State v. Wright

State v. Wright  (94-375); 164 Vt 622; 669 A.2d 553

[Filed 26-Oct-1995]

                               ENTRY ORDER

                      SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 94-375

                            SEPTEMBER TERM, 1995


State of Vermont                     }     APPEALED FROM:
                                     }
                                     }
     v.                              }     District Court of Vermont,
                                     }     Unit No. 1, Windham Circuit
Matthew L. Wright                    }
                                     }     DOCKET NO. 225-2-92WmCr


       In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       Defendant, who is charged with murder, was found incompetent to stand
  trial on December 24, 1992 and was committed to the custody of the
  Commissioner of Mental Health and Mental Retardation pursuant to 13 V.S.A.
  §§ 4820(2) & 4822(a).  The commitment order required a court hearing before
  discharge.  Id. § 4822(a).  On January 12, 1994, pursuant to new
  psychiatric evidence and a stipulation of the parties, he was found
  competent to stand trial. Concluding that defendant was no longer in need
  of further treatment, the Department of Mental Health and Mental
  Retardation then informed the court of its intent to discharge defendant. 
  See 18 V.S.A. §§ 7802 (discharge on administrative review), 8009(b)
  (administrative discharge). Over defendant's argument that he remained in
  need of further treatment, see 18 V.S.A. § 7101(16), the court discharged
  him from commitment.  We affirm.

       Defendant argues that the court misallocated the burden of proof and
  improperly ignored the undisputed evidence, and that the court ignored its
  own findings at a recent hearing on whether the criminal case should be
  transferred to juvenile court and that he was in need of further treatment. 
  These arguments are premised on defendant's view that the purpose of the
  court hearing was to review judicially the department's decision, a premise
  we find invalid.

       The court was proceeding pursuant to § 4822(e), which requires it to
  issue an order discharging defendant from the commissioner's custody if it
  determines "commitment shall no longer be necessary."  The debate between
  defendant and the department is over whether defendant needs treatment and
  in what setting.  Defendant's position is that his mental health will
  seriously deteriorate, to the point that he will again become dangerous, if
  placed in a correctional facility.  The department apparently disagrees.

       In construing a statute, our primary aim is to implement the intent of
  the Legislature. See Swett v. Haig's, Inc., ___Vt.___, 663 A.2d 930, 932
  (1995).  In this case, the court was following a special procedure
  triggered by a determination that a criminal defendant is mentally ill, or
  incompetent to stand trial, and would not face criminal adjudication, at
  least temporarily. The clear intent was to insure public safety while
  obtaining treatment for the defendant in a secure setting.  Once the
  "trigger" is removed, the public safety concern is abated.  We would expect
  the need for mental health commitment would normally be removed also. 
  Thus, we do not believe the criminal court is the appropriate place to
  resolve the debate between the department and defendant over treatment. 
  The issue under the statute is the need for commitment, not treatment.

   

       Defendant's evidence addressed his treatment needs and specifically
  stated treatment "could be provided in a less restrictive setting."  The
  court's findings in the juvenile transfer proceedings relate to the need
  for treatment.  Thus, the record fully supported the court's decision that
  commitment was no longer "necessary."  We find no error in the court's
  conclusion.

       The parties assume that defendant will be placed in the custody of the
  department of corrections.  If defendant is correct about his mental health
  treatment needs, there is a statutory procedure for the Commissioner of
  Corrections to transfer him to the custody of the Commissioner of Mental
  Health and Mental Retardation for treatment.  See 28 V.S.A. §§ 702(b), 703,
  704.  Use of that procedure is more appropriate for this case than the
  continued commitment defendant seeks.

       Affirmed.




     BY THE COURT:



     _______________________________________
     Frederic W. Allen, Chief Justice

     _______________________________________
     Ernest W. Gibson III, Associate Justice

     _______________________________________
     John A. Dooley, Associate Justice

     _______________________________________
     James L. Morse, Associate Justice

     _______________________________________
     Denise R. Johnson, Associate Justice