Morgan v. State
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Cite as 2009 Ark. 257
SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS
No.
CR08-1330
JOHNNY ELMO MORGAN,
APPELLANT,
VS.
STATE OF ARKANSAS,
APPELLEE,
Opinion Delivered
May 7, 2009
APPEAL FROM THE SCOTT COUNTY
CIRCUIT COURT,
NO. CR2007-33A,
HON. DEWELL FRANKLIN AREY III,
JUDGE,
AFFIRMED;
COURT OF APPEALS REVERSED.
PAUL E. DANIELSON, Associate Justice
Appellant Johnny Elmo Morgan appeals the judgment of the Scott County Circuit
Court convicting him of manufacturing methamphetamine, possession of drug paraphernalia
with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine, first-degree endangering the welfare of a
minor, manufacturing methamphetamine in the presence of a minor, and manufacturing
methamphetamine near certain facilities.1 He was sentenced to a total of 480 months’
imprisonment. On appeal, Morgan argues that the circuit court erred in denying his motion
to suppress evidence and that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions.
1
The later two counts are enhanced-penalty statutes. While the jury convicted Morgan of the
conduct described in both statutes, they chose only to enhance his sentence based upon finding him
guilty of manufacturing methamphetamine in the presence of a minor.
Cite as 2009 Ark. 257
The Arkansas Court of Appeals issued an opinion finding that the evidence was
insufficient to support the convictions. See Morgan v. State, CACR 08-306 (Ark. Ct. App.
Nov. 5, 2008). Accordingly, the court of appeals reversed and dismissed the case. The State
then petitioned this court for review of the court of appeals’s decision. We granted the
State’s petition for review pursuant to Arkansas Supreme Court Rule l-2(e). When we grant
review of a decision by the court of appeals, we review the case as though the appeal was
originally filed in this court. See Yarbrough v. State, 370 Ark. 31, 257 S.W.3d 50 (2007).
Upon such review, we find no error and affirm the judgment of conviction.
The record reveals the following facts. On March 8, 2007, the district court issued
a search warrant for the residence Morgan shared with Amy Smith. The warrant was issued
based upon the affidavit of Sergeant Joey Deer, of the Scott County Sheriff’s Office,
explaining that he had reason to believe that Morgan’s residence was being used to conceal
certain illegal property, namely, methamphetamine and/or drug paraphernalia. The affidavit
further stated that a confidential informant, who had been proven credible by making at least
two controlled-substance purchases that led to the confiscation/seizure of illegal narcotics,
had made a controlled buy of methamphetamine within the last forty-eight hours from the
Morgan residence.
At trial, Heath Tate, of the Fifteenth Judicial District Drug Task Force, testified that
he executed the warrant at Morgan’s residence. When the warrant was executed, Morgan
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was not present, but Smith and another woman were standing outside the single-wide mobile
home. Two children, both of whom were Morgan’s, and a fifteen- or sixteen-year-old
juvenile were inside. Two more of Morgan’s children later arrived on a school bus.
Tate testified that there was an unlocked metal outbuilding approximately thirty to
forty feet behind the trailer, as well as a “semi-trailer box.” Tate acted as the evidence
custodian and, according to his log, the following evidence was found: a glass smoking pipe,
a plastic bag, three corners of plastic bags, and a plastic bag containing a white powder
substance, all located in the north bedroom of the residence; and two light bulbs, a rolled
dollar bill, a straw, and a roll of plastic bags, all located on top of the refrigerator in the
kitchen. He testified that the pipe could be used for smoking methamphetamine, that a
controlled substance could be wrapped in a plastic bag corner, and that the light bulb had
been hollowed out and could be used to smoke methamphetamine. Both light bulbs had
discoloring which, as Tate testified, suggested they had been used to smoke
methamphetamine. Tate also noted that the plastic bags could be used for delivery of
methamphetamine and that the corners of the bags are also commonly utilized as a way to
handle methamphetamine.
The evidence log also reflects that the police found the following evidence in the
outbuilding: a camp stove; an “active” HCL generator; two one-gallon containers of muriatic
acid; a one-gallon container of lighter fluid that was one-half full; coffee filters; two glass
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containers; a paper towel with red residue; a glass container holding one pound of salt; two
glass containers holding unknown liquids; two empty charcoal starter containers; an empty
salt package; plastic tubing; “ten generators made of plastic 20 oz. bottles”; a “green metal
ammo can containing numerous matches”; and a plastic cardboard box containing seven pints
of hydrogen peroxide. Tate testified that the “active” HCL generator, which had a tube
coming out of it, was used in the manufacture of methamphetamine. Though listed as part
of the items found in the outbuilding, Tate stated that the ten, twenty-ounce plastic bottles
were found “outside the metal building just laying around the yard” between the residence
and the building. Keith Vanravensway, of the Scott County Sheriff’s Office, had participated
in the search and stated that he found them scattered around the back yard in a twenty-fiveto fifty-yard radius. Tate testified that the bottles had been used as generators because they
contained salt inside, which is used to gas off the methamphetamine. Tate further testified
that the striker plates had been removed from the matches, which is consistent with the
manufacture of methamphetamine.
