State v. LaClair

ENTRY_ORDER.92-446; 161 Vt. 585; 635 A.2d 1202

[Filed 19-Nov-1993]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                       SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 92-446

                             OCTOBER TERM, 1993


 State of Vermont                  }          APPEALED FROM:
                                   }
                                   }
      v.                           }          District Court of Vermont,
                                   }          Unit No. 3, Lamoille Circuit
                                   }
 Ronald T. LaClair, Jr.            }
                                   }          DOCKET NO. 346-6-91Lecr


              In the above entitled cause the Clerk will enter:

      Defendant appeals from a jury conviction of aggravated assault in
 violation of 13 V.S.A. { 1024(a)(1), which provides, in part, that a person
 is guilty of aggravated assault if he causes serious bodily injury to
 another "recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to
 the value of human life."  Defendant was convicted after a trial by jury.
 There is no dispute that the victim was shot in the head and that the wound
 constituted serious bodily injury.  The issue on appeal is whether the trial
 court should have charged the jury that defendant was guilty only if he
 caused the serious bodily injury "with the intent to inflict serious bodily
 injury on the alleged victim."  We affirm.

      On June 6, 1991, defendant was drinking with Dennis Knight and Steve
 Smith when a friend told the three that the victim was at Knight's apartment
 with a gun.  The three proceeded to Knight's apartment, but the victim had
 left.  Defendant armed himself with a twelve-gauge shotgun; his two
 companions had hand guns.  The three concealed themselves in some bushes
 outside the apartment.  The victim then returned, and walked toward the
 apartment.  The victim was unarmed and his hands were empty.  He spoke with
 some people and turned to leave.  At that point, defendant shot the victim
 in the back of the head.  Defendant testified he discharged the gun
 accidentally after a twig poked him in the eye.

      In its instruction to the jury, the court defined the elements of the
 charge, in relevant part, as follows:

        For you to find the defendant guilty of aggravated assault, the
      state must have proved beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of
      the following essential elements.  There are three of them.
      Number one, the defendant, Ronald T. LaClair, Jr., caused serious
      bodily injury to another; two, the defendant did so under
      circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to the value of
      human life; three, the defendant acted recklessly under such
      circumstances and it resulted in the bodily injury.

 

        . . . .

        Circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to the value
      of human life are those events surrounding the imposition of
      serious bodily injury which demonstrate a blatant disregard for
      the victim's life.

        Recklessly means a conscious disregard of a substantial and
      unjustifiable risk.  The risk in this case of serious bodily
      injury must be of such a nature and degree that considering the
      nature and purpose of the defendant's conduct and the
      circumstances known to him, its disregard is a gross deviation
      from the standard of conduct that a law abiding citizen would have
      observed in the actor's situation.  (Emphasis added).

      Defendant argues that the trial court should also have instructed the
 jury that, to be liable for recklessly causing serious bodily injury to
 another "under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value
 of human life," one must intend to cause serious bodily injury.  In other
 words, defendant requested an instruction that the jury must find that his
 discharge of the shotgun was purposeful or knowing and not accidental.
 Defendant argues that because the actual shooting was an accident he did not
 have the requisite intent for conviction.  To support his contention,
 defendant cites State v. Joseph, 157 Vt. 651, 652, 597 A.2d 805, 805-06
 (1991), in which we stated:

      [T]he trier of fact must be convinced that the defendant showed
      such extreme indifference that the intent element of the
      particular crime is satisfied . . . .  Thus, with regard to the
      instant statute, rather than focus on the probability of death
      resulting, the trier of fact must determine whether the
      "circumstances" of the attack demonstrate such a blatant disregard
      for life that one could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that
      the defendant intended to inflict serious bodily injury on the
      victim.

 (Emphasis added.) (Citations omitted.)

      Defendant's proposed instruction would do great violence to 13 V.S.A. {
 1024(a)(1) and to the extent that Joseph created any ambiguity as to the
 "intent" requirement of that statute, we now write to clarify it.  The
 statute creates three theories of criminal liability for aggravated assault:
 one is guilty if one causes serious bodily injury to another "purposely,
 knowingly or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference
 to the value of human life."  13 V.S.A. { 1024(a)(1) (emphasis added).  When
 one causes harm "purposely" or "knowingly" the person possesses some degree
 of an intent to harm.  State v. Bolio, ___ Vt. ___, ___, 617 A.2d 885, 887
 (1992).  In contrast, when one causes harm "recklessly," as the trial court
 correctly instructed, the person consciously disregarded a substantial and
 unjustifiable risk.  Id. at ___, 617 A.2d  at 887.

      The trial court's charge tracked the plain language of the statute,
 defining the terms used, and was complete because a statute must be enforced
 according to its terms when its meaning is plain on its face.  State v.

 

 Wilcox, ___ Vt. ___, ___, 628 A.2d 924, 926 (1993).  The language of the
 statute reflects a legislative judgment that a person who causes serious
 bodily injury "recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme
 indifference to the value of human life" cannot be distinguished from a
 person who causes bodily injury "purposely" or "knowingly."  See Model Penal
 Code and Commentaries {{ 211.1 and 210.2.  Defendant's proposed instruction
 would essentially eliminate the reckless theory from the statute, in
 contravention of the established rule of statutory construction that all
 language in a statute should be given effect.  See State v. Tierney, 138 Vt.
 163, 165, 412 A.2d 298, 299 (1980) (in construing statutes, give effect to
 every word, clause and sentence if possible).

     The court's instruction caught the letter as well as the spirit of the
 statute.  Even if the jury found that the actual discharge of the shotgun
 was accidental, it still could have found that defendant's course of conduct
 was "reckless under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the
 value of human life."

      Affirmed.





                                    BY THE COURT:


                                    _______________________________________
                                    Frederic W. Allen, Chief Justice

                                    _______________________________________
                                    Ernest W. Gibson III, Associate Justice

                                    _______________________________________
                                    John A. Dooley, Associate Justice

                                    _______________________________________
                                    James L. Morse, Associate Justice
 [ ]  Publish
                                    _______________________________________
 [ ]  Do Not Publish                Denise R. Johnson, Associate Justice