Milton Jones v. State of Arkansas
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ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT
No.
CR 88-05
Opinion Delivered
MILTON JONES
Petitioner
v.
STATE OF ARKANSAS
Respondent
April 3, 2008
PRO SE MOTIONS FOR
RECONSIDERATION OF DENIAL
OF PETITION FOR LEAVE TO
REINVEST JURISDICTION IN THE
TRIAL COURT TO CONSIDER A
PETITION FOR WRIT OF ERROR
CORAM NOBIS, TO DEPOSE
WITNESS AND TO SUPPLEMENT
MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION [CIRCUIT
COURT OF JEFFERSON COUNTY,
CR 86-396]
MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT
GRANTED; MOTION TO DEPOSE
WITNESS DENIED; MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION DENIED.
PER CURIAM
A jury found petitioner Milton Jones guilty of capital murder and sentenced him to
imprisonment for life without parole. This court affirmed the judgment. Jones v. State, 296 Ark.
135, 752 S.W.2d 274 (1988). Petitioner brought a pro se petition in this court in which he requested
permission to proceed in the trial court with a petition for writ of error coram nobis.1 We denied the
petition. Jones v. State, CR 88-05 (Ark. Feb. 7, 2008) (per curiam). Petitioner filed a pro se motion
1
For clerical purposes, the petition and the instant motions were assigned the same docket number
as the direct appeal. After a judgment has been affirmed on appeal, a petition filed in this court for leave
to proceed in the trial court is necessary because the circuit court can entertain a petition for writ of error
coram nobis only after we grant permission. Dansby v. State, 343 Ark. 635, 37 S.W.3d 599 (2001) (per
curiam).
requesting this court to reconsider that decision. He next filed pro se motions requesting this court
to order the deposition of his codefendant, Roosevelt Ferguson, and to add a paragraph to the
previously filed motion for reconsideration.
We will not order deposition of Mr. Ferguson. Petitioner has not referenced any potential
statement by Mr. Ferguson that could have a bearing on the proceedings. We will allow petitioner
to supplement his previous motion, but, even with the addition, he has failed to provide any reason
for us to reconsider our previous decision.
A writ of error coram nobis is an exceedingly narrow remedy, appropriate only when an
issue was not addressed at trial because it was somehow hidden or unknown and would have
prevented the rendition of the judgment had it been known to the trial court. Pitts v. State, 336 Ark.
580, 986 S.W.2d 407 (1999) (per curiam). As we discussed in our prior opinion, petitioner hopes
to fall within one of the recognized categories that provide a basis for the writ through a
constitutional violation of his right to due process as guaranteed by Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83
(1963). See Pitts, 336 Ark. at 583, 986 S.W.2d at 409. But, in determining whether a petition for
writ of error coram nobis that makes such a claim may be granted, we determine whether there is
a reasonable probability that the judgment of conviction would not have been rendered, or would
have been prevented, had the claimed exculpatory evidence been disclosed at trial. We noted in our
opinion that petitioner failed to identify any specific exculpatory evidence to satisfy that
requirement.
It is a petitioner’s burden to show that the writ is warranted. Echols v. State, 354 Ark. 414,
125 S.W.3d 153 (2003). While petitioner complains that he lacks a legal background and sufficient
vocabulary to make himself clear, petitioner had identified some specific evidence he claimed was
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withheld, and that our previous opinion addressed. Perhaps, however, we were not sufficiently clear
in explaining that the generalized claim of misconduct by the prosecution that he raised is also not
sufficient to meet petitioner’s burden and bring his claim within the very narrow category of claims
that might support the writ.
In his motion, petitioner reasserts his previous more specific claims to support this
generalized misconduct claim, with no additional facts. He does add a claim that the prosecution
overstepped its authority by filing an information rather than an indictment to charge him. It is well
settled that argument is without merit. See Ruiz v. State, 299 Ark. 144, 165, 772 S.W.2d 297, 308
(1989); see also Rudd v. State, 76 Ark. App. 121, 125-127, 61 S.W.3d 885, 889-890 (2001).
A petitioner must state specific facts that support his claim for extraordinary relief;
conclusory statements are not sufficient. See Coulter v. State, 365 Ark. 262, 227 S.W.3d 904
(2006); Smith v. State, 301 Ark. 374, 784 S.W.2d 595 (1990). He must set out facts that would
present a claim that falls within the standard for the relief requested. He is not required to do so in
elegant prose, but he must allege facts, not generalized, conclusory allegations, that support a claim
within the standard set forth for the relief requested. Petitioner has failed to allege facts sufficient
for that purpose either in his original petition or in this motion to reconsider our decision to deny
the petition. Because petitioner has stated no cause for us to reconsider our conclusions in the
previous opinion, we deny the motion for reconsideration.
Motion to supplement granted; motion to depose witness denied; motion for reconsideration
denied.
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