Sergeant Deer also assisted in the search of Morgan’s residence. Deer testified that
there was a metal outbuilding, a trailer for an eighteen wheeler, an old swimming pool, thirty
or forty salvage vehicles, and other buildings. He also stated that the back yard was “grown
up.” According to Deer, there was no fence between the residence and the outbuilding.
Phillip Johnston, a forensic chemist with the Arkansas State Crime Laboratory,
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testified that the burned residue in the pipe was methamphetamine and dimethyl sulfone,
which is a common cutting agent that is combined with a drug to increase the weight of the
drug. He stated that the white powder in the plastic bag was 0.2199 grams of dimethyl
sulfone. Johnston also tested the residue in the light bulb and the straw and found it was also
methamphetamine and dimethyl sulfone. He found methamphetamine, phosphorus, and
iodine residue on the stained paper towel and concluded that it was evidence of
manufacturing methamphetamine. The unknown liquids found in a glass container did not
contain any controlled substance, but one contained an acid, which is used in the manufacture
of methamphetamine. Johnston testified that an HCL generator is a plastic bottle with salt
and sulfuric acid mixed in the bottom. He further testified that a hole can be made in the cap
of the bottle, through which a tube is inserted, and gas then exits the bottle through the tube.
Johnston concluded that the plastic bottle found with the tubing might indicate the
manufacture of methamphetamine and that a gas stove can be used in the manufacture of
methamphetamine. He also testified that lighter fluid, muriatic acid, phosphorus, plastic
tubing, charcoal fluid, salt, hydrogen peroxide, and iodine are used in the manufacture of
methamphetamine. On cross-examination, Johnston acknowledged that he did not know
when the manufacturing process would have taken place and that he could not determine how
long ago someone used the HCL generator that had the tubing.
Larry Garner, a five-year agent of the Fifteenth District Drug Task Force, testified
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that, upon investigation and consideration of the materials present, he concluded it was a
methamphetamine lab. In his opinion, the ten HCL generators made from the plastic bottles
were old and inactive, but that the one with the tubing was still active. He stated that each
one indicated a separate manufacturing process.
On appeal, Morgan argues that the jury’s verdicts were not supported by substantial
evidence. Although Morgan raises this issue as his final point on appeal, double-jeopardy
concerns require that we review arguments regarding the sufficiency of the evidence first.
See Boldin v. State, 373 Ark. 295, 283 S.W.3d 565 (2008). The State first argues that this
argument is not preserved for appeal. In the alternative, the State argues that substantial
evidence supports the convictions.
Our standard of review for a sufficiency challenge is well settled. In reviewing a
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in a light most favorable
to the State and consider only the evidence that supports the verdict. See Cluck v. State, 365
Ark. 166, 226 S.W.3d 780 (2006). We affirm a conviction if substantial evidence exists to
support it. See id. Substantial evidence is that which is of sufficient force and character that
it will, with reasonable certainty, compel a conclusion one way or the other, without resorting
to speculation or conjecture. See id.
Furthermore, circumstantial evidence may provide a basis to support a conviction, but
it must be consistent with the defendant’s guilt and inconsistent with any other reasonable
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conclusion. See id. Whether the evidence excludes every other hypothesis is left to the jury
to decide. See id. The credibility of witnesses is an issue for the jury and not the court. See
id. The trier of fact is free to believe all or part of any witness’s testimony and may resolve
questions of conflicting testimony and inconsistent evidence. See id.
We first address the State’s assertion that this issue was not properly preserved for
appeal. The State argues that Morgan failed to preserve this argument because he did not
renew his directed-verdict motion. The State is mistaken. Morgan offered no testimony or
evidence in his defense. We have held, under these circumstances, that the close of the
State’s case and the close of all the evidence occur simultaneously, and there is no need to
renew the motion for a directed verdict to preserve the earlier sufficiency argument. See Bell
v. State, 371 Ark. 375, 266 S.W.3d 696 (2007). Therefore, this issue was preserved for our
review.
Morgan contends that the evidence presented at trial was all circumstantial and was
insufficient to support the convictions because nothing linked him to the contraband seized.
