Robertson v. State
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Cite as 2009 Ark. 430
SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS
No.
CR09-159
Opinion Delivered 9-24-09
DIANA NICHOLE ROBERTSON,
APPELLANT,
VS.
STATE OF ARKANSAS,
APPELLEE,
APPEAL FROM THE CRITTENDEN
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, NO.
CR-07-1427, HON. RALPH WILSON ,
JUDGE,
AFFIRMED.
ROBERT L. BROWN, Associate Justice
Appellant Diana Nichole Robertson appeals from her convictions for capital murder,
aggravated robbery, and arson and her sentences to life imprisonment without parole, twentyfive years imprisonment, and ten years imprisonment, respectively. She asserts three points
on appeal. We find no reversible error, and we affirm.
The facts are garnered from Robertson’s statements to West Memphis detectives.
Robertson and her boyfriend, Maurice Leflore, had a small-time prostitution operation in
West Memphis. One of their customers was the victim, O. V. Johnson, who had a valuable
gun collection. On November 19, 2007, Robertson and Leflore met B.M., a fifteen-year-old
runaway, at a party. The next day, Leflore dropped off Robertson and B.M. at Johnson’s
house, where Robertson tried to make B.M. have sex with Johnson. When B.M. refused,
Robertson had sex with Johnson instead. Later that night, both Robertson and Leflore had
Cite as 2009 Ark. 430
sex with B.M. in a motel room. The following day, Leflore again dropped Robertson and
B.M. off at Johnson’s house, and this time B.M. had sex with Johnson.
Over the next week, Robertson and Leflore developed a plan to kill Johnson and steal
his collection of guns. On November 26, 2007, Robertson went to Johnson’s house and left
the front door open for Leflore. Leflore followed fifteen or twenty minutes later and shot
Johnson in the neck, while Johnson was sitting on the couch. After shooting Johnson, Leflore
and Robertson gathered up his guns and piled them next to the front door. The two then
left the house and walked down the street to Leflore’s car. They next drove to meet another
man, G, after which Robertson, Leflore, and G, took G’s car back to Johnson’s house.
There, they loaded the guns into G’s car, drove into the woods, dumped the guns into a
ditch, and covered the guns with leaves. After this, they returned to Johnson’s house for a
third time. At this point, Robertson went into the house, set Johnson’s body on fire, and left.
The following day, B.M. called her mother, and the police came to pick her up. That
same day, Leflore was arrested for the sexual assault of B.M.. On December 3, 2007,
Robertson went to the West Memphis Police Department to turn herself in on an arrest
warrant for sexually assaulting B.M., after Leflore informed her that a warrant was also out for
her arrest.
On December 3rd and December 5th, Robertson gave statements to West Memphis
police detectives. She later moved to suppress the statements, and the motion was denied by
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the circuit judge. She was tried before a jury and convicted and sentenced as has already been
stated in this opinion.
I. Duress Instruction
For her first point on appeal, Robertson asserts that the circuit judge erred in refusing
to instruct the jury on the affirmative defense of duress with respect to the charge of capital
murder. We conclude that this issue is not preserved for our review. Robertson did not
proffer the desired duress instruction on murder into the record, and, as a result, we do not
have it before us for review. This court has repeatedly stated that it is the appellant’s duty to
present to this court a record sufficient to show that the circuit judge erred below. See, e.g.,
Stevenson v. State, 375 Ark. 318, __ S.W.3d __ (2008). To preserve an objection to an
instruction for appeal, the appellant must make a proffer of the proposed instruction to the
judge. Stewart v. State, 316 Ark 153, 870 S.W.2d 752 (1994). That proffered instruction
must then be included in the record and abstracted to enable the appellate court to consider
it. Id. An instruction that is not contained in the record is not preserved and will not be
addressed on appeal. Id.
It is true that Robertson offered an instruction on duress pertaining to the arson charge
under AMCI 606 and claimed that sufficient evidence had been presented at trial for the jury
to consider whether she had acted under duress in committing the arson. The circuit judge
gave this instruction. He ruled, however, that he would not give the instruction in
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connection with the murder charge because he found (1) that her evidence of duress
pertained to conduct that occurred after the murder had taken place, (2) that she had failed
to articulate a specific threat regarding the murder, and (3) that she had acted recklessly in
putting herself in the situation leading up to the murder and robbery.
