Hinojosa v. State
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS
No.
CR08-1336
MARTIN HINOJOSA
Opinion Delivered M ay 21, 2009
APPELLANT,
AN APPEAL FROM THE POPE
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, NO.
CR 2007-103, HONORABLE JAMES
D. KENNEDY, CIRCUIT JUDGE
VS.
STATE OF ARKANSAS
APPELLEE,
CIRCUIT COURT AFFIRMED;
COURT OF APPEALS REVERSED
ELANA CUNNINGHAM WILLS, Associate Justice
This court granted the State’s petition for review of the decision in Hinojosa v. State,
103 Ark. App. 312, ___ S.W.3d ___ (2008), in which the court of appeals reversed and
remanded appellant Hinojosa’s conviction for possession of marijuana with intent to deliver.
At issue is whether the circuit court erred by denying Hinojosa’s motion to suppress
statements and evidence obtained following a traffic stop. Hinojosa argues that the initial stop
was unlawful, and, therefore, his statements and the evidence obtained after the stop were
inadmissable under the Fruit of the Poisonous Tree doctrine established in Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). We disagree and affirm the circuit court.
On January 27, 2007, Sergeant Kyle Drown of the Arkansas State Police initiated a
traffic stop of Hinojosa’s truck in Pope County after observing that the vehicle’s license plate
1
cover obscured the name of the issuing foreign state.1 During the traffic stop, Drown
eventually asked Hinojosa if he had anything illegal in his vehicle. Hinojosa responded that
there was approximately three hundred pounds of marijuana in the truck. After a canine sniff
confirmed presence of the marijuana, Hinojosa was charged with possession of a controlled
substance with an intent to deliver under Ark. Code Ann. § 5-64-401.
Hinojosa filed a motion to suppress, contending that his statements and the physical
evidence were illegally seized as a result of an unlawful traffic stop. Sergeant Drown testified
at the suppression hearing that he stopped Hinojosa, because the license plate frame on his
truck obscured the identification of the plate’s issuing state in violation of Ark. Code Ann. §
27-14-716.2 Hinojosa asserted that the license plate cover did not violate Arkansas or Arizona
law, and that Sergeant Drown’s mistake of law rendered the traffic stop without probable
cause and, therefore, illegal. The circuit court denied the motion to suppress in an order
issued on November 5, 2007, and filed a letter containing its findings regarding the
suppression motion the same day. Quoting from Travis v. State, 331 Ark. 7, 959 S.W.2d 32
(1998) and Burris v. State, 330 Ark. 66, 73, 954 S.W.2d 209 (1997), the trial court stated in
the letter of findings that the supreme court had previously held that a law enforcement
1
A photograph of the license plate frame was admitted into evidence at trial,
showing a thin metal frame affixed to the license plate. The frame widened over the top
portion of the license plate, and this part of the frame, with the word “HONDA” printed
on it, completely obscured “Arizona.” The frame did not obscure the registration
numbers on the license plate or the expiration stickers.
2
Violation of § 27-14-716 is a misdemeanor, punishable by up to $500 in fines
and/or up to six months’ imprisonment. See Ark. Code Ann. § 27-14-301.
2
CR08-1336
officer’s mistake of law does not negate probable cause; instead, “all that is required is that the
officer had probable cause to believe that a traffic violation had occurred.” Hinojosa entered
a conditional plea of guilty, reserving his right to appeal the suppression ruling under Ark. R.
Crim. P. 24.3(b), and filed a timely notice of appeal.
Upon review, the court of appeals first determined that the applicable law in the case
was Ark. Code Ann. § 27-14-704, rather than Ark. Code Ann. § 27-14-716, which Sergeant
Drown testified provided the basis for his traffic stop of Hinojosa. The court of appeals found
that § 27-14-704 only requires that a motor vehicle registered in another state must
“conspicuously display the registration numbers,” and stated that it was undisputed “that the
registration number of Hinojosa’s vehicle was conspicuously displayed.” Hinojosa, 101 Ark.
