Justin Ewell v. State of Arkansas
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SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS
No.
CR08-584
Opinion Delivered November 20, 2008
JUSTIN EWELL,
APPELLANT,
VS.
AN APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, NO. CR
2005-3680, HONORABLE WILLARD
PROCTOR, CIRCUIT JUDGE
STATE OF ARKANSAS,
APPELLEE,
AFFIRMED
ELANA CUNNINGHAM WILLS, Associate Justice
W ITNESSES —
POSITIVE EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION
—
VICTIM S’ PRETRIAL AND IN - CO U RT
IDENTIFICATION OF APPELLANT PROVIDED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT CONVICTIONS.
— Unless
there is an allegation of a constitutional violation in an eyewitness identification procedure, the reliability of
a witness’s identification is a question for the fact-finder; unequivocal testimony identifying the appellant as
the culprit is sufficient to sustain a conviction; here, the victims’ pretrial and in-court identification of
appellant were unequivocal and provided sufficient evidence to support his convictions; even though the
victims indicated that they noticed a small tattoo on the appellant’s face and that they did not report to
police that the perpetrator had any identifying tattoos, any alleged inconsistencies in eyewitness testimony
became in issue of credibility for the fact-finder to determine; accordingly, the trial court’s verdict was
affirmed.
William R. Simpson, Jr., Public Defender, Brenna Ryan, Deputy Public Defender, by: Clint
Miller, Deputy Public Defender, for appellant.
Dustin McDaniel, Att’y Gen., by: Eileen W. Harrison, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.
Following a bench trial in the Pulaski County Circuit Court, appellant Justin Ewell was
convicted of aggravated robbery, theft of property, and two counts of kidnapping.
Ewell
received an enhanced sentence of life imprisonment under Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-501(d)(1)(A)
(Supp. 2007) for aggravated robbery because of his previous violent felony convictions.
The
trial court also sentenced Ewell to serve three concurrent ten-year sentences for the theft of
property and kidnapping convictions.
On appeal, Ewell brings one point for reversal, arguing
that the trial court erred by denying this motion for a directed verdict. We affirm.
The State presented evidence that on July 22, 2005, victims Courtney Orange and Farren
Norwood were at a carwash cleaning a car belonging to Orange’s boyfriend.
Both victims
testified that they saw Ewell approach them with a gun and demand the car from Orange. The
keys were in the ignition, but Ewell was unable to start the car. The victims testified that Ewell
then got out of the car and ordered them, at gunpoint, to get into the car with him.
They
complied. Once the car was started, with Orange and Norwood inside, Ewell lost control of the
car after exiting the carwash, crashed it into a drainage ditch, and ran away from the scene.
Orange and Norwood later identified Ewell from a photo line-up at the police station and he
was arrested.
This court treats a motion for directed verdict as a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence. Boyd v. State, 369 Ark. 259, 253 S.W.3d 456 (2007). In reviewing a challenge to
the sufficiency of the evidence, this court determines whether the verdict is supported by
substantial evidence, direct or circumstantial. Id.
Substantial evidence is evidence forceful
enough to compel a conclusion one way or the other beyond suspicion or conjecture. Id. This
court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, and only evidence
supporting the verdict will be considered.
On appeal, this court does not weigh the evidence
presented at trial, as that is a matter for the fact-finder; nor does the appellate court assess the
credibility of the witnesses. Ridling v. State, 360 Ark. 424, 203 S.W.3d 63 (2005).
Ewell specifically argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a directed
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CR08-584
verdict because the State failed to introduce substantial evidence that identified him as the
perpetrator of the theft, robbery, and kidnapping.
Although victims Orange and Norwood
identified Ewell as the perpetrator in a pretrial photo line-up and in the courtroom, when they
were asked on cross-examination whether they noticed a small tattoo on his face, they
responded that they did.
However, the victims testified that they did not report to police that
the perpetrator had any identifying tattoos. Ewell argues that the victims’ failure to report that
the perpetrator had a tattoo on his face rendered their eyewitness testimony so inconsistent
that it was insufficient to identify him as the perpetrator.
Unless there is an allegation of a constitutional violation in an eyewitness identification
procedure, the reliability of a witness’s identification is a question for the fact-finder. Phillips
v. State, 344 Ark. 453, 40 S.W.3d 778 (2001). On appeal, the fact-finder’s decision will not
be disturbed when it is supported by substantial evidence. Stipes v. State, 315 Ark. 719, 870
S.W.2d 388 (1994).
This court has repeatedly held that “unequivocal testimony identifying the
appellant as the culprit is sufficient to sustain a conviction.” Id. at 721, 870 S.W.2d at 389.
Here, the victims’ pretrial and in-court identification of Ewell were unequivocal and
provided sufficient evidence to support his convictions.
Even if Ewell had established that his
tattoo pre-dated the theft, robbery, and kidnapping, which he did not, any alleged
inconsistencies in eyewitness testimony became an issue of credibility for the fact-finder to
determine. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s verdict.
In compliance with Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 4-3(h), the record has been examined for all
objections, motions, and requests made by either party that were decided adversely to Ewell,
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and no prejudicial error has been found.
Affirmed.
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CR08-584
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