Richard Mattoon v. Randy Blades Petition for writ of habeas corpus
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Docket No. 34583
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RICHARD MATTOON,
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Petitioner-Appellant,
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v.
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RANDY BLADES, Warden; IDAHO STATE )
CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION; IDAHO )
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COMMISSION OF PARDONS AND
PAROLE,
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Respondents.
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Boise, February 2008 Term
2008 Opinion No. 41
Filed: March 28, 2008
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of
Idaho, Ada County. Hon. Daniel C. Hurlbutt, Jr., Senior District Judge.
Order dismissing application for writ of habeas corpus is affirmed.
Richard Mattoon, Boise, appellant pro se.
The Honorable Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.
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J. JONES, Justice
Richard Mattoon appeals a district court order dismissing his petition for writ of habeas
corpus. Mattoon claims he was denied due process and equal protection of the law when the
Commission of Pardons and Parole revoked his parole and forfeited time he had served on
parole. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s order dismissing the petition. We
granted review and affirm.
I.
In 1992, Richard Mattoon received a unified sentence of ten years with two years fixed
for sexual abuse of a child under 16 years, a felony. He was released on parole on May 16, 1996,
but his parole officer issued a violation report on July 18, 1996. After a violation hearing,
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Mattoon returned to parole. Mattoon agreed to additional restrictions as a condition of remaining
on parole. In 1998, another report of violations was filed but Mattoon was allowed to remain on
parole. As a result of a polygraph examination of Mattoon on April 22, 2002, indicating that he
had violated several of the conditions of his parole, a parole violation hearing was held on May
29, 2002. The hearing officer found that Mattoon was in violation of several conditions of his
parole, but requested reinstatement of parole for Mattoon. On July 9, 2002, the Commission of
Pardons and Parole denied the hearing officer’s request for reinstatement and “determined a
parole revocation hearing was needed.” On August 24, 2002, the hearing officer issued written
parole violation findings with respect to the May 29, 2002 hearing, recommending that
Mattoon’s parole be revoked.
On September 20, 2002, a parole revocation hearing was
conducted by the Commission. The Commission adopted the findings of the hearing officer,
concluded that Mattoon was in violation of the conditions of his parole and elected to revoke the
parole. The Commission gave Mattoon credit on his sentence for his time on parole from
May 16, 1996, through October 9, 1996, when he was reinstated following his first parole
violation hearing (a period of 147 days), but forfeited the time from October 10, 1996, to April
23, 2002, a period of 2,021 days.
Mattoon filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the district court, alleging the
Commission violated statutory provisions in revoking his parole and forfeiting his time and that
his due process and equal protection rights had thus been violated. The State moved to dismiss
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) and 56(c). The district court summarily dismissed the petition.
Mattoon appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court in an unpublished opinion.
Mattoon requested and we granted review.
II.
We address the following questions:
(1) whether the procedure employed by the
Commission in revoking Mattoon’s parole was violative of governing statutes, and (2) whether
the Commission’s decision to forfeit the 2,021 days violated Mattoon’s equal protection rights.
A.
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which this Court exercises free
review. State v. Robinson, 143 Idaho 306, 307, 142 P.3d 729, 730 (2006). If the statutory
language is unambiguous, “‘the clearly expressed intent of the legislative body must be given
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effect, and there is no occasion for a court to consider rules of statutory construction.’” Garza v.
State, 139 Idaho 533, 536, 82 P.3d 445, 448 (2003) (quoting Payette River Property Owners
Ass'n v. Board of Comm'rs of Valley County, 132 Idaho 551, 557, 976 P.2d 477, 483 (1999)).
The plain meaning of a statute therefore will prevail unless clearly expressed legislative intent is
contrary or unless the plain meaning leads to absurd results. Garza, 139 Idaho at 536, 82 P.3d at
448. Where the statute is ambiguous, we attempt to ascertain legislative intent, and in construing
the statute we may examine the language used, the reasonableness of the proposed
interpretations, and the policy behind the statute. Id. Statutes are in pari materia if they relate to
the same subject. Such statutes are construed together to effect legislative intent. Gooding
County v. Wybenga, 137 Idaho 201, 204, 46 P.3d 18, 21 (2002). For a case on review from the
Court of Appeals, we review the trial court’s decision directly, albeit serious consideration is
given to the Court of Appeals decision. Quinlan v. Idaho Com’n for Pardons and Parole, 138
Idaho 726, 729, 69 P.3d 146, 149 (2003).
B.
On appeal, Mattoon does not challenge any of the factual findings below. Instead, he
protests the application of the law to his case. Mattoon contends the Commission violated the
provisions of I.C. § 20-229B in revoking his parole and, thus, violated his due process rights. He
further argues that the Commission violated his due process and equal protection rights by
deciding to forfeit 2,021 days of the time he spent on parole as a credit against the length of his
sentence. On the other hand, the State contends that the Commission properly complied with its
statutes in revoking his parole and forfeiting his time and, thus, his due process and equal
protection claims are without merit.
i.