App. at ___, ___ S.W.3d at ___. Noting that Sergeant Drown testified that “he had seen
more than 100 Arizona license plates, and admitted that he recognized the license plate on
Hinojosa’s vehicle as an Arizona license plate,” the court of appeals stated that there “were
no facts or circumstances that would permit a person of reasonable caution to believe that an
offense had been committed.” Id. Accordingly, the court of appeals reversed the circuit court,
holding that the traffic stop was unlawful because it was conducted without probable cause.3
3
The court of appeals concluded the opinion as follows:
In deciding this case today, we are mindful that in Travis v. State,
331 Ark 7, 959 S.W.2d 32 (1998), the supreme court rejected a
mistake-of-law argument. However, we believe that Travis is
distinguishable. In Travis, the appellant was stopped based on a
deputy’s erroneous belief that Texas law required an expiration
sticker to be displayed on the license plate, in the same manner
as is required by Arkansas law. In the instant case, only Arkansas
3
CR08-1336
When this court grants a petition for review of a decision by the court of appeals, it
reviews the case as though it had originally been filed with this court. Brookshire v. Adcock, ___
Ark. ___, ___ S.W.3d ___ (April 16, 2009). In reviewing a circuit court's denial of a motion
to suppress evidence, the appellate court conducts a de novo review based on the totality of the
circumstances, reviewing findings of historical facts for clear error and determining whether
those facts give rise to reasonable suspicion or probable cause, giving due weight to inferences
drawn by the circuit court. Sims v. State, 356 Ark. 507, 157 S.W.3d 530 (2004). This court
will reverse the circuit court only if the ruling is clearly against the preponderance of the
evidence. Id. Additionally, this court defers to the circuit court's superior position to judge
the credibility of witnesses. Id.
Hinojosa brings three points on appeal, arguing that the circuit court erred in denying
his motion to suppress for the following reasons: (1) Sergeant Drown did not have probable
cause to stop Hinojosa because § 27-14-716 does not prohibit the obscuring of the state name
on a license plate; (2) the traffic stop was unlawful because it was based on a mistake of law
that § 27-14-716 was applicable to Hinojosa as a nonresident; and (3) even if the initial stop
was valid, the subsequent seizure “became unlawful when it was prolonged beyond the time
law was at issue, and there clearly was no violation of the
applicable statute. Pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section
12-8-101 (Repl. 2003), the Department of the Arkansas State
Police was created for the express purpose of enforcing our
motor vehicle laws. We hold that it is not reasonable for a
trooper to stop a vehicle because he or she was not thoroughly
familiar with this discrete body of law.
Id.
4
CR08-1336
necessary to issue a citation for the alleged traffic infraction in the absence of reasonable
suspicion that [he] was committing a crime.”
Hinojosa first argues that Sergeant Drown lacked probable cause to stop his vehicle
because the stop was based on a mistake of Arkansas law. Specifically, Hinojosa asserts that
Sergeant Drown stopped him based on the erroneous belief that Hinojosa’s license plate frame
violated § 27-14-716 because a frame placed over the license plate obscured the name of the
plate’s issuing state — Arizona. Hinojosa contends that § 27-14-716(b), involving the
legibility of license plates, does not contain any reference to the visibility or legibility of the
state name. He also argues that § 27-14-716(c), which contains a separate prohibition against
placing any type of cover over a license plate that makes the plate more difficult to read,
“prohibits only license plate covers that cover the registration number in such a way as to make
it more difficult to read.”
A police officer must have probable cause to believe that a vehicle has violated a traffic
law before making a valid stop. Sims, supra.
Probable cause is defined as “facts or
circumstances within a police officer's knowledge that are sufficient to permit a person of
reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been committed by the person suspected.”
Burks v. State, 362 Ark. 558, 210 S.W.3d 62 (2005). In assessing the existence of probable
cause, this court’s review is liberal rather than strict. Laime v. State, 347 Ark. 142, 60 S.W.3d
464 (2001). In the context of traffic stops, this court has “repeatedly held that degree of proof
sufficient to sustain a finding of probable cause is less than required to sustain a conviction.”
Burris v. State, 330 Ark. 66, 73, 954 S.W.2d 209, 213 (1997). Whether a police officer has
5
CR08-1336
probable cause to make a traffic stop does not depend on whether the driver was actually
guilty of the violation which the officer believed to have occurred. Id.
The proper inquiry relevant to Hinojosa’s first point is whether there were “facts or
circumstances within a police officer's knowledge that are sufficient to permit a person of
reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been committed by the person suspected.”
