In re Cottrell

 NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P.
 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
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                                 No. 91-498


 In re Application of Walter Cottrell,        Supreme Court
 Town of Newbury Planning Commission
                                              On Appeal from
                                              Orange Superior Court

                                              March Term, 1992


 Alan W. Cheever, J.

 C. Daniel Hershenson of Hershenson, Carter, Scott, McGee & Grey,
   Norwich, for appellants

 Peter F. Welch of Welch, Graham & Manby, White River Junction, for
   appellee Cottrell

 Charles D. Hickey, St. Johnsbury, for appellee Town of Newbury


 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley and Johnson, JJ.


      DOOLEY, J.   This is an appeal from a decision of the Orange Superior
 Court granting a conditional use permit and site plan approval to applicant,
 Walter Cottrell, to operate a veterinary clinic in the Newbury Town Center
 Commercial District.  Appellants, Jack and Veira Anderson, are neighbors to
 the clinic's proposed location.  They argue that the zoning amendment that
 allowed veterinary clinics in the district is invalid because of defects in
 the adoption process.  We reverse.
      The process that led to the zoning amendment began with a petition
 signed by over 5% of the voters of Newbury to amend the boundaries of the
 Town Center Commercial District to reduce its size.  Pursuant to 24 V.S.A. {
 4403, the Newbury Planning Commission held a public hearing on the proposal
 and submitted it to the selectmen, together with an analysis of the proposal
 as required by { 4403(c).  The commission recommended against the proposed
 amendment and also submitted an alternative change of boundaries they felt
 would be better.  Accompanying the transmission to the selectmen was a
 letter from the planning commission chair recommending that they add an
 authorization to the amendment allowing veterinary clinics in the district.
 The letter indicated that the chair had been contacted by three veterinar-
 ians who were interested in opening such a clinic.  There is no indication
 that this issue was considered by the planning commission.
      The minutes of the selectmen's meeting indicate that they treated the
 veterinary clinic addition as if it had come from the planning commission.
 They amended the proposal to make the changes urged by the planning
 commission, added the authorization for veterinary clinics and published
 notice for a public hearing on the zoning amendment package.  They also
 notified the planning commission of their action.  The planning commission
 discussed the veterinary clinic addition but took no formal action on it.
      Following the public hearing, the selectmen published a warning to town
 voters of a special town meeting for April 9, 1991, to consider the zoning
 changes.  The notice did not set forth the specific amendments but instead
 referred back to the earlier notice of the public hearing and stated that a
 copy of the amendments was available at the town clerk's office.  The
 ballots used for voting at the meeting also failed to contain the specifics
 of the proposal.  The amendments passed by 122 to 35, and the next day
 applicant, pursuant to the amendment, submitted the request for a permit
 for a veterinary clinic.
      Appellants raise four arguments to support their position that the
 amendments are invalid:  (1) the addition of the provision for veterinary
 clinics to the zoning amendments proposed by the planning commission was
 beyond the power of the selectmen; (2) the warning for the vote on the
 zoning amendments was deficient; (3) the voting procedure was deficient
 because the town failed to hold a meeting; and (4) the ballot used for the
 vote was deficient.  In addition, appellants attack applicant's planned
 landscaping and screening as inconsistent with the zoning ordinance.
 Because we agree that the selectmen could not adopt the veterinary clinic
 amendment without its consideration by the planning commission, we do not
 reach the other issues.
      The first issue deals with the power of the selectmen to change a
 proposal that comes from the planning commission.  Our statutes place the
 primary responsibility for proposing zoning ordinances, or amendments to
 ordinances, on the town planning commission.  See 24 V.S.A. { 4325(2).
 Zoning amendments must either be prepared by the planning commission or "be
 submitted in writing along with any supporting documents to the planning
 commission," which then proceeds as if it had prepared the amendment. Id. {
 4403(a), (b).  The planning commission must hold at least one public
 hearing on a proposal.  Id. { 4403(d).  The final result of the planning
 commission process is the submission of a proposal to the legislative body
 of the municipality, in this case the board of selectmen.  See id. {
 4403(f).
      If a proposal is supported by a petition signed by at least five per-
 cent of the municipality's voters, the planning commission must submit it to
 the legislative body without change except to correct a technical
 deficiency.  Id. { 4403(b), (f).  Otherwise, the planning commission has the
 discretion whether to submit a proposal.  If it submits a proposal to the
 legislative body, it normally will prepare a written report.  Id. { 4403(c).
 If the proposal would "alter the zoning designation of any land area," the
 report must address five specified issues.  Id.
      On receiving the proposal, the legislative body must hold one or more
 public hearings on it and make available to the public copies of the
 proposal and the planning commission report.  Id. { 4404(a).  It may "change
 the proposed bylaw, amendment, or repeal" if it does so at least fifteen
 days before the required public hearing and files a copy of the changed
 proposal with the planning commission.  Id. { 4404(b).  The planning
 commission may submit a report on the change prior to the public hearing.
 Id.  If the legislative body "makes substantial changes in concept, meaning
 or extent of the proposed bylaw, amendment or repeal," it must warn a new
 public hearing.  Id.  In a rural town like that involved here, the action
 of the legislative body forms the proposal on which the town's citizens town
 vote.  Id. { 4404(d).
      Appellants argue that the addition of the provision authorizing
 veterinary clinics created a new zoning amendment and was more than a change
