Montez v. Colorado
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In this case, the Colorado Supreme Court held that the General Assembly had not classified firearms as per se deadly weapons for the purposes of the first degree burglary statute. The legislature did not intend theft of a firearm from a building to constitute first degree burglary regardless of the manner the burglar used or intended to use the firearm. The General Assembly superseded earlier decisions of the Colorado Supreme Court which held that firearms were per se deadly weapons. In 2005, Defendant Mark Montez broke through a window of a home in Lakewood, Colorado, entered and ransacked the home, took about $150 and a gun case containing two unloaded shotguns before leaving left. A jury convicted Defendant on two counts of first degree burglary (one for each shotgun), as well as two counts of possession of a weapon by a previous offender, one theft count, and six habitual criminal counts based on prior convictions. The court of appeals affirmed the convictions, but merged the two convictions for first degree burglary into one. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the statutory construction at issue in this case. Upon review, the Court held that the term "intended to be used" in the deadly weapon definition of section 18-1-901(3)(e) refers to the defendant's, not the manufacturer’s intent. The statute does not classify a firearm as a deadly weapon per se. In this case, the prosecution conceded that, if its argument that a firearm is per se a deadly weapon did not prevail, Defendant's could not stand. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated Defendant's conviction.
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