Regardless of the circuit judge’s reasons for not giving the duress instruction in
connection with the murder charge, Robertson failed to proffer that instruction into the
record for our review. We affirm on this point.
II. Right to Counsel
Robertson next urges that the circuit judge erred by refusing to suppress her
December 5, 2007 videotaped statement and any evidence obtained from it because it was
given after she had invoked her right to counsel.
The facts relevant to this point are these. On December 3, 2007, Robertson went to
the West Memphis Police Department to turn herself in on an arrest warrant for sexual assault
involving B.M. Her boyfriend, Leflore, had been arrested on the same charge earlier in the
week and had informed Robertson that she had an arrest warrant outstanding. After signing
a waiver-of-rights form on December 3rd, Robertson was questioned by Detectives Terri
Hollis, Donald Oaks, and Ken Mitchell about the sexual-assault charge. Robertson later
agreed to a videotaped interview.
During the recorded portion of the interview, Detective Hollis asked Robertson about
the sexual-assault charge. At one point during Detective Hollis’s questioning, Robertson
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asked “Do I need a lawyer?” and then said that she wanted to talk to the detective “woman
to woman” and continued talking. After Detective Hollis’s questioning, Robertson was
questioned by Detectives Oaks and Mitchell about the sexual-assault charge and Johnson’s
murder. She completed the interview, and was taken to the Crittenden County jail on the
sexual-assault charge and told that she would have a bail hearing on December 5th.
On the morning of December 5, 2007, Robertson was transported from the county
jail to the West Memphis Police Station for additional questioning about Johnson’s death.
She was again given her Miranda rights and again signed a waiver-of-rights form. During the
unrecorded interview that followed, Robertson admitted her involvement in Johnson’s
murder and offered to show the detectives where the guns stolen from Johnson’s house and
the murder weapon were located. She subsequently took the detectives to the site where the
guns were hidden and the site where she claimed Leflore discarded the murder weapon. The
police detectives recovered the guns stolen from Johnson’s house but were unable to locate
the murder weapon.
The detectives and Robertson returned to the police station, and Robertson agreed
to give another videotaped statement. At the outset of the interview, Detective Mitchell
began to read Robertson her Miranda rights, but she cut him off and recited the Miranda rights
from memory, commenting that this was the fifth time they had gone over them. She then
detailed her involvement in Johnson’s murder. After the interview, Robertson was arrested
for capital murder.
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Prior to trial, Robertson moved to suppress her December 5, 2007 statement and the
evidence recovered on the same date. At the suppression hearing, the circuit judge heard the
testimony of Robertson and the four detectives—Hollis, Galtelli, Oaks, and Mitchell.
Robertson testified that she asked several times for an attorney off the record and once on the
record on December 3rd. Robertson also stated that she asked whether she had missed her
court date during her December 5th interview because she thought she would be getting an
attorney at that time. All four detectives testified that Robertson never asked for an attorney
off the record and that her only reference to an attorney came on December 3rd, when she
asked if she needed a lawyer. At the conclusion of the hearing, the circuit judge found that
“any request or mention of a lawyer was unclear and equivocal at best.”
Robertson now claims that the circuit judge should have suppressed her December 5th
statement because: (1) she invoked her right to the assistance of counsel during the December
3rd interrogation by asking if she needed an attorney; (2) she believed that “she was going to
an appointment to have an attorney appointed to her” when she was interrogated on
December 5th; and (3) she testified at the suppression hearing that she made a number of clear
and unequivocal requests for an attorney on December 5th that were not recorded by the
detectives.
The question before this court is whether Robertson sufficiently invoked her right to
counsel at the December 3rd interrogation. This court has observed that when invoking the
Miranda right to counsel, the accused must be unambiguous and unequivocal. Holsombach v.
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State, 368 Ark. 415, 421, 246 S.W.3d 871, 876 (2007) (citing Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S.
