Ashcroft v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs.
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Cite as 2009 Ark. 461
SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS
No. 09-998
Opinion Delivered October 1, 2009
DAVID ASHCROFT
APPELLANT
VS.
ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF
HUMAN SERVICES
APPELLEE
MOTION TO DISMISS
DENIED; MOTION FOR BELATED
APPEAL GRANTED
PER CURIAM
Appellee, the Arkansas Department of Human Services, moves the court to dismiss
appellant David Ashcroft’s appeal of an order adjudicating his children dependent-neglected.
DHS asserts that Ashcroft failed to file a timely notice of appeal from the order.
The Pulaski Circuit Court entered the dependency-neglect order on July 8, 2009.
Ashcroft filed a motion for new trial on July 20, and on August 17 he filed his first notice of
appeal, which was unsigned. On August 20, the circuit court denied Ashcroft’s new trial
motion. Ashcroft then filed a second—unsigned—notice of appeal on August 21. On
September 8, DHS lodged a partial record with the clerk and filed its motion to dismiss the
appeal. Ashcroft filed a third notice of appeal on September 11, which he signed.
In its motion to dismiss, DHS argues that neither of the two notices of appeal filed by
Ashcroft that are contained in the partial record were signed as required by Arkansas Supreme
Court Rule 6-9(b)(1)(B), a rule that has been strictly enforced by this court. See Martin v. Ark.
Cite as 2009 Ark. 461
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 369 Ark. 477, 255 S.W.3d 830 (2007) (per curiam). In his
response, Ashcroft admits that his first two notices failed to include his signature, but he claims
that his third notice of appeal was timely because pursuant to Rule 4(b) of the Arkansas Rules
of Appellate Procedure–Civil, he was allowed additional time to file his notice of appeal from
the denial of his motion for new trial. He maintains that his timely filed post-trial motion for
new trial tolled the time for filing a notice of appeal until twenty-one days from the entry of
the order disposing of that motion. In its reply, DHS maintains that Ashcroft failed to
supplement the record to include his third notice of appeal and that, even if Rule 4(b) applies,
his third notice was also untimely because it was filed on the twenty-second day after his new
trial motion was denied.
Rule 6-9 sets twenty-one days as the time within which the notice of appeal must be
filed in cases involving dependency neglect. Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 6-9(b)(1) (2009). In addition,
Rule 6-9(b)(4) states that “[t]he time in which to file a notice of appeal or a notice of crossappeal and the corresponding designation of record will not be extended.” The express
purpose of Rule 6-9(b) is to expedite the appellate process in dependency-neglect cases. Ratliff
v. Ark. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 371 Ark. 534, 268 S.W.3d 322 (2007) (per curiam).
Although Rule 4(b)(1) of the Arkansas Rules of Appellate Procedure–Civil allows the
deadline for a notice of appeal to be extended where certain post-trial motions have been
filed, we have held that we will not extend that rule to dependency-neglect cases because
doing so would vitiate the purpose of Rule 6-9(b). Ratliff, 371 Ark. at 535, 268 S.W.3d at
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Cite as 2009 Ark. 461
323. Therefore, to be considered timely, Ashcroft should have filed a signed notice of appeal
by July 29.
Because expedition of the appellate process is our stated goal in dependency-neglect
cases, we have held that granting the motion to dismiss and requiring appellant’s counsel to
file a motion for belated appeal would only further delay the appeal. Id. at 535–36, 268
S.W.3d at 323–24. Therefore, we will deny DHS’s motion to dismiss and treat Ashcroft’s
response as a motion for belated appeal.
Relief from the failure to perfect an appeal is provided as part of the appellate
procedure granting the right to an appeal. McDonald v. State, 356 Ark. 106, 146 S.W.3d 883
(2004). In McDonald, we clarified our treatment of motions for rule on clerk and motions for
belated appeal in criminal cases, explaining:
Where an appeal is not timely perfected, either the party or attorney filing the appeal
is at fault, or there is good reason that the appeal was not timely perfected. The party
or attorney filing the appeal is therefore faced with two options. First, where the party
or attorney filing the appeal is at fault, fault should be admitted by affidavit filed with
the motion or in the motion itself. There is no advantage in declining to admit fault
where fault exists. Second, where the party or attorney believes that there is good
reason the appeal was not perfected, the case for good reason can be made in the
motion, and this court will decide whether good reason is present.
Id. at 116, 146 S.W.3d at 891 (footnote omitted). While this court no longer requires an
affidavit admitting fault before we will consider the motion, an attorney should candidly admit
fault where he or she has erred and is responsible for the failure to perfect the appeal. Ratliff,
371 Ark. at 536, 268 S.W.3d at 324. When it is plain from the motions, affidavits, and record
that relief is proper based on error or good reason, the relief will be granted. Id. If there is
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Cite as 2009 Ark. 461
attorney error, a copy of the opinion will be forwarded to the Committee on Professional
Conduct. Id.
As it is plain from the motion and response that relief is proper, we grant Ashcroft’s
motion for belated appeal. Because we grant the motion for belated appeal, we deny DHS’s
motion to dismiss. Furthermore, it is clear that Ashcroft’s counsel committed error in
perfecting the appeal in this case and he admits fault in filing the first two unsigned notices
of appeal. Therefore, we refer him to the Committee on Professional Conduct for appropriate
action.
Motion to dismiss denied; motion for belated appeal granted.
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