In re Interrogatory on House Joint Resolution 20-1006

The Colorado General Assembly unanimously adopted legislative rules that set the number of days to a legislative session to 120 days consecutively from the start of the regular session. The rules had one, single, narrow exception: when the Governor declares a state of disaster emergency and has activated the state’s emergency operations plan due to a public health emergency “infecting or exposing a great number of people to disease, agents, toxins, or other such threats.” The General Assembly agreed that in such circumstances, it would count only “working calendar days” toward the 120-day limit. Before the spring of 2020, this narrow exception had never been triggered. On March 14, 2020, recognizing the danger to the public and legislators posed by continuing to congregate at the State Capitol in light of the novel coronavirus spreading throughout the country, the General Assembly adjourned until March 30, 2020. Both chambers extended their adjournments. This suspension of the regular session was without precedent in state history; moreover, because the situation continued to escalate, the Colorado Supreme Court acknowledged the possibility that the legislature might not be able to convene safely before the originally scheduled adjournment sine die on May 6, 2020. Some have questioned whether the legislative rule counting only “working calendar days” during a declared public health disaster emergency ran afoul of article V, section 7 of the Colorado Constitution, such that legislation passed after May 6 in reliance on the rule could be challenged as void. Thus, the General Assembly petitioned the Supreme Court to exercise its original jurisdiction under article VI, section 3 to settle the issue raised. The Supreme Court determined the limitation on the regular legislative in article V, section to "one hundred twenty calendar days" was ambiguous as to whether those calendar days had to be counted consecutively. The Court further answered that the General Assembly reasonably resolved this ambiguity through its unanimous adoption of Joint Rules 23(d) and 44(g). "Together, these rules interpret article V, section 7 to count the 120 calendar days of a regular session consecutively, except in the extraordinary circumstance of a declared public health disaster emergency that disrupts the regular session, in which case only 'working calendar days' (i.e., calendar days when at least one chamber is in session) count toward the 120-day limit." The Court concluded that such an interpretation did not run afoul of either the text or underlying purposes of article V, section 7 and was therefore valid.