 of the planning commission proposal.  They maintain that the new amendment
 was required to originate in the planning commission pursuant to { 4403(a)
 and could not be initially instituted by the selectmen under { 4404(b).
 Applicant and the town, on the other hand, argue that the new provision on
 veterinary clinics was a change in the commission's proposal, authorized by
 { 4404(b).  They point in particular to the language authorizing
 "substantial changes."  They further argue that it was submitted to the
 planning commission when a copy was filed with the planning commission
 before the public hearing.
      A number of canons of statutory construction are applicable to our
 task.  Essentially, we must review the entire statutory scheme to determine
 the intent of the Legislature.  See Smith v. Town of St. Johnsbury, 150 Vt.
 351, 355, 554 A.2d 233, 237 (1988).  In doing so, we must read the statutes
 in pari materia.  See In re McCormick Management, 149 Vt. 585, 592, 547 A.2d 1319, 1324 (1988).  We give effect to the plain meaning of the words chosen,
 and assume that the Legislature did not intend an unreasonable result.  See
 Smith, 150 Vt. at 355, 554 A.2d  at 237.  Also applicable is a canon
 involving the procedures for enactment of zoning ordinances.  To validate
 the ordinance, we require "strict compliance with established procedures."
 In re McCormick Management, 149 Vt. at 591, 547 A.2d  at 1323.
      It is clear that if the selectmen had approved the veterinary clinic
 amendment to the zoning ordinance without attaching it to a proposal from
 the planning commission, and with no action on it from that body, it would
 be invalid because the procedures established in { 4403 would be violated.
 See 3 E. Ziegler, Rathkopf's The Law of Zoning and Planning { 30.03, at 30-
 06-08 (1991).  Such an action would be inconsistent with the strict
 compliance with procedure we require.  Thus, the question before us is
 whether the result is different if the provision is added to an unrelated
 zoning ordinance amendment.  The question reflects the tension between the
 requirement that proposals to amend a zoning ordinance be submitted to the
 planning commission for initiation by that body, if appropriate, and the
 authorization for the selectmen to amend the proposal of the planning
 commission before putting it before the voters.
      The requirement that amendments to the zoning ordinance be initiated in
 the planning commission represents the legislative policy that zoning
 ordinances, and amendments to them, be entrusted to the body primarily
 responsible for planning in the town.  See Abel v. Board of Works of City of
 Elizabeth, 63 N.J. Super. 500, 512, 164 A.2d 764, 770 (1960) (purpose is to
 "have a critical and expert review by the one municipal agency which has an
 ongoing concern with municipal planning").  We believe that requirement must
 prevail in this case.  The authorization of veterinary clinics as
 conditional uses in the Town Center Commercial District was totally
 unrelated to the proposal to change the coverage of that and the surrounding
 zone.  Thus, the addition of that authorization cannot be considered an
 amendment to the planning commission proposal.  The report of the planning
 commission contained nothing relevant to the decision to add the veterinary
 clinic authorization.  We would do violence to the clear legislative intent,
 and fail to read the statutory scheme as a whole, if we were to uphold the
 process used here.
      The distinction between an amendment and a separate proposal is set
 forth in two cases decided by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court,
 involving an almost identical statutory scheme.  In Fish v. Town of Canton,
 322 Mass. 219, 220, 77 N.E.2d 231, 231 (1948), voters of the town petitioned
 the planning board to repeal the town zoning ordinance.  The planning board
 submitted it to the town legislative body with a negative recommendation,
 and it was submitted to the voters at the annual town meeting.  Id. at 221,
 77 N.E.2d  at 232.  The citizens instead voted to change the minimum lot
 areas and setbacks in certain zones and to rezone a specific parcel.   Id.
 The court invalidated the amendments, holding that "the change thereby
 sought to be wrought was truly fundamental and could not be valid in the
 absence of a hearing and report on the new proposal by the planning board."
 Id. at 223, 77 N.E.2d  at 233.  It concluded that the "substance of the
 amendment involved too great a departure" to be covered by the statute
 allowing the town meeting to amend the proposal put before it.  Id.
      In Johnson v. Town of Framingham, 354 Mass. 750, 751, 242 N.E.2d 420,
 421 (1968), a proposed amendment to a town zoning scheme with respect to the
 treatment of a golf course and tennis courts was changed in the town vote,
 to delete tennis courts from the proposal and to restrict its applicability
 to parcels of fifty acres or greater.  The court held that the changed
 amendment did not have to be resubmitted to the planning board,
 distinguishing Fish as involving a radically different amendment.  Johnson,
 354 Mass. at 754, 242 N.E.2d  at 422.
      We also find relevant the decision in Wilgus v. City of Murfreesboro,
 532 S.W.2d 50 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1975), in which the Tennessee Court of Appeals
 invalidated a rezoning amendment for failure of the City Council to resubmit
 it to the planning commission after it had amended the commission proposal.
 The court stated the standard for resubmission:
           If a proposed zoning ordinance is amended so substan-
         tially that a new proposal is, in effect, created we
         think it clear that both the state statute and
         municipal code provision require it to be submitted to
         the planning commission for its consideration before the
         municipal legislative body may finally act upon it.  To
         hold otherwise would defeat the clear intent of the
         statutory requirement that the legislative body have
         available, before it acts, the recommendations of the
         commission.
         . . . .
         The test is whether the revision is so substantial as to
         create a strong probability that the commission's
         recommendation would have been affected by the revision.
         If the change is both inconsequential and produces no
         detrimental effects to those who would oppose it, then
         the revised proposal is not required to be resubmitted.

