In re MM & FM

 NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
 order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                           Nos. 90-411 and 91-157


 In re M.M. & F.M., Juveniles                 Supreme Court
 In re F.M. & M.M., Juveniles
                                              On Appeal from
                                              Windham Family Court

                                              May Term, 1992



 Theodore S. Mandeville, Jr., J.  (90-411)

 Ellen Holmes Maloney, J.  (91-157)

 Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General, Montpelier, and Barbara L. Crippen and
   Michael O. Duane, Assistant Attorneys General, Waterbury, for plaintiff-
   appellant

 E.M. Allen, Defender General, and Anna Saxman, Appellate Attorney,
   Montpelier, for defendants-appellees juveniles

 Charles S. Martin of Martin & Paolini, Barre, for defendant-appellee mother


 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley and Johnson, JJ. and Peck, J. (Ret.),
           Specially Assigned



      GIBSON, J.  The Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services (SRS)
 appeals three family court decisions.  On August 1, 1990, the court denied
 SRS's petition to terminate the residual parental rights of A.M., the mother
 of M.M. and F.M.  On October 22, 1990, the court denied SRS's motion for a
 new trial or to modify the decision of August 1.  On March 27, 1991, the
 court granted A.M.'s motion to seal a report from the children's guardian ad
 litem and did not allow SRS to present evidence in support of a subsequent
 termination motion.  We affirm the decisions of August and October 1990.
 The decision of March 1991 is collateral to a proceeding not before the
 Court, and we do not consider it.
      A.M. suffers from a chronic mental illness characterized by mania and
 depression.  She was hospitalized six times between 1983 and 1989 for as
 long as six and ten months.  The illness can be treated, but A.M. has often
 refused medication, causing her condition to deteriorate.  A.M. has visited
 F.M. and M.M. at irregular intervals determined primarily by her condition.
 She loves her children, but has rarely, if ever, been able to care for them
 without help.
      A.M.'s daughter, M.M., was born in 1985.  Her son, F.M., was born in
 1983.  M.M. and F.M. have lived continuously with separate foster parents,
 respectively, since 1985 and 1988, when their father died.  The foster
 parents would like to adopt the children, both of whom have required therapy
 for developmental delays and behavioral problems.
      In February 1989, SRS petitioned the family court to allow termination
 of A.M.'s residual parental rights.  The court heard five days of testimony
 on the merits of the petition and a motion by A.M. to compel visitation.  In
 its order, the court acknowledged the "overwhelming" opinion of the expert
 witnesses that termination of A.M.'s parental rights was in the best inter-
 ests of the children, but also noted "substantial" evidence that termination
 was not "the only answer embodying the children's best interests."  The
 court concluded that SRS had not met its burden of proof and that A.M. must
 be given "some chance" to resume her parental duties.  The court ordered
 that each child be placed in long-term foster care with appropriate visita-
 tion with A.M. as determined by A.M.'s, F.M.'s, and M.M.'s therapists.
      In related arguments, SRS first challenges the legal basis of the
 court's decision to place the children in long-term foster care.  A.M. and
 counsel for the children contend that SRS did not raise these arguments at
 trial or in its motion for a new trial or modified order and therefore
 waived the arguments.  See In re A.K., 153 Vt. 462, 465, 571 A.2d 75, 78
 (1990) (failure to raise even a constitutional issue can result in waiver).
 We are reluctant to address questions not raised before the family court and
 decline to do so in the present case because they are of little practical
 significance.
      SRS argues that the family court was not authorized to order that the
 children be placed in long-term foster care and, even if authorized, it did
 so without sufficient findings and under the wrong standard.  We are per-
 suaded, however, that SRS views the court's order improperly.  Once the
 court concluded that SRS had not proven by clear and convincing evidence
 that termination of A.M.'s parental rights was in the best interests of the
 children,  In re S.R., __ Vt. __, __, 599 A.2d 364, 366 (1991); 33 V.S.A. {