Specifically, he argues that the HCL generators were old and not tested to confirm that they
were HCL generators and that “no fingerprint testing was done on any of the items seized
from the yard and outbuilding, which was unlocked and open to anyone, to demonstrate any
connection between [Morgan] and the seized items.” He further notes that none of the
State’s witnesses could testify as to when there had been a manufacture of methamphetamine.
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The State avers that proof of constructive possession is sufficient to support the conviction
and that exclusive possession is not necessary as long as the place where the contraband was
found was under the dominion and control of the accused.
The first count of which Morgan was convicted was unlawfully manufacturing
methamphetamine in violation of Ark. Code Ann. § 5-64-401(a)(1) (Supp. 2007). Arkansas
Code Annotated § 5-64-101(16) (Supp. 2007) defines manufacture as follows:
(A) “Manufacture” means the production, preparation, propagation,
compounding, conversion, or processing of a controlled substance, either
directly or indirectly by extraction from a substance of natural origin, or
independently by means of chemical synthesis, or by a combination of
extraction and chemical synthesis.
(B) “Manufacture” includes any packaging or repackaging of a controlled
substance or labeling or relabeling of a controlled substance’s container.
Furthermore, he was found to be in violation of Ark. Code Ann. § 5-64-403 (Supp. 2007),
which states, in pertinent part, that “[i]t is unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with
intent to use, drug paraphernalia to manufacture methamphetamine.” Ark. Code Ann. § 564-403(c)(5).
According to the testimony of Sergeant Deer, a confidential informant made two
controlled-buy purchases from Morgan’s residence before a search warrant was obtained.
A field test conducted on the substances recovered during these controlled buys tested
positive for methamphetamine. As previously noted, drug paraphernalia and several items
used in the manufacture of methamphetamine were seized from Morgan’s residence, yard,
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and an outbuilding located thirty to forty feet behind the residence.
Although Morgan was not present at the residence at the time of the search, it is not
necessary that the State prove literal physical possession of contraband. See Dodson v. State,
341 Ark. 41, 14 S.W.3d 489 (2000). Contraband is deemed to be constructively possessed
if the location of the contraband was under the dominion and control of the accused. See
Fultz v. State, 333 Ark. 586, 972 S.W.2d 222 (1998). We have held that constructive
possession exists where joint occupancy of the premises occurs and where there are
additional factors linking the accused to the contraband. See Embry v. State, 302 Ark. 608,
792 S.W.2d 318 (1990). Those additional factors include: (a) whether the accused exercised
care, control, and management over the contraband; and (b) whether the accused knew the
material was contraband. See id.; see also Crossley v. State, 304 Ark. 378, 802 S.W.2d 459
(1991). This control and knowledge can be inferred from the circumstances, such as the
proximity of the contraband to the accused, the fact that it is in plain view, and the ownership
of the property where the contraband is found. See Plotts v. State, 297 Ark. 66, 759 S.W.2d
793 (1988).
In the instant case, pursuant to a valid search warrant, the contraband was found in the
kitchen and a bedroom of Morgan’s residence, strewn about his yard, and in an outbuilding
directly behind his residence. Mr. Garner testified that he concluded the materials found in
the search were the components of a methamphetamine lab.
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While ten of the HCL
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generators were old and inactive, in Garner’s opinion, one found was still active. Traces of
methamphetamine were found in the pipe, light bulb, and straw. The stained paper towel
contained traces of methamphetamine, phosphorus, and iodine residue, which Garner and
Phillip Johnston, a forensic chemist, testified are all consistent with the manufacture of
methamphetamine. Other specific items seized, such as the lighter fluid, muriatic acid,
phosphorus, plastic tubing, charcoal fluid, salt, hydrogen peroxide, and iodine were all also
said to be consistent with the manufacture of methamphetamine by the State’s witnesses.
On appeal, Morgan’s argument focuses on what evidence was not presented at trial
to prove his guilt. However, after reviewing the evidence introduced at trial in the light most
favorable to the State and considering only the evidence supporting the verdict, we conclude
that there was substantial evidence to support the jury’s verdict. Therefore, we affirm the
convictions for manufacturing methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia with
the intent to manufacture methamphetamine.
Arkansas Code Annotated § 5-27-205(a)(1) instructs that a person commits the
offense of first-degree endangering the welfare of a minor if, “being a parent . . . he or she
purposely . . . [e]ngages in conduct creating a substantial risk of death or serious physical
injury to a minor.” Ark. Code Ann. § 5-27-205(a)(1) (Repl. 2006). In the instant case, at
least two of Morgan’s minor children were present in the residence at the time of the search.
