Gatsby v. Gatsby
Annotate this CaseLinsay and Kylee Gatsby married in June 2015. They later decided Kylee would attempt to conceive a child through artificial insemination, using semen donated by a mutual friend. It was undisputed that Kylee is the child’s biological mother. The birth certificate worksheet, which Kylee signed, designates Kylee as “mother,” and the word “father” on the form is crossed out and “mother” written by hand in its place to also identify Linsay as the child’s mother. The Idaho Department of Health and Welfare issued a Certificate of Live Birth identifying both Kylee and Linsay as the child’s mothers. Both Kylee and Linsay shared in caregiving, but Kylee was the child’s primary caregiver. The following summer the couple had an argument. Both Linsay and Kylee had been drinking, and Kylee became drunk. Kylee shoved Linsay off a bed. Then Linsay punched Kylee, breaking her nose. The child was in the bedroom during the fight, and Linsay’s two children from a prior relationship were also in the home. Kylee was arrested and subsequently pleaded guilty to misdemeanor domestic battery. Kylee had also committed an act of domestic violence years earlier. On July 5, 2017, a No Contact Order (“NCO”) was issued, which prohibited Kylee from seeing the child except at daycare. On August 29, 2017, Linsay filed for divorce. Kylee filed an Answer and Counterclaim, asserting that Linsay had “no legal claim or standing to any custody or visitation” to the minor child. The issue this appeal presented for the Idaho Supreme Court's review centered on Idaho law pertaining to artificial insemination, paternity, and parental rights in light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 647 (2015). The district court affirmed the magistrate court’s ruling that Linsay had no parental rights to the child under Idaho’s common law marital presumption of paternity because she conceded that she lacked a biological relationship with the child. The district court also affirmed that Linsay had no parental rights under the Artificial Insemination Act because she did not comply with the statute’s provisions. The district court further ruled that Linsay would have had parental rights if she had filed a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity or adopted the child, but she did not do so. Finally, the district court affirmed that Linsay did not have third party standing to seek custody and, in the alternative, that custody or visitation would not be in the child’s best interest if Linsay did have third party standing. Accordingly, the district court's judgment was affirmed.
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