop. 

  

  Lanoue, 156 Vt. at 36, 587 A.2d  at 406; Ryea, 153 Vt. at 454, 571 A.2d  at 676.

       Reversed.



     BY THE COURT:



     _______________________________________
     Frederic W. Allen, Chief Justice

     _______________________________________
     Ernest W. Gibson III, Associate Justice

     _______________________________________
     John A. Dooley, Associate Justice

     _______________________________________
     James L. Morse, Associate Justice

     _______________________________________
     Denise R. Johnson, Associate Justice