In re Raymond Estate

IN_RE_RAYMOND_ESTATE.93-453; 161 Vt. 544; 641 A.2d 1342

[Filed 15-Apr-1994]

 NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
 order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.

                                 No. 93-453


 In re Joan W. Raymond Estate                 Supreme Court

                                              On Appeal from
                                              Orange Superior Court

                                              March Term, 1994

 Alan W. Cook, J.

 Harvey B. Otterman, Jr. of Otterman and Allen, P.C., Barre, for appellant

 William B. Field of Valsangiacomo, Detora & McQuesten, Barre, for appellee


 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


      DOOLEY, J.   This appeal arises from a decision of the Randolph Probate
 Court awarding the entire estate of Joan W. Raymond, who died intestate, to
 her adopted half-brother Paul Dixon Raymond.  Appellants James, John and
 William Raymond, cousins of the deceased, appealed that decision to the
 Orange Superior Court, which affirmed in favor of the appellee, Paul
 Raymond's guardian, and now appeal here.  We affirm.
      Joan Raymond was born in 1921 to Joseph Raymond and Helen Wedgewood
 Raymond.  Joseph Raymond was previously married to Carrie Tewksbury Raymond.
 During that marriage, Joseph and Carrie adopted Carrie's sister Mary's son,
 Paul Dixon, on January 7, 1916.
      The only issue in this case involves the inheritance rights of an
 adopted sibling.  It is undisputed that if Paul Dixon Raymond is to be
 treated as if he were a natural sibling of the deceased, he will inherit her
 entire estate.  See 14 V.S.A. {{ 551(4), 552 (kindred of the half-blood

 

 shall inherit as kindred of the whole blood).  On the other hand, if Paul
 Dixon Raymond does not stand as a sibling, the estate of the deceased will
 go to appellants as her next of kin.  See 14 V.S.A. { 551(5).
      At the time of Paul Dixon's adoption in 1916, adoptions were governed
 by P.S. {{ 3264-3271, made effective in 1906.  Adoptee inheritance rights
 were specifically addressed in P.S. { 3270, which provided in relevant part:
             Upon the proper execution and filing of such an
           instrument [of adoption] the same rights, duties and
           obligations, and the same right of inheritance shall
           exist between the parties as though the person adopted
           had been the legitimate child of the person or persons
           making the adoption, except that the person adopted
           shall not be capable of taking property expressly
           limited to the heirs of the body or bodies of the
           parties making such adoption.

 In 1945, the Legislature revised the laws of adoption, setting out the new
 laws in 15 V.S.A. {{ 431-454.  See 1945, No. 41, {{ 1-23.  Thus, at the time
 of Joan Raymond's death in 1991, adoptee inheritance rights were governed by
 15 V.S.A. { 448, which provides in relevant part:
           Upon the issuance of a final adoption decree the same
         rights, duties and obligations, and the same right of
         inheritance shall exist between the parties as though
         the person adopted had been the legitimate child of the
         person or persons making the adoption, except that the
         person adopted shall not be capable of taking property
         expressly limited to the heirs of the body of the
         persons making such adoption.  The same right of
         inheritance shall exist between the person adopted and
         his issue on the one hand and natural or adopted
         children of the person or persons making the adoption
         and their issue on the other hand as though the person
         adopted had been the legitimate child of the person or
         persons making the adoption.

 For ease of reference, P.S. { 3270 will be referred to as the 1906 law,
 while 15 V.S.A. { 448 will be referred to as the 1945 law.
      The sole issue before us reduces to a question of which of the two
 statutes is applicable to Paul Dixon Raymond's inheritance rights -- the

 