 Id. at 53-54; see also Midway Protective League v. City of Dallas, 552 S.W.2d 170, 173 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977) (minor amendment can be made by city
 council without resubmission of matter to planning commission); City of
 Amarillo v. Wagner, 326 S.W.2d 863, 866 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959) (where
 planning commission recommended a rezoning of property to a particular zone,
 city commission could not place it in a different zone without resubmission
 to the planning commission).
      Although the facts of this case are different from Fish or Wilgus, the
 addition here was similarly a radical departure from the proposal submitted
 by the planning commission and was a totally new proposal.  If the veteri-
 nary clinic authorization can be added in this case, then any unrelated
 zoning amendment can be added to a zoning proposal from the planning
 commission.  The process established by the Legislature is evaded if zoning
 amendments unrelated to those reviewed by the planning commission can be
 added by the legislative body.  See George v. Town of Edenton, 294 N.C. 679,
 685, 242 S.E.2d 877, 881 (N.C. 1978) (use of amendment procedure to
 circumvent procedural requirements in enactment of zoning ordinance cannot
 be allowed).
      Our conclusion is not changed by the language authorizing the
 legislative body to make "substantial changes in the concept, meaning or
 extent" of the planning commission proposal as long as it holds a new
 hearing after making the changes.  24 V.S.A. { 4404(b).  That language
 directs when the legislative body must hold a new hearing and not when it
 must refer its change to the planning commission.  See Wilgus v. City of
 Murfreesboro, 532 S.W.2d  at 53.  It was added to implement our decision in
 Kalakowski v. Town of Clarendon, 139 Vt. 519, 524-25, 431 A.2d 478, 481
 (1981) to the same effect.  The provision's purpose is to ensure that
 persons whose interests will be affected by a zoning amendment have notice
 and an opportunity to be heard.  A change may be substantial, however, and
 not require submission to the planning commission.  In this case, for
 example, the legislative body could have made a substantial change in the
 district boundaries proposed in the citizen's petition or by the planning
 commission such that different landowners were affected.  A new hearing may
 be required in such a circumstance to give landowners affected by the new
 proposal an opportunity to be heard.  There would be no reason, however, to
 resubmit the proposal to the planning commission because the commission had
 already reported its views on the proper boundaries of the zones.
      Nor is our conclusion changed by the fact that the planning commission
 was notified of the selectmen's addition.  As the facts here demonstrate,
 notification of a planning commission in a rural town does not mean that the
 commission will engage in thoughtful review.  The selectmen asked for no
 action by the planning commission, and the commission, which first saw the
 amendment six days before the public hearing and final vote of the
 selectmen, took no action.  The minutes indicate only that there was some
 "discussion" on the veterinary clinic addition.  There was no written report
 as contemplated by { 4403(c) or a planning commission public hearing as
 required by { 4403(d).  The selectmen were not given the benefit of the
 expertise and critical review of the body charged with responsibility for
 municipal planning for the town.
      We do not decide whether the procedural defect would be cured if the
 planning commission had engaged in the review contemplated in the statute
 and had provided the results of that review to the selectmen.  Those steps
 were not taken in this case.  See Hasbrouck Heights Hosp. Ass'n v. Borough
 of Hasbrouck Heights, 15 N.J. 447, 454-55, 105 A.2d 521, 525 (1954) (even
 though planning board reviewed the proposal, procedural defect not cured
 where results of review not reported to governing body).
      Because the zoning amendment authorizing veterinary clinics in the Town
 Center Commercial District is invalid, the court erred in granting applicant
 a conditional use permit.
      Reversed.

                                         FOR THE COURT:




                                         Associate Justice