Jackson v. Norris
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Cite as 2011 Ark. 49
SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS
No.
09-145
Opinion Delivered February
KUNTRELL JACKSON,
9, 2011
APPELLANT,
VS.
LAR R Y N O R R IS, DIR EC T O R ,
ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTION,
APPELLEE,
APPEAL FROM THE JEFFERSON
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
NO. CV-08-28-2,
HON. ROBERT HOLDEN WYATT,
JR., JUDGE,
AFFIRMED.
KAREN R. BAKER, Associate Justice
This is an appeal from a denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Appellant
Kuntrell Jackson was convicted of capital murder and aggravated robbery by a jury in
Mississippi County Circuit Court on July 19, 2003. After the jury rendered a verdict, the trial
court sentenced Jackson to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. We affirmed.
Jackson v. State, 359 Ark. 87, 194 S.W.3d 757 (2004). Jackson did not file a petition for
postconviction relief.
On January 8, 2008, Jackson filed a petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus in the
Jefferson County Circuit Court. The State moved to dismiss the petition. After a hearing,
the State’s motion to dismiss was granted. In its order dismissing appellant’s petition for writ
of habeas corpus, the circuit court found that Jackson failed to demonstrate that his
Cite as 2011 Ark. 49
commitment was facially invalid or that the Mississippi County Circuit Court lacked
jurisdiction to sentence him to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. This
appeal followed.
Jackson’s argument on appeal is that the circuit court erred in denying his petition
because it lacked lawful authority to impose the sentence of life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole for an offense committed when Jackson was fourteen years old. Jackson
specifically argues that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution and article 2, sections 8 and 9 of the Arkansas Constitution prohibit the
mandatory sentencing of children fourteen years of age and younger to life without the
possibility of parole. We find no error and affirm.
A writ of habeas corpus will only lie where the commitment is invalid on its face or
where the court authorizing the commitment lacked jurisdiction. Flowers v. Norris, 347 Ark.
760, 68 S.W.3d 289 (2002); McKinnon v. Norris, 366 Ark. 404, 231 S.W.3d 725 (2006) (per
curiam). The writ may be granted where a petitioner pleads either facial invalidity or lack of
jurisdiction and makes a “showing, by affidavit or other evidence, [of] probable cause to
believe” he is so detained. See Ark. Code Ann. § 16-112-103 (Repl. 2006). This court has
recognized that detention for an illegal period of time is precisely what a writ of habeas
corpus is designed to correct. See Bangs v. State, 310 Ark. 235, 835 S.W.2d 294 (1992); see
also Friend v. Norris, 364 Ark. 315, 219 S.W.3d 123 (2005) (per curiam); Meny v. Norris, 340
Ark. 418, 13 S.W.3d 143 (2000) (per curiam).
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Jackson argues that his sentence is unusual, excessive, and in violation of his rights
under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, as well as article
2, sections 8 and 9 of the Arkansas Constitution. Jackson correctly notes that a sentence of
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole is the penultimate punishment under
Arkansas law, exceeded only by the death penalty. For capital offenses, the legislature has
proscribed only these two punishments. See Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-615 (Repl. 1997).
In Arkansas, sentencing is entirely a matter of statute, and this court defers to the
legislature in all matters related to sentencing. See Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-104(a) (Rep. 1997);
State v. Britt, 368 Ark. 273, 244 S.W.3d 665 (2006). Where the law does not authorize the
particular sentence pronounced by a trial court, the sentence is unauthorized and illegal, and
the case must be reversed and remanded; however, if a sentence is within the limits set by
the legislature, it is legal. State v. Joslin, 364 Ark. 545, 222 S.W.3d 168 (2006); Porter v. State,
281 Ark. 277, 663 S.W.2d 723 (1984). We have specifically rejected the claim that a sentence
of life imprisonment without parole violates the Eighth Amendment of the United States
Constitution’s prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment and stated that such a
sentence is not unconstitutionally excessive when it is within the statutory bounds. See Dyas
v. State, 260 Ark. 303, 539 S.W.2d 251 (1976).
This court has held that if the sentence fixed by the trial court is within legislative
limits, we are not free to reduce it even though we might consider it to be unduly harsh,
with three extremely narrow exceptions: (1) where the punishment resulted from passion or
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prejudice; (2) where it was a clear abuse of the jury’s discretion; or (3) where it was so wholly
disproportionate to the nature of the offense so as to shock the moral sense of the
community. Bunch v. State, 344 Ark. 730, 43 S.W.3d 132 (2001). In Bunch, the court
concluded that none of the three exceptions applied where the life-imprisonment
punishment was mandated by the legislature and had been determined by the Supreme Court
in Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991), as not violative of the Eighth Amendment. Id.
Likewise, in the instant case, the sentencing court imposed a sentence of life imprisonment
without parole, which is the sentence mandated by the legislature and one that we have
determined to be constitutional when imposed within the statutory bounds.