477 (1981)). An equivocal request for counsel does not obligate police officers to cease
questioning and seek clarification, but interrogation may continue until the suspect
unambiguously requests counsel. Wallace v. State, 2009 Ark. 90, __ S.W.3d __. As the
United States Supreme Court has said, an accused “must articulate his desire to have counsel
present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would
understand the statement to be a request for an attorney.” Davis v. United States, 512 U.S.
452, 459 (1994)). Furthermore, “after a knowing and voluntary waiver of the Miranda rights,
law enforcement officers may continue questioning until and unless the suspect clearly
requests an attorney.” Id. at 461.
The precise issue here is Robertson’s statement made to Detective Hollis during the
December 3rd interrogation, where Robertson said: “Do I need a lawyer?” This court on
numerous occasions has rejected the argument that questions of this type are unequivocal
requests sufficient to require an interrogating officer to cease questioning. See, e.g., Wallace v.
State, 2009 Ark. 90, __ S.W.3d __ (asked if he understood his right to have an attorney
present, appellant responded: “Yes sir, do I need one?”); Flanagan v. State, 368 Ark. 143, 243
S.W.3d 866 (2006) (“Do I need to call an attorney?”); Higgins v. State, 317 Ark. 555, 879
S.W.2d 424 (1994) (“Do you think I need an attorney?”). In these cases, this court rejected
the argument that such questions constituted unequivocal requests for the assistance of
counsel, concluding that such references were “surely ambiguous and hardly amounted to the
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sort of direct request required to invoke [the] Fifth Amendment right to counsel.” Wallace,
2009 Ark. 90, at 8-9, __ S.W.3d at __; Flanagan, 368 Ark. at 160, 243 S.W.3d at 878; Higgins,
317 Ark. at 563, 879 S.W.2d at 428.
Here, Robertson’s question, “Do I need an attorney?” is analogous to the questions
raised in Wallace, Flanagan, and Higgins, and those cases control this issue. We hold that
Robertson’s question did not amount to the type of unequivocal request required to force
an interrogating officer to cease questioning.
Similarly, Robertson’s inquiries in her
December 5th statement concerning her bail hearing on the sexual-assault charge that was
scheduled for later that day, which she contends showed she was under the impression that
a lawyer would be appointed for her shortly, were insufficient to force a cessation of the
interrogation. As noted previously, an accused “must articulate his desire to have counsel
present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would
understand the statement to be a request for an attorney.” Wallace, 2009 Ark. 90, at 8, __
S.W.3d at __ (quoting Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994)). Robertson’s
questions concerning whether she would make her bail hearing did not articulate a desire on
her part to have counsel present. A reasonable police officer under these circumstances would
not have understood them to be requests for an attorney.
As a final point, Robertson asserts that she unequivocally asked for an attorney several
times off the record, both on December 3rd and December 5th, and testified to such at her
suppression hearing. However, all four detectives involved in interrogating Robertson
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testified at the suppression hearing that she never asked for a lawyer on December 3rd or
December 5th and that her only mention of an attorney came on December 3rd when she
asked if she needed a lawyer. The circuit judge credited the testimony of the four officers
over that of Robertson’s, and this court defers to the superior position of the circuit judge to
pass on the credibility of witnesses. Davis v. State, 351 Ark. 406, 94 S.W.3d 892 (2003).
Robertson makes much of the fact that large portions of her interrogations were not
recorded. This court, nevertheless, has noted that no Arkansas law requires the police to
record an interrogation in its totality. See, e.g., Clark v. State, 374 Ark. 292, 287 S.W.3d 567
(2008).
We affirm on this point as well.
III. Hearsay
For her final issue on appeal, Robertson maintains that the circuit judge allowed the
State to introduce inadmissible hearsay evidence. At issue is the testimony of B.M., who
testified that she overheard a conversation between Robertson and Leflore in which the two
discussed a plan to rob Johnson. Specifically, Robertson objects to B.M.’s testifying as
follows:
I first met Leflore on the 19th of November 2007. At least two days
after I met [Robertson] and [Leflore], I had a conversation in the vehicle with
them. [Roberston] said that [Johnson] was getting too cocky, and that she
knew he had more money and more guns in the house and to find a way to
rob him . . . . In response, [Leflore] said he was going to find a way to kill
him. He was going to go in after [Robertson] and put Seroquel in his drink,
and find a way to shoot him.
