Benton v. Unnamed Circuit Judge
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT
No.
CR 09-325
Opinion Delivered
May 7, 2009
v.
PRO SE MOTION FOR RULE ON
CLERK TO FILE PETITION FOR WRIT
OF MANDAMUS WITHOUT NAMING
RESPONDENT [CIRCUIT COURT OF
HEMPSTEAD COUNTY, CR 94-108]
UNNAMED CIRCUIT JUDGE
Respondent
MOTION MOOT.
RICO BENTON
Petitioner
PER CURIAM
On March 5, 2009, petitioner Rico Benton tendered to this court a petition for writ of
mandamus in which he sought a writ compelling the Circuit Court of Hempstead County to act on
a pro se petition for writ of error coram nobis filed November 2, 2005. Petitioner noted that the
circuit judge to whom the coram nobis petition had originally been assigned was no longer in office
and contended that he had been unable to determine the judge to whom the petition had been
reassigned. On March 19, 2009, petitioner filed the motion for rule on clerk that is now before us
in which he seeks leave to file the mandamus petition without naming a respondent.
On March 31, 2009, the Circuit Clerk of Hempstead County provided this court a copy of
an order entered by the Honorable Duncan Culpepper, Circuit Judge, on March 30, 2009, that
disposed of petitioner’s petition for writ of error coram nobis. Judge Culpepper said in the order that
the petition had been assigned to Judge Keith Wood, who failed to rule on the petition while he was
in office.
We take judicial notice that Judge Wood left office on December 31, 2006, approximately
one year and two months after petitioner filed the petition for writ of error coram nobis on November
2, 2005. As the petition was not ruled on by Judge Wood during the approximately fourteen months
it was pending in his court, it should have been promptly assigned to Judge Wood’s successor in
office or another judge in the judicial district early in 2007.
As petitioner’s coram nobis petition has been acted on by the court, the instant motion for
rule on clerk is moot. We take this opportunity to remind the bench that the court has the obligation
of ensuring that each matter filed receives a reasonably prompt disposition. Cabral v. Keith, 364
Ark. 456, 220 S.W.3d 683 (2005) (per curiam). As we have said before when there was an
unwarranted delay in a court's acting on a pleading, all judicial districts are charged with developing
and maintaining a system whereby judges are made aware of filings in their courts. McCoy v.
Phillips, 357 Ark. 368, 166 S.W.3d 564 (2004) (per curiam). Those procedures should have in place
a means by which any pleading not acted on by the judge to whom it was assigned before the judge
leaves office is promptly assigned to his or her successor or another judge in the district. Otherwise,
the pleading languishes without action and the petitioner is denied the efficient disposition that
should be the hallmark of any judicial system. While we recognize that the delay in the instant case
cannot be laid at the feet of just one person, because the procedures in place failed to ensure action
on petitioner’s petition, we encourage Judge Culpepper, in his capacity as the Administrative Judge
for the Eighth North Judicial District, to assess the system in place in his judicial district and to take
whatever steps are necessary to prevent future undue delays.
We further urge all other
Administrative Judges to examine the system in his or her district for assigning matters to
determine that a change in judges does not occasion delay in the disposition of pleadings.
Motion moot.
-2-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