Jackson also contends that dismissing his petition was erroneous because his sentence
violated his federal constitutional rights pursuant to Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005),
as extended by the Supreme Court last year to cases with juvenile defendants involving a
sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for nonhomicide crimes by
Graham v. Florida, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010). In Roper, the Court held that
execution of criminal defendants who are juveniles at the time the crime was committed is
prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, but clearly limited its holding to
death-penalty cases involving juveniles: “Because the death penalty is the most severe
punishment, the Eighth Amendment applies to it with special force.” Roper, 543 U.S. at 568.
The Court expressly noted that although the execution of a juvenile is impermissible under
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, sentencing a juvenile to life imprisonment is not.
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Id. at 578–79.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Graham marked the first time the Court elected to
extend a categorical ban on a particular type of punishment in a case that did not involve the
death penalty. The Court in Graham employed a categorical analysis in reaching its conclusion
that sentencing juveniles to life imprisonment without parole was excessive for nonhomicide
offenses; however, the Court limited its ban to nonhomicide crimes. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at
2030. In reaching its conclusion, the Court specifically acknowledged this distinction between
homicide and nonhomicide offenses, noting that “[t]here is a line ‘between homicide and
other serious violent offenses against the individual.’” Id. (quoting Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554
U.S. 407, 438 (2008)). The Court’s holdings in Roper and Graham are very narrowly tailored
to death-penalty cases involving a juvenile and life-imprisonment-without-parole cases for
nonhomicide offenses involving a juvenile. We decline to extend the Court’s bans to
homicide cases involving a juvenile where the death penalty is not at issue.
Jackson has failed to allege or show that the original commitment was invalid on its
face or that the original sentencing court lacked jurisdiction to enter the sentence. We hold
that the circuit court’s dismissal of the petition for writ of habeas corpus was not clearly
erroneous.
Affirmed.
B ROWN, J., concurs.
C ORBIN , J., and D ANIELSON, J., dissent.
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R OBERT L. B ROWN, Justice, concurring. I concur in the decision. The majority is
correct that the United States Supreme Court has held that sentencing juveniles to life in
prison without parole for non-homicidal offenses violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition
in the United States Constitution against cruel and unusual punishment. Graham v. Florida,
130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010). The case before us, however, is a homicide case, which renders
Graham inapposite. There is no case from the United States Supreme Court finding a
comparable violation of the Eighth Amendment for juveniles sentenced to life without parole
for felony murder. That Court, of course, is the last word on the extent of Eighth
Amendment protection. Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769 (2001) (per curiam).
The majority is also correct that sentencing for crimes upon conviction is entirely a
matter of statute. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-104(a) (Repl. 1997); State v. Britt, 368 Ark. 273, 244
S.W.3d 665 (2006). And once there is a conviction for capital murder for juveniles, life
without parole for the offender becomes the mandatory sentence without any requirement
for a pre-sentence hearing. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-602(3)(B)(ii) (Repl. 2006). Hence, for
Kuntrell Jackson, who was age fourteen at the time of the crime, his only remedy to avoid
spending the rest of his life in prison afer the conviction for capital murder is executive
clemency from the governor.
I agree with Jackson’s argument that this state needs a procedural mechanism for the
jury to hear aggravating and mitigating circumstances before a juvenile is put away in prison
for the rest of his life without the possibility of parole. Here, Jackson maintains he was not the
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trigger man in the homicide, and, indeed, he was convicted of a murder that occurred in the
course of committing a felony—not deliberated or premeditated murder. Ark. Code Ann. §
5-10-101.
Hearing those factors at a sentencing-phase hearing may well have convinced the jury
that life without parole was too severe and not appropriate in light of Jackson’s age and
circumstances. As it stands today, no sentencing hearing for a juvenile is available by statute
once the death penalty is no longer an option and a conviction for capital murder has been
had.
The General Assembly should examine this part of the criminal code to determine
whether a sentencing hearing is appropriate before a mandatory sentence of life without parole
is imposed on a person who was a juvenile at the time of the homicide and when the basis for
the conviction is not premeditated murder but felony murder.
P AUL E. D ANIELSON, Justice, dissenting. I respectfully dissent from the majority’s
decision to affirm the denial of habeas relief in the instant case. I understand that the sentence
fixed by the circuit court was within legislative limits; however, I disagree that this is not a
case in which the particular facts allow us, if not require us, to provide relief.
Appellant Kuntrell Jackson was barely fourteen on the night of the incident that led
to his arrest. He was walking with an older cousin and friend, Travis Booker and Derrick
Shields, through the Chickasaw Courts housing project in Blytheville when the boys began
discussing the idea of robbing the Movie Magic video store. On the way to Movie Magic,
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Jackson became aware of the fact that Shields was carrying a sawed-off .410 gauge shotgun
in his coat sleeve. When they arrived at the store, Shields and Booker went in, but Jackson
elected to remain outside by the door. Shields pointed the shot gun at the video clerk, Laurie
Troup, and demanded that she “give up the money.” Troup told Shields that she did not have
any money. A few moments later, Jackson went inside. Shields demanded that Troup give up
the money five or six more times, and each time she refused. After Troup mentioned
something about calling the police, Shields shot her in the face. The three boys then fled to
Jackson’s house without taking any money.