 1906 law in effect at the time of his adoption or the 1945 law in effect at
 the time of Joan Raymond's death.  If the former, appellants would prevail
 because the statute permits an adoptee to inherit from, but not through, the
 adopting parent(s).  See In re Walworth's Estate, 85 Vt. 322, 333, 82 A. 7,
 11 (1912) (construing 1906 law) ("[T]he words 'between the parties' are
 intended to limit such right of the person adopted to inherit from the
 person or persons making the adoption, and to this end they in effect
 negative any right to inherit through such person or persons by right of
 representation . . . .").  If the latter, appellee prevails because the 1945
 law specifically allows for inheritance from siblings.
      Appellants see this primarily as a statutory construction case.  From
 the wording of the statute, they argue the Legislature's intent in enacting
 the 1945 law was not to affect existing inheritance rights of persons
 adopted before its effective date.  Further, they claim an alternative
 reading would apply the 1945 statute retrospectively, and there is a strong
 presumption against retrospective operation.  See Curran v. Marcille, 152
 Vt. 247, 250, 565 A.2d 1362, 1364 (1989) ("statute affecting legally
 existing rights should not be construed to operate retrospectively" absent
 clear langauge to that effect).  Although appellants' arguments draw some
 support from the statutory language, we reject them for three reasons.
      First, our precedents, as well as those of the vast majority of states,
 are against appellants' position.  The most important decision in Vermont,
 In re Estate of Hagar, 98 Vt. 235, 126 A. 507 (1924), concerned the right of
 the State to collect collateral inheritance and transfer taxes upon property
 devised by a decedent to her two adopted children.  Although Hagar was a tax
 case, the Court was required to choose between the law in effect at the time
 of adoption and the law in effect at the time of the testator's death.  To

 

 do so, it looked to the law that had developed in other states on the
 inheritance rights of adopted children.  Quoting extensively from Sorenson
 v. Rasmussen, 131 N.W. 325 (1911) and Gilliam v. Guaranty Trust Co., 186 N.Y. 127, 78 N.E. 697 (1906), the Hagar court reasoned:
         The rule is well settled that since the right of one
         person to inherit the property of another vests at the
         death of the latter, the statute in force at that time
         rather than the one in force at a prior or subsequent
         date governs the disposition of the estate.  And by the
         same rule the right of adopted children in the estate of
         adoptive parents is determined.

 Hagar, 98 Vt. at 241, 126 Vt. at 509 (citations omitted).
      We recognize that a great deal of time has passed since Hagar.  A
 review of existing precedents, however, indicates that the vast majority of
 states that have considered this issue have ruled in accordance with Hagar.
 See, e.g., McClure v. Noble, 602 So. 2d 377, 378 (Ala. 1992) ("The
 inheritance rights of adopted persons are governed by the law of adoption
 and descent and distribution in force at the time of death of the person
 whose estate is involved."); Brooks Bank & Trust Co. v. Rorabacher, 171 A. 655, 656-67 (Conn. 1934) ("[T]he right of an adopted child or his heirs to
 inherit from an adoptive parent and, as well, from relatives of such parent
 is to be determined by the law in force at the time of the death of the
 person from whom inheritance is claimed."); In re Williams, 144 A.2d 116,
 117 (Me. 1958) ("The law is settled in this state that the right to inherit
 property from or by an adopted person is determined by the law of descent in
 effect at the time of the death of the intestate."); In re Estate of
 Adolphson, 271 N.W.2d 511, 512 (Mich. 1978) ("Determinations of heirs are to
 be governed by statutes in effect at the time of death, and an adoption
 statute in effect at the time of death is controlling.") (citation omitted);
 In re Cilley, 163 A.2d 302, 305 (Pa. 1960) ("In determining the rights of

 