Mattoon’s first argument is based on the notion that when a parole revocation hearing is
held before a hearing officer the Commission does not have the authority to review the hearing
officer’s decision. Two statutes are key to Mattoon’s argument, I.C. § 20-229 and I.C. § 20229B. I.C. § 20-229 provides, in part pertinent to Mattoon’s case:
Whenever a paroled prisoner is accused of a violation of parole . . . the parolee
shall be entitled to a fair and impartial hearing of such charges . . . . The hearing
shall be held before one (1) or more members of the commission for pardons and
parole, or before an impartial hearings officer selected by the executive director.
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I.C. § 20-229B provides the procedure after a parole revocation hearing has been concluded. It
states,
After a factual parole revocation hearing has been concluded, the member or
members of the commission for pardons and parole or the designated hearing
officer, having heard the matter, shall enter a decision within twenty (20) days. If
the member or members or hearing officer, having heard the matter, should
conclude that the allegations of violation of the conditions of parole have not
been proven by a preponderance of the evidence, or those which have been
proven by a preponderance of the evidence are not sufficient cause for the
revocation of parole, then the parolee shall be reinstated on parole on the same
or modified conditions of parole. If the member or members or hearing officer,
having heard the matter, should conclude that the allegations of violation of the
conditions of parole have been proven by a preponderance of the evidence and
constitute sufficient cause for the revocation of parole, then a dispositional
hearing shall be convened during a regular session of the commission to execute
an order of parole revocation and determine the period of time the parole violator
shall be returned to state custody.
Id. (emphasis added). Mattoon contends the italicized language mandates that the Commission
defer to the hearing officer’s recommendation about whether parole should be reinstated. The
Commission’s decision to review the recommendation, contends Mattoon, was violative of the
statutory procedure constituting a violation of his due process rights.
A parolee has a restricted liberty interest in remaining out of prison and his parole may
not be revoked without some orderly process. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972).
However, because there is a risk that parolees may not be able to live in society without
committing additional anti-social acts, a parolee’s liberty interests are far more restricted than
that of the general population. Id. at 483. The State has an overwhelming interest in being able
to return the individual to imprisonment without the burden of a new adversary criminal trial if
he has failed to abide by the conditions of his parole. Id. Thus, the process due for a revocation
of parole is an informal hearing structured to assure that the finding of a parole violation will be
based on verified facts and that the exercise of discretion will be informed by an accurate
knowledge of the parolee’s behavior. Id. at 484.
This Court has determined that the procedures in Idaho’s parole revocation statutes and
rules meet the standards set forth in Morrissey. In Smith v. Idaho Dept. of Correction, 128 Idaho
768, 918 P.2d 1213 (1996), a habeas petitioner claimed he was denied due process because he
could not compel witnesses to appear at his parole revocation hearing. Id. at 771, 918 P.2d at
1216. The Court found that Idaho’s statutes, rules, and regulations regarding parole revocation
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complied with the basic requirements set forth in Morrissey, citing, specifically, Idaho Const. art.
X, § 5; I.C. §§ 20-229—229A; I.C. § 20-223; and IDAPA 50.01.01.650.08 (now IDAPA
50.01.01.400.06).
Id. at 772, 918 P.2d at 1217.
Mattoon claims that the hearing officer initially recommended his reinstatement to parole
and that the Commission violated the provisions of I.C. § 20-229B by failing to abide by that
recommendation. When I.C. § 20-229B is read in isolation, it appears to support Mattoon’s
argument. It says, “If the . . . hearing officer, having heard the matter, should conclude that the
allegations of violation of the conditions of parole . . . which have been proven by a
preponderance of the evidence are not sufficient cause for the revocation of parole, then the
parolee shall be reinstated on parole . . . .” However, I.C. § 20-229B is only one of several
statutes pertaining to the parole process. In order to determine how decisions are to be made and
carried out, the statutes must be considered together. They are in para materia.
The Idaho Constitution grants to the State Board of Correction the control, direction, and
management of adult probation and parole.
Idaho Const. art. X, § 5.
However, parole
responsibilities have long been shared between the Board of Correction and the Commission. As
set out in Mellinger v. Idaho Dept. of Corrections, 114 Idaho 494, 757 P.2d 1213, (Ct. App.
1988):
Under I.C. § 20-223, the Commission has sole power to determine eligibility for
parole. The Commission is further mandated to specify in writing the conditions
of parole. I.C. § 20-228. The Board [of Correction], on the other hand, retains
legal custody and control of the parolee. Accordingly, the Board also has the
duty to supervise all probationers and parolees, make necessary investigations,
report violations to the Commission or courts, and prepare case histories to assist
the Commission or courts in making parole or probation decisions. I.C. § 20-219.
Id. at 499-500, 757 P.2d at 1218-19.
The Court of Appeals went on to note that the
Commission’s functions under I.C. § 20-223 are “quasi-judicial in character – requiring the
exercise of judgment in determining facts and applying legal standards entrusted to the
Commission by law, and cannot be delegated.” Id. at 500, 757 P.2d at 1219. The Court of
Appeals did not mention it, but I.C. § 20-216 also recognizes this division of parole
responsibilities, requiring the Board to “enforce observance of rules and regulations for parole or
probation established by the commission or the courts.”
