Schubert v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs.
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
Cite as 2009 Ark. 596
SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS
No.
09-643
JOHN AND CINDY SCHUBERT,
APPELLANTS;
VS.
ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF
HUMAN SERVICES & K.M., A MINOR
CHILD,
APPELLEES;
Opinion Delivered December 3, 2009
MOTION TO DISMISS; MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION
MOTION TO DISMISS DENIED;
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
MOOT.
DONALD L. CORBIN, Associate Justice
Presented to this court is a motion by Appellees Arkansas Department of Human
Services and K.M., a minor child (collectively, “DHS”), to dismiss an appeal from an order
denying a motion for intervention filed by Appellants John and Cindy Schubert. The appeal,
itself, was filed in the Arkansas Court of Appeals and has been docketed as Schubert v. Arkansas
Department of Human Services, No. CA09-695.1 In requesting that we dismiss the appeal, DHS
argues that the Schuberts failed to sign the notice of appeal, as required by Ark. Sup. Ct. R.
6-9 (2009), and have not filed a request to proceed with a belated appeal, thus, their appeal
1
In conjunction with the instant case, we accepted certification of a motion pending
in the court of appeals in which DHS requests the court to reconsider an order granting
Appellants an extension of time to file their brief on appeal. As the Schuberts filed that brief
on September 11, 2009, that motion is now moot.
Cite as 2009 Ark. 596
should be dismissed.2 Our jurisdiction is pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 1-2(b)(5) (2009). We
deny the motion to dismiss.
The underlying action in this case began as a dependency-neglect matter. DHS was
notified by staff at St. Edward Mercy Health Center that a child, K.M., had been born to
Cynthia Hudson, who suffered from bipolar disorder and post-traumatic-stress disorder. The
staff believed that the child would not be safe if sent home with her mother. DHS petitioned
for emergency custody, and the circuit court entered an order finding K.M. to be dependent
neglected and placing custody with DHS. DHS subsequently placed K.M. in foster care in
the home of the Schuberts.
K.M. remained in the Schuberts’ home while her case plan proceeded. Initially, the
goal of the plan was reunification of mother and child; however, on August 15, 2008, Hudson
signed a consent voluntarily relinquishing her parental rights. Brandon Hudson, the legal
father of K.M., also signed a voluntary consent relinquishing his parental rights. Thereafter,
DHS sought to terminate all parental rights and to change the goal of the case plan to
adoption. A warning order was issued to any putative fathers, and a hearing on the
termination petition was scheduled for November 6, 2008. The court entered an order on
November 21, 2008, terminating the parental rights of Cynthia, Brandon, and Jackie Overby,
the putative father, and granting DHS the authority to consent to K.M.’s adoption.
2
Appellants filed a motion for belated appeal along with their response to Appellees’
motion to dismiss.
-2-
09-643
Cite as 2009 Ark. 596
K.M. continued to remain in the Schuberts’ home until March 20, 2009, at which
time the circuit court entered an order that allowed DHS the immediate discretion to change
K.M.’s placement. The Schuberts filed their motion to intervene on March 26, 2009, arguing
that K.M. had been in their foster care since she was five days old and that they were led to
believe that they would be allowed to adopt the child. Appellants filed a petition for adoption
contemporaneously with their motion to intervene.
A hearing on the motion and petition was held on April 9, 2009. The circuit court
entered an order on April 24, 2009, denying the motion to intervene. The circuit court
found that DHS had the authority to consent to K.M.’s adoption and that DHS had not
designated the Schuberts as an appropriate adoptive home. Thus, the court reasoned that the
Schuberts did not satisfy the requirements of Ark. R. Civ. P. 24(a) (2009) allowing for
intervention by right, nor was permissive intervention warranted under the facts of the case.
The Schuberts filed a notice of appeal on May 4, 2009. That notice was signed by counsel
for the Schuberts but not the Schuberts themselves. DHS subsequently filed the instant
motion to dismiss.
In its motion to dismiss, DHS argues that the appeal should be dismissed because the
Schuberts failed to sign the notice of appeal as required by Rule 6-9(b)(1)(B). Appellants
counter that Ark. R. App. P.–Civ. 2(a)(2) (2009), not Rule 6-9, is applicable to an appeal
from the denial of a motion to intervene, so that their failure to sign the notice does not
warrant dismissal. Alternatively, Appellants argue that if Rule 6-9 is controlling, this court
-3-
09-643
Cite as 2009 Ark. 596
should grant their motion for belated appeal. Thus, the issue to be decided by this court is
whether the Schuberts’ appeal from the denial of their motion to intervene is governed by
Rule 6-9 or whether it falls within the ambit of Rule 2(a)(2).
Rule 6-9 provides in relevant part:
-4-
09-643
Cite as 2009 Ark. 596
(a) Appealable Orders.