Burks, supra. Sergeant Drown testified that he stopped Hinojosa’s vehicle because he believed
that the license plate frame obscuring the name of the issuing state violated § 27-14-716.
Section 27-14-716, originally adopted as part of Act 142 of 1949, provides as follows:
(a)(1) License plates issued for a motor vehicle other than a motorcycle shall be
attached thereto, one (1) in the front and the other in the rear.
(2)(A) When one (1) plate is issued, it shall be attached to the rear.
(B) License plates for trucks of one (1) ton capacity or larger may be displayed
either on the front or rear of the vehicle.
(C) The license plate issued for a motorcycle required to be registered under
this chapter shall be attached to the rear thereof.
(b) Every license plate shall, at all times, be securely fastened in a horizontal
position to the vehicle for which it is issued so as to prevent the plate from
swinging and at a height of not less than twelve inches (12 ¢) from the ground,
measuring from the bottom of such plate, in a place and position to be clearly
visible and shall be maintained free from foreign materials and in a condition
to be clearly legible.
(c) Placing any type of cover over a license plate which makes the license plate
more difficult to read or which reduces the reflective properties of the license
plate is prohibited.
Section 27-14-716(b) requires that “every license plate shall, at all times, be . . . clearly
visible and shall be maintained free from foreign materials,” and § 27-14-716(c) prohibits
“[p]lacing any type of cover over a license plate which makes the license plate more difficult
6
CR08-1336
to read.” The language in § 27-14-716 prohibits obscuring the license “plate.” Nothing in
the language of the statute restricts its applicability to the registration numbers alone, as
Hinojosa contends in his first point on appeal. It is undisputed that Hinojosa’s license plate
frame obscured “Arizona” from the license plate; therefore, the license plate was not “clearly
visible” or “clearly legible” as required by § 27-14-716(b), and the frame made “the license
plate more difficult to read” as prohibited by § 27-14-716(c) (emphasis added). Accordingly,
Sergeant Drown did not lack probable cause to stop Hinojosa’s vehicle under § 27-14-716
on this basis. See United States v. Orduna-Martinez, 561 F.3d 1134 (10th Cir. 2009) (although
Kansas statute did not specifically require registration decals to be legible, the statute’s general
requirement that license plates be “clearly visible” encompassed all parts of the license plate,
including the decals); Nelson v. State, 544 S.E.2d 189, 190 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) (because the
statute did not “specify that only certain portions of the tag must not be obscured” and “[t]he
overarching duty of the driver is to keep the license tag legible at all times,” the court held
that “no portion of the license tag may be covered with any material so as to render the
license information illegible,” including “the name of the state issuing the license.”); State v.
Hayes, 660 P.2d 1387, 1389 (Kan. Ct. App. 1983) (because “all of the tag must be legible,
including the state name, which may be the most important information on the tag,” an
officer had probable cause to initiate a stop where the name of the foreign state was obscured,
even though the officer could read the words “Hoosier State” on the plate).
For his second point for reversal, Hinojosa argues that, even if § 27-14-716 does
prohibit a license plate frame that obscures a state name, the statute is inapplicable to him
7
CR08-1336
because his vehicle was registered in another state. Hinjosa contends that as a nonresident,
the statute applicable to his vehicle was § 27-14-704 rather than § 27-14-716. Section 27-14704, originally adopted in 1931 and titled “Vehicles of nonresidents,” states as follows:
(a) Any motor vehicle or motorcycle belonging to any person who is a
nonresident of this state who has registered the motor vehicle or motorcycle in
and who has complied with all the laws of the state, territory, District of Columbia, or
any province or territory of Canada in which the owner resides with respect to the
registration of motor vehicles and the display of registration numbers and who shall
conspicuously display the registration number as required may be operated in this state as
follows:
(1) If the motor vehicle is operated for the sole purpose of marketing farm
products raised exclusively by the owner or other growers of the products
associated with the owner in the raising of the farm products;
(2) A privately owned and duly registered motor vehicle not operated for hire
but for the purpose of going to and from the owner's place of regular
employment and the making of trips for the purchasing of goods, wares, and
merchandise if the owner lives outside of this state;
(3)(A) Any motor vehicle operated by a nonresident only making an occasional
trip into this state shall have the right to make an occasional trip without the
payment of any motor vehicle license fee to this state, if the motor vehicle is
not operated for hire.