Drug paraphernalia was found inside the residence and in the yard, both locations that
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children could easily access. Furthermore, dangerous chemicals and other components of
a methamphetamine lab were found in the unlocked outbuilding behind the residence. We
cannot say that Morgan’s conviction for endangering the welfare of a minor or the sentence
enhancement he received for manufacturing methamphetamine in the presence of a minor
were not supported by substantial evidence and, therefore, we affirm.
For his second point on appeal, Morgan contends that the search warrant in the instant
case was defective because it was obtained by allegedly false and misleading information
provided to the judge who issued it. The State argues that the circuit court properly denied
Morgan’s motion to suppress. We do not find the search warrant defective and agree that
Morgan’s motion to suppress was properly denied.
In deciding whether to issue a warrant, the magistrate should make a practical,
common-sense determination based on the totality of the circumstances set forth in the
affidavit. See Stanton v. State, 344 Ark. 589, 42 S.W.3d 474 (2001). Thus, when reviewing
the denial of a motion to suppress evidence, this court conducts a de novo review based upon
the totality of the circumstances, reversing only if the circuit court’s ruling is clearly against
the preponderance of the evidence. See Koster v. State, 374 Ark. 74, 286 S.W.3d 152 (2008).
Issues regarding the credibility of witnesses testifying at a suppression hearing are within the
province of the circuit court. See id. Any conflicts in the testimony are for the circuit court
to resolve, as it is in a superior position to determine the credibility of the witnesses. See id.
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On appeal, Morgan argues that the information provided by Sergeant Deer in his
affidavit obtaining the search warrant was so deficient and lacking in indicia of probable
cause, reliance upon the search warrant issued was unreasonable, and the circuit court should
have granted his motion to suppress the evidence. Specifically, Morgan contends that there
was no basis upon which to gauge or assess the reliability of the confidential informant
because Sergeant Deer did not know the confidential informant before the Morgan
investigation and because the two controlled buys that Sergeant Deer referenced in his
affidavit had been controlled buys in this case, at the residence in question, rather than in
previous cases. Further, Morgan argues that while Sergeant Deer believed he had made a
thorough search of the confidential informant before each controlled buy, he admitted that
he did not search under the confidential informant’s shoe inserts.
Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 13.1 governs the issuance of search warrants.
Rule 13.1(b) generally requires that where an affidavit or testimony is based in whole or in
part on hearsay, the affiant shall set forth particular facts bearing on the informant’s
reliability. However, Rule 13.1(b) also provides that the failure of the affidavit or testimony
to establish the veracity and bases of knowledge of persons providing information to the
affiant shall not require that the application be denied if the affidavit or testimony, viewed
as a whole, provides a substantial basis for a finding of reasonable cause to believe that
things subject to seizure will be found in a particular place.
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This is not a case in which the search warrant was based on pure hearsay or in which
the reliability of the informant was completely unknown. There is no fixed formula in
determining an informant’s reliability. See Stanton v. State, supra. Factors to be considered
in making such a determination include whether the informant’s statements are: (1)
incriminating; (2) based on personal observations of recent criminal activity; and (3)
corroborated by other information. See Stanton v. State, supra.
Here, the confidential informant’s information was corroborated by his personal
observations and corroborated by the personal observations of officers Tate and Deer. The
controlled buy was corroborated by the participation and observation of officers Tate and
Deer: Sergeant Deer searched the informant and his vehicle for any illegal contraband or
monies; the informant was given money to make the controlled buy; Tate and Deer followed
the informant to a location near Morgan’s residence; and, Tate and Deer observed the
informant walk into the residence, stay approximately two minutes, and return with drugs.
Sergeant Deer’s account of the drug buy, alone, was sufficient to establish probable cause
to search Morgan’s home for drugs and other contraband. See Langford v. State, 332 Ark.
54, 962 S.W.2d 358 (1998) (holding that an officer’s account of a controlled buy, made by
an informant, was, by itself, sufficient to establish probable cause for issuance of a search
warrant). We do not find the fact that the officers did not search under the confidential
informant’s shoe inserts of consequence as both Deer and Tate personally observed the
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controlled buys in their entirety other than the short amount of time that the confidential
informant was inside Morgan’s home. Considering the totality of the circumstances, that
fact, alone, does not obliterate the probable cause established.
The facts in the affidavit, as a whole, provided a substantial basis for determining that
reasonable cause existed to believe that items related to the sale of controlled substances
would be found in Morgan’s residence. Accordingly, the circuit court’s denial of Morgan’s
motion to suppress was not clearly against the preponderance of the evidence, and we affirm.
Affirmed; court of appeals reversed.
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