Nothing contained in I.C. §§ 20-216, 20-219, 20-223, or 20-228 lends support to the
proposition that the duties of the Commission can be carried out solely by one member, let alone
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a hearing officer. Rather, I.C. § 20-223(a) vests in the Commission the power to establish rules,
policies and procedures governing parole. The Commission has adopted rules pertaining to the
parole revocation process. IDAPA 50.01.01.400. With respect to violation hearings, “[i]n most
cases, a hearing officer will conduct a fact-finding or violation hearing and will make a finding
on each allegation as to the guilt or innocence and may dismiss some or all allegations.” IDAPA
50.01.01.400.06(f). However, the rules vest in the Commission the determination of whether or
not parole will be revoked. IDAPA 50.01.01.400.06(g). 1 Nothing in the rules gives the hearing
officer authority to make the decision to revoke or continue parole. I.C. § 20-229B does not
specifically vest in the hearing officer the explicit authority to enter an order reinstating a parole,
nor could it do so in light of the Commission’s duty to determine eligibility for parole. Thus, the
Commission had the sole authority to revoke Mattoon’s parole and, therefore, Mattoon’s due
process rights were not violated.
In any event, the hearing officer did not make the type of finding specified in the
language Mattoon cites from I.C. § 20-229B. The hearing officer determined at the conclusion
of the factual inquiry that Mattoon had violated the conditions of his parole, but before the
hearing officer reduced her findings to a report for filing in Mattoon’s case, she requested that
the Commission review the parole violation for possible reinstatement to parole.
The
Commission denied the request and the hearing officer then entered her written report finding
Mattoon in violation of his parole and recommending revocation of his parole. Nothing in the
record indicates the hearing officer “concluded” that the proven violations were “not sufficient
cause for the revocation of parole.” Thus, even if one were to accept Mattoon’s interpretation of
the statute, he still would not be entitled to relief. Mattoon has not shown that the Commission
violated any provisions of law and, therefore, any claim of a deprivation of due process must fail.
ii.
Mattoon next claims that his due process rights were violated when the Commission
forfeited the 2,021 days he spent on parole after his first parole violation without allowing him
an opportunity to speak to that issue. The Commission forfeited Mattoon’s time pursuant to I.C.
§ 20-228, which states, “Such person so recommitted must serve out the sentence, and the time
during which such prisoner was out on parole shall not be deemed a part thereof; unless the
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This procedure is essentially the same as that which this Court approved in Smith.
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commission, in its discretion, shall determine otherwise . . . .”
The Commission credited
Mattoon with the 147 days he was on parole before his first probation violation under this
statute. It determined he was not entitled to the remaining 2,021 days. The Court of Appeals has
noted that the threat of forfeited time is an additional incentive to comply with parole. See, e.g.,
Winter v. State, 117 Idaho 103, 105-06, 785 P.3d 667, 669-70 (Ct. App. 1989). Further, Mattoon
received the benefit of a recent change to I.C. § 20-228 that allows the Commission not to forfeit
all time spent on parole. The current version of I.C. § 20-228 allows the Commission discretion
to credit time; the prior version of the statute automatically mandated forfeiture of all time spent
on parole. As such, the current statute is more lenient.
I.C. § 20-228 does not implicate due process concerns. Mattoon is entitled to only
limited due process in the revocation of parole because of his limited liberty status. As such, the
forfeiture of his parole pursuant to a valid parole revocation hearing satisfies due process
requirements. The Court of Appeals recently discussed whether I.C. § 20-228 is constitutionally
valid in Gibson v. Bennett, 141 Idaho 270, 108 P.3d 417, (Ct. App. 2005). In that case, the court
considered whether forfeiture of time spent on parole implicated constitutional considerations,
such as prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment, violating separation of powers, or imposing
double jeopardy on a parolee. Id. at 275-76, 108 P.3d at 422-23. The court concluded that none
of these constitutional claims had any merit and affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the
petitioner’s writ for habeas corpus, thus affirming the constitutionality of I.C. § 20-228. Id.
Given Mattoon’s limited due process rights and the opportunity he had to speak at his
parole revocation hearing, his lack of an opportunity to speak on the number of days that might
be forfeited was not a violation of due process.
iii.
Mattoon argues the Commission violated his equal protection rights by applying I.C. §
20-228 unequally between first-time parole violators and repeat parole violators. He states, “To
credit parolees with one violation more ‘street time’ than parolees with more than one violation
does not promote the stated aim of the legislature.” Mattoon makes no cogent argument as to
how he was deprived of equal protection of the law. The Commission acted within the terms of
the statute, it had a rational basis for forfeiting the 2,021 days, and Mattoon has failed to show
any equal protection violation.
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III.
The order of the district court, dismissing Mattoon’s application for writ of habeas
corpus, is affirmed.
Chief Justice EISMANN, and Justices BURDICK, W. JONES and HORTON CONCUR.
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