 inheritance of "chosen" or adopted children we are bound by the statutes of
 inheritance at the time the inheritance became effective . . . ."); see also
 Annotation, What Law, In Point of Time, Governs as to Inheritance From or
 Through Adoptive Parent, 18 A.L.R. 960, 962-966 (1951 & Supps. 1987 & 1993)
 (collecting and discussing cases from additional jurisdictions applying the
 statute in effect at date of death, including Colorado, District of
 Columbia, Florida, Idaho, Kentucky, Minnesota, Nebraska, New York, Ohio, and
 Virginia).  In large part, decisions in accord with Hagar rely, as did this
 Court, on the fact that inheritance rights can be determined only upon the
 death of the testator or intestate and, therefore, should be governed by the
 inheritance law then in effect.  See, e.g., In re Estate of Carlson, 457 N.W.2d 789, 791 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) ("The right to inherit from an
 ancestor's estate accrues or vests at the time of that ancestor's death.
 Thus, no one has any rights to inherit until the death of the relative whose
 estate is at issue.") (citing Sorenson, 131 N.W. at 326); McFadden v.
 McNorton, 69 S.E.2d 445, 448 (Va. 1952) ("No one is heir of a living person.
 No vested right arises therefore until the death of the person from whom one
 seeks to take.").
      Second, we can see no policy reasons for distinguishing between the
 inheritance rights of older adopted children and those of children adopted
 more recently.  Application of the Hagar holding here is consistent with
 "the modern trend of placing adopted children upon the same footing as
 natural offspring."  In re Estate of Flowers, 848 P.2d 1146, 1150-51 (Okla.
 1993) (inheritance rights of adopted child not governed by law in effect at
 adoption, but rather by law in force at testator's death; therefore, Uniform
 Adoption Act, which abolished all differences between natural and adopted
 children, allows adopted daughter to qualify as pretermitted heir

 

 notwithstanding adoptive mother's previous termination of parental rights);
 see also McFadden, 69 S.E.2d  at 450 (construing adoption and descent and
 distribution laws and concluding that "they emphasize the specific intention
 to put an adopted child on the same footing as the natural child").  The
 modern view of adoption should apply equally to children adopted at an
 earlier time and govern their current rights.
      We also note that the courts that have rejected the Hagar rule rely on
 antiquated notions of the adoptive relationship as "a civil or contractual,
 an artificial, as contradistinguished from a natural status."  Weber v.
 Griffiths, 159 S.W.2d 670, 674 (Mo. 1942); see also Wilson v. Anderson, 59 S.E.2d 836, 842 (N.C. 1950) ("'The right to inherit property created by
 adoption is an artificial one.  The status established by adoption
 proceedings is a contractual status . . . .'") (quoting Grimes v. Grimes,
 178 S.E. 573, 574 (1935)).  Subsequent to the Wilson decision, the North
 Carolina Legislature amended its adoption and inheritance statute "and in
 each instance provided in substance that the adopted child should have the
 same right to inherit by, through, or from the adoptive parent as if he were
 the legitimate child of the adoptive parent."  Bennett v. Cain, 103 S.E.2d 510, 512-13 (N.C. 1958).  Perhaps to punctuate this intent, the Legislature
 also specifically provided that the amendments applied to adoptions that
 occurred before as well as after the effective date of the statutory
 amendment.  See id. at 513.
      Finally, we reject appellants' argument that the probate court's use of
 the 1945 adoption-inheritance law amounts to an impermissible retrospective
 application of that law.  This argument was also rejected in Hagar, in which
 this Court observed: "Rights of inheritance in an estate do not accrue until
 the death of the owner intestate."  Hagar, 85 Vt. at 241, 126 A.  at 509

 

 (quoting Sorenson, 131 N.W. at 326); see also In re Williams, 144 A.2d  at
 119 (inheritance rights do not vest until death of intestate).  At the time
 of his adoption, Paul Raymond acquired no rights to inherit from Joan
 Raymond.  Instead, Paul's rights to inherit from Joan Raymond vested upon
 her death in 1991.  Therefore, applying the 1945 law to an inheritance
 vesting in 1991 is a permissible prospective application of that statute.
 See In re Estate of Carlson, 457 N.W.2d  at 792 (given that inheritance
 rights do not vest until death of decedent, legislature may change
 inheritance laws without changing or affecting any existing rights).
      In conclusion, we emphasize that we are prepared to modify rules of law
 that "lack[] justification in legal principles or reasoning."  Estate of
 Girard v. Laird, ___ Vt. ___, ___, 621 A.2d 1265, 1270 (1993).  Our
 reexamination of Hagar, however, shows that its reasoning is widely accepted
 in other jurisdictions, is fair to adoptees whenever they were adopted, and
 is in accord with the modern view of adoption.  We decline to overrule Hagar
 and reaffirm its holding that the inheritance rights of adoptees are
 determined as of the date of death of the person from whom inheritance is to
 be derived.
      Affirmed.
                                    FOR THE COURT:

                                    _____________________________
                                    Associate Justice