Thomas S. Caffery v. State of Arkansas

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ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT  No.  CR 07­824  Opinion Delivered  THOMAS S. CAFFERY  Appellant  January 17, 2008  PRO SE APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT  COURT OF SALINE COUNTY, CR  2004­369, HON. GARY M. ARNOLD,  JUDGE  v.  STATE OF ARKANSAS  Appellee  AFFIRMED.  PER CURIAM  In  2005,  appellant  Thomas  S.  Caffery  entered  a  plea  of  guilty  to  second­degree  battery,  tampering with physical evidence, possession of cocaine with intent to deliver and failure to appear.  He was sentenced to an aggregate term of 360 months’ imprisonment.  In 2007, appellant filed in the  trial court a pro se petition for writ of error coram nobis.  The trial court denied the petition and  appellant has lodged an appeal here from that order.  Where a judgment of conviction was entered on a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, or the  judgment of conviction was not appealed, a petition for writ of error coram nobis is filed directly in  the trial court.  Dansby v. State, 343 Ark. 635, 37 S.W.3d 599 (2001) (per curiam).  Denial of a writ  of error coram nobis is reviewed by appeal.  Magby v. State, 348 Ark. 415, 72 S.W.3d 508 (2002)  (per curiam).  The standard of review of the denial of a writ of error coram nobis is whether the trial  court abused its discretion in granting or denying the writ.  Cloird v. State, 357 Ark. 446, 182 S.W.3d  477 (2004).  An abuse of discretion occurs when the circuit court acts arbitrarily or groundlessly.  Id. Appellant alleged entitlement to an error coram nobis writ based upon: (1) a coerced guilty  1  plea; (2) the imposition of invalid sentences.  Initially, we note that appellant’s guilty plea hearing  transcript was not brought up on appeal, and the testimony from the hearing was not abstracted or  contained in appellant’s addendum.  Also, the record does not indicate that appellant filed a writ of  certiorari to  supplement  the record on appeal  to include the transcript of this hearing.  We will,  however, not require appellant to seek leave to supplement the record, as it is clear on the record  before us that appellant could not prevail.  See  Pardue v. State, 338 Ark. 606, 999 S.W.2d 198  (1999) (per curiam); Seaton v. State, 324 Ark. 236, 920 S.W.2d 13 (1996) (per curiam).  A writ of error coram nobis is an extraordinarily rare remedy, more known for its denial than  its approval.  State v. Larimore, 341 Ark. 397, 17 S.W.3d 87 (2000).  The writ is allowed only under  compelling circumstances to achieve justice and to address errors of the most fundamental nature.  Pitts  v.  State,  336  Ark.  580,  986  S.W.2d  407  (1999)  (per  curiam).    Issuance  of  a  writ  may  be  available to address certain errors that are found in one of four categories: insanity at the time of trial,  a coerced guilty plea, material evidence withheld by the prosecutor or a third­party confession to the  crime during the time between conviction and appeal.  Pitts, supra.  For the writ to issue, appellant must show a fundamental error of fact extrinsic to the record.  See  Larimore  v.  State,  327  Ark.  271,  938  S.W.2d  818  (1997).  A  writ  of  error  coram  nobis  is  appropriate only when an issue was not addressed, or could not have been addressed, at trial because  it was somehow hidden or unknown and would have prevented the rendition of the judgment had it  been known to the trial court.  Echols v. State, 360 Ark. 332, 201 S.W.3d 890 (2005); Brown v. 1  It appears that appellant has abandoned on appeal the allegation of false testimony given  by the prosecutor regarding the chain of custody of evidence.  Issues raised below but not argued  on appeal are considered abandoned.  Jordan v. State, 356 Ark. 248, 147 S.W.3d 691 (2004).  ­2­  State, 330 Ark. 627, 955 S.W.2d 901 (1997).  Although couched in terms of a coerced guilty plea, the gravamen of appellant’s complaint  regarding entry of the guilty plea is that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance.  To support his  ineffective assistance  claim, he argues that counsel pressured him to accept a guilty plea so that  counsel could be paid, failed to investigate facts surrounding the charges and failed to present a valid  affirmative defense, thereby causing the affirmative defense to be unknown to the trial court at the  time  appellant  entered  his  plea  of guilty.  As  to  sentencing,  appellant  alleges  that  the  sentences  imposed exceeded the presumptive sentences of the charges, causing the sentences to be invalid under  2  Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).  Neither of these allegations of error is subject to review in a coram nobis proceeding.  With  respect to the claim that his attorney was ineffective, the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel  could have been raised in a timely petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Criminal Procedure  Rule 37.1.  Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are outside the purview of a coram nobis  proceeding, McArty v. State, 335 Ark. 445, 983 S.W.2d 418 (1998) (per curiam), and a coram nobis  proceeding is not a substitute for proceeding under Rule 37.1. McDonald v. State, 295 Ark. 482, 688  S.W.2d 302 (1985).  The issue of sentencing raised by petitioner was a matter which was known to  petitioner at the time the plea was entered and thus could have been settled in the trial court.  As a  result, the claims do not constitute grounds on which the writ could issue.  See Pitts, supra; Penn v. 2  In Blakely, the defendant was found guilty by a jury of kidnapping.  During the  sentencing phase, the trial court additionally found that Blakely acted with deliberate cruelty.  The  additional factual findings increased Blakely’s maximum sentence beyond the sentencing range  established by the facts presented to the jury.  The United States Supreme Court held that the  state trial court’s sentencing of Blakely in excess of the statutory maximum for the standard range  for his offense violated Blakely’s Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury.  ­3­  State, 282 Ark. 571, 336 Ark. 580, 986 S.W.2d 407 (1999) (citing Troglin v. State, 257 Ark. 644,  519 S.W.2d 740 (1975)).  In a petition for writ of error coram nobis, it is the petitioner’s burden to show that the writ  is  warranted.  Cloird,  supra.  Here,  appellant  has  failed  to  make  a  showing  that  the  allegations  contained in his petition were meritorious and warranted issuance of a writ of error coram nobis.  As  no substantive basis existed for granting the petition, we need not reach the issue of whether appellant  exercised due diligence in proceeding for the writ.  The trial court did not abuse its discretion in  denying the writ and its decision is affirmed.  Affirmed. ­4­ 

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