(1) The following orders may be appealed from dependency-neglect
proceedings:
(A) adjudication order;
(B) disposition, review, no reunification, and permanency planning
order if the court directs entry of a final judgment as to one or more of the
issues or parties based upon the express determination by the court supported
by factual findings that there is no just reason for delay of an appeal, in
accordance with Ark. R. Civ. P. Rule 54(b);
(C) termination of parental rights; and
(D) denial of right to appointed counsel pursuant to Ark. Code Ann.
§ 9-27-316(h).
In Posey v. Arkansas Department of Health & Human Services, 370 Ark. 1, 256 S.W.3d
504 (2007) (per curiam), this court explained that Rule 6-9 was a new rule adopted by this
court to govern appeals in dependency-neglect cases. We have further explained that the
purpose of Rule 6-9 is to expedite the appellate process in dependency-neglect cases by
curtailing extensions and establishing time lines. Ratliff v. Ark. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.,
371 Ark. 534, 268 S.W.3d 322 (2007) (per curiam).
Rule 2(a)(2) provides that an appeal may be taken from “[a]n order which in effect
determines the action and prevents a judgment from which an appeal might be taken, or
discontinues the action.” Although the right to appeal the denial of a motion to intervene
is not specifically set forth in this rule, this court has recognized that such an order is
appealable pursuant to Rule 2(a)(2). See Duffield v. Benton County Stone Co., Inc., 369 Ark.
-5-
09-643
Cite as 2009 Ark. 596
314, 254 S.W.3d 726 (2007) (holding that an appeal from a denial of a motion to intervene
as a matter of right is allowed under Rule 2(a)(2)); Billabong Prods., Inc. v. Orange City Bank,
278 Ark. 206, 644 S.W.2d 594 (1983) (holding that pursuant to Rule 2(a)(2) a party may
appeal an order denying a motion for permissive intervention). As such, a party is not
required to wait until final judgment is rendered in a case before appealing an order denying
intervention.
Likewise, Rule 6-9 provides a mechanism for an appeal in certain circumstances prior
to entry of a final order in a dependency-neglect case. Pursuant to Rule 6-9(a)(1)(B),
disposition, review, and permanency planning orders are only appealable, however, if the
court enters an order in compliance with Ark. R. Civ. P. 54(b) (2009). Thus, not every order
entered in a dependency-neglect case can be immediately appealed, a fact previously
recognized by this court in West v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, 373 Ark. 100, 281
S.W.3d 733 (2008). There, we accepted a certified question from the court of appeals
involving the issue of whether a permanency planning order awarding permanent custody of
two of the four children involved in the case was final and appealable. Specifically, we
addressed a potential conflict between Ark. R. App. P.–Civ. 2(d) (2009) and Rule 6-9: Rule
6-9(a)(1)(B) provides that a “permanency planning order” is appealable in accordance with
Rule 54(b), while Rule 2(d) provides that custody orders are final, appealable orders. This
court determined that even though Rule 6-9 did not specifically list a permanent custody
order as appealable, the order granting permanent custody was a final, appealable order
-6-
09-643
Cite as 2009 Ark. 596
because there was no direct conflict between Rule 2(d) and Rule 6-9. More specifically, this
court explained that Rule 6-9 did not state that permanent custody orders are not final,
appealable orders or that a Rule 54(b) certificate is necessary for a permanent custody order
relative to one child to be appealable. Ultimately, this court held that the permanent custody
order was appealable under Rule 2(d).
Considering our holding in West and reading the plain language of the rule, we
conclude that an appeal from the denial of a motion to intervene in a dependency-neglect
matter is not governed by Rule 6-9. It is true that the purpose of Rule 6-9 is to expedite the
appellate process in dependency-neglect matters but concluding that Rule 6-9 is not
applicable in this case does not necessarily impede that purpose. First, Rule 2(a)(2) allows an
immediate appeal from an order denying intervention. Second, such an appeal does not
prohibit the circuit court from maintaining jurisdiction and conducting hearings, as Ark. Code
Ann. § 9-27-343(c) (Repl. 2008) specifically provides that the circuit court retains jurisdiction
to conduct further hearings, pending an appeal from any case involving a juvenile
out-of-home placement. See also Harwell-Williams v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 368 Ark.
183, 243 S.W.3d 898 (2006).3 Moreover, not every order resulting from a dependencyneglect case is automatically appealable under Rule 6-9. See Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v.
Denmon, 2009 Ark. 485, ___ S.W.3d ___ (holding that a permanency planning order was not
immediately appealable under Rule 6-9 absent a Rule 54(b) certification). Accordingly, as
3
Harwell-Williams was decided prior to the effective date of Rule 6-9.
-7-
09-643
Cite as 2009 Ark. 596
this appeal is governed by Rule 2(a)(2), the Schuberts’ failure to sign the notice of appeal was
not a fatal defect, and we deny DHS’s motion to dismiss.
Motion to dismiss denied; motion for reconsideration moot.
IMBER, J., not participating.
-8-
09-643
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.