(B) The Director of the Department of Finance and Administration may issue
temporary permits without payment of license fees for motor vehicles operated
for hire by a nonresident into and across the highways of this state when the
vehicles are operated upon charters for casual, irregular, occasional, and
nonscheduled sightseeing trips; and
(4) The director is authorized and empowered to enter into any agreement or
issue any permit for the operation of any motor vehicles upon the highways of
this state without payment of license fees when the vehicles are operated under
and by the supervision of the proper authorities of the United States Army, Air
Force, Navy, or Marine Corps during any period of emergency.
(b) The provisions of this section shall be operative as to a vehicle owned by a
nonresident of this state only to the extent that under the laws of the state,
territory, District of Columbia, or any province or territory of Canada, or other
place of residence of the nonresident owner, like exemptions are granted to
vehicles registered under the laws of, and owned by, residents of this state.
8
CR08-1336
(Emphasis added.) Hinojosa asserts that under § 27-14-704 he was only required to ensure
that his vehicle’s registration numbers were conspicuously displayed as required by Arizona
law. Because his vehicle’s registration number was visible despite the license plate cover,
Hinojosa argues that he was in compliance with § 27-14-704; therefore, Sergeant Drown’s
mistake of law rendered the traffic stop an unreasonable violation of the Fourth Amendment.
In response, the State argues that this court held in Travis v. State, supra, that an
officer’s mistake of law does not negate probable cause. In Travis, a deputy sheriff stopped a
truck with a Texas license plate in the erroneous belief that Texas law required the display of
an expiration sticker on the license plate. After making the traffic stop, the deputy discovered
that the driver of the truck had a suspended driver’s license, and that the owner/passenger also
had a suspended driver’s license, as well as a prior felony conviction. After calling a tow truck
to remove the vehicle from the highway, the deputy opened one of the vehicle’s doors in
order to roll up a window and observed a rifle in plain view. The deputy arrested the
vehicle’s owner for being a felon in possession of a firearm.
The appellant in Travis argued that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to
suppress the rifle as evidence because “the deputy’s understanding of Texas licensing
requirements was erroneous,” and, therefore, “there was no ‘probable cause,’ or even
‘reasonable suspicion,’ to make the stop.” Travis, 331 Ark. at 9, 969 S.W.2d at 34. This court
rejected that argument, stating that “[a]lthough the deputy was erroneous, the question of
whether an officer had probable cause to make a traffic stop does not depend upon whether
the defendant is actually guilty of the violation that was the basis of the stop.” Id. at 10, 969
9
CR08-1336
S.W.2d at 34. Instead, “[w]hether the defendant is actually guilty of the traffic violation is for
a jury or court to decide, not an officer on the scene.” Id. (citing Burris v. State, 330 Ark. 66,
954 S.W.2d 209 (1997)).
Although the parties disagree as to whether the holding in Travis extends to a mistake
of Arkansas law, it is unnecessary to address this issue here; § 27-14-716 applies to all vehicles
traveling on Arkansas roads based on this courts’ decision in Burris v. State, supra, and the
express terms of the statute.
In Burris, an officer of the Arkansas State Highway Patrol testified at a suppression
hearing that he stopped a vehicle with a Florida license plate because the license plate was
improperly displayed under § 27-14-716, and because the vehicle had a broken brake light.
Upon review, this court affirmed the circuit court’s order denying the suppression motion,
holding that the officer had probable cause to believe there was a violation of § 27-14-716,
because the Florida license plate “was fastened to the trailer in such a fashion that the license
plate flipped upwards in the wind and because the last digits of the plate were obscured by the
corner of the trailer.” 330 Ark. at 72, 954 S.W.2d at 212. Thus, this court has previously
applied the legibility requirements of § 27-14-716 to nonresidents as well as residents.
Additionally, the express terms of the statute indicate that the General Assembly
intended for the pertinent provisions of §§ 27-14-716(b) and (c) to apply to residents and
nonresidents. Section 27-14-716(b)provides that:
10
CR08-1336
Every license plate shall, at all times, be securely fastened in a horizontal position
to the vehicle for which it is issued so as to prevent the plate from swinging and
at a height of not less than twelve inches (12" ) from the ground, measuring
from the bottom of such plate, in a place and position to be clearly visible and
shall be maintained free from foreign materials and in a condition to be clearly
legible.