Jackson was tried as an adult and convicted of capital murder when, pursuant to Ark.
Code Ann. § 5-10-101(a)(1) (Repl. 1997), the State proved that Jackson attempted to commit
or committed an aggravated robbery and, in the course of that offense, he, or an accomplice,
caused Troup’s death under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to the value
of human life. The only sentence available for that conviction was death or life imprisonment
without parole. See Ark. Code Ann. § 5-10-101(c)(1). Jackson was sentenced to life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole.
As noted by the majority, our United States Supreme Court has held that not only
does the execution of criminal defendants who are juveniles violate the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments, sentencing a juvenile to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole is
also an excessive punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments for a
nonhomicide offense. See Graham v. Florida, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010). The facts
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in Graham are not terribly different from the facts in the instant case, except that the victim
in Graham did not die from Graham’s accomplice’s physical attack:
In July 2003, when Graham was age 16, he and three other school-age youths
attempted to rob a barbeque restaurant in Jacksonville, Florida. One youth,
who worked at the restaurant, left the back door unlocked just before closing
time. Graham and another youth, wearing masks, entered through the
unlocked door. Graham’s masked accomplice twice struck the restaurant
manager in the back of the head with a metal bar. When the manager started
yelling at the assailant and Graham, the two youths ran out and escaped in a car
driven by the third accomplice. The restaurant manager required stitches for his
head injury. No money was taken.
Id. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 2018. Graham was charged as an adult for the armed burglary with
assault or battery, a first-degree felony carrying a maximum penalty of life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole; and attempted armed-robbery, a second-degree felony
carrying a maximum penalty of fifteen years’ imprisonment. See Graham, supra. Graham
pleaded guilty to both charges under a plea agreement, which was accepted by the trial court.
See id. He was then placed on probation after serving some jail time. See id. Graham was
actually only sentenced to life imprisonment by the trial court after violating the terms of his
probation by engaging in subsequent criminal activity. See id.
In analyzing whether this sentence was constitutional under the Eighth Amendment,
the Supreme Court noted that:
[W]hen compared to an adult murderer, a juvenile offender who did not
kill or intend to kill has a twice diminished moral culpability. The age of the
offender and the nature of the crime each bear on the analysis.
....
Here one cannot dispute that this defendant posed an immediate risk,
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for he had committed, we can assume, serious crimes early in his term of
supervised release and despite his own assurances of reform. Graham deserved
to be separated from society for some time in order to prevent what the trial
court described as an “escalating pattern of criminal conduct,” App. 394, but
it does not follow that he would be a risk to society for the rest of his life. Even
if the State’s judgment that Graham was incorrigible were later corroborated by
prison misbehavior or failure to mature, the sentence was still disproportionate
because that judgment was made at the outset. A life without parole sentence
improperly denies the juvenile offender a chance to demonstrate growth and
maturity. Incapacitation cannot override all other considerations, lest the Eighth
Amendment’s rule against disproportionate sentences be a nullity.
Id. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 2027, 2029.
In the instant case, Jackson did not kill and any evidence of intent to kill was severely
lacking. He never possessed the weapon, he was not the shooter, and his involvement in the
robbery was limited. While he was convicted of capital murder, that conviction was only
obtained by proving that he was an accomplice, and his accomplice took someone’s life in the
course of a felony, the aggravated robbery. Jackson’s involvement in the robbery was no
more, if not less than, Graham’s involvement had been. I simply cannot ignore the fact that
the analysis of the United States Supreme Court in Graham applies to the juvenile defendant
in the instant case, regardless of the fact that, in the instant case, the prosecution was able to
secure a capital-murder conviction through our felony-murder statute.
Also of great concern to me is that once Jackson was convicted, the circuit court had
no discretion in sentencing. At the time of sentencing, the circuit court could not consider
the defendant’s age or any other mitigating circumstances—the circuit court only had
jurisdiction to sentence Jackson to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. “An
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offender’s age is relevant to the Eighth Amendment, and criminal procedure laws that fail to
take defendants’ youthfulness into account at all would be flawed.” Graham, ___ U.S. at ___,
130 S. Ct. at 2031.
For these reasons, I believe that the sentence as applied in the instant case violates the
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment found in the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution and article 2, section 9 of the Arkansas
Constitution and, therefore, is illegal. Detention for an illegal period of time is precisely what
a writ of habeas corpus is designed to correct. See Taylor v. State, 354 Ark. 450, 125 S.W.3d
174 (2003). Accordingly, I would reverse the denial of Jackson’s petition for a writ of habeas
corpus.
CORBIN, J., joins.
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