 5540, the court simply solidified the status quo, continuing foster care and
 allowing A.M. appropriate visitation.  Any error was harmless: if the court
 had simply denied SRS's motion, or if the motion had never been made, there
 would have been no difference in the children's circumstances, absent a
 decision by SRS to change their placement.  Nor do the words "long-term"
 prejudice SRS's continuing efforts to terminate A.M.'s parental rights.
 Nearly two years have passed.  If, when the question is revisited, A.M. has
 not shown substantial improvement, SRS will again be able to urge the family
 court to terminate A.M.'s parental rights.
      Next, SRS argues that the family court abused its discretion in denying
 its motion for a new trial or modified order.  In its motion, supported by
 affidavits, SRS alleged that M.M.'s condition had regressed following a
 visit with A.M. and that F.M.'s condition had regressed after his therapist
 attempted to discuss with him the possibility of visiting A.M.  SRS also
 produced a letter from A.M. that suggested her mental state had taken a turn
 for the worse.  Except for the letter, the motion was based on evidence that
 arose before the court issued its decision.  The court questioned SRS's
 failure to bring the evidence to its attention sooner, and denied the motion
 because it did not demonstrate a substantial change from the situation at
 the time of the hearing.
      Whether to grant a new trial to hear newly discovered evidence is a
 question for the trial court's discretion that turns on several factors,
 including the probability that the evidence will change the outcome and
 whether it is cumulative.  State v. Smith, 145 Vt. 121, 131, 485 A.2d 124,
 130-31 (1984).  In the present case, it is plain from the court's ruling
 that the evidence would not have changed the order.  Further, we will not
 disturb the court's conclusion that the evidence was cumulative.  It showed
 a recent deterioration in the prospects for successful interaction between
 A.M. and her children, but was not substantially different from the
 evidence SRS produced at trial.  There was no abuse of discretion, and the
 court properly denied the motion.
      Finally, SRS urges us to reverse the family court's decision because
 the court's uncontested findings allow no conclusion other than to terminate
 A.M.'s parental rights.  SRS argues that the court applied an incorrect
 legal standard to the facts and that application of the correct standard
 would require termination.  We disagree.
      The court enunciated the proper test at the outset of its decision.
 In order to grant termination at a modification proceeding, the family court
 must find by clear and convincing evidence that a substantial change in
 material circumstances has occurred and that termination will serve the best
 interests of the children under the factors set forth in 33 V.S.A. { 5540.
 In re S.R., __ Vt. at __, 599 A.2d  at 366.  Stagnation of an unacceptable
 situation is sufficient to constitute a material change in circumstances.
 In re C.L., 151 Vt. 480, 483, 563 A.2d 241, 244 (1989).  The most important
 factor in determining a child's best interests is whether the parent will be
 able to resume her parental duties within a reasonable time.  In re J.R.,
 153 Vt. 85, 100, 570 A.2d 154, 161 (1989).
      Later in its decision, the court quoted from a family court decision
 rejecting SRS's first attempt to terminate A.M.'s parental rights.  That
 decision in turn quoted a concurring decision of this Court in 1976 holding
 that parental rights may be terminated only in a "hopeless" situation.  See
 In re J. & J.W., 134 Vt. 480, 486-86, 365 A.2d 521, 524 (1976).  We cannot
 conclude that the family court relied on an improper standard.  By quoting
 the earlier decision involving A.M., it was simply putting its own decision
 in context.
      Further, application of the proper test to the court's findings does
 not require termination.  The experts were in favor of termination, but A.M.
 presented coherent testimony in favor of allowing her more time to improve
 her parenting skills.  We will not substitute our judgment for that of the
 family court, In re M.C.P., 153 Vt. 275, 296, 571 A.2d 627, 638 (1989), and
 we will not reverse its conclusion, based on uncontested findings, that SRS
 had not established by clear and convincing evidence that termination of
 parental rights was appropriate.
      Affirmed.

                                    FOR THE COURT:


                                    ____________________________________
                                    Associate Justice