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Initially, the circuit judge sustained Robertson’s objection to B.M.’s testimony over
the prosecutor’s argument that the testimony was not offered for the truth of the matter
asserted but rather as evidence of Robertson’s state of mind or intent. Yet, after the
prosecutor proffered B.M.’s testimony, the circuit judge changed his mind and ruled that the
testimony was admissible under Arkansas Rule of Evidence 803(3), the state-of-mind
exception. Robertson now contends that B.M.’s testimony should have been excluded
because the statement “relates to a plan or action, which was rejected by [Robertson].” She
argues further that the circuit judge erred “in allowing a devastating statement by Leflore
where he was going to sho[o]t the victim, which inferred that appellant was part of a plan to
shoot the victim, into evidence based upon a plan that was not carried out.”
The State first urges that Robertson failed to preserve this issue for appeal because she
failed to make a responsive argument to the Rule 803(3) ruling, after the circuit judge
readdressed the issue at trial. The State also claims that the basis for Robertson’s objection
below differed from her arguments on appeal. For its last point, the State urges that this court
should decline to reach this issue because Robertson has failed to cite authority in her brief
on appeal to support her argument or provide convincing argument. The State is correct
about Robertson’s change of argument on appeal.
Prior to trial, Robertson moved to exclude any witness from testifying about
statements made by Leflore and argued that Leflore’s statements were hearsay under Arkansas
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Rule of Evidence 802. Specifically, she contended that the State had failed to prove the
existence of a conspiracy so as to make the statements admissible as a “statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy” under Arkansas
Rule of Evidence 801(d)(v). During B.M.’s testimony on direct examination, the prosecutor
asked her: “Now at that point, what did [Leflore] tell you and [Robertson]?” Robertson’s
counsel immediately objected without articulating a reason, though presumably it was a
general hearsay objection. Counsel said: “Well, objection to that, your Honor.” The circuit
judge responded: “I’ll sustain . . . the part about [Leflore].”
After continuing with the direct examination of B.M. for several minutes, the
prosecutor approached the bench and, referring to the circuit judge’s ruling on Robertson’s
prior objection, argued that B.M.’s testimony about Leflore’s statements was admissible as a
statement against interest, or as a present sense impression, or because it was not being
introduced to prove the truth of the matter asserted. After discussion with counsel, the circuit
judge sustained the objection, finding that a statement or confession offered against the
accused in a criminal case, made by a codefendant or other person implicating both himself
and the accused, was not within the argued Rule 804(b)(3) hearsay exception dealing with
a statement against interest.
As already noted, at the conclusion of the State’s evidence, the prosecutor proffered
the testimony of B.M. that the circuit judge had excluded. After B.M.’s testimony was
proffered, the following colloquy occurred:
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THE COURT: You still object to this information?
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Yes.
THE COURT: All right. The court’s researched this issue last night and again today and
based on my reading and rereading Rule 803(3), then existing mental, emotional,
physical condition, including state of mind, such as intent and motive. Finding that
motive and intent are always relevant and probative in a criminal case and based on
the holding of Haire v. State, . . . court finds this evidence is admissible and overrules
the objection of [Robertson]
PROSECUTOR: Thank you.
THE COURT: So, I’ll note your objection and the jury can hear the evidence.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: So, your Honor, you’re specifically allowing that under –
THE COURT: 803(3).
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Right.
THE COURT: State of mind.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: State of mind.
THE COURT: Yes.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: All right.
Defense counsel made no argument against allowing the testimony under Rule 803(3).
Indeed, at no point did Robertson address her opposition to the Rule 803(3) exception
before the circuit judge, as she now does in this appeal.
Because Robertson did not contest the circuit judge’s Rule 803(3) ruling in any form
or fashion after the judge changed his mind and concluded that B.M.’s testimony fit within
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that exception, we will not consider it at this juncture. It is boilerplate law that we will not
consider arguments made for the first time on appeal. See, e.g., Ramaker v. State, 345 Ark.
225, 46 S.W.3d 519 (2001).
The record in this case has been reviewed for reversible error pursuant to Arkansas
Supreme Court Rule 4-3(i), and none has been found.
Affirmed.
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