(Emphasis added.) The plain language of § 27-14-716(b) requiring that “[e]very license plate
shall, at all times . . . be clearly legible” does not limit its application to residents of Arkansas.
See United States v. DeGasso, 369 F.3d 1139, 1147 (10th Cir. 2004) (construing a similar
section of an Oklahoma statute and holding that “[b]y its terms, this portion of the statute
applies to any vehicle equipped with a license plate, whether or not it is from Oklahoma.
This accords with the common-sense proposition that police officers have no less need to
identity out-of-state vehicles than they have to identify those registered in Oklahoma.”); State
v. Davis, 641 S.E.2d 205, 206 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007) (“Trial court erred by ruling that [similar
Georgia statutory provisions] did not apply to the out-of-state license plate. Although certain
portions of [the Georgia statute] apply only to vehicles registered in Georgia, the [license plate
legibility] portions of the statute apply to any vehicle whether registered in Georgia or out of
state.”); State v. Hayes, 660 P.2d at 1389 (holding that “an illegible or obscured vehicle tag is
a violation of [similar Kansas statute] even if the vehicle is duly licensed in another state” and
that separate Kansas statute addressing the vehicles of nonresidents “does not grant total
exemption from Kansas law. . . . Out-of-state cars on Kansas highways are subject to the same
police imperatives as local vehicles.”). Additionally, the General Assembly amended § 27-1411
CR08-1336
716 in 2001 to add subsection (c), prohibiting covers that make license plates more difficult
to read. Act 1378 of 2001. There is no language in subsection (c) that limits its application
to residents of Arkansas.
Although Hinojosa asserts that § 27-14-704 is the more specific statute and is “the only
statute applicable to the display of license plates on vehicles of nonresidents,” our rules of
statutory construction provide that statutes relating to the same subject are “in pari materia”
and should be read in a harmonious manner if possible. Mays v. Cole, 373 Ark. 532, ___
S.W.3d ___ (2008). Unless two statues relating to the same subject are in conflict and cannot
be reconciled, they are to be read together, and each is to be given its intended effect. Kan.
City S. Ry. Co. v. Pledger, 301 Ark. 564, 785 S.W.2d 462 (1990). The intended purpose of
the relevant portions of each statute is similar: the legible or conspicuous display of registration
information. Notably, Sergeant Drown testified that it is important that the name of the
license plate’s issuing state be clearly visible for law enforcement officers to identify vehicles
that are the subject of “NCIC BOLOS” (National Crime Information Center “Be on lookout
for” bulletins), and to facilitate citizens’ identification of license plates in order to report
reckless or intoxicated drivers. In our view, the language of the two statutes does not conflict
such that one must take precedence over the other. To hold otherwise would result in the
nonsensical proposition that law enforcement officers have less need to identify out-of-state
vehicles than they have to identify vehicles registered in Arkansas. This court does not engage
in statutory interpretations that defy common sense or produce absurd results. See, e.g.,
12
CR08-1336
Shipley, Inc. v. Long, 359 Ark. 208, 195 S.W.3d 911 (2004). Thus, we conclude that the
license plate display requirements of § 27-14-716 apply to all vehicles traveling on Arkansas
roads — resident and non-resident alike. Accordingly, Sergeant Drown had probable cause
to stop Hinojosa for violation of § 27-14-716.
For his third point on appeal, Hinojosa argues that, even if the initial traffic stop was
valid, “it became unlawful because it was prolonged beyond the time necessary to issue a
citation for the alleged traffic violation in the absence of reasonable suspicion that the
Appellant was committing a crime.” Neither the circuit court’s order denying the motion
to suppress, or the court’s letter of findings of fact filed the same day, address Hinojosa’s third
point for reversal. An appellant must obtain a ruling on his argument to preserve the matter
for this court's review. Wallace v. State, ___ Ark. ___, ___, ___ S.W.3d ___, ___(Feb. 26,
2009). Accordingly, we cannot reach the merits of Hinojosa’s third point on appeal.
Circuit court affirmed; court of appeals reversed.
13
CR08-1336
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.